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Propositions 
1 To identify the lack of land reform as a root cause of the Zapatista uprising is to 
deny that also in Chiapas land reform was substantial and had far-reaching 
social and political consequences, (this thesis) 
2 State intervention is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about 
privatisation of common property arrangements, (this thesis) 
3 Land tenure reform is an exercise in institutional engineering with highly 
uncertain outcomes. 
4 The heightened self-awareness of indigenous peoples threatens the self-
confidence of anthropologists. 
5 In view of the lack of job opportunities at Dutch universities, it is hardly 
appropriate to call the PhD a rite of passage. 
6 In the hands of people with a strongly developed protestant work ethic, 
personal computers may turn into time-bombs. 
7 Dancing is as much about standing still as it is about moving. 
Propositions to be defended with the thesis Gaining ground: land reform and the 
constitution of community in the Tojolahal Highlands of Chiapas, Mexico, 
December 7, 2001,13:30 hrs, by Gemma van der Haar. 
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This book owes a great deal to coincidence and circumstance as well as to the 
encouragement and support of many people. In accounting for the first and 
expressing my indebtedness to the latter, I shall go a bit further back in time than is 
perhaps common. I need, however, to explain, not only how this book came about, 
but also why it concerns Chiapas in the first place. 
Somehow, it all started with my mother's attentiveness. My eagerness to 'see 
something of the world' and 'get to know other cultures' might never have taken me 
anywhere, had she not seen an ad in the paper about an international high school. 
Thanks to the United World College network and funding, I spent two intensive, 
instructive years in a small but globalised village on the Adriatic coast of Italy. 
Amongst my best friends there were two Mexicans. When I decided to take a year 
off and work as a volunteer somewhere, Alberto Diaz and Lizzy Gomez mobilised 
their networks in Mexico. I ended up in Comitan, Chiapas - which at the time had 
none of the prominence on the world map it has today - with a team of pastoral 
workers from the San Cristobal diocese. The ten months there were tough but deci-
sive. Heike da Costa had kindly taught me my first Spanish while I was still at home. 
In Comitan, a new challenge awaited me: Tojolabal. What would I have done without 
the enthusiastic instruction of Martin Lopez and the language material prepared by 
Karlos Lenkersdorf? Members of the pastoral teams of Kastalia and the Mision de 
Guadalupe shared with me their belief in a better world. Martin Lopez and Pedro 
Villafuerte introduced me to the Tojolabal communities with patience and infectious 
enthusiasm. My friendship with Monica Drewes and the encouragement of 
Alejandro Guevara kept me going when I thought I could not take it any more. But 
it was the families of Honduras-Piedra Huixtla that shared their food and their life 
with me while I made an only partly successful attempt to teach their children to 
read and write that made Chiapas unforgettable. 
Having decided I was probably more of an academic than a missionary, I went to 
Wageningen. Throughout my studies, Chiapas was always at the back of my mind. 
Wout van den Bor, then head of the Department of Agricultural Education, 
supported my plan to write my master's thesis on indigenous primary school 
teachers in eastern Chiapas. I soon knew this would not be my last visit. The re-
encounter with the people from Piedra Huixtla and neighbouring communities 
tbuched me deeply. The more I learned, the more my fascination grew. 
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So, the 'why Chiapas?' is accounted for and therefore, half the story behind this 
book. But it was by no means clear that there would ever be such a book. The expe-
rience of re-working my master's thesis into a publication, under the inspiring 
supervision of Douwe Beijaard, had whetted my appetite, but it was not until Arij 
Ouweneel of CEDLA made the suggestion that I thought of writing a PhD. Arij's 
encouragement was the first step, the financial support offered by CEDLA - enough 
to cover about half a PhD-position- the next. However, without the willingness of 
Norman Long (head of the Department of Rural Development Sociology) to take a 
chance with me, the project could not have worked. I am deeply indebted to both 
Arij and Norman for their institutional and moral support. 
The KLV facilitated a preliminary visit to Chiapas in 1995, which allowed me to 
assess the political conditions that had arisen as a result of the Zapatista uprising. 
Gaby Vargas opened the institute of which she was director at the time, the CIESAS-
Sureste, and her house in San Cristobal, to me. She was highly original and stimu-
lating company. When I was hesitating over whether it would be wise to undertake 
a research project in the Tbjolabal region at all, she said, "You know where you want 
to go, so just do it." So back to Comitan it was. The theme for the research - land 
reform - sprang from an interest I had developed in rural history (while doing 
research in Spain in a project supervised by Jan Douwe van der Ploeg) together with 
the lack of information on this subject that seemed so important in the Tojolabal 
region. 
For the fieldwork and archival work I am indebted to many people in Chiapas. 
Firstly, my thanks go the people of San Miguel Chibtik, who allowed me to stay and 
work in their community. I will never be able to repay their hospitality. Without the 
courage and dedication of a number of the Chibtikeros there would have been no 
fieldwork at all; without the patience and the stimulating and challenging company 
of many others, it would have been far less worthwhile. Jitzan tzfakatalje we'nlex kola 
ermano ti h'a ch'ibtiki. Ermano ixuke ermano winike, yal untik, spetzaniljajmojjumasa, 
tzfakataljun tiro. Jaju'un iti wa xyala wala istoria'exi, wala lucha'exi. Jel t'ilan wa sna'a 
ja kristianoja h'a tuk luwari. 
Several people in Comitan shared with me what they knew about the^ncas in my 
region of study, providing m e with a glimpse of times gone by. These included don 
Ricardo Castro, don Jorge Castellanos and dona Gloria de Castellanos, dona Lolita 
Albores, dona Leticia Roman, and dofia Trinidad Pulido (director of the regional 
museum). Don Pepe Castellanos, the last owner of Chibtik.also provided me with 
valuable information. Unfortunately, he is no longer alive to see what I did with it. 
I am also grateful to his wife, who dug up an old map of the property just before I 
left. 
The work at the archives of the state-level land reform ministry was greatly facil-
itated by the help of Marta Diaz and Jose Luis Becerra O'leary. Marta not only 
arranged for m e to obtain access to them, she also greatly enhanced my under-
standing of the land problems of Chiapas. I never would have been able to get 
through all the files without the efficient assistance of Marta Elena Santana. Several 
other offices provided important information. I was looked after very well at the 
Registro Agrario National and the INEGI and the Archivo Histdrico del Estado de 
Chiapas in Tuxtla Gutierrez and at the Public Property Register of Ocosingo. In 
Comitan Adrian Argumedo and his companions from the Colegio de Posgraduados 
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insights with me. John Taylor from Pajal helped m e explore the possibilities for 
fieldwork. 
San Cristobal harbours m u c h valuable scholarship of which I took as much 
advantage as I could. The CIESAS-Sureste (to which I was attached as a visiting 
researcher for the duration of the fieldwork) provided a very stimulating environ-
ment. Gaby Vargas and Igor Ayora always gave me plenty of food for thought as well 
as excellent food to eat. At different moments, Shannan Mattiace, Xochitl Leyva, 
Araceli Burguete, Carmen Legorreta and Conrado Marquez shared their insights 
with me. Andres Aubry of Inaremac and Elena Fernandez of the Institute de Estudios 
Indigenas provided me with important sources. Very special thanks go to the staff at 
the Laboratorio de Andlisis de Information Goegrdfica e Estadistica (LAIGE) of the 
Golegio de la Frontera Sur. Ignacio March offered me every facility. Miguel Angel 
Castillo and Emmanuel Valencia worked miracles, making satellite images and other 
geographic information available to me. The bird-eye's perspective on the region 
gave rise to many stimulating conversations. The cartography in this book owes a 
great deal to their efforts. 
Comitan became a home to me thanks to my next-door neighbours, the people 
from the Centro de Investigation en la Salud de Comitan (CISC). This was largely 
thanks to Dr. David Halperin, then head of the institute. I am very sorry he did not 
live to see the completion of this book. Rolando Tinoco generously made the infra-
structure of the institute available to me. I feel extremely privileged to have shared 
the company of Martin Lopez Moya, Hermelindo Aguilar, Juan Mendez, and Delfina 
Ajguilar, when I participated in a CISC-project involving the community of San 
Mateo Veracruz. Watz Delfina has been a great source of support to me throughout, 
always prepared to clarify my doubts on some aspect of the Tojolabal world in which 
she has grown up. Martin, his wife Kena and their wonderful daughters opened 
their house to me on subsequent visits. 
It was extremely enriching to share my experiences in Chibtik with other 
'p|assers-by' like myself. Eva was working for a regional NGO, Norma was a teacher 
iik Chibtik, while Margara Millan studied the gender aspects of Zapatismo. I am 
grateful to Carlota Duarte from the Archivo Fotografico Indigena at CIESAS-Sureste, 
who made it possible for some of the Chibtikeros to experiment with photography, 
an experience they as well as I enjoyed greatly. 
A number of other people in Mexico increased my awareness of current devel-
opments and made my stay a lot more pleasant. In Ocosingo, these included Elbrig 
de Vries and her husband Arturo Castellanos; in Mexico City, Karlos and Gudrun 
Lenkersdorf, Maria Eugenia Reyes Ramos, Joaquin Flores and his daughter Valeria, 
Cesar Hernandez and Aurora Gomez. 
Writing this book was a different adventure altogether. Initially sharing my time 
between the CEDLA and the Rural Development Sociology Group, but eventually 
spending most time at the latter, I tried to find my own academic identity. This was 
not always easy but it would have been much harder without the support of my 
colleagues. Life at the Leeuwenborch would have been unbearable without Jos 
Michel and my fellow Ph.D. candidates, especially Jens Andersson, Thea Hilhorst, 
Flip van Helden, and Edwin Rap. They frequently helped m e regain the right 
perspective on things. I am grateful for the support of research school CERES (espe-
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dally Ab van Eldijk) and the Department of Social Sdences at Wageningen Univer-
sity. I learned a great deal in my collaboration with CEDLA colleagues Willem Assies 
and Annelies Zoomers. 
My participation in a number of fora, both inside and outside Wageningen, 
allowed me to try out some of my ideas. The trips abroad were made possible by the 
financial support of the Landbouw Export Bureau, NWO, the Mesa Redonda de 
Palenque, and the Storm-van der Chijs Fund. I am grateful to all those who shared 
their comments with me on those occasions. More than once, remarks by Monique 
Nufjten and Pieter de Vries pointed to new directions for the analysis. 
Drafts of chapters were read and commented on by Yvette Nelen (Chapter i), 
Esther Roquas (Chapter 5), and Chris van der Borgh (Chapters 6 and 7). This was 
very helpful. Suzanne Stephens did a wonderful job of strdghtening out my English. 
Emmanuel Valenda did most of the cartography. For maps 1.1 and 3.11 relied on the 
help of Jens Andersson and Deanne Nederveen, respectively. My father did the scan-
ning necessary for most of the other figures. A spedal word of thanks is due to Carin 
Vaessen and Dr. Nuijt whose patience and pragmatism got m e back on track when 
RSI problems arose. 
This is the point where you usually get references to the supportive husband or 
wife. That is missing here. But I have not gone all this way alone. Love at a safe 
distance meant that most of the time I could dedicate myself to writing without 
feeling guilty, while it also added flavour to my existence. Friends doser by reminded 
m e there are other things in life. Their wit and warmth were a great source of 
inspiration. Finally, I want to share the joy of having completed this project with my 
two sisters, my parents and my grandparents. If they ever lost faith, they never 
showed it. 
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Chapter one 
Introduction: community and land 
reform in the Tojolabal Highlands 
Encountering 'community' 
Asking a favour 
One Sunday morning in late 1996, I asked the people of San Miguel Chibtik 
whether they would allow me to stay and work in their community. Men and women 
had gathered in the square in front of the church, right after the church service that 
was held that Sunday like any other Sunday morning. I had come to know the 
people of Chibtik about ten years earlier, when I worked as a volunteer with one of 
the Comitan-based teams of the San Cristobal diocese, the Kastalia. At that time I 
had been working as a primary school teacher in a nearby community and had had 
a lot of contact with Chibtik as well. Several years later I had returned to the commu-
nity for a short period when I was doing research on bilingual teachers in the 
r e g i o n . 1 1 had grown attached to this Tojolabal community of about five hundred 
people. It was located in a small valley in the extreme north-west of the region inhab-
ited by Tojolabal-spealdng people, some 20 k m from the town of Altamirano and 
about 60 kms from the larger and more important city of Comitan where I was 
living at the time. 
My research agenda concerning the people of Chibtik was related to changes in 
land tenure and land use in the region. I was interested in exploring the manifesta-
tions and effects of two processes. The first concerned Mexican land reform since 
the 1940s, which involved the break-up of large estates (known locally as fincas) and 
their transfer to groups of former labourers - fathers and grandfathers of the present 
inhabitants - in the form of ejidos. These ejidos combined private rights to cultiva-
tion plots with joint ownership of forests, pastures and water sources, and shared 
responsibility for overall management by the land reform beneficiaries as a collec-
tivity. The second process was the increasing scarcity of land due to population 
growth and the closing of the agrarian frontier. On an earlier visit in 1995 I had seen 
s|gns of a shift from slash-and-burn cultivation of maize on the hillsides to perma-
nent maize cultivation in the plains as well as of an increasing individualisation of 
land rights, and I wanted to find out more about these processes. I hoped to 
contribute to the understanding of what at the time I called 'the workings of peasant 
control' under conditions of scarcity of resources, which I had identified as an issue 
of crucial importance in debates on sustainable resource management. As the 
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research progressed, it focussed increasingly on the question of land tenure (rather 
than land use), meaning that my study developed into an exploration of the estab-
lishment and development of land tenure arrangements in the Tbjolabal High-
lands. 2 I would eventually rework this to focus on land tenure as a contested field in 
which different claims to control are confronted - a perspective that I will return to 
at the end of the book, after presenting the detailed socio-historical narrative. 
During the service that morning, I had been re-introduced by Pedro, one of the 
people responsible for religious affairs in Chibtik. I had participated in the service, 
as I had done some ten years earlier, giving my opinion on the Bible text read out by 
one of the catechists. Though I made no secret of the fact that I was no longer 
working with the Kastalia team, I knew that this type of participation was expected 
of me and lent me legitimacy. After the service I was given the opportunity to explain 
the purpose of my visit. I was slightly nervous as I started talking. I knew I had little 
to offer and was really asking a favour. Would people give me the benefit of the 
doubt? I addressed the people in Tojolabal, as I had always done since my Kastalia 
days. I explained that I was now working in a university in my own country that 
sends people all over the world to learn how peasants (I used the Spanish term 
campesino which is one of the labels they frequently apply to themselves) live and 
work. Every day there are more people, I continued, but the amount of land does not 
increase, so how do the campesinos cope with this situation? I added that I knew 
that the campesinos were often blamed for the disappearance of the forest, but that 
I believed it was necessary to try and understand how the campesinos work and care 
for their land. I suggested that in order to do so I might join people in their daily 
activities. 
In this way I tried to paraphrase one of the main questions underlying my 
research so that it was both understandable and legitimate to my audience. By 
stressing land scarcity as a problem and by suggesting the possibility of countering 
the negative image of campesinos as 'destroyers' of forest and soils I tried to elicit 
the interest of the Chibtikeros (as the inhabitants of Chibtik are called). Not having 
any concrete benefits to offer, I could only hope to interest them in an outlet for their 
knowledge and perhaps the possibility of learning something in the process. I 
thought it wise not to focus too much on my other research interest, land tenure, at 
this stage. Being a highly politicised topic in this region, it would certainly have 
given rise to a lot of suspicion had I shown explicit interest in it. Consequently, I had 
decided, at an early stage in my research, to phrase my interest in terms of the peas-
ants' land and resource management in conditions of growing scarcity. I knew that 
once I had established myself in the community, I would be able to touch on the 
issue of land tenure and land rights. 
As I said, I was nervous. I knew I had the support of Pedro and the sympathy of 
many of the people (especially women and girls) who remembered me from earlier 
days, but this might not be enough. The past months had proved that gaining access 
to a Tojolabal community for fieldwork was more difficult than I had thought. Field-
work in one community would allow m e to study the establishment and dynamics 
of land rights and land use in detail. This was an important part of my research as 
I had planned it. The other line of work I wanted to develop concerned the study of 
the archives of the land reform ministry. This was well underway. Getting started 
with the fieldwork, however, had proved more difficult. Chibtik was in some ways 
my last resort. 
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Earlier attempts 
During the previous months, I had tried to gain access to two different communi-
ties but without success. The first one had initially seemed promising. It combined 
different legal forms of land tenure (ejido and hienes comunales3) and was located 
partly on the land of what had previously been a fmca and partly on what had been 
national lands, which made it particularly intersting to my research. Furthermore, 
I was introduced to the community by a person working on a forestry project in 
which part of the community was involved. 4 The first meeting had been promising; 
I seemed to get the benefit of the doubt partly as a result of people's curiosity and 
partly because of their interest in the forestry project. But since not all the men in 
the community had been there that day, a final decision could not be taken and a 
second meeting was proposed. The second meeting was a disaster. The group of 
men that had not been present the first time were strongly opposed to my presence. 
I |had never previously encountered such hostility amongst the Tojolabal; I was not 
eyen given the chance to speak and I left the community almost immediately. I 
suspected internal divisions of the community were part of the explanation but I 
niever fully grasped the reasons for their outright opposition. 
My second attempt to gain access to a community for fieldwork proved equally 
unsuccessful. I approached a relatively large community located in the centre of the 
research area, where I had spent a week during my research on bilingual teachers 
years earlier. I introduced myself to the local authorities (comisariado ejidal), who, as 
I expected, told m e when to come back to explain my aims to 'the community'. I 
would have to present my project to the m e n gathered in the assembly and await 
their reaction. The meeting was postponed once before I had the chance to address 
the community. My exposition ran along the lines of the one I gave later in Chibtik 
and was met by silence. Somebody suggested taking time to think it over before 
making a decision. I knew this was a bad sign. A few weeks later the comisariado 
ejidal confirmed what I had already feared: "the people did not want it". 
As in the previous case, without the formal acceptance of the community 
confirmed by an assembly decision, fieldwork in these communities was out of the 
question. Once again, I suspected that their refusal was related to political tensions. 
The region of study is located west of the Cafladas region of the Lacandona rain-
forest, the stronghold of the EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation National), better 
known as the 'Zapatistas'. Though apparently quiet and free from the presence of 
the violence that characterised the Cafladas, the conflict had repercussions in the 
Tojolabal Highlands as well. 5 It had created divisions within and between commu-
nities which increased suspicion towards outsiders and made communities close in 
on themselves. I had deliberately chosen to enter the region 'on my own' rather than 
as part of either the Church or one of the peasant organisations. This is somewhat 
unusual in Chiapas, where most researchers operate within the framework of an 
organisation. But I had done so previously, when I researched bilingual education, 
with no problem. Furthermore, the political situation was not transparent and I felt 
unsure about the role and position of the different organisations, which was reason 
enough to try to avoid being identified with any of them. 
Entering the region proved more complicated than I had anticipated. Several 
months had passed without my being able to gain access to a community for field-
work and I was getting worried. I then decided to try my luck with Chibtik, a 
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community that I had grown to like during my previous stays in Chiapas. Never-
theless, I had initially excluded it as a fieldwork site because it was located in the far 
north of the region of study and would therefore significantly differ from the rest of 
the region, or so I imagined. It was, however, the community where I had the best 
chance of being accepted due to my earlier stays and their close links with the 
Kastalia. Chibtik turned out not to be at all a bad choice, although its peculiarities 
did influence the development of the research and the focus of this book. 
Gaining access 
After I had explained my intentions in front of the church in Chibtik that Sunday, 
people were initially silent. I realised once again that what I had to offer them must 
have seemed extremely meagre, since I was actually asking them a favour. When 
Pedro started talking, paraphrasing what I had said, I was very grateful to him. By 
speaking up for me, he paved the way for my acceptance. It was not so much that 
he clarified my words, but that he, a man whose opinions count, was showing his 
support. Then the men began talking among themselves, commenting on what I 
had said. Once I heard some of them say, "It is for our good," I felt relieved. What 
followed was a discussion in which the men confirmed and added to some of the 
issues that I had raised and that I would explore further during the period of field-
work, such as the problems of permanent maize cultivation, forest management, 
and their experiences with government engineers. The discussion was lively and the 
atmosphere relaxed and I thought the matter was settled. I was therefore somewhat 
taken aback when someone suggested: "It is all right if you want to work with the 
people, that way you can learn about the work of the campesino. But right now we 
have no work". Others confirmed this. At that time, in December, the maize harvest 
was almost over and only towards the end of February would they be starting to work 
on the fields again, they said. Perhaps I could come, they added, in March, when 
there would be work again. Somewhat confused and worried about further delays 
to the fieldwork, I suggested that I might come a little earlier. Even though there was 
no work in the fields, I could spend time talking to the older people to learn about 
the past, or fetch fire wood with the women, which, I hoped, would enable me to get 
to know different parts of the community land. After some discussion they agreed 
that, as of February, I could come whenever I wanted. They ended by saying that 
although not everybody was there, they would tell the others this was the agreement 
they had reached. For a while we continued to discuss issues related to land and agri-
culture. Some of the older men started telling m e how they had bought their land 
from the landowner thirty years earlier. 
Before I left for Comitan, where I lived, Pedro said to me: "Now they have agreed, 
nobody will be able to say anything, the matter has been settled". In the months that 
followed I often wondered why the Chibtikeros had wanted to postpone my arrival. 
Much later I realized that the EZLN had just declared an alerta roja (red alert), which 
meant increased safety measures and the avoidance of visits from outsiders, for their 
own good. As I discovered during the course of my research, Chibtik was a base civil 
de apoyo, a civil support base, meaning that they were committed to the Zapatista 
uprising. They had also been involved in a land invasion, one of the hundreds that 
had swept eastern Chiapas in the wake of the uprising. This situation prompted me 
to consider the political dimension of land tenure in more detail than I had initially 
planned. 
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Community control 
I have related these encounters with some of the communities in the Tojolabal High-
lands in order to introduce the reader to the general research concerns with which 
I came to the region and to familiarise her or him with the context in which I set out 
tb conduct my fieldwork. My main purpose, however, has been to introduce the 
cammunity dynamics which not only conditioned my stay in the region but which 
also became a central issue in my research. I encountered the 'tough' side of 
communities, that is, their capacity to control access by outsiders. This 'tough' side 
is also experienced internally, by community members, who come up against 
community control in their access to land and residence, dispute settlement, etc. 
Community control is therefore crucial to an understanding of land tenure 
arrangements, the central issue in this book. 
Fieldwork in any of the Tojolabal Highland communities therefore depended on 
the permission granted by that community. I needed formal permission from a 
meeting with a recognised constituency (an assembly of the m e n or a village 
meeting including both men and women), endorsed by what is called an acuerdo 
(agreement) in order to 'enter* the community. Without such permission I could not 
legitimately talk to people or propose projects, in fact, my presence itself would be 
illegitimate, questionable, and probably short-lived. In the Tojolabal Highlands, this 
is a common attitude to virtually all outsiders wishing to gain access, not only 
researchers like myself, but also pastoral workers from the Church and representa-
tives of NGOs, political organisations and state agencies. Since my first encounter 
with a Tojolabal community, in 1 9 8 6 ,1 had been aware of this and had learned to 
rfegard it as a feature of Tojolabal cornmunities. I had noticed that the pastoral agents 
df the San Cristobal diocese, as well as the schoolteachers with whom I shared time 
in different Tojolabal communities, acknowledged this dynamic and generally 
respected it in their dealings with 'the community'. In fact, the very phrase "entering 
a community" acknowledges the fact that communities are somewhat 'closed' 
spheres, to which access is controlled. 
My attempts to gain access also reflect some of the factors that facilitate or 
prevent admission. Internal divisions and political tensions make access more of an 
i£sue: outsiders are suspected of having hidden agendas that might critically inter-
fere with the already tense situation. Under these circumstances, if not met by 
outright opposition, the outsider is not easily given the benefit of the doubt. The 
support of one or several figures with authority in the community, however, might 
lead to a more favourable outcome, as it did for me in Chibtik. 
Community control is largely exercised through meetings such as the asambha, 
the assembly of men, and the agreements reached there. These meetings are not 
only an essential element of formal procedure, but also an arena in which decision-
making is contested, initiatives are proposed, supported or rejected, rules are 
designed and changed and claims are made, accepted or contested. They are also 
spheres in which internal divisions and power differences may become apparent. 
Assemblies and agreements are part of the institutions that govern community life 
and as such are crucial to the social, economic and political dynamics of Tojolabal 
communities. I found such institutions or governance structures to be essential in 
defining who has rights, what these rights involve, what obligations they entail, as 
tyell as how rights may be redefined and conflictive situations resolved. For this 
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reason, they played a central role in my analysis of land tenure in Tojolabal commu-
nities. 
Multiple dimensions of community in the Tojolabal Highlands 
I have referred to Chibtik and other settlements in the Tojolabal Highlands as 
'communities'. The fact that I use the term does not mean that I am unaware of the 
conceptual problems that attach to it, or that I accept its traditional connotations of 
cohesion, reciprocity and isolation. 6 Rather, my adoption of the term is inspired by 
the fact that 'community' is a socially meaningful, accepted label without which it 
would be difficult to talk about the region in general or the dynamics of land rights 
in particular- for outsiders as well as insiders. The Spanish term comunidad is a 
regionally accepted convention for referring to rural settlements in this part of 
Chiapas. The Tojolabal themselves speak of komon.7 The English word 'community' 
is the closest equivalent to these terms. Like comunidad or komon, 'community' is an 
indicative term, pointing at something meaningful in social reality. With Crow and 
Allan I would argue that the concept of community addresses "a level of social expe-
rience, which cannot be ignored" and that "is constantly drawn on by people in 
everyday discourse to express both descriptively and evaluatively aspects of their 
social experience." (Crow & Allan 1994:193). Community suggests some commonly 
understood - although not precisely defined - characteristics of a particular type of 
social configuration, without pretending to give an exhaustive or unambiguous 
description of it. Neither is it an exclusive term. In the region of study, it may be 
used together or interchanged with other terms such as ejido, settlement, or 'our 
place' (jnajtiki). 
In the context of the Tojolabal Highlands, the term 'community' refers primarily 
to a rural settlement or locality. Here, the term 'rural' means that the settlement is 
located at some distance from an urban centre, or 'town' (locally known as pueblo), 
and conceived of as different from it. The region of study, the Tojolabal Highlands, 
comprises over twenty-five such settlements, varying in size from a few hundred to 
over a thousand inhabitants. A setdement comprises fairly densely clustered houses 
as well as community buildings, such as the church and the school, and a basket-
ball field, which together constitute something like a centre. Most settlements have 
an 'old' name - that of the finca from which it was created, or a name based on 
ethno-geography - as well as a 'new* name, that they were given when they were 
established as ejidos. 
The term 'community' also refers to the people living in the settlement. The 
people from San Miguel Chibtik, for example, are usually referred to by other Tojo-
labal speakers as Chibtikeros, or swinkil chibtik, which means something like 'those 
belonging to Chibtik'. The community is an important factor of identification for the 
Tojolabal people, and associated with differences in language (such as the variations 
of Tojolabal spoken), clothing (especially women's clothes, the design and cut of 
blouses, skirts or dresses), and facial traits (related to patterns of endogamy). The 
residents of one community often also share a history that dates back to the times 
of the fincas, or to the foundation of the ejido settlement. 
Land constitutes another dimension of community in the Tojolabal Highlands. 
Most communities have received lands as ejido endowments from the Mexican State 
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through land redistribution since the late 1930s. These endowments may vary in 
size from several hundred to several thousand hectares, and include not only arable 
land, but also forests, pastures, and rivers. Together with other resources such as 
public buildings (schools or churches), these lands form the shared resource base 
of a community, entitlement to which is dependent on community membership. 
Finally, community refers to a particular form of social organisation, that I 
encountered as I sought access to communities for fieldwork. This type of organi-
sation is characterised by the existence of local authorities appointed by the popula-
tion (most important among these being the comisariado ejidal) and by specific deci-
sion-making procedures in which decisions must be endorsed by agreements 
reached at meetings. It also comprises procedures for co-ordinating work activities, 
funding of services and political representation. Community jurisdiction extends to 
all its residents and territory. 
The elements offered here are intended to give the reader a feel for what people 
- 1 those that live in Tojolabal communities or those that deal with them in one way 
or another - may have in mind when they speak of 'the community'. The above 
should not be taken as an exhaustive, unambiguous description of what 'commu-
nity' means. Indeed, a central theme throughout this book is the exploration of the 
njieanings attached to the concept of community -and ejido for that matter - in the 
region. It is important to point out that in the Tojolabal Highlands, the terms ejido 
ajtid 'community' are often used interchangeably, which may be confusing to some 
readers. Sometimes, especially among Mexican scholars, the terms ejido and comu-
nidad axe regarded as mutually exclusive. They reserve ejido for localities that possess 
ejido land, whereas comunidud is taken to refer explicitly to indigenous communi-
ties that own their land communally (under the regime of bienes comunales). This 
distinction is related to the fact that comunidud and ejido are two, mutually exclusive, 
legal categories. However, when I use the word 'community' in this book, I am not 
referring to comunidad as a legal category, but as a socially meaningful notion or 
reference. My use of the term is not intended as a statement about the actual or 
desirable legal status of indigenous communities. 
The different meanings of community that I outlined above for the Tojolabal 
Highlands coincide with the three dimensions of community identified by Crow and 
Allan (1994: 3-7), whose analysis concerns studies of community in Great Britain, 
but has a wider relevance. These dimensions include a shared identity or sense of 
belonging, locality or shared residence, and shared interest in land, resources, and 
services. In the case of the Tojolabal Highlands, a fourth dimension can be distin-
guished, that of 'government' or governance structures. Thus, in addition to the 
dimensions identified by Crow and Allan, Tojolabal communities have institutions 
and procedures that constitute something like a de facto local government. 8 To 
address this dimension of control or regulation, I also use the term 'governance 
structures'. Governance structures perform a wide range of public functions at the 
community level: they regulate rights and obligations to shared resources, condition 
community membership, provide administration of justice, and organise internal 
authority and representation to the outside world. This fourth dimension of commu-
nity is crucial. For the Tojolabal of this region, community does not merely signify 
vyhere they live and where they belong, but is also what governs their entitlements 
to essential resources and what frames their behaviour. Much of what community 
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'is' in the Tojolabal Highlands relates to such control over resources and people. 
The community, then, is multi-dimensional; it is locality, ejido, and local govern-
ment. These different dimensions do not necessarily fully overlap nor need they 
always be equally strong. We shall see later on that this creates considerable room 
for manoeuvre in the definition and delimitation of community in particular situa-
tions. Nor is the community the only referent of identity or the only significant 
network of mutuality and commitment; it exists next to the family group and 
regional organisations, yet occupies a crucial position among them. Furthermore, 
although community is an inevitable social referent in the region today, this has not 
always been the case. On the contrary, it is the product of specific historical processes 
that acted upon the identifications, associations, alliances, and commitments of the 
people in the region. Land redistribution is not the only relevant process, but as I 
shall argue throughout this book, it is a very important one. 
Although I have chosen to save broader conceptual discussions for the last 
chapter of this book, it is useful to outline briefly my approach to community at this 
point. I propose to understand communities in the region of study as historically 
constituted, multi-dimensional social configurations. In doing so, I build on the 
interactionist, social constructivist approaches to community developed in the 1970s 
and 1980s. One important contribution of these perspectives is to see community 
in terms of coalitions of interest and to make the specific patterns and institutions 
of co-operation and mutuality a central part of the research agenda, rather than 
taking them as given (Long & Roberts 1978; Orlove & Custred 1980). Another valu-
able insight is to approach community as being 'symbolically constructed' (see 
Cohen 1985), calling for explorations of what people understand community to be, 
when and how they define, stage and invoke it. It is in these processes that commu-
nity is constructed. In keeping with such approaches, community has come to be 
understood in terms of people's identities and their sense of belonging, in other 
words, as 'community of meaning'. Yet to my mind, the emphasis on the cultural 
and symbolic dimensions of community should not totally eclipse the other dimen-
sions. The concept of 'community' in the Tojolabal Highlands cannot simply be 
reduced to 'community of meaning". Community is not only about symbols and a 
sense of belonging but is also, at the same time, about resources, interests, and 
commitments, control and authority. The community of meaning is also the 
community that governs people's entitlement to resources. Processes of symbolic 
boundary construction and material inclusion or exclusion regarding certain 
resources, are inextricably linked. 
Unexplored dimensions of land reform 
The other central theme of this book, land reform, is unlikely to strike the reader as 
original. Land reform in Latin America in general, and in Mexico in particular, has 
been extensively written about and one might perhaps be tempted to consider the 
subject exhausted by now. 9 There is a general consensus that land reform has not 
met expectations in terms of rural development or agricultural production. In the 
field of policy, the neo-liberal paradigm leaves little room for redistributive land 
reform while academic interest in land reform has declined as incomes from agri-
culture have been seen to play an ever decreasing role in rural l ivel ihoods. 1 0 
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Compared with other Latin American countries, land reform in Mexico was quite 
successful in terms of the expanse of the land affected and the number of benefici-
aries. However, also in Mexico disappointment over land reform is widespread. 
Redistributive land reform has moved to the edges of both policy and academic 
interest. So why study it at all? 
First, as I will argue throughout this book, certain crucial dimensions of land 
reform in Mexico have remained unexplored. Second, the importance of land reform 
in the contemporary history of Chiapas has hardly been reflected in the literature on 
this state. Much of the work on land reform has kept fairly close to the official goals 
of land reform, judging its performance in terms of land redistribution, production 
growth and rural income. A broader approach has been developed by Mexican 
anthropologists since the 1960s who, inspired by the dependency paradigm, 
directed their attention towards agrarian structures, domination processes and the 
ctaculties of peasant organisation (Hewitt 1984: Ch. 4; Stavenhagen 1970). The vast 
literature generated in this field has yielded important insights into land redistrib-
ution and state intervention in the organisation of agricultural production. It is not 
rhy aim to assess these achievements here, but rather to point out one limitation. In 
general terms, concern with structural domination has resulted in a rather flat treat-
ment of the communities of land reform beneficiaries. A great deal of attention has 
been paid to the political and economic networks surrounding ejidos (through which 
such domination takes shape) and to peasant organising but the often-complex ways 
in which land reform has shaped people's identifications, their loyalties and 
alliances, their sense of property and their organising practices have been largely 
ignored (see also Nuijten 1998). Most case studies of individual ejidos concerned 
highly capitalised collective o n e s , 1 1 whose internal dynamics and insertion into 
wider networks may be expected to differ considerably from the more marginal, 
subsistence-oriented ejidos that also make up an important share of rural Mexico. 
Furthermore, the dependency school partly maintained the state-centred perspec-
tive on land reform. Understanding the state as playing a crucial role in domination, 
it has placed a strong emphasis on what may be called the 'hidden agenda' of land 
reform, the subordination of land reform communities to national goals and the 
political manipulation which they have suffered. In short, the effect of land reform 
on the constitution of rural communities has only been addressed in limited ways. 
However, it is precisely this dimension that allows us to understand how land 
reform becomes engraved in social reality, setting in motion processes that extend 
beyond the realm of policy and cannot be controlled by it. 
In the region of study, land redistribution - the turning over of finca land to 
former Tojolabal peons in the form of ejidos - had important territorial, social and 
political consequences. As I will argue throughout the thesis, land reform was one 
of the key processes in the contemporary history of Chiapas, especially the eastern 
part. With the exception of the coastal coffee-producing region of the Soconusco, the 
process of ejido formation in regions previously dominated by fincas has received 
scant attention in the anthropological literature on Chiapas. This is explained by 
both regional and paradigmatic biases. Most of this work was generated in the 
course of the Harvard project, which concentrated on the Central Highlands, 
adopted a functionalist perspective, and largely neglected 20th century social history 
(Hewitt 1984: 5 9 , 6 0 ) . 1 2 With this brief outline of the academic treatment of land 
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reform in Mexico, I hope to have indicated that there still remains some ground to 
cover. 
About this book 
Narrative lines 
On a first level, this book tells the story of one community, San Miguel Chibtik. The 
history of the Chibtikeros and their land runs through the book. Their efforts to 
obtain the land of the finca they had been working and Uving on, the ways in which 
they organised access to this land amongst themselves, and finally their involvement 
in land occupations under the banner of Zapatismo serve as an entry point to several 
of the key processes discussed and highlight the numerous ambiguities and contra-
dictions involved. 
On another level, this book provides an analysis of three interrelated processes 
in the Tojolabal Highlands. First, it reconstructs the process of land reform, or rather 
land redistribution, in a region that was dominated by fincas - large estates 
depending on the labour of resident peon families - until the late 1930s. Second, it 
explores the role of land reform in the formation of communities of Tojolabal-
spealdng land reform beneficiaries, especially in the establishment of land rights 
and the creation of institutions governing land tenure. Third, it addresses the polit-
ical dimensions of land reform and links land redistribution with the Zapatista 
uprising. The development of land tenure arrangements thus provides a window on 
changing social configurations and political processes in the region. These processes 
were documented on the basis of archival material and fieldwork, and placed in the 
context of wider developments and debates where this seemed relevant. For 
instance, the reader will encounter side-arguments related to the Mexican Revolu-
tion, scarcity of land, and struggles over municipal government. The narrative at this 
level is structured around the processes analysed and guided by an exploration of 
the intricacies, particularities and emergent patterns. References to literature and 
comments of a more conceptual nature are inserted in passing. In a rather prag-
matic way, I draw on insights from different perspectives, such as neo-institutional 
analysis, legal anthropology, and the literature on state formation. Although such 
eclecticism might not appeal to all readers, I felt it provided the best means of devel-
oping the narrative. 
Conceptual considerations are developed more consistently in the concluding 
chapter. Here, the material presented in the empirical chapters is reviewed in the 
light of wider debates. At this level, the book presents a critique of state-centred 
perspectives on land reform and land tenure policy, focusing on the numerous 
contestations such policies involve. It moves beyond an understanding of land 
reform as a shift in land distribution patterns to address the ways in which land 
reform acts upon the identifications, alliances and commitments of the rural popu-
lation. What I attempt to do is to insert community into the analysis, to relate what 
community means, how it is defined and established, to particular historical 
processes, especially - in this case - land reform. This not only leads to a reflection 
on the historical contingency of particular social configurations, but also on the role 
of state intervention in bringing these about. The book, then, may also be read as an 
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attempt to understand how the state 'reaches in', how state endeavours in the field 
of land tenure regulation shape notions of property, identities, and forms of gover-
nance. It explores how labels, criteria and instruments of regulation that are 
designed and applied in the course of land reform find their way into people's 
fijames of reference, how they are re-signified or rejected, and at times generate 
resistance to the state. 
Outline of the chapters 
The book consists of six empirically based chapters, as well as an introductory 
chapter and a conclusion. The six empirical chapters are clustered in pairs, falling 
into three parts. The first two chapters after this introduction reconstruct the process 
of land reform in the Tojolabal Highlands. In these chapters, the regional level of 
analysis predominates. The next two chapters analyse the development of land 
tenure arrangements and governance structures in the communities of land reform 
beneficiaries. The focus here is more strongly on the community of San Miguel 
Chibtik. The last two chapters address the developments following the Zapatista 
uprising, both in Chibtik and the region as a whole. 
The first chapter after this introduction (Chapter 2: Towards a region of communi-
ties), describes the transformation of the Tojolabal Highlands from a region domi-
nated by fincas to one dominated by ejidos. It lays the foundations for later chapters. 
After a sketch of the finca universe that the Tojolabal Highlands comprised before 
the 1940s, it shows that land distribution implied the transfer of vast tracts of land 
held by fincas, to former peons. Using maps and figures I indicate the extent of land 
reform in this region, leading to the geographical domination of Tojolabal commu-
nities and reducing the presence of private property. This chapter shows that land 
reform implied a territorial reconfiguration, which is an important element in the 
constitution of the Tojolabal Highlands as a region of communities. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3: The intricacies of land reform) takes the story of land 
redistribution further. In this chapter the focus is on the nature (rather than the 
extent) of the land reform process and how it affected communities in terms of inter-
communal relations, their relation to the state, and their relation with other political 
actors. The intricacies of land redistribution are documented, highlighting the role 
of the different actors involved. Since the stagnation of land redistribution in the 
1970s, Tojolabal communities increasingly became territorial entities competing for 
the remaining land in the region. State agencies (particularly the land reform office 
and municipal governments) became increasingly involved in the ensuing land 
conflicts. Furthermore, with political organisation taking shape in the region, land 
conflicts acquired more explicit political dimensions. This chapter shows how the 
stagnation and politicisation of land reform involved the communities in rather 
conflictive relations with the state apparatus (elements that are crucial to an under-
standing of the Zapatista uprising and the invasions of land after 1994 discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7). 
The fourth chapter (Land reform and the constitution of community) is central to the 
overall argument of this book. It indicates some of the ways in which state attempts 
at land reform constituted community. After providing a brief sketch of social organ-
isation and land tenure in Chibtik under the finca-regime, the chapter analyses how 
the land reform process entered people's identifications and commitments. The 
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acquisition of the land involved a process of re-alignment among the mozos as well 
as efforts to define community membership. The departure of the landowner and 
the establishment of joint ownership of the land entailed a period of elaboration and 
adaptation of both land tenure arrangements and governance structures. It was at 
this juncture that elements of the legal framework (especially notions of property 
and criteria for estabhshing authority) were incorporated into the community's insti-
tutional repertoire. 
Chapter 5 (Privatisation and conflict in Chibtik) focuses more specifically on 
changing land tenure arrangements in Chibtik in the decades after joint ownership 
was established. As a result of the growing population, a number of entitlements 
have successively been restricted to right-holders in the copropiedad, giving rise to 
processes of differentiation. In discussing the partially successful expulsion of part 
of the community, the chapter shows how privatisation is linked to conflicts and 
factionalism and to the definition of community itself. Furthermore, land tenure 
emerges as a field of confrontation in which groups within the community as well 
as state agencies seek to assert their control and jurisdiction. 
Chapter 6 (Land occupations under the banner of Zapatismo) deals with the land 
seizures that took place after the Zapatista uprising of 1 9 9 4 .1 describe these inva-
sions as the culmination of land reform in the region, in the sense that any 
remaining properties that had not been affected by land redistribution now came 
into the hands of Tojolabal communities. Focusing on one particular property next 
to Chibtik that was invaded, I discuss the ways in which it is embedded in the 
autonomous municipal structures created by the Zapatistas. Several of the ideas 
elaborated in the previous chapters are taken up again here. First, I analyse the 
creation of institutions governing land in the properties that were invaded, indi-
cating both the parallels with and the differences from the establishment of the ejidos 
forty to fifty years earlier. Thus, land tenure is shown to be a field of dispute in the 
new context too, both between different groups within communities and between 
communities and the autonomous municipality. 
Chapter 7 (Autonomy at the margins of the law) addresses the constitution of 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities in eastern Chiapas, drawing particularly on 
information from one of the municipalities in the region of Chibtik. I trace the roots 
of this attempt to establish and affirm autonomous governing structures at a supra-
communal level to both the historical experience of communal governance and expe-
riences of political organisation since the 1970s. The type of institutions created, the 
ways decision-making and authority are organised, and the ways community 
membership is defined, are modelled after and show strong parallels with the 
communal level. Within the framework of autonomous municipalities, the relative 
autonomy of land tenure regulation is now more explicitly stated than before, while 
attempts by the government to regulate land invasions are openly challenged. 
Furthermore, the affirmation of autonomy acquires a more explicit ethnic dimen-
sion. 
The last chapter (Fields of contention: land reform between endowment and appro-
priation) discusses the constitution of community in relation to state policies of land 
redistribution from a perspective of state formation processes. It provides a critique 
of state-centred perspectives of land reform. 
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A note on methodology 
Defining the region 
The region that I have called "Tojolabal Highlands' extends to either side of the road 
connecting Comitan and Altamirano, in southern Chiapas (see maps I . I and 1.2) 
arid includes the highest and westernmost part of the region inhabited by Tojolabal-
speaking people today. This delimitation of the region requires some explanation. 
Although it builds on folk categories, it does not coincide exactly with these, and cuts 
through administrative boundaries. 
The region that I call Tojolabal Highlands coincides largely with what the Tojo-
labal people refer to as the tierrafria o tierras altas, the (relatively) cold plateau, with 
altitudes ranging from approximately 1200 to 1900 m above sea level. They distin-
guish it from the montana, the steep yet warmer terrain of the Lacandona rainforest 
to the east, also known as the Canadas. In contrast with the colder parts, where Tojo-
labal communities grew out of the fincas that had been established there since the 
iSth century, Tojolabal settlements in the Canadas have resulted from migration 
sirice the 1950s. I have also distinguished the Highland region from the flatter, more 
productive valleys to the east. Like the Highland region, these valleys were also char-
acterised by the establishment of fincas on which a Tojolabal-speaking population 
settled as resident peons. Yet the region has had a different agrarian history: land 
redistribution here did not lead to the extreme reduction in private property that 
occurred in the Highland region, and ejidos have been established alongside ranches 
in the hands of mestizo owners. The Highland region is further distinguished from 
the valleys by the communications infrastructure that has also served as the basis 
for a common identification. The road that runs through the Highlands means that 
the communities are more oriented towards Comitan, whereas the valley commu-
nities in the valleys are primarily connected to Las Margaritas. 1 3 The reason for not 
including the valleys in the study was primarily a practical one: it would have been 
too much to manage within the framework of this project. 
The region I call the Tojolabal Highlands therefore has a certain distinctiveness 
in terms of its geography as well as its historical configuration if compared to the 
valleys and the Canadas. Precise limits between these regions cannot, however, be 
drawn. For the purposes of this study I take the region as starting some 15 k m north 
of Comitan, with the locality of Yaxha, and extending almost as far north as the river 
Tzaconeja. To the south of Yaxha, communities are predominantly mestizo now, 
though Tojolabal speakers may have existed there before. The northern boundary is 
formed by the river Tzaconeja. Heading to Altamirano, taming towards the east just 
before the Tzaconeja, are several Tojolabal communities, amongst which Chibtik, 
the community from which I have drawn most of my case material. These northern 
communities belong administratively to the municipality of Altamirano, whereas 
the remainder of the region falls under the municipality of Las Margaritas. I have 
drawn the northern boundary largely on the basis of language, leaving adjacent 
Tzeltal communities out of the study. The western boundary was the least compli-
cated to draw. Here I have followed the municipal limit between Las Margaritas and 
Chanal, inhabited mainly by Tzeltal speakers. 
In other studies on south-eastern Chiapas, readers are likely to encounter other 
delimitations of some sort of'Tojolabal region', that are either broader or narrower 
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than those used in this study. My definition of the Tojolabal Highlands roughly coin-
cides with what Ruz has called tierras altos or tierrafria (1982: 73). What I call the 
valleys coincides with what he calls voiles, while the Cafiadas are equivalent to his 
selva.14 The Colegio de Postgraduados, an organisation in the field of rural develop-
ment, used a slightly narrower definition of the higher region (which it calls Canada 
Tojolabal), excluding communities that belong to Altamirano (see, for example, Plan 
Comitân 1988). Conversely, the regional division developed by the diocese of San 
Cristobal includes these northern communities in the region attended by the 
Kastalia 1 5 - which is what took m e to Chibtik in the first place. 
In the literature on Chiapas, the Tojolabal Highland region has been a kind of' in-
between' area, faEing outside of what is usually defined as the Central Highlands or 
Altos de Chiapas - studied fairly intensively since the 1 9 6 0 s 1 6 - yet not part of the 
eastern Selva, or Lacandona rainforest - that has attracted more recent scholarly 
attention. Though the region of study shares certain characteristics with the Altos 
and the Selva, it has had a different history from either. It has only relatively recently 
attracted the attention of anthropologists, although it has been the subject of several 
linguistic studies. In 1969, a mere four pages were dedicated to the Tojolabal in the 
Handbook of Middle American Indians (Montagu 1969) and when Ruz began his 
work on the Tojolabal in the early 1980s he found a grand total of 132 pages 
(excluding linguistic studies) (in Mattiace 1 9 9 8 ) . 1 7 Consequently, processes charac-
teristic of the Tojolabal Highland region, notably the predominance and subsequent 
decline of fairly extensive fincas and the creation of ejidos with the population of resi-
dent peons, have been largely ignored in the literature on Chiapas. 
A combination of methods 
In this study I have combined archival work, anthropological fieldwork, and the 
study of geographical information. I will not bore the reader with a lengthy discus-
sion on methodological issues, but some remarks are in order here as to how the 
information was gathered and processed. Since the use of archives and geograph-
ical data in the reconstruction of the land redistribution process is discussed in detail 
in chapter 2 in direct relation to the data concerned, an abstract discussion of the 
technical complications and choices made would not serve any useful purpose at 
this point. I have mainly relied on two archives, that of the Chiapas division of the 
Land Reform Ministry in Tuxtla Gutierrez (Delegation de la Secretaria de Reforma 
Agraria) - which I refer to as ARA-TG), and the Land Registry Office of Ocosingo 
(Registro Publico de Propiedad - which I refer to as R P P - O . ) 1 8 For comparative 
purposes, I also used data from the RAN (Registro Agrario National), in charge of the 
registration of and issuing of land titles for social property and its potential trans-
formation into private property as envisaged under the new agrarian legislation. 1 9 
In the initial stages of the research I also consulted the Archivo Histôrico del Estado 
de Chiapas in Tuxtla Gutierrez, the A H E C H . 
Fieldwork comprised a wide range of ethnographic methods, from oral history to 
participant observation. Most of this work focussed on San Miguel Chibtik. Such a 
localised focus allowed m e to address the complexities involved in the processes of 
design and change of land tenure arrangements. Why I selected Chibtik has already 
been explained. Within Chibtik I made an effort to spend time with as many 
different people as possible, though I certainly developed much closer relations with 
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Map 1.1 T h e Tojolabal H i g h l a n d s in C h i a p a s 
some families than with others. I interviewed some of the older men and women 
specifically on the issues of changing land tenure. More often, though, I was in 
kitchens chatting with the women, out fetching fire wood or bathing with the girls, 
or working in the fields with young families, trying to figure out how land tenure 
arrangements worked, but touching on several other issues as well. I seized every 
opportunity to get to know the land area belonging to Chibtik, in order to discover 
the Chibtikeros' spatial frame of reference. I visited fields, forested areas, springs 
and caves. Fieldwork also comprised participation in all sorts of events, such as reli-
gious celebrations and weddings. I was also involved in other activities, notably a 
small project on green manure (financed by the Dutch embassy in Mexico) devel-
oped in conjunction with a regional NGO, and a photography project supported by 
the Archivo Fotogrdfico Indigena based in San Cristobal. 
Although I was a frequent visitor, I did not live in Chibtik. I usually stayed in the 
community for one or two weeks before going back to Comitan. My interest in other 
types of information meant that I needed to spend time in Tuxtla Gutierrez and 
Ocosingo (for the archives), San Cristobal (for geographical information), and 
Comitan (for interviews with former landowners and other people that had specific 
information on the region). Travelling in and out of the region (first by bus, later by 
car) provided numerous opportunities for talking to people from other communi-
ties, and these conversations have also contributed to my understanding of land 
reform and changing land tenure arrangements in the region. 
Although at times I regretted not being able to concentrate fully on Chibtik, I 
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found the combination of different methods extremely useful. Conversations with 
people other than Chibtikeros gave m e a feel for some of the ways in which Chibtik 
differed from other communities. Archival and geographical information proved 
very useful for visualizing other aspects of certain processes and events than had 
been brought up by the Chibtikeros. I used this secondary information to construct 
a regional picture and contextualise Chibtik. Conversely, comparing the different 
sources allowed m e to use one to check the other, that is, the secondary sources 
allowed me to interpret the findings from fieldwork in Chibtik in different ways- and 
vice versa. In this way, I was able to add depth to the analysis. 
Some remarks on the construction of the text 
Out of the fragments of information from different sources I tried to construct one 
story, one picture. I found several differences and contradictions between different 
accounts and some pieces were missing. Sometimes I was able to fill in the blanks 
and reconcile the differences, but not always. What you find in this book is my 
reconstruction of the land reform process in the Tojolabal Highlands, my account 
of changing land tenure arrangements in Chibtik. I have tried to create a fluid text, 
presenting the general picture without always providing insight into all the separate 
pieces of the puzzle. At some points, however, I explain the choices I have made in 
this exerdse of reconstruction. At other points, I point out the open ends, the contra-
dictions and the ambiguities. I hope in this way to have created a text that is both 
readable and informative, without eliminating all the uncomfortable and unruly 
elements. 
Three more remarks are in order to end this introduction. The first relates to the 
use of names. All the place names are real. I have chosen to work with real localities 
because my reliance on archival sources and cartography combined rather poorly 
with the use of pseudonyms that would collapse the moment one referred to the 
sources. I do use pseudonyms for individuals, however, and have omitted informa-
tion that would identify them. The second remark concerns the use of Spanish and 
Tojolabal terms. Where possible, I use English equivalents to facilitate reading. 
Some terms, however, have such specific connotations or evoke such a particular 
irjiage, that I have retained them. They are written in italics (Spanish words that 
hive been incorporated into (American) English are used without italics). Third, and 
finally, all translations from Spanish to English are mine, unless indicated other-
wise. 
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Notes 
1 The results of this research have been 
published in Van der Haar ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 
2 I address the consequences o f land 
reform and population growth for land 
use in the region in Van der Haar 2 0 0 0 . 
3 Bienes comunales is a form of common 
property that resembles the ejido; it will 
be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 
Two. 
4 The project aimed to capture carbon 
dioxide through re-forestation and better 
forest management. John Taylor, working 
for the Pajal Yakac'tik organisation at the 
time, carried out the project in the Tojo-
labal region. For further reference see 
B C O S U R 1 9 9 5 . 
5 In the autumn of 1 9 9 6 , just as I was 
trying to enter one of the communities, a 
major schism was beginning to take 
shape within the CIOAC, one of the two 
important peasant unions in the region, 
affecting all those communities affiliated 
to it, including the two I had approached. 
One of the reasons behind the schism 
was the links between the C I O A C and the 
EZLN (see chapters 3, 6 & 7 ) . 
6 As a result of the academic debates of 
recent decades, few social scientists will 
use the term carelessly or regard 'commu-
nity' as an unproblematic, homogeneous, 
and unambiguously denned sodal entity. 
Differentiation, conflict, and the perme-
ability and flexibility of community 
boundaries have all been examined in 
detail since the 1 9 7 0 s and 1 9 8 0 s . These 
debates also inform m y perspective. What 
I have taken from them is the need to 
explore what community means in partic-
ular circumstances to different actors. 
7 This term might derive from the Spanish 
word comun used in colonial times to 
refer the lands of a village or pueblo as 
well as to the people using this land. 
Whether there is indeed such a connec-
tion between the present and the colonial 
term for the region of study could not be 
established. 
8 It should be noted that in Mexico today 
the community does not enjoy legal 
recognition as a level of government; the 
Mexican constitution only recognises the 
federal, state, and municipal levels of 
government. 
9 For useful recent introductions to the 
land reform debate see Thiesenhusen 
1 9 8 9 and 1 9 9 5 ; Dorner 1 9 9 2 ; Kay 1 9 9 9 . 
1 0 See also Zoomers & Van der Haar (eds.) 
2 0 0 0 , and Zoomers (ed.) 2 0 0 1 . 
11 See for example Stavenhageris discussion 
of four case-studies in the comarca 
lagunera, Sonora, Michoacan and Tabasco 
( 1 9 8 9 [ 1 9 8 0 ] ) . 
1 2 There are some exceptions, such as the 
work of Jan Rus, that I will come back to 
later in the text. 
13 My inclusion of the community Veracruz 
partly breaks with this rule, for it is 
oriented more towards Las Margaritas. 
The inclusion is based on practical 
considerations, namely m y involvement 
with the Centro de Investigaciones en la 
Salud de Comitdn (CISC) which gave m e 
easy access to the community. 
1 4 I have not been able to pinpoint where 
Ruz draws the limits between these 
regions, not where he locates the fourth 
region he distinguishes, the somontano. 
Martinez Lavin ( 1 9 7 4 ) speaks of the 
macizo tojolabal referring to both the 
highlands and the valleys. 
15 One of the pastoral teams based in 
Comitan and part of the zona sureste. 
1 6 The Harvard Chiapas Project, which 
produced classics by Bvon Z. Vogt, 
George and Jane Collier, Frank Canaan, 
Robert Wasserstrom and others, took off 
in 1 9 5 7 . 
17 Ruz compiled four volumes on the Tojo-
labal ( 1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 6 ) and wrote 
two books on the fincas in the region 
(Gomez and Ruz 1 9 9 2 and Ruz 1 9 9 2 ) . 
1 8 In Mexico, ejido and communal property 
are considered as 'social property' and 
correspond to the ministry of land 
reform, which keeps track of the tenure 
situation. Registration and documenta-
tion of private property (including joint 
ownership) on the other hand, are the 
responsibility of the Land Registry Office. 
1 9 In 1 9 9 7 , all the ARA-TG files were being 
transferred to the RAN in Tuxtla 
Gutierrez. 
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Chapter two 
"jbwards a region of communities 
Introduction: the remnants of times gone by 
Travelling by road from Comitan to Altamirano - some 70 k m of recently laid 
asphalt winding through the hills - one notices the remains of the estates that once 
djominated the region, the f incas. 1 The road leaves Comitan from the 'El Cedro' 
Neighbourhood where Tojolabal people dominate the street scene. Leaving behind 
houses and shops, the road enters a relatively open landscape of hills and valleys, 
covered by trees and bushes in some places and maize fields and grassland in 
others. After several kilometres, the first road signs with Tojolabal names begin to 
appear, such as Yaxha (meaning 'clear water') and Lomantan. The next village, 
Bajucu, affords the traveller a spectacular view. The white plaster of its 19th century 
church stands out against the green of the hills in the background. 2 Built on a rise, 
the church and what was once the landowner's residence, the casa grande, still domi-
nate the landscape. Below it are scattered wooden huts, some with grass but most 
with alvmiinium roofs. 
As the journey continues, the image repeats itself: in Napite, San Francisco Justo 
Sierra, and Veinte de Noviembre, white plaster buildings stand as silent witnesses 
of times gone by, amid the bustle of community life. The buildings still play a key 
rple in present-day Tojolabal communities. The children and grandchildren of the 
jlnca's resident labourers - called peons or mozos - have turned many of the casus 
grandes into schools. Stables, hen houses, and storage rooms have been replaced by 
additional school buildings, a health centre or a shop. 
What happened to the fincas that once dominated the region? How were they 
transformed into the Tojolabal communities we find there now? These are some of 
the central questions dealt with in this chapter, which describes how land redistrib-
ution policies enforced by central government since the 1930s destroyed jinca hege-
mony in the Tojolabal Highlands, turning it into a region of Tojolabal peasant 
communities. The impetus given to land redistribution by President Lazaro 
Cardenas marked the beginning of the end of the privately owned estates in the 
region. Large extensions of finca land were transferred to former Tojolabal mozos 
Under the ejido regime of land tenure, whereas other properties were jointly acquired 
by groups of mozos. The process set in motion by land reform efforts was quite 
extreme in the Tojolabal Highlands in comparison to that of other regions in 
Chiapas. In fact, it led to the virtual disappearance of private property in the hands 
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of ladino 3 landowners. This chapter reconstructs such transformations from approx-
imately 1930 to 1993. It focuses primarily on the extent of land reform and the terri-
torial reconfiguration this implied, leaving the social and political dimensions for 
the next chapter. First, however, the chapter provides a brief description of the finca 
era, as well as a sketch of the revolutionary struggles of the first decades of the 20th 
century that, although they took their toll, left the finca structure largely untouched. 
Although its main aim is to provide a regional overview, the focus of this chapter 
sometimes shifts to the finca and subsequently copropiedad4 of San Miguel Chibtik, 
to illustrate or elaborate on a point made. Chibtik is one of the northernmost Tojo-
labal communities. Further along the road to Altamirano after Veinte de Noviembre 
and La Ilusion, the landscape becomes more abrupt, its soft undulations giving way 
to steep slopes covered with oak and pine forest. After several abrupt curves, and just 
a few kilometres before the bridge over the river Tzaconeja, a dirt road that leaves the 
main road towards the east takes one to Chibtik. Once one of the largest estates in 
the region, San Miguel Chibtik is now in Tojolabal hands. Its history of fragmenta-
tion and expropriation, directly related to the process of land reform, exemplifies the 
fate of most of the fincas in the Tojolabal Highlands as they finally gave way to the 
Tojolabal pressure for land. Only sold to former mozos in 1963, San Miguel Chibtik 
resisted the pressure on private property longer than most other estates and parts of 
the former finca were still privately owned in 1993. The fate of these private proper-
ties was sealed, however, with the Zapatista uprising of January 1 1 9 9 4 . 
A region of fincas 
Origins 
The origins of the fincas in the Tojolabal Highlands are only known in fairly general 
terms. Ruz (1992) has publicised the scanty information available in a book on the 
fincas around Comitan during the 18th and 19th century. For the region that inter-
ests us here, the highlands to the northeast of Comitan, Ruz found that estates were 
only created towards the early 18th century, by citizens of Comitan (Ruz 1992:29) . 5 
There are indications that the Tojolabal Highlands were inhabited before colonial 
times, but not much is known about the people who built the small temples and left 
the fragments of pottery and cloth found in caves that are now the only vestiges of 
their times.6 Whoever the inhabitants were, they abandoned the region in the early 
colonial period. In the region of study, the general demographic crisis that affected 
Chiapas was aggravated by the violent invasions of groups that refused to submit to 
Spanish rule. 7 These groups inhabited the Desierto de los Lacandones, now known as 
the Lacandona Rainforest or Selva Lacandona, bordering the Tojolabal Highland 
region to the east. Consequently, the region was depopulated in the 16th century and 
remained uninhabited for most of the 17th century. The Desierto de los Lacandones 
was conquered in 1695, after which families from Comitan began to establish land-
holdings in the highland region (Ruz 1992:340). 8 There are early references to the 
estates of Jotana (1723) (Ruz 1981:44), Bajucu (1728) and Bahuitz (1747) (Ruz 1992: 
118), as well as to Palma Real and Chibtik, which belong to the oldest fincas in the 
region (see also Ruz 1992:123,124,187,188). All these fincas are mentioned on a 
map of c. 1890 (see map 2.1). They formed part of what Jan de Vos has called a finca-
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belt [franjafinquera) on the edges of the Lacandona Rainforest, stretching from the 
Guatemalan border to Palenque (see map 2.2, De Vos 1988). 
The Tojolabal were probably attracted to the highland region as the holdings 
expanded (Ruz 1992). How and when the Tojolabal came to the region of Comitan 
remains obscure. Colonial records only mention Tojolabal (also called 'chanabal') -
part of the Maya linguistic family - as a distinct language at the end of the 17th 
century (Ruz 1982: 259-60). The origins of the Tojolabal have been traced to the 
Cuchumatanes region in present day Guatemala, but it remains unclear where they 
were during the 16th and a good deal of the 17th century. Ruz ventures the hypoth-
esis that the Tojolabal reached the mountainous region of the Lacandona Rainforest 
during the early colonial period - within broader migratory movements in which 
Qther groups also participated - moving down to the region of Comitan during the 
17th century (Ruz 198:47,48). Part of the Tojolabal settled on the estates in the high-
land region, where they grew in numbers and developed into a distinctive population, 
largely confined to the fincas.9 It is likely, then, that most settlements developed in 
the region as part of the exanding fincas rather than as independent communities. 
Tbwards hegemony 
As in other regions of Mexico, the fincas of the Tojolabal Highlands flourished 
during the second half of the 19th century, partly as a result of the policies of Pres-
ident Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) supporting private properties. During his rule, the 
Porfiriato, a considerable increase in the number of haciendas and r a n c h o s 1 0 was 
registered both for Chiapas as a whole and for the Departamento de Comitan in 
particular, to which much of the region of study belonged. According to one source, 
the number of hadendas in Chiapas as a whole grew from 98 in 1877 to 518 in 1900 
totalling 1076 by 1910; over the same period, the number of ranchos grew from 501 
to 1842 (Tello 1968 in Ruz 1992). Using different sources, Benjamin finds that the 
riumber of ranchos doubled between 1890 and 1910 (1995: 75). For the Departa-
mento de Comitan Benjamin gives the following figures: the number of haciendas 
increased from 88 in 1896 to 143 in 1909, while the number of ranchos rose from 
396 to 905 during this period (Benjamin 1995: m , Table 3 ) . 1 1 
It has been suggested that the increase in private property involved an encroach-
ment on lands owned by indigenous communities, using the possibilities of'denun-
dation of vacant lands' opened up by the Ley Lerdo of 1856 and similar 'liberalising' 
measures in Chiapas (see Garcia de Leon 1985a: 156,157; Benjamin 1992: 75, 76). 
The data available suggest that fincas in Tojolabal Highlands followed the general 
trend of expansion, in some cases involving conflids with the Tojolabal population 
and possibly poor mestizos. Garcia de Leon mentions several cases of denunciation 
for the region: in 1874 Jose Pantaleon Dominguez (governor of Chiapas at the time) 
Was involved in a conflirt with the Tojolabal population of Santa Barbara Bajucu over 
land he daimed was vacant and in 1876 Vicente Dominguez daimed Yaxha (Garcia 
de Leon 19853:185-164; see also Ruz 1992:150,151). For Chibtik, I found that Don 
Felix Parada denounced baldios bordering the titled area of the finca. President 
Porfirio Diaz granted him titles for these lands in 1889 and 1 8 9 0 . 1 2 These denun-
ciations allowed the fincas to extend their hold on the region, but it is difficult to 
establish whether and in what ways they involved dispossession. I suggested above 
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Map 2.1 F i n c a s a r o u n d C o m i t ä n (19th century) 
R e p r o d u c e d f r o m a 19th c e n t u r y m a p f o u n d in t h e files o f t h e 
C h i a p a s d iv is ion o f t h e Land R e f o r m Ministry. 
that the Tbjolabal were drawn to the region only after the establishment of land-
holdings by families from Comitan and it is not clear whether there were any inde-
pendent Tbjolabal settlements or where these were located. One cannot exclude the 
possibility, however, that there were independently settled families especially in the 
rougher areas, but these must have been limited in number. It is possible therefore, 
that the lands claimed by ladino landowners as haldios near Yaxha and Bajucu had 
become occupied by Tojolabal families for cultivation or residence. 
Contours of thefinca universe 
During the Porfiriato, the fincas came to dominate the Tojolabal Highlands both 
geographically and socially. Their territorial control was almost complete and they 
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Map 2.2 T h e L a c a n d o n a R a i n f o r e s t a n d t h e f inca-bel t 
R e p r o d u c e d f r o m Leyva S o l a n o (1995) , C a t e q u i s t a s , m i s i o n e r o s y 
t r a d i c i o n e s e n Las C a f i a d a s , in J. P. V i q u i e r a a n d M . H. R u z (eds) 
Chiapas, los rumbos de otra historia, p a g e 378. 
constituted most of the population. The spectacular population growth reported for 
Chiapas since the 1870s (Benjamin 1995: 53, Fig. 1) was repeated also in the Tojo-
labal Highlands (Ruz 1992). The census data from 1910 (table 2.1) only list settle-
ments as 'haciendas' and 'ranchos', which suggests that there were no independent 
villages or other settlements of considerable size to be f o u n d . 1 3 Most of the Tojo-
labal population was tied to the fincas as resident labourers, referred to as baldianos 
or mozos. All over Chiapas, debt peonage had been reinforced and deepened with 
the expansion of private holdings (Garcia de Leon. 1985a: 165; Benjamin 1992: 52, 
112,113). The finca universe of the Tojolabal Highlands at the beghrning of the 20th 
century comprised some twenty settlements with a total population of about 3,200 
individuals. 
Let us consider some of the characteristics of the fincas in the Tojolabal High-
lands during their heyday that we can deduce from historical statistics (summarised 
in table 2.2). The properties had an average size of almost 3000 hectares, though 
the average per owner was over 5000 hectares. The extensions listed only refer to 
titled surfaces and are probably an underestimation of the areas actually used by the 
fincas, since large sections were not fenced at the time, nor were precise measure-
ments carried out. 
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Table 2.1 D e m o g r a p h i c d a t a o n t h e 
Tojo labal H i g h l a n d s in 1 9 1 0 
Name population category 
Bajucu* 347 Hacienda 
Rosario 26 Rancho 
Piedad 62 Hacienda 
Bahuitz 314 Hacienda 
Yaxha 349 Hacienda 
Lomantan 53 Hacienda 
Jotana 414 Hacienda 
Napite SO Hacienda 
Santa Rita 96 Hacienda 
Palma Real 168 Hacienda 
Vergel 164 Hacienda 
ilusion 66 Rancho 
San Francisco 163 Hacienda 
Santiago 240 Hacienda 
San Mateo 332 Hacienda 
Chiptic 178 Hacienda 
Honduras 37 Rancho 
Nantze 58 Rancho 
Mendoza 70 Rancho 
* The data for Bajucu have been taken from the 
1900 census, since it was not included in the 1910 
census. 
SOURCE: 1 9 0 0 C E N S O Y D iv i s idN TERRITORIAL DEL ESTADO DE 
CHIAPAS (PUBLISHED IN 1 9 0 5 ) A N D 1 9 1 0 CENSO DE POBLACI6N. 
In terms of production, the fincas seem to have been very similar to one another, 
differing only in the presence or absence of sugar cane, probably related to the possi-
bility of irrigation. Besides maize, beans, and cattle - especially the latter, which were 
of economic value - a variety of other products could be found, such as fruits, sheep, 
horses. In contrast to the coastal plantations of the Soconusco, the fincas in the Tojo-
labal Highlands lacked valuable cash crops such as coffee. 
The owners of the fincas were all ladino families from Comitan, many of whom 
were fairly prominent, and part of what Garcia de Leon has called lafamilia chia-
paneca (1985a: 205; see also Hernandez Chavez 1979:340). Many of these families 
also owned properties in other regions and some were involved in other economic 
activities (the Castellanos, for example, owned an aviation company), and others held 
key political p o s t s . 1 4 One Comiteco family in particular dominated the region. In 
1910, Conrado de Jesus Dominguez owned Jotana, Bajucu, El Rosario, Napite, Santa 
Rita, San Francisco El Nantze and San Miguel Chiptic, properties totaling around 
19 000 hectares . 1 5 When he died (not long after 1910) his widow Rosario Castel-
lanos (not to be confused with the author of the same name) inherited all the prop-
erties and thus became the person who concentrated most land in the Tojolabal 
Highlands, as well as one of the most wealthy citizens in Comitan. 
Map 2.3 provides a reconstruction of finca territorial dominance at the beginning 
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of the 20th century. 1 6 The picture is only approximate, since the limits of the areas 
being occupied by fincas were not always clear and have shifted over time. The roads 
ate simply added for reference; they were not present in 1910. 
In short, the fincas in the Tojolabal Highlands began to be developed in the early 
18th century, only achieving territorial dominance during the second half of the 19th 
century. By 1910, when the Mexican Revolution had started, with its promise of land 
reform, the Tojolabal Highlands were a finca universe: the fincas controlled most of 
the land and encompassed most of the population. This situation was to change 
quite drastically, but not until decades later. Finca hegemony in the Tojolabal High-
lands survived the Revolution virtually intact. 
Revolution resisted 
Between 1910 and 1920, Mexico was the scene of multi-layered struggles that went 
dpwn in history as 'the Mexican Revolution'. The struggles put an end to the rule of 
Pprfirio Diaz, who had occupied the presidency since 1876, and had important polit-
ical implications. Especially in the centre and north, the revolution had a strong 
undercurrent of agrarian discontent, which translated into a constitutional promise 
o f l a n d r e f o r m . 1 7 In Morelos, the terrain of the revolutionary general Emiliano 
Zapata, the progressive encroachment of sugar cane producing haciendas on village 
lands, was an important reason for the peasant population to take up arms (see 
Womack 1969, Knight 1986a). In their revolutionary manifesto, the so-called Plan 
de Ayala, the Zapatatistas of Morelos proclaimed the restoration of these illegitimate 
deprivations (Plan de Ayala, Art. 6) and the expropriation of large holdings for the 
benefit of communities with a shortage of land (idem, Art. 7 ) . 1 8 Land redistribution 
along these lines was first taken up in a law issued on January 6,1915 and enshrined 
in the constitution in 1917. Land redistribution thus emerged as one of the central 
promises of the Mexican revolution, but its delivery has had an uneven trajectory 
and varying results in different regions. 
Chiapas was no Morelos. The revolts against powerful landowners were not 
repeated here and when peons or poor peasants were involved in the struggles, they 
mostly fought on the side of their patrones. In Chiapas the revolution failed to seri-
ously affect either land distribution or the political power of landowners. 
The revolution in Chiapas 
Though the political struggles of the centre and north of Mexico had some reper-
cussions on Chiapas, most authors conclude ihaXfinquero domination of the coun-
tryside was only superficially affected (Garcia de Leon 1985b; Hernandez Chavez 
1979; Knight 1986; Benjamin 1995). As mentioned in the previous section, before 
the Revolution large parts of Chiapas were characterised by the domination of large 
holdings dependent on debt peonage. This system remained largely intact. 
In 1911, the revolution sparked confrontations between two political camps in 
Chiapas, on the one hand, landowners from San Cristobal in alliance with the 
Indian population of the Altos region, and on the other, the politically dominant and 
economically more dynamic land owning elite of the new capital of Chiapas, Tuxtla 
Gutierrez. Comitan sided with the latter. A truce was reached, but unrest in the 
countryside remained, without, however, developing into revolutionary struggle. As 
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Table 2.2 His tor ica l d a t a o n f incas in Tojolabal H i g h l a n d s 
name owner 
1909 
owner 
1910 
crop crop extension 
1909 1910 (hectares) 1910 
Departamento Comitan 
La Piedad lose Fuentes 
Bahuitz 
Jotana 
Bajucu 
El Rosario 
San Mateo 
Santa Rita 
Napite 
Yaxha 
anexo Lomantan 
idem 
David Dominguez idem 
idem J. Conrado 
Dominguez 
Rosario Castellanos Emilio Esponda 
de Castellanos 
Quirino Dominguez Conrado J. 
Dominguez 
Virginia D. 
de Carrascosa 
idem 
Ce,L 1774-20-58 
Ce.Su .L M 1802-68-58 
Ce, Su, L M,B 9045-45-90 
Ce, Su, L M 2807-64-58 
Ce, Su, L M 4385-70-62 
Ce,Su ,L M 10328-91-10 
Departamento Chilon 
El Vergel 
Palma real 
Zaragoza 
San Francisco 
San Francisco 
El Nantze 
San Miguel Chiptic 
Santiago, Morelia 
Reforma Mendoza 
Eleuterio Aguilar idem 
R. Cordillo L. 
Saul Culebro 
Conrado de 
J. Dominguez 
Conrado 
dej. Dominguez 
Belisario Albores 
no data 
idem 
Agenor Culebro 
idem 
idem 
idem 
Rafael Albores 
Ce, L 
Raymundo Gordillo Reinaldo Cordillo Ce, L 
M, Su 1904-08-62 
Ce, L 
Ce, L 
not exploited 
Ce, Su, L 
Ce, L 
no data 
M,B 
M,B 
M 
M,B 
M,B 
M,B 
M,B 
1969-
1755-
2867-28-51 
3030-91-23 
2461-62 
5563-38-90 
1995-31-77 
Ce= cereal, Su= sugarcane, L= livestock, M = maize, B= beans 
SOURCE: FOR 1 9 0 9 : SECRETARIA GENERAL DE G O B I E R N O ( 1 9 1 1 ) , ANUARIO ESTADISTICO DEL ESTADO DE CHIAPAS 150$, TABLE " N O T I C I A DE LAS FINCAS DE 
CAM PO EXISTENTES EN EL ESTADO, CUYO VALOR FISCAL EXCEDE DE $ 1 0 . 0 0 0 , 0 0 , C O N EXPRESIÖN DE SUS PRINCIPALES PRODUCCIONES"; FOR IGIO: 
SECRETAREA GENERAL DE G O B I E R N O ( 1 9 1 2 ) , C E N S O AGSICOLA 1970, TABLE "NOTICIAS DE U S FINCAS RÙSTICAS DEL ESTADO EXISTENTES EN 1 9 1 0 Y CUYO 
VALOR FISCAL EXCEDE DE $ 5 - 0 0 0 , 0 0 " 
Benjamin concludes: "Chiapas was revolution-proof (aprueba de revoluciones, 1995: 
136). Possibly, as Hernandez Chavez suggests, the fmqueros' hold over the mozos 
was too strong, since the latter were economically dependent on their patrones and 
politically fragmented (1979: 347-48). 
The direct effects of the revolution began to be felt in 1914 when Venustiano 
Carranza, who had assumed the Mexican presidency in the midst of ongoing strug-
gles that same year, attempted to tighten his grip on Chiapas. He sent in 1200 
soldiers and imposed a governor, Jesus Agustin Castro. The arrival of the soldiers -
referred to as carrancistas or norteWos - was seen by the fmqueros as an 'invasion* and 
generated fierce resistance. Other landowners, however, supported Carranza, which 
is why Benjamin describes the ensuing struggles as a dvil war (1995:148,156). For 
the region of Comitan the most violent years seem to have been 1916 and 1917, 
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Map 2.3 C o n t o u r s o f finca territorial h e g e m o n y in t h e Tojolabal H i g h l a n d s 
II = 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
Yaxha a n d a n e x o Lomantctn 
Bajucu 
= R o s a r i o a n d La P i e d a d 
= B a h u i t z 
= P a l m a Real a n d Z a r a g o z a 
= S a n F r a n c i s c o 
VII =Verge l a n d a n e x o La Ilusi6n 
SOURCE: ELABORATED O N THE BASIS O F THE FILES FROM T 
THE LAND REGISTRY OFFICE IN O C O S I N G O . 
VIII - S a n t i a g o a n d a n e x o M o r e l i a 
IX = M e n d o z a 
X = Chibt ik a n d a n e x o s 
XI = S a n t a Rita a n d N a p i t e 
XII = J o t a n a 
XIII = S a n M a t e o 
IN OF THE LAND REFORM MINISTRY IN TUXTLA GUTIERREZ A 
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when the city was raided, while on the fincas cattle were slaughtered, and valuables 
and property deeds destroyed. Though the effect was also felt by the peons, la guerra 
as it is still called today, was above all a war of ladino landowners; if the peons partic-
ipated, they did so by siding with their patrons (Benjamin 1995:165; Garda de Leon 
1985b: 95; Hernandez Chavez 1979). 
Carranza's representative in Chiapas, Castro, launched a frontal attack on the 
fmqueros with his Ley de Obreros 0 de Liberation de Mozos of 1914, outlawing debt-
servitude and threatening to confiscate properties (Benjamin 1995:143; Garda de 
Leon 1985b: 51). Added to this was the announcement of expropriation of properties 
in keeping with Carranza's Ley Agraria of January 6 1915 (Garda de Leon 1985b: 60). 
In Comitan and the Tojolabal Highlands people still remember how the Carrandstas 
portrayed themselves as defenders of the mozos and announced the end of the 
baldio, as debt peonage was called there. They burnt the books which listed the 
mozos' hereditary debts, attempting to kill the patrons and give the land to 'those 
who worked i t ' . 1 9 However, the message of liberation often seemed to fall on deaf 
ears. On more than one occasion, the mozos chose to proted their patron. The 
elderly remember how they hid xinan Chayo, dona Rosario Castellanos, by then the 
prindpal landowner of the region, in caves. (To this day some of the caves still bear 
the name waynub' xinan Rosaryo, meaning "the bed of the ladina Rosario".) 
The struggles of 1910 to 1920 failed to modify the regime of land tenure in 
Chiapas in any significant way, and in some regions merely reconfirmed it (Garda 
de Leon 1985b: 142). Castro's emphasis on land reform only led to minor land redis-
tribution, mostly in the Soconusco (Benjamin 1995:152,153). Though some of the 
mozos did leave the fincas in inland Chiapas to occupy national lands (Benjamin 
1995:154), this did not undermine the finca system. The fmqueros soon managed 
to attrart new mozos and restore the dependent population to its old level, re-estab-
Ushing the old order. 2 0 When Obregon came to power in 1920, after the assassina-
tion of Carranza, he made peace with the rebellious landowners of Chiapas and 
guaranteed them their rights (Hernandez Chavez 1979:364). 
Garcia Leon (1985b: 142) charaderised the carrancista land reform as 'luke-
warm'; 2 1 under Obregon and Calles the situation was no different. The Ley agrario 
del Estado passed in Chiapas in 1921 by governor Tiburcio Fernandez, set the 
maximum size of private properties at 8000 hedares, and the state government 
controlled most of the 'agrarian committees' engaged in petitions for land 
(Benjamin 1995: 175, 179; Reyes Ramos 1992: 47-50). As counterpoints, fairly 
serious attempts at land redistribution were made first by the 'revolutionary 
fmquero' Carlos Vidal, governor between 1925 and 1927, and then by Raymundo 
Enriquez (1928-1932) (Benjamin 1995:186-191, 202-5). These actions were mostly 
limited to the Soconusco, where a sodalist movement developed in the 1920s 
(Benjamin 1995:176-191; Garcia de Leon 1985b: 161-75). They meant little for the 
Central Highlands (Rus 1994) and adjacent regions to the east. There, as in the Tojo-
labal Highlands, land reform only began two decades later, under president Lazaro 
Cardenas, eleded in 1934. Times of dired support to the fmqueros had returned to 
Chiapas when Vidorico Grajales assumed the governorship of Chiapas in 1933. He 
encountered a strong opponent in Cardenas, however, who placed land reform high 
on the national agenda. 
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The revolution never made it? 
It is common to find references such as 'in Chiapas the revolution never happened' 
or 'the Revolution never came to Chiapas'. To dte just one example, Gilly (1997:45) 
writes that "[...] Chiapas, as is well known, remained [...] at the margin of the 
Mexican Revolution." Such affirmations are not surprising in view of the persistent 
and overt counter-revolutionary forces at work in Chiapas throughout the revolu-
tionary period and the survival of traditional forms of domination based on the 
exploitation of landless peasants. The emphasis on the failure of revolution in 
Chiapas and the suggestion that the benefits of the revolution did not reach Chiapas 
file way they did the rest of Mexico, however, needs to be viewed with some caution 
on two counts. In the first place, it is fair to ask whether revolution fared that much 
better elsewhere in Mexico. With Womack, we might conclude that the revolution 
was "contradictory, indefinite, contentious, omnivourously and remorselessly polit-
ical, sometimes radically reformist" in Chiapas as well as elsewhere in Mexico 
(1999: 9). Knight argues that landlords survived and prospered not only in Chiapas 
but also elsewhere, inducting Morelos (1986b: 469). That brings us to the second 
point: the dismissal of land reform in Chiapas as limited, ineffective and neutralised 
by the landholding elite. Did not land reform also fall dramatically short of expecta-
tions elsewhere in Mexico, until Cardenas revived the revolutionary promise? As we 
will see in the remainder of this chapter, land reform eventually took place in 
Chiapas too. 
Gctrdenas' land reform 
Renewing the promise 
Land redistribution began to play a role in the Tojolabal Highlands during the pres-
idency of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940). As elsewhere in Mexico, land reform, one 
of the central promises of the Mexican revolution, had largely remained a dead letter 
Until then. The agrarian legacy of the revolution can be found in Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution, which stipulates both restitution of land taken from villages 
in the latter half of the 19th century (fraction VII), and the right of landless peasants 
to be endowed with land in the form of ejidos. The latter possibility has been given 
much more prominence in the ensuing land reform policy and reads, loosely trans-
lated, as follows: 
Those rural settlements {pueblos, rancherias and comunidades) that lack lands 
and water, or do not have these in suffident quantities to meet the necessi-
ties of their population, have the right to be endowed with these, by taking 
them from neighbouring properties, while respecting private smalmoldings 
(pequeHa propiedad) .22 
Cardenas' efforts to carry this through were unprecedented. Whereas his predeces-
sors, Obregon and Calles, had redistributed 7.6 million hectares of land between 
1917 and 1934, during his administration alone (1934-1940) this figure was almost 
20 million. Unlike his predecessors, Cardenas did not hesitate to expropriate major 
haciendas in productive regions and, making a fundamental break with past poli-
cies, Cardenas turned the ejido into the focal point of his strategies of agricultural 
modernisation and national development, where a productive agricultural sector 
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would sustain industrialisation. 2 3 Instead of a rather marginal role as village 
commons (to which the word originally referred in old Spanish), in Cardenas' 
project the ejido was given a more central function in agricultural production. 
Through the ejido, Cardenas sought to combine the advantages of smallholder agri-
culture (greater commitment and productivity) with the economies of scale that 
larger units would permit. High hopes were placed in this regard on the so-called 
'collective ejidos', organised much like production co-operatives, but these only 
succeeded in a limited number of cases (Otero 1989:282-287; Markiewizc 1993: 95-
100). Cardenas not only promoted land redistribution but also sought to develop the 
productive capacity of the ejidos through the provision of mfrastructure and credit 
schemes. 
Cardenas' agrarian agenda not only responded to the need for national self-suffi-
ciency in food supply and to combat rural poverty. It was equally inspired by aspira-
tions of nation-building and giving the national state a greater grip on the Mexican 
countryside. Cardenas is generally seen as the architect of the corporate state, of 
which land reform was a key element. The impetus to the creation of ejidos went 
hand in hand with efforts to organise the peasant population and draw them closer 
to the federal state. To this end, Cardenas created the Confederation National 
Campesina (CNC) in 1938. 
Through Cardenas, the ejido gained prominence in important parts of rural 
Mexico, both in terms of hectares and in terms of the population involved. Cardenas' 
successors - with the exception of Luis Echeverria - however, did not share his 
commitment to the sector. Political priorities shifted to the private sector, allowing 
for modernisation and capitalisation there and widening the gap with the ejido 
sector (Grindle 1986; Otero 1989). In view of the need to raise production levels and 
curtail rural unrest - land invasions were occurring throughout the country - Echev-
erria (1970-1976) boosted the ejido sector, by reforming the agrarian legislation and 
organising greater institutional and financial support. 
Land reform in Chiapas 
Before Cardenas, agrarian legislation allowed individual states considerable scope 
for manoeuvre, for example, in setting the upper limits to private property. This had 
allowed Chiapas to protect large holdings. However, the Codigo Agrario of 1934, an 
attempt to centralise agrarian legislation and give it greater coherence, no longer 
gave such leeway. Amongst other changes, it set the limit for private property at 150 
hectares of irrigated land and 300 hectares of rain-fed land, and explicitly consid-
ered the peones acasillados of haciendas as potential land reform beneficiaries. These 
changes had important repercussions for Chiapas with its predominance of large 
estates and debt-peonage. 
Cardenas resolutely promoted land reform in Chiapas. A n inkling of what was to 
come had already emerged during his campaign in 1933, when his PNR (Partido 
National Revolutionario, later to become the PRI) promoted similar ideas on land 
reform in Chiapas (Benjamin 1995: 212). In early 1934, Cardenas visited Chiapas 
and was confronted with the persistence of debt servitude (Garcia de Leon 1985b: 
196,197). His efforts to promote land redistribution clashed with the policies of 
governor Victorico Grajales who was a fierce defender of the landowners, but 
Cardenismo was strengthened when in 1936 Efrain Gutierrez was appointed as the 
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new governor. Data provided by Garcia de Leon (1985b: 223, 225) and Benjamin 
(1992: 235) show a considerable increase in ejido endowments under Gutierrezf rule, 
which lasted till 1940. It was also during this period that land redistribution in the 
Central Highlands of Chiapas took off, affecting the properties of ladino landowners 
in this region. Erasto Urbina, who headed a new institute to promote the develop-
ment of the indigenous population in the Highlands, spearheaded the creation and 
activation of agrarian committees that petitioned land (Wasserstrom 1983; Rus 1994; 
Benjamin 1995: 229). Under Urbina, the promotion of land reform went hand in 
hand with the incorporation of indigenous communities into the corporate state and 
party apparatus engineered by Cardenas (Rus 1994). 
Between 1934 and 1984, at least 2 million hectares were transferred to land 
reform beneficiaries in Chiapas (a conservative estimate based on data provided by 
Reyes Ramos 1992: 133-135, Annex II). Some of these were taken from ladino 
landowners, despite their opposition. This happened in the Soconusco and Grijalva 
basin, as well as in the central Highlands. However, as several authors argue, expro-
priations were carried out in such a way as to avoid threatening the viability of the 
property. In the Soconusco, for example, ejidos were created on the periphery of the 
coffee plantations, whereas the core, including the machinery, remained in private 
hands, thereby ensuring continued control over commercialisation (Reyes Ramos 
1992: 31; Wasserstrom 1983:164; see also Benjamin 1995: 230-5). Another impor-
tant avenue of land redistribution was the establishment of ejidos on national lands 
to which no private property deeds existed, notably in the Lacandona rainforest 
(Reyes Ramos 1992:123,124). Thus, expropriation of private properties could be 
avoided to protect the interests of the landowning elite. 
As I will show in the remainder of this chapter, in the Tojolabal Highlands both 
of these processes played a role. However, expropriation of finca land was even more 
important for the creation of ejidos than the endowment of national lands. In the 
Tojolabal Highlands, land reform since Cardenas meant the end of finca hegemony. 
Federal policy and legislation incited and backed claims to peons' land, and most 
finqueros failed to effectively counter these. This resulted in the gradual dismantling 
of private property. Below, I document the fate of the fincas in the Tojolabal High-
lands, based on the archives of the Chiapas division of the Land Reform Ministry 
(Delegation de la Secretaria de Reforma Agraria) in Tuxtla Gutierrez, combined where 
possible with other sources, such as oral history and interviews with former 
landowners. The results of this work are presented in two ways, with regional data 
on the land affected by land reform, and by particular reference to the case of San 
Miguel Chibtik. In the discussion of this chapter I contrast my findings with 
patterns of land reform in Chiapas as a whole. The new linkages that were forged in 
the process between the communities of land reform beneficiaries and the Mexican 
state will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The changing fate of Chibtik 
In 1963 the mozos of the finca San Miguel Chibtik bought the central area of this 
estate on which they had been Uving and working all their fives. The transaction was 
part of a wider process of transfer of former finca land to Tojolabal peons that had 
been taking place throughout the Tojolabal highlands since the mid 1930s. Most of 
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Map 2.4 Chibt ik a n d a n e x o s in 1931 
SOURCE: ELABORATED O N THE BASIS OF THE FILES FROM THE CHIAPAS DIVISION OF THE LAND REFORM MINISTRY 
IN TUXTLA GUTIERREZ A N D FROM THE LAND REGISTRY OFFICE IN O C O S I N G O . 
the transfers had been through land redistribution whereby former peons received 
the land in the form of ejidos. However, in several cases ftnca land was bought from 
the landowner, as happened in Chibtik. Through land redistribution and land sales, 
former finca land as well as considerable expanses of national lands came into the 
hands of former Tojolabal mozos. This process implied the fragmentation and 
subsequent disappearance of fincas that had existed in the region since the late 18th 
century. The process was completed in 1994 when land invasions in the wake of the 
Zapatista uprising eliminated the last remnants of private property, now no longer 
fincas but considerably smaller ranchos. The fate of the finca Chibtik reflects the 
dynamics of land redistribution in the Tojolabal Highlands. It illustrates the frag-
mentation as a result of land redistribution efforts, the continuing pressures of the 
Tojolabal ejidatarios on the remaining private properties, and the variety of land 
tenure modalities that arose in response to the possibilities and limitations of the 
land reform policy. 
Chibtik on the eve of land reform 
San Miguel Chibtik was one of the largest fincas in the Tojolabal region and its 
church is one of the most beautiful of its kind. Perched on a hill, it constitutes the 
natural centre of the community as it once did of the finca. The facade tells us that 
the 'San Miguel Chapel' was built in 1886 by Don Felix M. Parada. He had inher-
ited the property of 150 caballerias24 (equivalent to some 6 ,420 hectares) from his 
father, Don Manuel M. Parada, who in turn had bought it from a priest, Don 
Valentin Soils . 2 5 Nowadays, nobody remembers Don Felix Parada. It is a later owner 
of the property who lives on in local memory, Dona Rosario Castellanos, who by the 
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Map 2.5 T h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f C h i b t i k 
SOURCE: ELABORATED O N THE BASIS OF THE FILES FROM THE CHIAPAS DIVISION OF THE LAND REFORM MINISTRY 
IN TUXTLA GUTIERREZ AND FROM THE LAND REGISTRY OFFICE IN O C O S I N G O . 
11920s had come to own a great number of the properties in the Tojolabal Highlands. 
Even today, numerous anecdotes circulate about this lady, who was also known as la 
Heuhuechuda (Derbyshire neck), due to the fact that she suffered from goitre and is 
said to have been avaricious and shrewd, respected and feared. 
Rosario Castellanos inherited Chibtik, together with several other properties, 
from her husband Don Conrado Dominguez. He had bought both San Miguel 
Chibtik and the adjacent San Francisco El Nantze in 1 9 0 6 2 6 and had continued to 
expand the property. In 1907 he bought San Jose Quixthe, a small property of some 
230 hectares, situated near Chibtik and thence appearing as an anexo to it, and in 
1909 he added El Amolar, an area of 342 hectares . 2 7 When Conrado Dominguez 
died, the finca Chibtik and its anexos had a total area of some 6000 hectares. 
The property emerged from the revolution with no lasting damage. Rosario 
Castellanos survived thanks to the protection of her mozos and managed to expand 
the property after the revolution. When she died in 1924, at around the age of eighty, 
she left her properties to her five grandchildren. (Her only daughter, Siomara Alicia 
Dominguez, had already died by that time, leaving Don Ventura Castro as her 
widower.) She bequeathed Chibtik and its anexos to her grandson Rafael Castro in 
1924, as recorded in the Land Registry Office of Ocosingo in 1931 . 2 8 Rafael Castro's 
share comprised the finca Chibtik, with the anexos El Amolar, San Francisco El 
Nantze and San Jose Quixthe. It also included an anexo encountered during the 
reading of the will, called Honduras. A sketch of the finca Chibtik and anexos is 
given in map 2.4 (Honduras is not indicated separately here). 
Rafael Castro did not keep the finca for long. Inhabitants of San Miguel Chibtik 
recall how drink impoverished him, forcing him to sell first the livestock and then 
53 
the property itself (a version corroborated by a surviving relative). The new owner 
was called Jose Luis Castellanos, better known as Don Pepe, who despite what the 
surname suggests, was probably unrelated to Dona Rosario Castellanos. When Don 
Pepe Castellanos bought the finca and its anexos, it was registered as having a total 
of 7021 hectares 2 9 , making it one of the largest in the reg ion . 3 0 Don Pepe died in 
1945, just before the start of the decline of Chibtik. He left all his properties to his 
wife, Dona Julia Castellanos, which, in addition to Chibtik and its anexos, included 
two other estates. 3 1 However, in 1955, when she finally registered the properties she 
had inherited, the area of Chibtik and its anexos had been reduced from the original 
7021 to 5747 hectares. Between 1945 and 1955 not only had the anexo El Amolar 
been sold, but land redistribution had also begun to affect the f inca. 3 2 These trans-
fers were only the start of further reduction and fragmentation of the Chibtik finca 
(summarised in map 2.5). 
Ejido endowments and transactions 
At the time of its sale to former mozos in 1963, the Chibtik finca comprised about 
2000 hectares 3 3 , far less than the over 7000 hectares it had in its heyday in the early 
1930s. I mentioned earlier that by 1955 the property comprised 5747 hectares. By 
1957 the property included about 3000 hectares and by 1963 it had been further 
reduced to around 2000 hectares, due to land redistribution and the sale of anexo 
El Nantze . 3 4 Continuing threats of further land redistribution led to the sale of the 
main area of the Chibtik finca in 1963. 
The first time the Chibtik finca was affected by land redistribution was in 1951, 
in favour of the San Caralampio community, located south of the finca. San 
Caralampio received 4199 hectares of national lands, as well as 385 hectares of El 
Nantze, still part of Chibtik at that time.35 The next two endowments with land from 
the Chibtik finca were made to peons of the finca itself. In 1952 a Presidential Reso-
lution was issued in favour of the Piedra Huixtla e j ido. 3 6 Chibtik contributed with 
172 hectares to this ejido, which consisted of the population of Honduras (anexo to 
Chibtik) together with the population of another small settlement (they had joined 
together in order to reach the minimum of 20 adult men needed to apply for ejido 
land). The rest of the land consisted - as in the case of San Caralampio - of national 
l a n d s . 3 7 A year later, 762 hectares of the Chibtik finca were given as an ejido to 32 
of its peons - about half of the total number of adult male peons at the time - who 
created a new settlement, named La Florida, one kilometre away from the original 
finca settlement. 3 8 
Having lost considerable expanses of land to Tojolabal peasants, and given the 
upcoming claims for more ejido land, Pepe Castellanos the younger, acting as the 
representative of his mother Julia, sold part of the land to reduce the size of the prop-
erty. Fragmentation of properties is a commonly used strategy both in Chiapas and 
elsewhere to avoid land redistribution. It was in this context that first El Amolar and 
later San Francisco El Nantze were sold. El Nantze was purchased jointly in 1956 by 
a group of 38 individuals, mostly mestizos from rancherias (settlements of small 
private landowners) around C o m i t a n . 3 9 In addition to los comitecos, as they were 
locally called, the group of buyers also included the four Tojolabal men that had been 
working on the property as mozos. 
The sale of El Nantze reduced the property considerably (to about 3000 hectares), 
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but not enough to avoid firrther land redistribution. A Presidential Resolution of 1961 
endowed a group of former mozos from Chibtik with 835 hectares to create the 
Puebla ejido. 4° It was probably as a means of avoiding further threats of expropria-
tion that Pepe Castellanos junior agreed to sell 900 hectares of the main area of the 
finca Chibtik to his mozos in 1963. The acquisition of the 900 hectares was really 
the result of the Chibtikero mozos' failure to obtain that land in the form of an ejido. 
After meeting with an unsatisfactory response to their petitions for ejido land, they 
pressured a reluctant Pepe Castellanos junior into selling the central finca area, which 
included the buildings (casa grande and church) as well as the settlement where they 
had been living. The Chibtikeros subsequently acquired more land from the finca. 
Repe Castellanos gave them 200 hectares between the area they had bought and the 
puebla ejido, and in the 1970s they received San Jose Quixthe (an anexo to the Chibtik 
finca of some 280 hectares) as an ejido.41 Earlier they had received 90 hectares from 
El Nantze, also as an ejido. (In fact, the ejido endowment to the Chibtikeros was 
larded with irregularities, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.) 
Further demise of private property 
After the sale of the main area of the finca, Pepe Castellanos and his mother retained 
about 1100 hectares in private property. These were further fragmented in the years 
to come. As mentioned, 200 hectares of this area were donated to the Tojolabal joint 
Owners of Chibtik. The remaining 900 hectares, known as rancho Yalchihtik, were 
sold in 1964, to two different owners, both from Comitan. One section, called 
Yalchibtik, had 600 hectares, while the other, Cananea, had 300 hectares. 4 2 In 1969, 
however, Pepe Castellanos bought both sections back. This might suggest that the 
Sale had only been a subterfuge to avoid further land redistribution, but it is also 
possible that the buyers were unable to clear their debts with the former owner. It 
was not the last time the properties changed hands. Pepe Castellanos sold the two 
Sections again in 1977 to two men of the same surname, probably brothers. 4 3 A few 
years later, the smaller section, Cananea (later known as San Augustin) was sold 
a g a i n . 4 4 The new owners (a couple) split it into two sections of 150 hectares each, 
which they sold in 1984 and 1985 respectively. 4 5 The first of these bordered on the 
ejido of La Florida and was bought by a group of peasants from this community. 4 6 
The other was sold to a private owner. 
Yalchibtik (of 600 hectares) underwent a similar process of subdivision. It was 
sold to different owners in sections of 100 hectares e a c h . 4 7 In 1989, several of these 
sections constituted a rural cooperative society dedicated to cattle ranching . 4 8 By 
^993, Yalchibtik and one of the sections of Cananea were the only parts of the former 
Chibtik finca that were still in the hands of private non-indigenous landowners who 
did not live on the land. The rest had come into the possession of Tojolabal peasants, 
either through land endowments or sales. These private properties proved vulner-
able to pressures from the surrounding communities, however. In 1994, with the 
Zapatista uprising, they were invaded by Tojolabal Zapatista sympathisers. 
Land redistribution in the Tojolabal Highlands 
The mozos of the Tojolabal Highlands were quick to respond to the possibilities 
created by the land reform policy of president Lazaro Cardenas. The first petition for 
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Figure 2.1 From f incas t o e j i d o s : t e n u r e c h a n g e s i n c e 1939 
i o o % c o r r e s p o n d s t o 51 525 h e c t a r e s (land o w n e d by f incas in 1939). 
Key: 
Ejido-D = ejido e n d o w m e n t s (dotaciones) 
Ejido-A = e x t e n s i o n s t o ejido e n d o w m e n t s (ampliaciones) 
C o p r o p i e d a d = l a n d s b o u g h t a s c o p r o p i e d a d (several later c h a n g e d t o t h e 
s y s t e m o f bienes comunales) 
P o s s e s s i o n = o c c u p i e d w i t h o u t legal r e c o g n i t i o n 
Private = pr ivate p r o p e r t i e s (fincas first, later pequena propiedad, t h e 
f igure e x c l u d e s copropiedades) 
SOURCE: ELABORATED O N THE BASIS O F FILES FROM THE CHIAPAS DIVISION OF THE LAND REFORM MINISTRY AND THE RAN 
ejido land was issued and published in the Diario Oficial de la Nation as early as 1933 
and another six followed in 1934. It has been suggested by Reyes Ramos (1992), that 
Cardenas' Codigo Agrario of 1934 opened up new possibilities for peones acasillados 
to petition land, considerably increasing the potential number of land petitions in 
Chiapas. The Codigo Agrario abolished the previous exclusion of hacienda-
labourers. 4 9 That the first petition from the Tojolabal Highlands (by the mozos from 
the Chibtik finca that subsequently established La Florida) preceded these legal 
changes, might possibly be understood as an anticipation of these, following the 
active campaign of the PNR in support of Cardenas' candicacy during 1933. The land 
claims by Tojolabal mozos led to a complete transformation of the land tenure situ-
ation in the region. This section and the next document that transformation in the 
Tojolabal Highlands as a whole. 
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Transfer offinca-land 
Land redistribution in the Tojolabal Highlands affected the fincas considerably. In 
the years from 1938 to 1950 ejido endowments to former mozos halved the expanses 
of land in the hands of ladino landowners. After this impressive start the rate of 
transfer slowed down but was still considerable. Figure 2.1 below clearly shows this 
tendency. It indicates how the property system of the land that had belonged to 
fincas before 1939 changed over time. We see that a significant amount was trans-
ferred to peasants in different ways. By i 9 6 0 , approximately 8 0 % of former finca 
land had been transferred to peasants, through ejido endowments as well as the 
acquisition of copropiedades. Thereafter, the rate of transfer gradually slowed down. 
In 1970 approximately 9 0 % of former finca land had been transferred; by 1980 this 
figure had climbed to 9 6 % , reaching 9 7 % in 1992. 
Figure 2.1 indicates the rate and extent to which finca land was transferred, 
mostly to former Tojolabal peons. It also shows what share of this land was trans-
formed into ejidos, in the form of both original endowments and extensions to 
existing endowments (called dotation and ampliation respectively). By 1950, nearly 
4 3 % of the former finca land had been turned into ejidos; by i 9 6 0 this figure had 
Reached 61%. From then on, the creation of ejidos slowed down. By 1970 approxi-
mately 65% of former finca land had been converted to ejidos; by 1980 this was only 
two percent more (69%), rising another percent by 1992 (70%). 
Figure 2.1 shows also the other means by which Tojolabal mozos and their 
descendants gained control over former finca land. The first category to consider is 
that of the copropriedad, 5 0 a form of joint property, acquired by groups of individ-
uals buying the land from the landowner, often their former patron. Fearing the loss 
of further land to redistribution, land owners began to partition their estates and in 
most cases eventually sold them to groups of Tojolabal peasants, as I described for 
Chibtik. The land reform legislation issued by president Cardenas allowed private 
owners to retain a certain amount of their land, the so-called pequena propiedad, that 
could not be expropriated for land redistribution. This property could have a 
maximum area of 150 hectares of irrigated land or its equivalent in less productive 
types of land. Given the conditions of the Tojolabal Highlands, with their combina-
tion of land for rainfed agriculture and less productive pastureland, this usually 
amounted to about 300 hectares. These private properties usually included the finca 
buildings and the flatter lands surrounding it. Although these properties could not 
be affected by land reform, many landowners eventually opted for selling them in 
response to continuous pressures from the surrounding ejidatarios. As the sons of 
the first generation of land reform beneficiaries grew up, new petitions for ejido land 
were issued (often in the form of extensions to existing ejidos, known as amplia-
tiones). Where finca land liable to expropriation for ejido endowments was lacking, 
no extensions could be granted and acquiring the pequena propiedad seemed a 
reasonable alternative. 5 1 These properties were generally considerably smaller than 
the ejido-endowments, but included lands of better quality. In total, about 2 4 % of 
the finca land that existed before 1939, or 12 500 hectares, was transferred to groups 
of peasants through sales. Many of these copropiedades changed to the tenure 
regime of bienes comunales52 in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Another albeit considerably smaller part of the finca land has passed into the 
hands of Tojolabal peasants without legal recognition. These lands are labelled 
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Figure 2.2 Land redis tr ibut ion a n d s a l e s 
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'possessions' in figure 2.1. Such cases usually involve disputes between different 
groups dairning the land which have not been formally resolved, with physical occu-
pation by one of the groups, exduding the other, not being legally confirmed. 
As a result of these processes (endowments, acquisition, and possession), by 1993 
only about 3% of the land originally owned by fincas was still in the hands of private 
(usually ladino) owners. Land reform did not only take place on the basis of fincas, 
however. National lands (terrenos nacionales) surrounding the fincas, for which no 
private property deeds existed, were also used to this end. 
Endowments on the basis of national lands 
Figure 2.2 gives an indication of the importance of national lands for ejido endow-
ments in the region of study. Endowment using national lands began in the 1950s, 
considerably later than that drawing on finca land. In total, over 12 720 hectares of 
national lands were transformed into ejido land. This means that national lands 
contributed about a third of all land for ejido endowments in the region, amounting 
to almost 36 000 hectares. Of the total land that came into peasant hands, induding 
not only ejido endowments but also copropiedades and lands in possession, national 
lands contributed about 2 0 % , the remaining 8 0 % being drawn from private prop-
erties. The ejidos which have been (partly) formed using national lands are all located 
in the north-eastern part of the region where fewer private estates were established 
prior to 1939 (see also Map 2.9 below). 
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Map 2.6 Land redis t r ibut ion in t h e Tojolabal Map 2.7 Land redis tr ibut ion in t h e Tojolabal 
H i g h l a n d s (1938-1944) H i g h l a n d s (1945-1964) 
Mapping the transformation 
Since the 1930s, when land redistribution began in the Tojolabal Highlands, more 
and more land has come to be controlled by Tojolabal communities. Fincas gave way 
to ejidos and some copropiedades. The graphic representations given here (Maps 2.6 
to 2.8) show which tracts of land came under the control of Tojolabal peasants in 
what period (making no distinction between endowment, acquisition, and occupa-
tion). The property boundaries as indicated on these maps are approximate - for 
reasons outlined in the section on methodology below -. They are accurate enough, 
however, to show the historical pathway of land redistribution. The sequence of 
maps shows that most of the land passed into Tojolabal hands during the first two 
decades (roughly 1940-1960), slowing down after that. 
Ejido endowments first took place in the western half of the region, subsequently 
shifting to the east. As of the 1960s, the limits to land redistribution began to 
become apparent. The maps show that after 1964 there was hardly any land in the 
region that could still be claimed. Significant expansions of land having been trans-
ferred, pressure on the remaining tracts of land increased. On the one hand, this 
translated into an increasing interest in national lands (usually more mountainous 
and less suitable for agriculture). On the other hand, the remaining private proper-
ties, those retained by finca owners after having been affected by land redistribution, 
were being claimed increasingly insistently. This led to the acquisition of land in 
copropiedad, as has already been mentioned. Another solution was found in the so-
called excedentes of the remaining private properties. Many of the ejido endowments 
(particularly extensions to existing ejidos) after the 1970s were based on such exce-
dentes. These were tracts of land that actually formed part of a pequena propiedad, 
without however being properly titled, continuing a situation that had also existed 
under the finca regime. Though all fincas had land titles, the area they in fact used 
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H i g h l a n d s ( 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 9 3 ) 
was often not predsely delimited or, in some cases, fenced. Fincas that bordered on 
national lands often used much more land than they were entitled to by their prop-
erty deeds. As pressure on land grew, private properties were surveyed and meas-
ured more accurately. When it was established that the territory actually occupied by 
a specific private property exceeded the area that their land titles covered, this extra 
area could legally be used for ejido endowments. 5 3 Through these processes, many 
of the 'blank spots' shown on the second map became filled in after 1964. 
Contours of the region of communities 
Under the influence of land redistribution, the Tojolabal Highlands became a region 
of communities. By 1950, six of the twenty-eight settlements listed appear as 
haciendas and another four as r a n c h o s 5 4 ; the remainder are listed as colonia 
agraria.55 Map 2.9 gives the spatial distribution of the different forms of tenure 
present in the Tojolabal Highlands by 1993. It shows that the ejido is the predomi-
nant form of land tenure in the region, the other major land tenure system being 
that of bienes comunales, or communal property. In the Tojolabal Highlands, bienes 
comunales were created on the basis of the copropiedades established earlier, most of 
which - as explained above - corresponded to pequenas propiedades that were 
purchased by groups of Tojolabal peasants. This was achieved by means of a proce-
dure offidally called Restitution y Titulation de Bienes Comunales (RTBC), designed 
to give a comrnunity deeds for common property. The tenure regime of bienes comu-
nales is surrounded by fewer detailed legal prindples than the ejido is, and formally 
leaves the community greater freedom as to the allocation of land among its 
members. One should recall that these are merely legal labels that do not necessarily 
describe land tenure practices, as we will discuss later on. Like ejidos, bienes comu-
nales are regarded by Mexican law as social property. Conversely, copropiedades are 
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considered to be private property. This legal distinction means that copropriedades 
may be liable to land redistribution, which in the Tojolabal Highlands has meant 
that expropriation of copropiedades began to be proposed as a means of providing 
ejido extensions to neighbouring ejidos wishing to expand. Converting to the system 
of bienes comunales, a form of social property, was a way of circumventing these 
threats. In this study, I regard copropiedades and bienes comunales as a single category. 
By 1993, distribution of the various land tenure regimes in the Tojolabal High-
lands was as follows: 7 6 % of the region was ejido land (mduding both endowments 
and extensions), 15% corresponded to bienes comunales and copropiedades, 2.5% was 
in possession (titles in dispute) and 6.5% was individual private property (100%= 
63 802 hectares). Most communities only owned ejido lands (see Table 2.3), a few 
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Table 2.3 T e n u r e r e g i m e s in t h e Tojolabal 
H i g h l a n d s by locality 
Type of tenure fsettlements 
Only ejido land 
Only bienes comunales 
or copropiedad 
Mixed 
Total 
3 
6 
26 
17 
only owned bienes comunales or land in copropiedad, while a few others had a 'mixed' 
tenure system, that is a combination of ejido land with bienes comunales or 
copropiedad and/or possession. O f the five private properties that existed in the 
region by 1993, only two had a proper settlement; while the others only had a few 
buildings (house, stable, and caretaker's hut). 
In 1993, the underlying finca grid of land distribution was still visible (compare 
maps 2.3 and 2.9). The boundaries of the ejidos and copropiedades were largely based 
on earlier finca boundaries, though several fragmentations had occurred and addi-
tional national lands had been assigned to communities. Many ejido settlements 
today still occupy the same site where the mozos lived in finca times and despite 
being renamed during the land reform process, continue to be referred to by the 
name of the finca. Plan de Ayala is still often called Jotana, Veinte de Noviembre is 
still often called Santiago, to cite just two examples. Notwithstanding these conti-
nuities, the creation of ejidos usually involved a certain redefinition and sometimes 
even re-location of communities. In many cases, the mozos were divided over the 
issue of land redistribution and part of the population moved to a nearby location to 
found a new settlement. A number of very small settlements, with only a few 
houses, which used to be located in the more remote parts of the fincas, have disap-
peared. Too small to qualify for an ejido endowment, they joined up with other 
settlements to gain access to land. 
It is evident from the maps that by 1993 the area still in possession of private, 
non-Indian landowners was reduced to a small percentage of the total area. These 
remnants of the old fincas now formed islands in predominantly peasant surround-
ings. It is interesting to note where these private properties are located. With one 
exception, the private properties are situated in the northern and southeastern 
extremes of the Tojolabal Highlands. The persistence of private properties here 
seems partly to reflect the land tenure dynamics of the regions to the north- and 
southeast of the Tojolabal Highlands, where land redistribution only affected private 
property to a limited extent and gave rise to a situation whereby ejidos and ranchos 
co-existed within the same geographical area. 
Pressures on private properties 
As of the late 1970s, land redistribution in the Tojolabal Highlands reached an 
impasse. The margins for groups of peasants to expand the land under their control 
became more and more reduced. At the same time, the demand for land continued 
to grow, as the children and grandchildren of the first generation of Tojolabal 
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ejidatarios needed land of their own. They could only just be accommodated on the 
existing ejidos and though some of them moved eastwards, settling in the Canadas 
region of the Lacandona rainforest (Acevedo 1995, Ruz 1982), both the population 
and the demand for land in the Tojolabal Highlands kept increasing. In the period 
from i960 to 1990, the population of this region doubled, from about 6,400 to over 
14,800. 
As a consequence of the growing but increasingly unsatisfied demand for land, 
pressure on the few remaining private properties grew. I discussed earlier how the 
Cliibtik frnca became more and more fragmented in response to such pressures and 
How large tracts of the former finca were transferred to groups of Tojolabal peasants. 
The fate of Mendoza and San Mateo was similar to that of Chibtik. Both properties 
had been reduced in size due to peasant pressure, first in the form of land redistri-
bution, and subsequently through sales. By 1973 the owners of Mendoza had sold 
part of their land (some 100 hectares) to a group of twenty peasants from the Tojo-
labal ejido Veinte de Noviembre. 5 6 Furthermore, the Chiapas division of the Land 
Reform Ministry in Tuxtla Gutierrez negotiated the sale of another 200 hectares 
within the framework of the Fondo de Regularizacion Agraria in favour of peasants 
ffom the same finca, known as Veinte de Noviembre . 5 7 The sale was eventually 
registered in 1995, but there are indications that the peasants had taken possession 
df it earlier. 5 8 The story of San Mateo is similar. First an endowment to the Veracruz 
ejido, followed by the (as yet unregularised) occupation of 1500 hectares by a group 
of ejidatarios from Veracruz, and finally an induced sale to the state government, 
had reduced the size of the private property to about 230 hectares by 1 9 9 3 . 5 9 
Parts of Chibtik (the private property being called Yalchibtik), Mendoza and San 
Mateo survived as private properties into the 1990s, together with El Nanzte and La 
Libertad, both former copropiedades of mestizo owners that had subsequently been 
split up in a number of individual sections. El Nantze, constituted as a copropiedad in 
1956, was divided into about thirty small properties in 1 9 7 0 . 6 0 La Libertad was 
formed in 1948 with lands from the Bahuitz finca and was jointly owned by eight 
brothers. 6 1 Attempts by the surrounding Tojolabal population to acquire these prop-
erties in the form of extensions to their ejidos continued, but failed to achieve the 
desired result. The properties did not exceed the official limit for private properties 
and were therefore not liable to imposed land redistribution. Peasant groups could 
only acquire these lands if the owners were willing to sell, sometimes, as in the case 
of Mendoza mentioned above, after they were persuaded to do so by the state govern-
ment. As of the 1970s, the story of land reform in the Tojolabal Highlands increas-
ingly became one of frustrated attempts to gain more land, and relations with the 
remaining private properties became rather antagonistic. As I will show in the next 
chapter, the struggle for land became increasingly politicised. The Zapatista uprising 
of 1994 broke the impasse: Yalchibtik, Mendoza and San Mateo have been invaded 
by surrounding communities, and El Nantze was also partially affected by invasions. 
A methodological intermezzo 
Before proceeding to the discussion of land redistribution in the Tojolabal High-
lands, I would like to deal with certain methodological aspects of my reconstruction 
of this process, to give the reader an insight into some of the methodological choices 
made. 
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In order to reconstruct the changes in land distribution in the Tojolabal High-
lands I drew primarily on the archive of the Chiapas division of the Land Reform 
Ministry in Tuxtla Gutierrez (ARA-TG), the Land Registry Office from Ocosingo 
(RPP-O), and data from the Registro Agrario National (RAN), where possible cross-
checked with geographical information, and information provided by inhabitants of 
the region. The ARA-TG keeps the files of the actiones agrarias, documenting the 
process of land redistribution for different settlements. There are files on the posi-
tively completed cases as well as on cases that did not lead to land endowments. I 
found that most files included documents on the petitions for land endowments and 
on the corresponding decisions at the state and national level, as well as maps (the 
definitive pianos de ejecution, or preliminary pianos proyecto). Furthermore, the files 
generally included surveys used to evaluate the viability of claims to land. These 
reports, produced by the CAM (Comision Agraria Mixta) - a state-level organisation 
that included representatives of the Land Reform Ministry, the state government and 
peasant unions - provide surveys of private properties as well as census and land 
use data of the petitioning population. Since the archive of the Delegation of the land 
reform ministry only concerned properties that had been created with their involve-
ment, i.e. social property, it provided a rather limited picture of the northeastern part 
of the Tojolabal Highlands (belonging to the municipality of Altamirano) where 
private properties and copropiedades predominated. To fill in the missing data I 
resorted to the Land Registry Office of Ocosingo, which turned out to have a fairly 
complete record of the history of sales and divisions of private properties as far back 
as 1900. The information contained in these archives is more limited than that of 
the ARA-TG, but it provided useful data on extensions, the names of sellers and 
buyers involved in transactions, as well as some of the previous history of a prop-
erty. 
I combined data from these archives with a land tenure map recently (1995) 
produced by the RAN in Tuxtla Gutierrez to construct a database on the transfer of 
land to Tojolabal communities, in other words, which tracts were given to which 
settlements and when. The RAN map had the advantage of presenting the various 
areas of land tenure (polygons) in relation to one another. I revised the map of the 
RAN considerably however, on the basis of the archives mentioned. (Though the 
RAN map was based on the archives of the Land Reform Ministry, I found it 
contained many inaccuracies both in relation to the archives and field data. 5 2 ) 
Together with the LAIGE (Lahoratorio de Andlisis de Information Geogrdfica y Estadh-
tica) of the Colegio de la Frontera Sur in San Cristobal de las Casas, I drew up my own 
map of land tenure in the region. This was further corrected by overlaying my provi-
sional tenure map with maps from the 1970s, indicating some of the existing fences 
(INEGI maps based on aerial photographs of 1973) 6 3 and a recent Landsat-satellite 
image on which some of the property divisions were clearly visible. The extensions 
I have worked with in this study are calculated on the basis of these maps, and do 
not always coincide with those reported by ARA-TG or the RAN. The boundaries as 
indicated on the land tenure maps used in this chapter remain tentative. To achieve 
more accuracy, detailed measurements of boundaries (linderos) in the field would be 
necessary, but this was not feasible in the framework of this research project, not 
only because of the time and money this would involve, but also because of the polit-
ical implications taking measurements would h a v e . 6 4 
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In reconslxucting the process of land redistribution I have used reference dates 
for the establishment of peasant control over specific areas of land, based on the year 
in which land was effectively transferred to peasant groups. 6 5 In some cases this was 
the year that the Presidential Resolution was issued, more often, however, I had 
convincing evidence that the would-be ejidatarios had already taken possession of 
the land before the Presidential Resolution was issued or executed, by means of the 
ekecution of the provisional endowment, granted by the state governor. 6 6 In many 
cases I found the effective transfer of land to former Tojolabal peons to have 
preceded formal recognition of their rights. Where I had no conclusive evidence on 
aj de facto transfer of the land at an early stage of the process, I used the date of the 
ekecution of the Presidential Resolution as the date of reference. In the case of prop-
erties that were bought by groups of Tojolabal peasants, I used the date of registra-
tion at the RPP-O, which in some cases may have been a slightly conservative esti-
mate. 
Reconstructing the process of land redistribution was quite a puzzle. In some 
cases I was not able to find conclusive answers to questions like: Was the Presiden-
tial Resolution ever executed? Did the final map {piano definiUvo) on which the execu-
tion was based coincide with the map for the projected endowment {piano proyecto)} 
y h e n disputes occurred, which group eventually gained control of a certain tract of 
land? I was able to solve some puzzles by cross-checking files from different 
communities, although in other cases I encountered discrepancies I could not 
account for. In several cases asking people in the field helped m e to interpret the 
documents in the files. However, there were still cases where I had to make an 
informed guess. I must have made mistakes in a few of these. The most important 
types of error concern the final settlement of land disputes, and the exact areas 
involved in the endowments as well as their physical boundaries. I am quite certain, 
however, that the differences involved do not alter the overall trends as outlined 
above. 
Discussion: patterns of land reform in Chiapas 
The data I presented in this chapter support at least one clear conclusion: since 
1939, Tojolabal peasants have acquired control over almost all the land in the Tojo-
labal Highlands. As a direct consequence of land reform, and to some extent of land 
acquisitions by groups of Tojolabal peasants, only some of the original fincas 
continued in the form of, considerably reduced, individual private properties in 
1993. In this section I will compare these developments with land tenure transfor-
mations in other regions of Chiapas, arguing that although the Tojolabal Highlands 
represent a somewhat extreme case, land reform also affected large estates else-
where. Another issue that I will address in this concluding section is the predomi-
nance of ejidos compared to other types of land reform, notably that of bienes comu-
nales. I will also point to some of the issues that I will develop in the following 
chapters. 
The Tojolabal Highlands as an extreme case 
It has been common for scholars to dismiss land reform in Chiapas as limited and 
neutralised by powerful landowners. Where it did take place, as in the Central High-
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lands, its negative consequences are pointed out, such as greater state control and 
caciquismo. This might almost lead one to overlook the fact that many regions in 
Chiapas were considerably affected by land reform (see also Viquiera 1999). By 
1993, over 50% of all land in Chiapas was ejidal or communal, totalling roughly 3.8 
rnillion hectares out of 7.4. Private property accounted only for a quarter of the total 
surface, with 1.8 million hectares (Villafuerte et al. 1 9 9 9 : 1 2 3 ) . 6 7 Data provided by 
Reyes Ramos (1992; maps 1-7 in the annex), show that no municipality was left 
untouched by land reform. Such extensive land redistribution was not only carried 
out on the basis of national lands and land marginal to large estates. Al though these 
played a role, the distribution of individual private property was as much part of the 
story, leading in some regions to the virtual disappearance of private property. 
The view that land reform did not seriously affect the interests of the landholding 
elite therefore seems one-sided. 6 8 Although political domination by certain groups 
of powerful landowners may have continued - albeit in a considerably modified 
fashion - over the past half century, it would be incorrect to say that their estates 
survived intact. With notable exceptions, by 1994 private properties in large parts of 
Chiapas were only a shadow of the fincas that had existed at the beginning of the 
century. The Tojolabal Highlands present an extreme example of this, but the case 
is certainly not unique: fincas have also given way to ejidos in other regions 
Significant regional differences exist. The near-completeness of the process I 
found in the Tojolabal Highlands, seems only to be repeated in parts of the Central 
Highlands of Chiapas and of the Lacandona rainforest. Wasserstrom (1993:166, 
167) cites data that, by 1944, give an average percentage of 57% of the total area 
being ejidal or communal for the municipalities of the Central Highlands. For 
Chamula, the figure is 99.690. 6 9 In the Highlands, ejidos and Henes comunales were 
at least partly created on the basis of private properties (see also Edel 1966). Ejidos 
have also come to predominate in the Cafladas region of the Lacandona rainforest, 
although in some areas private properties are still prominent (Ascencio 1995). Ejidos 
here were created partly on lands expropriated from large logging concessions that 
had been nationalised by the Mexican government but also affected cattle ranches 
that had spread into the Canadas from the traditional finca region on the edge of the 
Lacandona rainforest (De Vos 1995:348-51; Leyva & Ascencio 1996:175,176; Collier 
1994:39). In the areas immediately adjacent to the Tojolabal Highlands in the north 
and east, private property was curtailed, but did not disappear completely, giving rise 
to a rather complex mosaic of private and social properties. It is here that some of 
the properties of former governor Absalon Castellanos and his brother Ernesto are 
located (Burguete 1994). The situation of Yalchibtik and Mendoza to the north and 
San Mateo to the East, reflect some of the tensions and dynamics that were common 
to the regions of Ocosingo and Las Margaritas. 
In other regions, possibly because of the economic interests that were at stake, 
the pattern of land redistribution has been different. In the Soconusco, the Grijalva 
basin, and the northern region of Chiapas, the dissolution of private property has 
been far less extreme. The partial land reforms in the coffee-producing regions of 
the Soconusco, whereby landowners retained the central part of the fincas and ejidos 
were created as a buffer zone around them, have already been mentioned (Wasser-
strom 1983: 164; Benjamin 1995). In the Grijalva Basin, important for cattle 
ranching and sugarcane production, ejidos have been created since the 1970s mostly 
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as nuevos centros de poblacion ejidal, resettling people from other regions, on lands 
that first had been expropriated by the state (Villafuerte et al. 1999: 261-270; also 
Wasserstrom 1983). In Simojovel, in the coffee-producing northern region, some 
land redistribution took place in the 1940s, but was then blocked by landowners. By 
1980, only 2 0 % of the land in this region corresponded to ejidos (Harvey 1998: 58). 
By 1996, the northern region as a whole still had one of highest percentages of 
private property in Chiapas, namely 47 percent, as opposed to 41 per cent ejidos 
(Reyes Ramos 1998:41). 
As to the question of why it was that land redistribution in the Tojolabal High-
lands put an almost complete end to private property, I can only venture some 
hypotheses at this point. The explanation lies, I think, in the combination of various 
factors: the timing of the reforms and the boost given by the federal government, 
the comparatively low productive value of the properties in this region, and the pres-
ence of a considerable land claiming population. How landowners in this region 
tried (and largely failed) to defend their properties, is discussed in the next chapter. 
The predominance of ejidos 
l ike is true for Mexico in general, land reform in Chiapas has mainly taken the form 
0f ejido-endowments. Although, as a direct result of the Mexican Revolution, Article 
27 of the Mexican Constitution enshrines the right to restitution of land to commu-
nities that had been illegally deprived of it (especially following the Reform laws of 
fhe second half of the 19th century), endowment has played a far greater role in land 
redistribution. One explanation may be found in the orientation of land reform that 
favoured ejido endowments over restitution. As I have mentioned earlier, Cardenas 
gave the ejido a privileged role in his model of agricultural development, and the ejido 
fitted extremely well into the conception of land reform as an instrument for 
increasing the presence of the Mexican national state in the countryside. Whereas 
ivith restitution, the Mexican state is correcting an earlier wrong done to commu-
hities, in the case of ejido endowments, it emerges as a benefactor of the rural poor. 
Some authors argue that the Mexican state has consistently discouraged 'indigenous 
Claims', considered counterproductive to modernisation and nation building (see 
Flores Felix 1 9 9 8 ) . 7 0 Restitution was, however, also limited by practical constraints: 
many communities could not present the property deeds needed to prove their 
rights (see for example Whetten 1948:129; Ibarra 1 9 8 9 : 1 8 7 ) . 7 1 Ejido endowments, 
on the other hand, do not require such documentation. This alone could explain why 
restitution did not play a role in the Tojolabal Highlands. The historical inclusion of 
the Tojolabal in the fincas of the regions would have made it difficult if not impos-
sible to stake any historical claims to the land that would predate the establishment 
of the fincas. Furthermore, peons could only claim land through endowment proce-
dures. 
Official data from the VII Censo agropecuario of 19 91 make clear that in Chiapas 
ejidos represent 9 6 % of the localities that have benefited from land reform (see table 
2.4), covering 75% of the total area and containing 7 8 % of the total number of bene-
ficiaries. Figures on land reform actions (acciones agrarias) tell the same story. Of a 
total of 1836 such actions between 1920 and 1984, only 2 referred to land restitu-
tion and 43 to the creation of bienes comunales72 (see Reyes Ramos 1992, annex II)-
meaning that over 9 7 % of these actions were related to ejido endowments (in the 
67 
Table 2.4 C o m p o s i t i o n o f s o c i a l pr oper t y in C h i a p a s (1991) 
Ejidos Comunidades Total 
Number of settlements* 
Area (ha.)** 
Beneficiaries 
(heads of households) 
1983 
3 079 027 
193 741 
9 6 % 89 
7 6 % 978 070 
7 8 % 54 790 2 2 % 
4 % 2072 
2 4 % 4 066 097 
248 531 1 00% 
1 0 0 % 
1 0 0 % 
SOURCES: * ATLAS AGROPECUARIO DE CHIAPAS; VII C E N S O AGROPECUARIO 1 9 9 1 , I N E G I 1 9 9 6 
* * PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, G O B I E R N O DEL ESTADO DE CHIAPAS 
forms of original endowments, extensions or the creation of new ejido settlements). 
The tenure system of bienes comunales allows for a greater degree of communal 
autonomy in the internal allocation of rights, which is why it is often considered to 
be a form of land tenure more suitable for indigenous communities. Yet in Chiapas, 
as in most of Mexico, ejido endowments have made up the bulk of land reform even 
in indigenous regions. 7 3 Conventional statistics do not allow for a precise estimate 
of the number of Indians amongst the beneficiaries of land reform; statistics on land 
tenure such as the ten-yearly Censo ejidal do not specify the ethnic composition of 
the settlements involved, while the official population census - which does include 
data on ethnicity - does not report on the tenure system. Nevertheless it is quite 
clear that the ejido has become the dominant land tenure regime even in regions 
which are notably indigenous. 
In Chiapas, some large bienes comunales have been instituted in indigenous 
regions. The 600,000 hectares given to the Lacandon community is a well known 
but rather unusual c a s e . 7 4 Most other bienes comunales have been created in central 
Chiapas, for example in Chamula and Venustiano Carranza, involving 29, 000 and 
50, 000 hectares respectively (Reyes Ramos 1992: anexo 12). In the Tojolabal High-
lands, the bienes comunales axe much smaller, usually several hundred hectares, with 
the exception of San Frandsco, which has 2,200 hectares. As explained earlier, these 
were established as a reaction to the very limitations of the land reform process, 
which first, could not redistribute the established pequenas propiedades for the benefit 
of the Tojolabal populations (who then bought them as copropiedades), and then 
lacked other mechanisms for protecting these copropiedades from claims by their 
ejido neighbours. The establishment of bienes comunales in the Tojolabal seems not 
to have been related to particular ethnic demands. 
Land redistribution in the Tojolabal Highlands, then, implied a process of'ejidal-
isatiorf. In other words, the ejido became the predominant form of land tenure in 
the region. Land reform, however, not only completely changed the land tenure situ-
ation in the region but also implied a social reconfiguration. The region became 
'tojolabalised'. The hegemony of the fincas gave way to a domain of Tojolabal 
peasant communities, in which Tojolabal became the most important language and 
Tojolabal communities controlled land and resources. Though the estabHshment of 
ejidos placed the Tojolabal ejidatarios within a legal framework of the state, and to a 
some extent subjeded them to the agenda for national development, in practice it 
allowed them considerable autonomy in the regulation of land tenure at the 
communal level. These changes will be substantiated in the following chapters. 
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Notes 
i In Chiapas, the term finca for large, 
privately owned estates was more 
common than the term hacienda used in 
the rest of Mexico. 
t Further details on this simple neoclassic 
type of architecture can be found in 
Pulido, 1 9 9 4 . 
3 Term to designate the non-indigenous, 
which has the connotation of rich. 
4 Form of joint private property. 
5 This contrasts with the region south of 
Comitan which has been most highly 
documented. In this rather flat region, 
with its mild climate, large estates were 
established by Dominicans in early colo-
nial times. Conversely, the Tojolabal 
Highlands,, to the northeast of Comitan, 
are rougher, hillier, and — w i t h altitudes 
between of 1 2 0 0 and 1 9 0 0 m above sea-
level'—• colder. 
6 A description of the information on pre-
Hispanic populations in Chiapas is avail-
able in Tejada & Clark ( 1 9 9 3 ) . Sources 
related to the Tojolabal can be found in 
Martinez Lavin ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Some archeolog-
ical findings from caves in the Tojolabal 
region, amongst which textiles, are 
recorded by Blom (1954) . 
7 Gerhard gives a population estimate for 
the province of Chiapa immediately prior 
to the conquest of 2 7 5 0 0 0 ; the number 
steadily declined until 1 8 0 0 , for which he 
mentions a total of 6 7 , 0 0 0 , 53, 0 0 0 of 
w h o m were Indian ( 1 9 9 1 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 2 1 , Table 
B). 
8 A thorough account of the conquest of 
the Lacandona rainforest can be found in 
De Vos ( 1 9 8 0 ) . 
9 In flatter regions, e.g. to the south and 
southeast of Comitan, Tojolabal may also 
have settled; their development there 
seems to have involved a higher degree of 
miscegenation. 
t o The term hacienda can be taken as a 
synonym for 'fincas'; rancho is a term 
used to refer to smaller properties, with 
no stone buildings - no church or casa 
grande - and sometimes an anexo to a 
finca proper. 
11 Tello drew on statistical data published by 
the Secretaria de Economia; Benjamin 
based himself on statistical data from the 
state o f Chiapas, the Anuario estadistico de 
Chiapas of 1 9 0 3 , and Wasserstrom (1983) . 
It should be noted that the increase in the 
number of properties is not necessarily 
merely the consequence of expansion, but 
may also have involved the subdivision of 
large holdings. 
12 Archivo histôrico del Estado de Chiapas, 
Registro Publico de Propiedad de 
Comitan 1 9 0 4 . 
13 In this respect, the Tojolabal Highlands 
resemble Chiapas as a whole where by 
1 9 1 0 only 4 % of the localities were inde-
pendent villages and 8 8 % were haciendas 
and ranchos; see Hernandez Chavez 
( 1 9 7 9 : 343, Table 3). 
1 4 To give a few examples: Eleuterio Aguilar 
was 'Jefe politico' of the Comitan Departa-
mento, as I discovered in a reference 
from 1 9 0 7 ; Fondo Secretaria de 
Gobierno, Section de Fomento, 1 9 0 7 , 
Vol. I, A H E C H . Reynaldo Gordillo Leon 
was topographic engineer and served as 
interim-governor of Chiapas in 1 9 1 0 , 
Garcia de Leon ( 1 9 8 5 b : 23) . Quirino 
Dominguez was 'Juez de Comitari 
(Garcia de Leon 1 9 8 5 a : 1 6 9 ) . 
15 He also owned the finca La Soledad, in 
the valley region to the east, which falls 
outside of the scope of this study. 
1 6 The reconstruction is based on informa-
tion from the archives of the Chiapas divi-
sion of the Land Reform Ministery in 
Tuxtla Gutierrez. 
17 The view that the revolution was 'funda-
mentally popular and agrarian' is devel-
oped forcefully by Knight in his two 
volumes on The Mexican Revolution 
(Knight 1 9 8 6 : xi). 
18 Womack gives a translation of the Plan de 
Ayala of 15 December 1 9 1 1 , 1 cite the most 
relevant passages: 
Art 6 ...the pueblos or citizens who have 
the titles corresponding to those proper-
ties will immediately enter into posses-
sion of that real estate of which they have 
been despoiled by the bad faith of our 
oppressors.... 
Art 7 ....because lands, timber, and water 
are monopolized in a few hands, for this 
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cause there will be expropriated the ihird 
part of those monopolies from the 
powerful proprietors of them. . . in order 
that the pueblos and citizens of Mexico 
may obtain ejidos, colonies, and founda-
tions for pueblos, or fields for sowing or 
laboring. . . (1969: 4 0 0 - 4 0 4 ) . 
1 9 For accounts of the passing of the 
carrancista troups in the Tojolabal region, 
see the testimonies of Victoriano Cruz 
Vazquez and Enrique Espinoza Moreno, 
in G o m e z and Ruz ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 2 4 - 1 2 6 and 
1 7 0 ) . 
2 0 This is clear, for example, from the testi-
mony of Enrique Espinoza Moreno, in 
Gomez and Ruz ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 7 1 ) . 
2 1 Alan Right goes even further in stating 
that Carranza reversed the de facto land 
reform that had taken place during the 
Revolution and created barriers to further 
redistribution ( 1 9 8 6 b : 4 6 6 ) . 
2 2 The original text of this section of Article 
2 7 reads: 
Los pueblos, rancherias y comunidades que 
carezcan de tierras y aguas, 0 no las tengan 
en cantidad suficiente para las necesidades 
de supohlacion, tendrdn derecho a que se les 
dote de ellas, tomandolas de las propiedades 
inmediatas, respetando siempre lapequena 
propiedad. See, for example, Silva Herzog 
( 1 9 5 9 : 2 5 0 ) . 
23 See for example Gutelman 1 9 7 4 . 
2 4 The caballeria corresponds to 4 2 . 8 
hectares. 
25 Archivo Historico del estado de Chiapas, 
Registro Publico de Propiedad de 
Comitan, 1 8 9 2 
2 6 RPP-O 1 9 0 6 - 3 9 ; Adjudication 1 9 2 9 . 
2 7 RPP O 1 9 0 9 - 5 . 
2 8 RPP-O 1 9 3 1 - 0 5 , Adjudication 1 9 2 4 . 
2 9 RPP-O 1 9 3 3 - 0 6 
3 0 Here and in the remainder o f the chapter 
the reader may note differences in the 
size of these large properties. Such differ-
ences are recurrent and are not always 
accounted for in the documents. In some 
cases, they may be related to new, more 
precise, measurements made as a result 
of transactions. 
31 RPP-O 1 9 5 5 - 0 1 8 
32 R P P - O 1 9 5 5 - 0 1 8 
33 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 2 1 
34 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 2 1 
35 ARA-TG 1358; by the 1 9 4 0 census it is 
mentioned as a colonia agraria, indicating 
that settlement took place considerably 
before the Presidential Resolution. 
3 6 Both the Presidential Resolution and the 
execution took place in 1 9 5 1 . The Presi-
dential Resolution is an important step in 
the process of ejido endowments, which 
follows a sequence of petition, investiga-
tions, and provisional endowment. It 
states how m u c h land will be given, o f 
what type, where it is located, and lists 
the beneficiaries. In order to complete the 
endowment, the Presidential Resolution 
needs to be executed, a process which 
involves the physical location and meas-
urement of the lands. The procedure is 
dealt with in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
37 ARA-TG 1 2 7 5 ; There is mention of 1 2 0 
hectares of Honduras having been 
donated to the peon population previ-
ously; it is unclear whether these were 
included in the ejido-endowment or 
whether they were additional. 
38 ARA-TG 4 8 0 
3 9 RPP-O 1 9 5 6 - 0 0 4 ; El Nantze was acquired 
as a copropiedad, which implies that a 
number of socios own the property in 
equal (en partes aUcuotas) and undivided 
(pro indiviso) shares. Unlike the ejido, the 
copropiedad is a form of private property. 
4 0 ARA-TG 1 1 0 1 
4 1 ARA-TG 1275 
4 2 RPP-O 1 9 6 4 - 0 3 and 1 9 6 4 - 0 4 
4 3 RPP-O 1 9 7 7 - 0 9 and 1 9 7 7 - 1 0 
4 4 RPP-O 1 9 8 3 - 2 5 6 
4 5 RPP 1 9 8 4 - 2 3 ; RPP 1 9 8 5 - 2 2 6 
4 6 RPP 1985-373 
4 7 One in 1 9 8 5 (RPP-O 1 9 8 5 - 3 3 6 ) ; two in 
1 9 8 7 (RPP-O 1 9 8 7 - 1 2 4 ; 1 9 8 7 - 3 6 3 ) ; and 
the remaining three in 1 9 8 8 (RPP-O 
1 9 8 8 - 5 1 7 , 1 9 8 8 - 5 1 8 , 1 9 8 8 - 5 1 9 ) . 
4 8 ARA-TG 4 8 0 , 1 6 6 5 , including also one of 
the fractions of Cananea. 
4 9 O n such restrictions in the legislation of 
1 9 2 2 and 1 9 2 9 see Ibarra ( 1 9 8 9 : 1 9 2 -
1 9 6 ) . According to this same author the 
possibilities entailed in the Cddigo Agrario 
of 1 9 3 4 were still very restricted, and were 
only substantially broadened by Cardenas' 
revisions to the Codigo Agrario in 1 9 3 7 
(Ibarra 1 9 8 9 : 1 9 6 ) . In the case o f the 
Tojolabal Highlands, however, the restric-
tions placed on peones acasillados seem 
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not to have prevented their de facto inclu-
sion in the endowment process. 
5 0 Joint undivided property in which indi-
vidual associates have a proportional right 
referred to as parte alicuota (Diccionario 
1 9 9 4 : 750-1) 
51 A radius o f 7 k m around the petitioning 
settlement was considered. Another way 
out was to form a new settlement in an 
area with available land, in the form of a 
nuevo centra de poblaciôn ejidal. 
52 Communal property, owned by a settle-
ment or community (Diccionario 1994: 
3 4 0 ) . 
53 Formally, such excedentes were considered 
untitled, hence national, land. In this 
study I have considered these areas as 
finca land, thus approaching the de facto 
situation. 
54 These are Bajucû, Palma Real, Bahuitz, 
Vergel, Chibtik and Mendoza, San Isidro, 
Nantze and Santo Domingo Corona, 
respectively. 
55 Later censuses did not provide data per 
locality, but only at the aggregated, 
municipal level. The 1 9 9 0 census, 
however, simply lists all localities as ejidos 
(using this as a synonym for settlement) 
( I N E G I 1 9 9 5 ) . 
5 6 RPP-0 1 9 7 4 - 0 0 6 ; 1974-105. 
5J7 ARA-TG 735 
58 RPP-O 1 9 9 5 - 1 4 1 
5I9 ARA-TG 5 7 6 , 1 7 2 8 , 6 3 8 , 3 7 8 6 / 9 1 
6 0 RPP-O 1 9 7 0 - 1 0 6 
6 1 RPP-O 1 9 4 8 - 2 7 ; ARA-TG 9 6 4 
6 2 A comparison of the maps from different 
periods and files at ARA-TG showed that 
their topological exactitude varied and 
that there were discrepancies between the 
maps. These errors are partly related to 
the inaccurate land measurements 
carried out in the 1 9 4 0 s and 1 9 5 0 s when 
ejido endowments were handed over to 
peasant groups and which in many cases 
; have not been verified since. Certainly, 
some of these contradictions must have 
given rise to the inaccuracies in the RAN. 
6 3 The maps were the numbers E 1 5 D 7 3 , 
E 1 5 D 6 3 , E 1 5 D 6 4 and E 1 5 D 7 4 , scale 1: 50 
0 0 0 ) . 
6 4 Whereas in other regions of Mexico 
earlier imprécisions have been corrected 
during the process of measurement and 
registration involved in the implementa-
tion of the PROCEDE-programme 
(Programa de Certification de Derechos 
Ejidales y titulacion de solares urbanos), this 
was not carried out in the region of study 
due to the political tensions after 1 9 9 4 . 
65 My approach here differs from that 
followed by Reyes Ramos who, in her 
study of land reform in Chiapas, uses the 
date of execution of the Presidential Reso-
lution, d a r n i n g that only then did the 
endowment become effective ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 9 ) . 
6 6 The governor's mandamiento was a kind 
of mterim resolution to be confirmed by 
the Presidential Resolution, which made 
it possible to give the land to the peasants 
even before the time-consuming process 
of endowment was formalised. 
6 7 This figure only refers to lands that have 
officially been transferred to ejidatarios or 
comuneros, who might actually control 
even more land (Villafuerte et al. 1 9 9 9 
estimate 4.5 million hectares). 
6 8 A vision found for example in Garda de 
Leon 1 9 8 5 , Reyes Ramos 1 9 9 2 , Wasser-
strom 1 9 8 3 . 
6 9 For the sake of clarity: for the region of 
study I have given the figure of about 
9 3 % ; this is not a figure for the munici-
pality of Las Margaritas or of Altamirano. 
7 0 Cardenas himself is said to have declared 
that: "The Mexican Revolution does not 
seek to Tndianise' Mexico, but rather to 
'Mexicanise' our Indians" (Patzcuaro 
1 9 4 0 ) (my translation): 'La revolution 
Mexicana no pretende indianizar a 
Mexico sino mexicanizar a nuestros 
indios', Guillermo de la Pefia ( 1 9 9 4 ) , 
cited in Flores Felix ( 1 9 9 8 : 4 0 ) . 
7 1 In view of such difficulties, the 'double 
w a / of land redistribution was instituted, 
simultaneously promoting restitution and 
endowment procedures. 
7 2 The procedure is known as RTBC: 
Reconocimiento y Titulacion de Bienes 
Comunales 
73 A notable exception is the state of Oaxaca, 
where communal tenure predominates. 
7 4 Involving serious conflicts with ejidos on 
which the area was superimposed (see 
Leyva & Ascencio 1 9 9 6 ; Legorreta 1 9 9 8 ) . 
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Chapter three 
The intricacies of land reform 
Initial hesitations 
"Look, why dorit some of you stay here? Half of you could go, and half of you 
could stay. There is not much land [to be given away] and it will not be 
enough for all of you. Besides... you shouldn't leave your patron, he will be so 
lonely. You'd better stay and keep him company." 
Using similar wording the Mayor or municipal president {présidente municipal) of 
San Carlos (now called Altamirano) is said to have tried to persuade several of the 
mozos of Chibtik to abandon the idea of forming an ejido and to remain on the finca. 
This was in about 1940. For several years, the mozos of Chibtik had been petitioning 
for ejido land. Their original petition was submitted in 1933, but at the time they 
were visited by the municipal president the provisional endowment was still 
pending, and was eventually issued in 1942. A survey carried out earlier that year 
had indicated the liability of the Chibtik finca for land redistribution 1 and had 
Confronted the landowner, don Pepe Castellanos, with the threat of losing a consid-
erable part of his land. In view of this situation, he had called on the municipal pres-
ident, hoping he could alter the course of events. 
The words of the municipal president were not in vain. With some bitterness, 
tatjun Isidro - now one of the elder inhabitants of Chibtik, a boy at the time - recalls 
how about half the adult men of Chibtik decided not to press the ejido claim and to 
stay on with their patron. Among them was his father. As a result, La Florida, as the 
new settlement was to be called, was created with 32 beneficiaries and 762 hectares. 2 
The advantages to Don Pepe of the reduction of the number of e/ido-claimants were 
obvious. Not only would he lose far less land than he would have if all the men had 
sustained the petition, the reduction of the area to be endowed also allowed him to 
retain an important area of intensive maize cultivation, located at a riverside (this 
area apparently comprised 226 hectares, which was large for the region). 3 Further-
more, in this way he was able to assure the labour that he needed to run the finca. 
But why did the mozos give up? 
The land reforms under President Cardenas offered the mozos of the Tojolabal 
Highlands the possibility of direct control over land and freedom from debt peonage. 
Few of the mozos had ever envisaged such a possibility. The rumour of land reform 
was brought into the region by those who had worked as seasonal hands in the 
coastal coffee fincas, where ejido endowments had already taken place. The promise 
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of land stirred hopes amongst the Tbjolabal mozos, but also brought fears. The men 
that had known no other life than with their patron worried how would they get 
along on their own, and could hardly imagine life without him. Although nowadays 
these fears are difficult to understand for the younger generation, they must have 
been very real at the time. 
Don Pepe Castellanos must have sensed the fears of his mozos and turned them 
to his advantage. He realised that his main bargaining power lay in the social rela-
tions within the Tbjolabal Highlands. In fact, given the political conjuncture at the 
time, the doubts of his mozos were his only hope of countering the threat to his 
property. His alliance with local power holders, in this case, the municipal president, 
was only effective at this level. Had the original land claim been sustained, he would 
have been unable to counter it. The land reform legislation itself did not offer much 
scope for safeguarding his properties, nor could he expect much support from the 
authorities at the national and state level. Examples of futile attempts to prevent ejido 
endowments abounded in the region. Don Pepe had every reason to believe that had 
all the mozos of Chibtik decided to press the ejido claim, he would have lost twice 
the amount of land given to La Florida. To prevent this, he not only called upon the 
municipal president, but also promised his mozos payment for their work. 
Due to the doubts and fears of the mozos, in the Tbjolabal Highlands the possi-
bility of forming ejidos was initially received with some hesitation. This explains why 
several of the newly- formed ejidos were made up of only a part of the finca popula-
tion, while part of them stayed on with the patron. 4 However, as the positive results 
of the first ejidos were seen, petitions for ejido land appeared in quick succession. 
The Chibtikeros closely watched the experiences of the Jotaneros, who - as mozos 
- had frequently come to plough on the Chibtik finca and were amongst the first to 
receive their ejido (in 1938). They not only encouraged others to request their ejido, 
but also served as a living example that mozos could manage very well without the 
patrones. 
Land reform and processes of change 
Land reform meant not only a spatial but also a social and political reconfiguration 
of the Tbjolabal Highlands. Land reform altered social relations between patrones 
and mozos and drew Tbjolabal land reform beneficiaries closer to the Mexican state. 
Before the land reforms, finqueros like Pepe Castellanos were the masters of the 
regional universe: their position in the social fabric was largely unchallenged. Land 
reform changed this. The process of land redistribution implied the umavelling of 
the multiple bonds between patrones and mozos and the loosening of ihe finqueros' 
grip on the region. Land reform thus contributed to the construction of a new social 
fabric in which the finqueros played a less significant role while state policies and 
state actors became more prominent than before. 
Land reform became one of the most important realms in which state formation 
in central and eastern Chiapas took shape. Through land reform, the Mexican state 
became a rule-making and rule-enforcing political force in a domain that had previ-
ously been largely autonomous from it. The backing of the law and the support of 
the federal authorities gave land redistribution in the Tbjolabal Highlands consid-
erable momentum. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the dissolution of the 
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fincas was only a matter of time. Landowners managed to delay the break up of their 
properties, but could not ultimately avoid it. 
For the Tojolabal land reform beneficiaries, the process basically implied their 
first awareness of and experience with the Mexican state. The state entered their lives 
as a provider of land and as a force that - at least initially - opposed landowners, but 
also as a rule-making body that mediated and conditioned their access to land. Land 
redistribution interacted in complex ways with the existing territorial configuration 
and rights of particular groups of people to land. It also implied the entanglement 
of the Tojolabal land reform beneficiaries in the web of bureaucratic procedures and 
tike construction of new interfaces with government officials. 5 As noted by Nuijten 
(^998), experiences in this field are important in the construction of land reform 
bfenefidaries' political imagery or 'idea of the state'. 
Land redistribution has also become one of the main spheres in which the legit-
imacy of state intervention has been put to the test. In it, the federal state has sought 
to assert its power. However, new political forces arose in the arena of contention 
created by land redistribution - peasant organisations, political advisors - that chal-
lenged the power of the state. The 1970s saw the development of a second political 
momentum in Chiapas in which state intervention in the field of land redistribution 
became increasingly controversial as it became connected to factional struggles. 
This chapter describes these processes of sodal and political change, bringing 
otit some of the major contradictions and ambiguities it involved. The ground it 
seeks to cover is rather vast. It starts by exarnining the way land reform acted on the 
relations between landowners and mozos in the Tojolabal Highlands, before moving 
on to the intricades of the land reform process itself. It discusses conflids arising 
between groups of land daimants and the role of the land reform bureaucracy in the 
development of these conflids. The chapter also discusses the politidsation of land 
redistribution since the 1970s. It offers several elements for assessing some of the 
implications of state engagement with Tojolabal land reform benefidaries since the 
1940s. 
The times of the patrdn 
Perspectives on peonage in Chiapas 
When asked about the start of land redistribution in the region, many of the elderly 
Tojolabal recall the fear they had of being 'abandoned', of fadng life 'on their own'. 
They speak of 'how the patron left' or 'when we left the patron' rather than 'when we 
got the land' and stress the dependency they felt on their patron, and their reluctance 
to sever that bond. Others on the contrary, espedally but not only the younger Tojo-
labal, stress the exploitation their forefathers suffered from, the humiliation, the 
hard work and the poverty. For them, the times of the patron represent the yoke from 
which they were liberated, the point of reference of'never again'. The following state-
ment was recorded in Chibtik: 
"They [the patrones] regarded our grandparents as little more than puppets. 
That is why we do not want the patrones back. Now we don't want to return 
to the time of the mozos. Nowadays, in fact, what they did to our ancestors 
makes us angry." (from the testimony of tata Pedro, in: Van der Haar & 
Lenkersdorf 1993: 55). 
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Though other accounts have not disappeared, this latter vision on the finca past has 
now become dominant. It is a key element of what we might call the Tojolabal 'myth 
of origin' which centres on the creation of the ejidos and the exodus of ladino 
landowners. This latter view also resonates strongly with the way fmcas in Chiapas 
are generally portrayed. Although in recent decades revisionist studies have added 
many shades of grey to earlier, overly negative views of haciendas in central and 
northern Mexico, the picture for southern Mexico, especially Chiapas, is still painted 
mainly in black and white. 6 Peonage in Chiapas is not only associated with extremes 
of barbarism and maltreatment, but also with blatant racism. Furthermore, the fact 
that peonage in Chiapas continued well into the twentieth century, seemingly 
untouched by the ideas of modernisation and civilisation that transformed the rest 
of Mexico, has given rise to much criticism. 
Without denying that extremes of maltreatment have occurred, it also seems 
necessary in the case of Chiapas to add some shades of grey to our picture of 
haciendas, especially in the traditional fmca belt in central-eastern Chiapas. Unfor-
tunately, in-depth studies that would allow a more detailed assessment of the labour 
conditions and social relations on particular fmcas are not available. Much of the 
view of fmcas in Chiapas is based on the atrocities that have been reported for the 
monterias, the logging expeditions into the jungle. These correspond to what Knight 
has called 'classic debt servitude', characterised by coercion and with conditions 
approaching slavery (1986c: 46; 68-74). However, not all peonage in Chiapas should 
be classified under this heading. The coffee plantations of coastal Soconusco, for 
example, are regarded by Knight as 'proletarian' peonage, where forms of free wage 
labour were linked to the payment of cash advances (Knight 1986c: 4 6 , 56). In my 
view, fmcas in the Tojolabal Highlands may have come closest to a third form of 
peonage that Knight describes, that of'traditional' peonage, "distinguished by the 
peon's voluntary commitment to the hacienda, debt often figuring as a perk rather 
than a bond" (Knight 1986c: 46). Under these conditions, indebtedness does not 
function as a coercive mechanism to tie people (and their offspring) to the proper-
ties against their will, but rather acts as a privilege for certain categories of workers, 
together with the possibility of subsistence farming, for example. 
Hardly anything is known about daily life at the fincas in the Tojolabal Highlands, 
or central and eastern Chiapas in general. The fincas in the Tojolabal Highlands 
were organised broadly as is described for haciendas in general. The patron was the 
owner of the land, which he worked with the help of a resident labour force, the 
peones acasillados. The latter lived on the finca (usually around the casa grande) and 
worked part of the time for the patron and part of the time on their own plots. The 
peon families had the right to use parts of the finca property, not only for subsis-
tence cultivation, but also for gathering firewood and other forest products. They 
used to be given advance payments in cash, which created a situation of indebted-
ness with the patron. Women and children also provided labour. In addition to resi-
dent labourers, the patron may have hired temporary labour for shorter periods 
(days, weeks, months) or for specific activities. An overseer or steward (called encar-
gado or mayordomo in the Tojolabal Highlands) acted as the right hand of thefinquero 
and 'disciplined' the work force. 
All the entitlements the peons enjoyed depended directly on their relationship 
with their patron, that is, were due to their being 'the men o f . The patron was not 
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only the owner of the land and livestock, but also of the church. He was in charge 
of the religious celebrations. For All Saints' Day (November the I S T ) he would provide 
the mozos with an animal to slaughter and share amongst themselves, a practice 
called ko to-Kin and which, in different forms, is continued to this day. The patron's 
wife, the patrona, is reported by some fincas to have led the sung prayers in church 
and often acted as a midwife. 7 
The relations between patrones and mozos in the Tojolabal Highlands may be 
described in terms of 'paternalism'. It was common for the patron to be addressed 
as kajwal, which means 'my lord' and is the highest expression of respect now only 
used to address God in prayers. The patron called his mozos 'my children' (hijos), 
and assumed paternal functions, such as giving consent for marriage. In the case of 
Chibtik I was told that the patron would only give his consent for the marriage of 
one of his mozos after the latter had proven he could do hard work, such as bringing 
things over to Comitan by himself (which involved two days' travelling at the time). 8 
The following account of a Tojolabal woman recalling how the mozos from Chibtik 
managed to buy the fmca in 1963 highlights the paternalistic bond: "The one who 
was in charge [a lawyer] said to the patron: Look, they are your children, they have 
lived here all their life, give it to them." 
The 'old style' landowners of the Tojolabal Highlands shared a world with their 
iriozos. Many of them had grown up on the property and had spoken Tojolabal since 
their childhood. They had known their mozos for a long time and shared fears and 
beliefs with them. A few married Tojolabal women and many had children with 
them. Many of these landowners were engaged in business or politics, and had 
houses elsewhere; their world was larger than just the fmca. Yet many of them felt 
especially at home on their fincas and sensed that their fates were tightly bound to 
tl}em. 9 It may be significant in this respect that both Don Pepe Castellanos senior 
and Dofia Rosario Castellanos were buried in their fincas (from which they were 
removed decades later by their descendants). 1 0 
Social relations between patrones and mozos may be fruitfully studied from a 
rhoral economy perspective, as has been suggested by Bock (1993:231-2), Nickel 
(1997: 333-4) and Popkin (1979:13-4 1 1 ; see also Ouweneel 1996: 36-8). According 
to this perspective, drawing on the work of E. P. Thompson and James Scott, 
patrones experience a constant need to legitimise their claims to the labour and 
loyalty of resident peons, by offering protection and guarantees for subsistence. 
Besides crediting the peons with agency, the moral economy perspective has the 
advantage of pointing out the limits of exploitation. If certain limits of fairness and 
justice are overstepped, continued control over the peons is jeopardised. Thus, the 
patron will need to avoid excessive workloads, will find it difficult to refuse to give 
loans, and will be unable to avoid numerous obligations (for example, curing the 
sick). This provides the peons with a certain amount of leverage over the patron. 
The story of the death of Don Pepe Castellanos senior in 1945, as it is told today 
in Chibtik, provides a good example of the way the moral economy operates at the 
finca. It not only relates one instance of protest when the criterion of fairness was 
being violated, but also testifies to the extent to which the mozos considered their 
patron's existence and their own to be related. The Chibtikeros tell the story more or 
less as follows: 
"We were allowed to have some horses, one or two, not more. And our horses had 
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to earn their own food. They had to carry loads for the patron, which is how they 
earned their food. But he put very heavy loads on our horses, too heavy. Our horses 
would collapse under the weight of their loads. His own animals would go to El 
Tulipan [another of Don Pepe's properties, to the north of Chibtik] and rest for a day 
before returning, but our animals had to come back the same day. One day, one of 
the horses died because the load was too heavy. We got angry. And we told the 
patron: Look, you are treating our horses badly. You will have to pay for the horse 
that died. Don Pepe was so upset by the way his men spoke to him that he died that 
very evening. He died from koraja (anger)." 
For the Tojolabal, illness is closely related to strained social relations - such as anger 
(koraja), jealousy (envidia) and worries (pensar, cham sfcujol) - and Don Pepe's death 
was interpreted as vulnerability on his part to his mozos' attitude. 
The moral economy perspective also provides a good entry point for analysing 
the way the terms of power between patrones and mozos may change under the 
influence of wider political and economic processes . 1 2 In the case of the Tojolabal 
Highlands, land reform seems to have played a particularly important role in modi-
fying the bargaining power of each of the parties. As I will show in the next section, 
the implementation of land reform interacted with and possibly also speeded up an 
ongoing erosion of paternalism and consequently of the moral economy. 
Land reform and the erosion of the moral economy 
The Chibtikeros's accounts contain several suggestions that Don Pepe junior 
disturbed the balance of the moral economy. To this day, Don Pepe senior is still 
referred to as 'the real patron' (el mero patron), to distinguish him from his son, the 
'young Pepe' (ya'axal pepe). People recall that when he took over the reins of the 
property at the age of eighteen (several years after his father had died) he increased 
the workload considerably, overstepping the limits of what people considered fair. 1 3 
To this day, the Chibtikeros resent the fact that 'the patron cared more about his 
animals than about u s ' . 1 4 They were annoyed that he only let them have the meat of 
cattle that had been killed in the fields and my inquiry about his contribution to the 
feast of the Patron Saint (San Miguel, celebrated on May 8) aroused indignation: 
"We had to work every day, and when there was celebration like today [the 
conversation took place at Easter], he would give us a little time off. And for 
May 8th he didn't give us anything, not a penny. But on the day of San Jose 
[the patrdn's full name was Jose Luis], fhaf s when he made a big celebration, 
then a lot of people would come to visit, he flew them in by plane". 
A patron that does not provide for the celebration of the Patron Saint of the locality, 
supposedly his as well as the mozos', but prefers to organise 'his own' celebration, 
apart from that of the mozos, sounds like an eroding moral economy. This suggests 
that the time of Don Pepe junior marked the beginning of a clear distancing and 
opposition between patrones and mozos. Don Pepe junior laughed at the 
Chibtikeros' account of his father's death. He claimed that his father died 'quite 
simply' of a heart attack. This attitude is typical of the younger generation of 
landowners. 1 5 Unlike their parents, they were educated in town, did not speak Tojo-
labal and did not feel the same emotional attachment to the finca or the people living 
there. They were less inclined to respect the rules of the game of the moral economy 
than their fathers and viewed their properties more in terms of profitability. They 
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experienced the expected 'paternal' role as a burden and out of line with modernity. 
The avenue of land reform in the Tojolabal Highlands thus coincided with a gener-
ational change from 'traditional' to more 'modern' types of landowners. Both 
processes may have combined to erode the moral economy of the region. 
Evidence from Chibtik suggests that the fissures grew as the first ejidos were 
being created. Whenever his mozos complained, Pepe Castellanos junior told them: 
"If you don't like it here, get out to the nacionales (national lands)". There is another 
element to this. As the people from Chibtik report, towards the end of the time they 
were working with Don Pepe junior (in the decade or so before 1963), they were 
increasingly unable to meet their subsistence needs for maize and beans. They had 
always combined work for the patron, mostly three days a week, with work on their 
own plots. Since about the 1940s, but perhaps even before, they had been receiving 
payment for the days they worked for the patron. As they began to work more and 
more days for the patron in return for money, they neglected their own milpas. To 
meet their own needs for maize and beans, they bartered with some of the ejidos in 
the region. It seems that they were not forced to do this extra labour, although some 
mention the role of debts, but tempted by the possibility of earning cash. This might 
indicate that the relation between the patron and his m e n began to be structured 
increasingly around wage labour while non-economic elements grew less important. 
When Don Pepe junior appealed to the loyalty of his mozos in the early 1940s, 
in an attempt to prevent them from petitioning for an ejido endowment on his lands, 
he was - as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter - partly successful. Twenty 
years later, however, he had lost whatever credit he had. The ejidos that had already 
been created in the region were flourishing. Maize production was booming, yet 
people had more leisure time than ever. The eroded moral economy that was still 
b!eing sustained in Chibtik at the time, did not hold up to the comparison. In Chibtik 
as elsewhere, the mozos' initial hesitations gave way to the hope of a better life. The 
result was an increasing number of petitions for ejido endowments from which the 
landowners could barely defend themselves. 
The legal framework 
Itn the early years of land reform in the Tojolabal Highlands, groups of former mozos 
Were endowed with thousands of hectares. The creation of ejidos at that time enjoyed 
broad state support and the land reform legislation favoured the claims of the Tojo-
labal mozos. Nonetheless, land redistribution was a highly complex, lengthy, and 
often frustrating process for those involved. It was structured around constitutional 
provisions, legal norms and bureaucratic procedures with totally new rules. To 
Understand the type of complications that arose, it is useful to examine the legal 
framework governing land reform. 
Initially (in 1934) the relevant legislation was the Codigo Agrario, modified in 
1940 and 1942. As of 1971, land redistribution was governed by the Ley Federal de 
Reforma Agraria.16 These laws established criteria as to the settlements and individ-
uals that could qualify as land reform beneficiaries. Settlements had to have existed 
at least six months prior to the request for endowment and they should comprise at 
least twenty individuals that qualified as land reform beneficiaries (capacitados 
agrarios). They had to have Mexican nationality, could not own more than a 
79 
m m i m u m amount of land and should work the land personally. Men needed to be 
at least 16 years old (or of any age if they were heads of a household) while women 
(whether single or widowed) only qualified if they were heads of a household. As 
mentioned, since 1934, resident peons of haciendas could also initiate a request for 
endowment or be included in an endowment for another group on the basis of the 
lands of the hacienda to which they belonged. 
Ejido endowments entailed a long and complex bureaucratic procedure that 
involved multiple actors (for a detailed description, see, for example, Ibarra 1989). 
The process of endowment (action agraria) began with the request for endowment 
of a group of peasants - mozos in the case of the Tojolabal Highlands - made to the 
state governor, who was obliged to publish it and communicate it to the Comision 
Agraria Mixta (CAM) or Joint Agrarian Commission, a state level agrarian authority 
with representatives from state and national governments as well as from the 
peasant sector. Once a request had been submitted, the CAM carried out a series of 
investigations to establish whether the petitioning group fulfilled the legal require-
ments. A n 'agrarian census' was applied to verify whether there was capatidad 
agraria, i.e., whether the required minimum of twenty individuals that qualified for 
land endowment, was reached. Furthermore, a survey of the properties surrounding 
the settlement was conducted to verify their size, property regime, and land use. 
Both national lands and private properties within the radio legal de afectation, that 
is the radius of seven kilometres around the settlement making the endowment 
request, could be used for the purpose of land redistribution. Not liable to redistri-
bution (inafectahle) were those properties that did not exceed 150 hectares of irrigated 
land (riego) or its equivalent in other land types, i.e. 300 hectares of rain-fed agri-
culture (temporal), or equivalent amounts of good quality pasture land (agostadero) 
or poor quality land (monte). These limits were later reduced to 100 and 200 
hectares respectively. 1 7 In the Tojolabal Highlands this came down to areas of mostly 
around 300 hectares, although in one case it was raised to 600 hectares, reserved 
for the landowner. The landowner was free to choose which part of the property he 
would retain, usually the central area, which tended to be flatter and generally 
included the buildings. 
Taking into account the number of petitioners and the characteristics of the land 
available, the CAM established the size and location of the endowment. A minimum 
of arable land (cultivable) should be available per individual beneficiary. The Codigo 
Agrario of 1934 set this amount at 4 hectares of irrigated land or 8 hectares of rain-
fed land. Since 1942, these limits have been set at 10 and 20 hectares, respectively. 
In the Tojolabal Highlands, individual shares of cropland were usually 8 or 12 
hectares, and 4 or 6 where wetlands (de humedad) were concerned, amounting to 20 
hectares in only a third of the cases. In the region, these shares were not necessarily 
measured and set aside as individual plots, but in many cases they were simply 
portions of land deemed fit for agricultural production within the general area of the 
ejido endowment. In addition to the individual share of cropland, a similar amount 
of land was reserved for the school plot (parcela escolar) and, since 1971, for women's 
needs (unidad agricola industrial para la mujer).1& In addition to the individual shares 
of cropland, endowments included pasture and waste lands (agostadero and monte) 
for collective use. 
On the basis of its investigations, the C A M issued a verdict (dictamen) and a 
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proposal for endowment. The proposal formed the basis of the state governor's 
formal decision concerning the endowment (mandamiento). A positive decision 
usually implied the provisional transfer of the lands to the petitioning group, 
awaiting the final endowment through the execution of the Presidential Resolution. 
This procedure was the rule in the Tojolabal Highlands. In only 8 out of the total of 
38 ejido endowments in the region (mcluding original endowments as well as other 
expanses of land) did no provisional transfer take place (see Table 3.1). 
This first part of the procedure was carried out at the state level (primera 
instancia). After the governor's decision and/or the provisional endowment, the 
procedure would continue at the national level (segunda instancia). The so-called 
Cuerpo Consultivo Agrario (CCA) evaluated the case and issued a verdict on the basis 
of which the Mexican President would reach a Presidential Resolution. Usually, 
although not always, the Presidential Resolution coincided (in terms of the land to 
be endowed) with the governor's decision that had preceded it. This depended, 
among other things, on whether the investigations of the CCA had confirmed those 
of the first instance or whether new information had emerged or earlier mistakes 
were being corrected. With the execution of the Presidential Resolution, the proce-
dure of land endowment was formally completed. The execution involved the formal 
transfer and demarcation (deslinde) of the lands to be endowed, by means of a docu-
ment testifying possession and demarcation (Acta de posesion y deslinde). The process 
Usually involved physical measurement and demarcation in the field by making a 
corridor or hrecha through the vegetation, and/or the placement of boundary stones 
(mojones). However, I have also come across cases of a paper transfer (entrega virtual) 
which did not imply physical measurement. Bajucu, Lomantan, Yaxha, El Rosario 
and La Piedad all received their endowments in this way, in a massive land transfer 
of over 160,000 hectares staged by then president Avila Camacho in Las Margar-
i tas . 1 9 The physical demarcation of these endowments was carried out at a later date, 
with some difficulty. After the execution and transfer, what remained were the 
administrative 'details' to be arranged: individual certificates (certificado de derecho 
agrario) and maps indicating the location and size of the endowment (piano defini-
tive-) would have to be issued to the beneficiaries. In many cases this seems not to 
have been done. 
The process of land redistribution was a lengthy one. Even if everything went 
smoothly it would still take at least four years before an endowment request was 
rewarded with the execution of a Presidential Resolution. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give an 
indication of how long the cases took in the Tojolabal Highlands. The first table 
concerns the numbers of years that elapsed between the request and the provisional 
endowment; the second the number of years to the formal completion of the endow-
m e n t process, that is, with the execution of the Presidential Resolution. The average 
length of procedures from petition to execution for the Tojolabal Highlands was just 
over twelve years . 2 0 In two cases, the Presidential Resolution was apparently never 
executed (or at least the files did not contain any confirmation of this). Four out of 
the 38 acts of endowment were only partially executed, meaning that only part of the 
extension stated in the Presidential Resolution was demarcated and transferred to 
the beneficiaries. 
At various stages of the land reform process, obstacles could, and increasingly 
did, arise. The legal framework itself, inaccuracies and confusions arising during 
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Table 3.1 L e n g t h o f e n d o w m e n t p r o c e d u r e s 
in t h e Tojolabal H i g h l a n d s f r o m pet i t ion t o 
p r o v i s i o n a l e n d o w m e n t 
Table 3.2 L e n g t h o f e n d o w m e n t p r o c e d u r e s 
in t h e Tojolabal H i g h l a n d s f r o m pet i t ion t o 
e x e c u t i o n 
no. of years no. of cases average length 
(in years) 
no. of years no. of cases average length 
(in years) 
more than 5 
5 to 10 
12 3 
9 7.1 
3 19 
more than 5 6 3.8 
5 to 10 10 7.8 
more than 10 20 17.2 
no data 2 
more than 10 
no provisional 
endowment 
no data 
8 
6 
38 
Total no. of cases 38 12.4 
Note: only ejido endowments are being considered 
(dotaciones and ampliadones). Total no. of cases 
Note: only ejido endowments are being considered 
(dotaciones and ampliadones). 
the course of the investigations, and ambiguities regarding land measurements were 
all factors that contributed to complicating and delaying the process. Other factors 
that should be mentioned are conflicts with landowners, the dissatisfaction of the 
petitioning group with the lands proposed for the endowment and overlapping 
claims. These ambiguities and lack of precision not only conditioned the land 
reform process, but also left their mark on the archive of the state division of the 
Land Reform Ministry in Tuxtla Gutierrez (Delegacidn de la Secretaria de Reforma 
Agraria) that I consulted. Evidence of irregularities, differences between de facto and 
dejure land tenure, and disputes between various groups abounded. Moreover, the 
archive showed clear signs of having been intensively used. The documents within 
the files rarely followed a chronological order. In several files, important documents 
(such as a copy of the presidential resolution or ejido maps) apparently had not been 
returned after use or had been misfiled. Due to the loss of such vital documents, the 
files themselves created numerous ambiguities, complicating the land reform 
process even further. 
The resistance of the landowners 
Buying time 
With the C6digo Agrario of 1934, the landowners in the Tojolabal Highlands faced a 
serious problem. In view of the legal criteria, their properties were evidently liable 
to land redistribution (afectable), exceeding the maximum limits for private property 
by hundreds or even thousands of hectares. Once the endowment procedure was set 
in motion by the formal request of a group of peons and the CAM started its inves-
tigations, there was relatively little the landowners in the region could do to avoid 
land redistribution. They could, however, try to obstruct the process of land redis-
tribution. I found numerous traces of such attempts in the files at the state-level 
Land Reform Ministry. For example, landowners tried to invalidate the petitions for 
endowment by daiming that the settlement making the request did not exist, or that 
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a number of the land petitioners did not live there . 2 1 Or they claimed that the land 
of" their property was not fit for agriculture and therefore would not qualify as an 
ejido endowment. Another trick, often reported in the literature on land reform, was 
to quickly divide up the property among one's offspring or relatives. The latter was 
rarely an effective strategy in the Tojolabal Highlands, however. With the exception 
of Bahuitz, a case that I will return to below, I found partitions that had been carried 
out after the request for land endowment had been issued, to have been declared 
invalid. In several cases landowners objected to land redistribution by means of a 
jdicio de amparo or injunction (a constitutional remedy to guarantee the inviolability 
of rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution), a recourse also used by 
peasant groups that were dissatisfied with the proposed endowment. 
In general, the strategies employed by the landowners ultimately proved ineffec-
tive, though they did considerably complicate the land reform process. As is clear 
from the files, most of the landowners' objections were refuted. As it turned out, the 
landowners did not have a leg to stand on legally. So some resorted to other solu-
tions, outside the legal framework. What if the topographical engineer surveying the 
properties happened to 'overlook' one of the properties so it would not appear in the 
C A M report as liable to land redistribution, or 'forgot' to consider the best part of 
the property? Apparently, a certain degree of short-sightedness on the part of the 
CAM officials could be purchased. This explains why properties were 'reconsidered' 
or miraculously appeared at later stages of the endowment process (though at the 
same time, the fact that the properties resurfaced suggests the limits of this 
strategy). 2 2 
The resistance of the landowners consisted of isolated actions, undertaken indi-
vidually by each of the landowners. O n the whole, the most they achieved was to 
dfelay the endowment process. It was with these experiences in mind that Pepe 
Cistellanos of Chibtik tried another ploy (described at the beginning of this chapter) 
which proved relatively effective. By persuading people to refrain from claiming 
laird, his loss of property was greatly reduced. Combinations of persuasion and 
outright threats were also used in a number of other cases. Yet all this amounted to 
most of the time, as in the case of Pepe Castellanos, was buying time. 
The overall picture that emerges of the landowners' resistance in the Tojolabal 
Highlands is one of lukewarm, waning opposition. With notable exceptions, their 
attitude was one of pragmatic resignation rather than fierce opposition. This is not 
only suggested by evidence from the land reform files, but also by accounts from 
elderly Tojolabal and former landowners (a few of whom are still alive). An ejidatario 
from the Nuevo Mexico ejido, created with land from the Palma Real and Zaragoza 
fiticas, recalls how their patron reacted (in Tojolabal, since he had learned that 
language as a child) when they told him they had petitioned for an ejido: "Well, my 
children, if you don't want to stay with me, you are free to go". At times though, the 
land reform process was more antagonistic and involved violence. In Chibtik, for 
example, I was told that the ejido petition was drawn up without the patron's 
knowing, during nightly secret meetings. When Don Pepe found out (probably 
because one of the mozos told him) he threatened the leaders. 
Once the landowners realised that opposition to continued peasant insistence was 
futile, they tried to withdraw under the best possible conditions. They ensured the 
peauena propiedad inafectable to which they were entitled by law, but in many cases 
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chose not to retain that either. When I asked Don Ricardo Castro (one of Dona 
Rosario Castellanos' heirs and brother of the late Rafael Castro that had inherited 
Chibtik) why he sold La Piedad - which had been respected when the neighbouring 
ejidos of Bajucu and Rosario were endowed with parts of his properties - he 
answered: "I said to myself, they have got the ejido now, but in some years, their sons 
will have grown up, and they will be asking for more land. They will not give up. It 
is better to get rid of it sooner rather than later". In the same vein, Dona Lolita 
Albores, a landowner herself and niece of the former owners of the Santiago finca 
(now the Veinte de Noviembre ejido) said: 
"Many of them [meaning the landowners] did not want to stay on the finca. 
You could stay, because they left you the pequena propiedad, but many did not 
feel at home anymore, they felt very, very... surrounded (rodeados).This is why 
we sold the rancho ourselves: it was just my mother, my sister, and me. For 
some time, an uncle took care of the rancho, but afterwards my sister and I 
wanted to take charge. And we were there for a while. But my mum didn't 
feel comfortable there, she thought something might happen. Even though 
we never had any problems with them, and we locked up very well every 
night." 
These references reflect how, as the region became increasingly dominated by ejidos, 
landowner families felt vulnerable and came to fear peasant insistence. 
A good example of how even land that could initially be retained by the owners 
eventually ended up in the hands of peasants from the region, is provided by the 
case of the San Antonio Bahuitz finca. In 1948, and probably in anticipation of 
expropriations, the owner (a woman) divided the finca into three sections, which 
were sold to two men with the same surname and a w o m a n . 2 3 The men were prob-
ably the caretakers of the property and considered trustworthy by the owner; the 
woman was, judging from the surname, a relative of the seller. The subdivision was 
recognised as legal and a few years later, in 1954, the first two sections were sold to 
the nephews of the original owner, the still young children of her brother. 2 4 This 
does look rather like an attempt to avoid land redistribution. However, as the chil-
dren grew up in Mexico City and reached adulthood, they each sold their section to 
groups of socios (associates), presumably the mozos of Bahuitz . 2 5 Together with the 
third section, also sold to a group of m e n from Bahuitz in 1961, these lands even-
tually constituted the copropiedad of San Antonio Bahuitz, which at the time of field-
work, was being converted to the tenure regime of bienes comunales?6 
Losing out 
Ultimately, the resistance of the landowners in the Tojolabal Highlands could not 
prevent the loss of their properties. The federal government was taking a hard line 
against landowners who lacked the means to oppose these changes. Their connec-
tions to the state government of Chiapas were of little avail, for the federal govern-
ment overruled them when necessary. Although state governors played a significant 
role in the initial stages of the land reform process (the primera instancia), the 
involvement of the C A M allowed the federal government to follow the process 
closely. Furthermore, would-be beneficiaries of land reform could and did appeal 
directly to the federal Land Reform Ministry and the President in Mexico City. 2 7 Not 
all landowners had the political clout in the state capital that, for example, Pepe 
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Castellanos junior had. As mentioned earlier, many of the traditional landowners in 
the region felt more at home in the saddle than in a government office. They enjoyed 
the support of municipal presidents, but the latter could do little to stop the process 
of land redistribution once it was underway. Apart from lacking legitimacy in the 
eyes of the federal government, the apparent lack of support for the landowners of 
the Tojolabal Highlands may also have been related to factional struggles within the 
Chiapas elite, like those described by Schryer (1990) in Huejutla, where one faction 
of landowners (the rancheros) supported land reform as a means of settling accounts 
•writh their long-time political rivals. 
Given the difficulties of retaining their properties, many of the owners decided 
to give up and devote their efforts to more profitable causes. Many landowners did 
not only have houses and business in Comitan, they also had properties elsewhere, 
in the warmer regions of Ocosingo and Las Canadas. As they gave up the properties 
in the Tojolabal Highlands, some of them consolidated or expanded their properties 
in these regions, which were both suitable for stockbreeding and subject to much 
less peasant pressure on land (at least for the time being). Government incentives 
for ranching in tropical regions since the 1950s made this a sensible strategy (see 
Villafuerte, Garcia & Meza 1997). 
Conflicts between communities 
Once land redistribution had begun in the Tojolabal Highlands, there was no going 
back. The success of the first ejido endowments served as a powerful incentive to 
further claims. Maize production was booming in the new ejidos, thanks to the 
increased availability of land and abundant labour. 2 8 However, the formalisation of 
land rights for some meant the end to the usufruct of these lands by other groups. 
Securing these rights became another reason for requesting ejido endowments, in 
addition to the advantages in terms of access to land and control over labour. Land 
from one finca was sometimes endowed to groups of mozos from adjacent fincas. 
There were no provisions against the violation of user rights in the land reform law. 
The sense of ownership that Tojolabal mozos might have developed regarding 'their' 
fincas was not recognised by the land reform agencies nor given much importance 
in the design of ejido endowments. Something similar happened with the national 
lands surrounding the fincas. Although these were not officially titled, they were 
often utilised by adjacent fincas. Mozos from these fincas had developed use rights 
to such tracts that were not recognised by the land reform authorities. The above 
implied that the only way mozos could secure their historical use rights (both within 
fincas and on neighbouring national lands) was by receiving the land in the form of 
an ejido endowment. It soon dawned on them that unless they moved quickly, other 
groups would claim the land they had been working for generations. In order not to 
lose 'their' finca, they would have to play the land endowment game. 
The people of Chibtik had a painful experience in this respect concerning a tract 
of land called Las Chicharras, a section of national lands between the Chibtik and 
Santiago fincas. Although not officially part of the finca Chibtik, this and other tracts 
of national land had been used for grazing, and the mozos had made their slash-
and-burn milpas there. Gradually most of these untitled tracts of land had become 
enclosed by the new ejidos, each of which zealously enforced the new boundaries. 
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The people from Chibuk were particularly interested in Las Chicharras, but they lost 
it to the ejidatarios of Veinte de Noviembre who had it included in the extension to 
their ejido. 
The Chibtikeros accepted the situation, but in other cases, such as the one 
involving the ejidatarios of Bajucu and Rosario, boundary conflicts could go on for 
years. The people from Bajucu opposed the projected endowment to the people of 
Rosario with lands that had de facto belonged to the Bajucu finca but which exceeded 
the titled area (the so-called excedentes, liable to land redistribution). 2 9 The people 
from Bajucu physically opposed the demarcation of these lands in favour of Rosario, 
an act that they justified in a letter to the state division of the Land Reform Ministry 
in Tuxtla stating that they had cultivated these lands "since time immemorial'' and 
"needed them for subsistence". They argued that the lands they had received in the 
provisional endowment were mountainous and "unfit for cultivation" which is why 
in 1940 they had already requested the lands from the excedente. The people from 
Bajucu demanded the suspension of the demarcation in order to avoid conflicts 
between both ejidos?0 Despite threats from the land reform office to enforce the 
demarcation through miHtary surveillance, Bajucu continued to oppose it for at least 
another three years. (I am not sure how the matter was eventually settled.) A similar 
conflict arose between the Plan de Ayala (formerly Jotana) and Gonzalez de Leon 
ejidos (formerly Napite). The people from Gonzalez de Leon opposed a projected 
extension to the ejido endowment of Plan de Ayala on lands of the former Napite 
finca (now excedentes) which they cultivated. As people from Gonzalez de Leon 
continued to use the disputed area, the Land Reform Ministry labelled the act an 
"invasion" 3 1 
Conflicts such as these not only illustrate the sense of dispossession that certain 
groups suffered as a result of the land reform process, but are also indicative of the 
type of conflicts that increasingly arose between communities over the remaining 
tracts of land. As land reform advanced and less land was available for redistribu-
tion, competing claims became part and parcel of the process. Conflicts could drag 
on for years and the land reform authorities in general did little to effectively resolve 
such situations. In fact, they often made matters worse, adding to the confusion or 
causing further delays. It is often suggested, both in academic writing and by polit-
ical actors, that the land reform bureaucracy intentionally fuelled conflicts between 
different groups of land claimants as part of a divide-and-rule policy (see for example 
Warman 1982 [1972], Dennis 1987, Benjamin 1995, Taller 1988). Although I agree 
that the land reform bureaucracy often complicated rather than resolved conflicts in 
the field of land redistribution, its role cannot accurately be described as a centrally 
orchestrated political manipulation. The picture that arises when examining 
concrete cases - as I will do below for Chibtik- is so complex and messy that it can 
hardly be attributed to an 'invisible hand'. Inaccuracies in the procedures, tactics 
such as counterclaims and land occupations of groups of land claimants, as well as 
the personal aspirations of several of the intermediaries involved all add to the 
confusion. Rather than being regarded as part of a master plan, the role of the land 
reform bureaucracy needs to be understood in relation to the limitations of the land 
reform procedures and the private agendas of the different parties involved. 
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Conflicting claims: the case of Chibtik 
Ejido: first attempt 
M o w i n g the creation of the La Florida ejido, approximately thirty Tojolabal families 
left the Chibtik finca. At about the same time, in the early 1940s, several other fami-
lies moved from the finca to the nearby Puebla settlement, also engaged in an 
endowment procedure. In 1959, the remaining families of Chibtik launched a 
request for ejido land of their own. Published in the Periddico Oficial del Estado of May 
ijjtb. 1959, it expressed their concern to safeguard their rights to the land of the finca 
Chibtik, which they had been working for many years but of which they possessed 
no tit le. 3 2 Their fear that the land might be given to another community as an exten-
sion to their ejido lands was based on recent bitter experiences. A Presidential Reso-
lution of 1959 had endowed the Veinte de Noviembre ejido - established on the lands 
of the former Santiago finca - with the national lands known as Las Chicharras. The 
Cliibtikeros' request may either have been an attempt to prevent that endowment by 
making a counter claim, or it may have been a reaction to it. In any case, the 
Chibtikeros lost the tract to Veinte de Noviembre and became convinced of the need 
to ensure ejido lands of their own, as is clear from the words of Virgilio, then a young 
man who would later become involved in the land claim: 
"It was getting late, there was not much land left.... They [the people at that 
time] were with the patron, perhaps they did not think... but when they 
started to think of getting land, there was a problem. All of them - San 
Caralampio, Santo Domingo, Honduras [neighbouring corrrmunities] - they 
all had land already and there was not much left." 
The CAM studies began in 1959. By 1961 it was clear that the Chibtikeros were not 
satisfied with the way their request had been followed up. In 1961, in a letter to the 
president they complained that they had had to go to Mexico City to promote their 
cjase, since it was being blocked at the lower levels: they had had to deal with 
Unwilling and dishonest engineers of the land reform office in Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
some of whom had been bribed by the landowner (Pepe Castellanos junior), who 
had accused them of being "land thieves" (ladrones de tierra).33 
The main reason for the dissatisfaction of the Chibtikeros was the CAM's 
proposal to endow them with lands to the east of El Nantze, those of San Jose 
Quixthe (adjacent to the Chibtik finca), to be complemented with national lands. 
Apparently it was Pepe Castellanos himself who had made this suggestion, daiming 
that he was about to achieve an inafectabilidad ganadera for the trad of land the peti-
tioners had in mind (the central area of the finca). This would exempt that area from 
redistribution. 3 4 In 1962 the proposed endowment on the eastern lands was 
confirmed by the governor. The Chibtikeros, who had been hoping for an endow-
ment of the main area of the finca, far closer to their present settlement and with 
better quality land, were disappointed. Some of them moved to the eastern lands, 
but returned after a fortnight. They found the new place did not have a good water 
supply and was unsuitable for living. In 1962 the Chibtikeros rejected most of the 
proposed ejido endowment, accepting only the ninety hedares located on the 
copropiedad of El Nantze, meant to form a corridor from the main finca area to the 
endowment. 3 5 
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A deal with the landowner 
In view of the failure of their attempts to obtain the ejido land, the Chibtikeros 
changed tactics. They tried to buy the main finca area, which they managed to do in 
1963. This episode is described by one of the Chibtikeros as follows: 
"The mozos had heard that there was a government that was giving away 
ejidos. Without [the patron's] knowing, they arranged to go to Mexico to ask 
for the land where they were Uving. 
Gradually, the patron found out that they were 'walking' [meaning: engaged 
in efforts to achieve a land endowment]. He, in his turn, started to look for 
ways to resolve this, in order that the people wouldn't achieve [what they were 
after]. But the people then tried even harder to find help in order to get the 
land. They found a man called Orico. This man knew how to fix land [prob-
lems]. This man agreed to organise it for them. 
However, they did not get the land they were fixing as an ejido. Because the 
patrdn destroyed [what they were achieving] because he did not want to leave 
his land. Slowly those that wanted the land were getting disorganised. The 
government asked the patron whether he would sell. He said he would. That 
is why the government said they would give half the money. The other half 
had to be paid by the people who wanted the land. This is how they did it. 
The land of the community is bought land. In ten years they finished paying 
fo it." (testimony of tatjun Pedro, in Van der Haar & Lenkersdorf 1998: 64-
5; translated from the Tojolabal) 
As can be seen from this and other accounts, the help of Rodolfo Orrico, who had 
also been assisting the community in the ejido claim, was vital in the transaction. 
This private lawyer travelled to Mexico City to talk to the authorities, and confronted 
Don Pepe junior. Rodolfo the lawyer still lives in Chibtik as a hero, almost a legend. 
Virgilio recalls: 
"When the patrdn understood what the people wanted, he said: 'Well, in that 
case, I had better leave. I'll go and live somewhere else.' This was Pepe 
Castellanos, the son of Don Pepe, the real patrdn. He said: 'How much will 
you give me for the house? My father built that house.' To which the lawyer 
said: 'You should be ashamed of yourself saying that your father built this 
house: he didn't build anything, it was these people, their fathers, who built 
that house; they were forced to do so, they didn't even get paid, your father 
didn't do anything.' On hearing these words, Don Pepe felt ashamed and said 
to them: 'Well, then, give me 100, 000 pesos for the 900 hectares and the 
house. But let me build a house nearby, so that I can live there; I will see 
which of you people will build it for me, but you will get paid.' The lawyer 
replied: 'If there is anyone who wants to work with you, thaf s all right, we'll 
give you some time.' That is how the patron left. He went to live at the ranch 
at Yalchibtik." 
In Pepe Castellanos junior's own version of the events, Rodolfo Orrico plays a some-
what less prominent role. According to Don Pepe it was his mother, Julia, who 
convinced him to sell the property: "They have the right to keep this, they have their 
plots here- and you, you want to go on [defending the land] until you get lolled." He 
then offered Rodolfo Orrico, whom he calls an "independent lawyer only interested 
in making money" to sell the Chibifkeros half the property. Rodolfo Orrico accepted 
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on the condition that he would receive ten percent of the price for which the prop-
erty was sold. 
Ejido: new attempt 
After the victory of buying their finca, the Chibtikeros forgot about the ejido claim 
for a few years. But a number of them reopened the case in 1966. In 1967 a Presi-
dential Resolution confirmed the governor's decision of 1962, and endowed 31 bene-
ficiaries of Chibtik with a total of 1773 hectares: 90 hectares from El Nantze, 283 
hectares from San Jose Quixthe, and 1400 hectares of national lands (round 
numbers) . 3 6 But then the problems really started. The Presidential Resolution could 
not be executed because the endowment for Chibtik overlapped with other claims 
(see Map 3.1). While Chibtik's claim had been pending, other communities had 
submitted requests for ejido endowments on the national lands originally intended 
for Chibtik. The problem with Santo Domingo Corona turned out to be the most 
serious. This settlement had requested the national lands surrounding it since 1966, 
and had acquired provisional possession of these in 1 9 6 9 . In the mean time, the 
Chibtikeros - since the Presidential Resolution of 1967 - had been asking for the 
measurement (deslinde) and transfer of the ejido lands in vain. They had their doubts 
about the commitment of the Land Reform Ministry. They claimed in a letter that 
"certain elements of the [Comision] Agraria Mixta" had encouraged "their neigh-
bours" from Santo Domingo to submit a claim to the lands intended for Chibtik. 
Official attempts at measuring the national lands for Chibtik began in 1970, but 
were interrupted time and again by opposition from Santo Domingo Corona and 
later from San Isidro. Santo Domingo filed an injunction against the demarcation 
in favour of Chibtik that the Chibtikeros subsequently managed to have repealed. 
On another occasion, in November 1972, the topographic engineer reported that 
"the inhabitants of San Isidro had interfered". They had accompanied the engineer 
and the representatives of Chibtik to a certain point "without saying anything, 
whereupon they suddenly disappeared into the trees and threatened to shoot if we 
proceeded any further because that land was theirs". 
A suggestion by the C A M to prioritise the provisional endowment to Santo 
Domingo, on the grounds that the execution of the transfer to Chibtik had never 
become effective as it was "virtual" (the document confirming the execution was 
signed without the measurements having been taken) proved fruitless. Tensions 
grew and a violent solution seemed likely. In a letter the Chibtikeros warned about 
"bloody deeds". And people remember that the inhabitants of Chibtik and Santo 
Domingo were ready to "go at each other with machetes". The municipal president 
Of Altarnirano was willing to support the Chibtikeros with policemen (they speak of 
"12 judiciales") in order to take the measurements by force. What eventually calmed 
things down and made the Chibtikeros decide to respect the provisional endowment 
to Santo Domingo, as suggested by the land reform authorities, will probably never 
be entirely clear. One of the m e n from Chibtik that had been present at the time 
explained: 'we decided to let them stay there, because there is no point having poor 
people fighting amongst themselves'. The outcome was less satisfactory for San 
Isidro. Their provisional endowment was considerably reduced. San Isidro and 
Santo Domingo Corona had to wait until 1978 and 1983 respectively to have their 
provisional endowments confirmed by a Presidential Resolution. 
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The ejido endowment was eventually measured and transferred to Chibtik in 1975 
after many years of negotiation and pressurising, at a high financial and social cost 
to the community. Even then, it was only a partial endowment: 1050 of the prom-
ised 1773 hectares were not transferred for lack of available lands. Although legally 
entitled to a 'complementary' endowment to make up for the missing hectares, the 
Chibtikeros knew from the start that these would never be found. This situation of 
unresolved and half-resolved claims became more and more typical for the dynamics 
of land redistribution in the region from the 1970s onwards. 
Obscurities 
Looking back at the case of Chibtik several things remain obscure. Why did the 
CAM initially choose to locate the endowment so far away from the settlement when 
the area of the Chibtik finca was far larger than the legal maximum (it was over 
2000 hectares at the time), and the endowment could have been located there? Was 
this thanks to the political leverage of Pepe Castellanos junior - who was one of the 
landowners with the most political clout - or did he simply bribe the engineers? Was 
Pepe Castellanos really engaged in acquiring a certificate of inafectabilidad for the 
main finca area, as he claimed in a letter to the land reform authorities in Tuxtla or 
was he just bluffing? (The files contain no further reference to such a certificate.) 
On what grounds did the lawyer Orrico eventually manage to convince him to sell 
the main finca area? How did Santo Domingo's claim win over Chibtik's, when, by 
law, the latter should have had priority, not only because the request had been 
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submitted earlier but also because it had already obtained a Presidential Resolution? 
Why did the land reform officials in Tuxtla Gutierrez wait so long to measure the 
ejido for Chibtik, allowing the lands to be given in a provisional endowment to Santo 
Domingo Corona in the meantime? Was it just the lack of co-ordination between 
different officials, who failed to crosscheck files? Were they unaware of the law, or 
was this differential treatment a reflection of the fact that Santo Domingo Corona 
had better political connections than Chibtik? To what extent was political clien-
telism involved? And what was the role of the various intermediaries mentioned in 
the archives (but conspicuously absent from the Chibtikeros' accounts) such as the 
Vieja Guardia Agrarista in Comitan (appearing as advocates of Chibtik's cause), or a 
Tojolabal man named Juan Gomez Gomez (not his real name), a supposed expert 
in agrarian matters? 
Were the anomalies, inaccuracies, prolonged confusions and delays the inten-
tional work of the engineers and other land reform officials? Did they, as the 
Chibtikeros suggest, take sides in the conflict, first supporting the landowner and 
later Chibtik's adversaries from Santo Domingo? This cannot be unequivocally 
established in the case of Chibtik, nor, I suspect, in many other cases. The compli-
cations experienced by the Chibtikeros do not seem to be the result of a centrally 
engineered strategy, but rather the outcome of de-centred processes of conflict, 
shifting alliances, and strategies based on incomplete information. 
Land scarcity and the cultivation of ambiguity 
"Abuses and tricks" 
Anomalies and ambiguities such as those reported for Chibtik marked land redis-
tribution throughout the Tojolabal Highlands. This earned land reform officials a 
bad reputation, as they were accused of corruption and abuse. I encountered 
humerous insinuations and complaints about land reform lawyers and engineers in 
the land reform files. In 1974, Carlos Martinez Lavin, a Marist priest based in 
Comitan, asked the comisariados ejidales in several Tojolabal communities to report 
pn 'irregularities' involving land reform officials between i 9 6 0 and 1974. For the 
tojolabal Highlands, six communities reported having paid money in 1965 to the 
same official in order to obtain their certificados agrarios which they had not yet 
received. Some of these same communities reported having paid money to another 
individual in order to secure permission for logging on their ejidos. Puebla, in the 
municipality of Altamirano, reported having paid money in order to achieve an 
extension to their ejido, which was eventually refused (Martinez 1974b). 
The document in which Martinez Lavin recorded these findings was part of the 
preparations for the 1974 state-wide indigenous congress, commemorating the 
500th anniversary of the birth of Bartolome de Las Casas, the 'defender of the 
Indians'. During the congress itself, the Tojolabal delegation presented a document 
that underlined the failure of the land reform authorities to give "an effective answer 
to the petitions we make". Their statement continued: 
"We see that our word carries no weight with the authorities. When we go to 
their offices they pay no attention to us, they scold us, they send us back and 
forth. But they give us no orientation on how to resolve our problems. Specif-
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ically we note that the Joint Agrarian Commission seems to be fimctiorhng 
for interests definitely not Indian. So we simply waste our time and our 
money on trips, and the problems aren't resolved. [..] We want to denounce 
with all clarity the abuses and tricks [abusos y enganos] on the part of the 
authorities", (as translated by Womack 1999:153; a Spanish version of the 
statement can be found in Morales 1991). (Other problems cited in the state-
ment are the poor quality of their lands, conflicts with private landowners, 
and internal divisions within the communities.) 
The Tojolabal did not stand alone in their appreciation of the situation, complaints 
about the land reform bureaucracy were widespread. Reviewing a number of cases 
in different regions, Gomez and Kovic report "false technical reports", "omission of 
forms", unfulfilled "promises of land endowment" and "duplicated titles to different 
groups" (Gomez & Kovic 1994: 85). 
As mentioned earlier, such actions by lawyers and engineers in the land reform 
bureaucracy have been interpreted as part of an intentional policy by the Mexican 
government to cause conflict in the countryside, thereby preventing effective polit-
ical resistance. As the cases mentioned above indicate, conflicts over land between 
different groups of claimants were in fact aggravated by the actions of the land 
reform bureaucracy itself, often with highly disruptive consequences, sometimes 
escalating into violent confrontations. It is also clear that land reform officials have 
not always done everything in their power to prevent or solve such problems, and in 
some cases have intentionally fuelled them. Yet, their role cannot be adequately 
explained as part of a divide-and-rule master plan. When conflicts are deliberately 
aggravated, this seems to be guided more by the desire for personal gain. However, 
incomplete information or lack of insight into the problem also seem to have condi-
tioned the process. I propose, therefore, to understand the role of land reform offi-
cials, as well as that of other brokers in the land redistribution process, in terms of 
a cultivation of ambiguity. 
The process of land redistribution provided ample scope for the various actors 
involved to exacerbate the ambiguities and confusions and capitalise on them. The 
complexity and opacity of the land reform machinery in combination with the 
evident need of the Tojolabal population to deal with it in order to get land, created 
ideal conditions for brokers, not only land reform officials, but also landowners, 
private lawyers, comisariados ejidales and other peasant leaders. 3 7 They had access to 
information and documents that were vital to groups of peasants and could relatively 
easily capitalise on their knowledge and access to important persons . 3 8 Tojolabal 
land reform beneficiaries had to move around in unknown bureaucratic spaces 
where semiliteracy and an incomplete command of Spanish could easily be used to 
their disadvantage. By cultivating ambiguity, the land reform officials and others 
who knew their way around - often young Tojolabal with a good command of 
Spanish building up their expertise in the field of land redistribution - could prolong 
the procedures to increase their leverage. Two circumstances favoured the brokers: 
on the one hand, the existence of conflicting interests between different groups of 
claimants and on the other, the existence of inaccuracies and delays in the land 
reform process. Both became even more important as land redistribution stagnated 
in the 1970s. 
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Ambiguities 
The ambiguities and contradictions that arose in the land reform process were 
directly related to the way land redistribution was designed. The procedure started 
on the basis of separate requests for endowments by specific groups of peasants, 
t h i s could easily lead to compUcations. Both inaccuracies regarding the amount and 
type of land to be endowed and the existence of incompatible claims, only became 
formally visible at the end of the process, when the area was being demarcated. The 
land reform legislation entailed few provisions to avoid overlapping claims to the 
Same land at an early stage nor did it offer mechanisms for the reconciliation of 
incompatible claims. Rather, it stipulated that in the event of incompatibilities 
£'sing during the execution, the first endowment for which the Presidential Reso-ion had been issued should have priority, while the other group should only be 
endowed with the remaining lands (see Ley Federal de Reforma Agraria, Art. 313). 3 9 
In practice, various peasant groups could simultaneously be engaged in endowment 
procedures over the same land for years before a settlement was reached. As we saw, 
the response of groups sustaining competing claims often took the form of 
Obstructing the demarcation process. This meant that the Presidential Execution 
could not be executed and could prolong the dispute considerably. 
All these problems were reinforced by the procedural labyrinth of land redistrib-
ution, involving a multiplicity of bureaucratic levels and instances (state governor, 
CAM, state and federal divisions of the Land Reform Ministry, as well as local and 
regional offices of peasant organisations), and many (even to lawyers) complex 
juridical details. The length of time that elapsed between the different stages of the 
process and the fact that the various officials involved handled different parts of the 
information all complicated the process. Furthermore, there was the imprecision 
Q.nd incompleteness of information on the cases. A common confusion concerned 
the names of the petitioning settlements: old finca names and new names, assigned 
9t the start of the endowment procedure were confused. Sometimes a group 
Changed its name halfway through the process, with the land reform office taking 
this as a new petition, while common, recurrent names of private properties as well 
as setdements (e.g. San Miguel or Rosario) were easily confused. All this led to docu-
ments being misfiled and cases being mixed up. Data on private properties (drawn 
from the Land Registry Office) were sometimes outdated or incomplete. The areas 
mentioned in the Register were not always based on accurate measurements and 
usually needed to be adjusted when land measurements were eventually carried out, 
while maps drawn by the land reform topographers were riddled with errors. This 
implied that projected endowments needed to be adjusted when measurements in 
the field finally took place. The information on the ejidos in the files kept in the land 
reform office was often ambiguous and contradictory. The files did not clarify the 
State of affairs concerning disputes or when and how these were settled. Many cases 
seem never to have been officially closed. 4 0 It was sometimes impossible, therefore, 
for engineers or lawyers to know whether or not a certain tract of land could be 
included in a new endowment. 
Land scarcity and the loss of legitimacy 
The irregularities and contradictions in the process of land redistribution,backfired 
at the land reform bureaucracy. In the eyes of the Tojolabal population, it lost legit-
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imacy and came to be seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. 
Thus, the often frustrating experiences with the land reform bureaucracy 
contributed to the image of the Mexican state as oppressive and acting against the 
interests of the poor. Matters were only exacerbated as the amount of available land 
shrank and land reform stagnated. 
The land reform bureaucracy was less and less able to respond to demands for 
land, while inaccuracies and inconsistencies multiplied. The number of half-
resolved and unresolved land claims grew. As mentioned earlier, of the total of 38 
ejido endowment actions in the Tojolabal Highlands, four were 'partial executions', 
in which the extensions demarcated and transferred were only part of what the Pres-
idential Resolution stipulated. Officially, in these cases the ejidatarios were entitled 
to a complementary endowment, but in practice this was impossible owing to the 
lack of available land. Lack of available land - meaning that within the seven kilo-
metre radius around the settlement, no national lands or private properties liable to 
land redistribution could be found - was also the reason why many petitions for 
extensions to existing ejidos were rejected. In addition, since more and more of the 
land had already been turned into ejidos, the possibilities of adjusting overlapping 
endowments due to inaccurate measurements or of compensating one of the groups 
of claimants with land elsewhere close by, were severely reduced. Overlapping 
claims thus became irreconcilable and involved lasting conflicts between groups. 
Limited possibilities for further land redistribution, however, certainly did not 
mean the end to agrarian dealings (gestiones agrarias). On the contrary, they became 
more intensive, more time-consuming and costlier than ever. As the end to land 
redistribution came into sight, competition for the remaining land became fiercer 
and more obscure. The scarcer land grew, the more profitable the process of redis-
tribution became to the engineers, lawyers and intermediaries dealing with the 
claims. Groups of peasants were prepared to invest considerably in alliances with 
certain authorities and intermediaries in order to obtain recognition of their claim 
to land. It was against this background that the political organisations being formed 
in the Tojolabal Highlands from the 1970s onwards became involved in land 
conflicts. 
The politicisation of land reform 
Since the 1970s, land redistribution in Chiapas has become increasingly politicised. 
On the one hand, land redistribution became an important instrument in attempts 
to control rural unrest and land conflicts while on the other, land conflicts became 
increasingly linked to factional struggles. In the Tojolabal Highlands, newly created 
ejido unions took up some of the decades-old land conflicts in the region. 
Rural unrest in Chiapas 
The 1970s witnessed a new political stage in Chiapas, marked by the articulation of 
political organisations adopting a critical position towards the Mexican regime, an 
intensified agrarian struggle and a climate of growing antagonism. In several 
regions, the Canadas (Ocosingo) and the northern region (especially Simojovel), but 
also the western part of the central valley (Venustiano Carranza), the struggle for 
land became extremely violent (Benjamin 1995; Harvey 1998). Benjamin even 
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speaks of a "low intensity agrarian war" (1995:256). Peasant groups, often supported 
by political organisations such as the CIOAC (Central Independiente de Obreros Agri-
colas y Campesinos) and OCEZ (Organization Campesina Emiliano Zapata), invaded 
private coffee-plantations and cattle ranches (often alongside legal procedures for 
land endowment). In many cases, the land invasions involved violent confrontations 
with landowners that were not prepared to yield to peasant pressure. Land claimants 
confronted entrepreneurs whose properties represented considerable capital and, 
Unlike the finqueros of the Tbjolabal Highlands thirty years earlier, enjoyed consid-
erable political leverage at the state level. The state government, apparently unhin-
dered by national authorities, responded to the invasions with evictions and repres-
sion. The massacre at Golonchan (1980) where landowners and the army killed 
twelve peasants, was a dramatic example of this (Reyes Ramos 1992:112; Benjamin 
1995: 260). Governor General Absalon Castellanos (1982-1988) in particular built 
up an infamous record and is regarded as responsible for the deaths of numerous 
peasant leaders (Burguete 1994; Benjamin 1995: 275). 
At the same time, however, unrest in the country side led to considerable activity 
in the field of land redistribution, which was used as an instrument in a policy of 
contention (Reyes Ramos 1998: 34). During Castellanos' administration, consider-
able expanses of land were transferred in the form of both provisional (360 000 
hectares) and definitive endowments (450,000 hectares) (Villafuerte et al. 1999:115). 
Ijn addition, new land redistribution mechanisms were designed, which relied on 
induced sales. The state government either bought the land and sold it to groups of 
peasants or, as in the Programa de Rehabilitation Agraria (PRA) under Absalon 
Castellanos, facilitated transactions between landowners and the claimants, 
assuming the costs. Land acquisitions became an oft-repeated response to invasions 
in Chiapas. The PRA involved over 80, 000 hectares, most of which were concen-
trated in conflictive regions, particularly Simojovel, Ocosingo and Venustiano 
Carranza. Although it by no means put an end to land seizures (Villafuerte et al. 
1999:114), Castellanos' successor, Patodnio Gonzalez Blanco, continued the acqui-
sition policy under the name of Programa de Concertation Agraria (Reyes Ramos 
1998:33). 
The acquisition programmes have been highly controversial. Several sources 
report that they fuelled rather than resolved conflicts, espedally between the state-
endorsed CNC and independent organisations (Reyes Ramos 1992:113-8; Harvey 
1998:153-5; Taller 1988). As I argued for land reform in general, it does not seem 
that this was the result of a master plan of political subordination. Rather, the same 
problems of inaccurate data, conflicting interests and key artors 'cultivating ambi-
guity' that complicated ordinary endowment procedures, seem to have complicated 
the acquisition programmes. Furthermore, if the acquisitions were intended to 
manipulate the peasant population, they were totally unsuccessful. The programmes 
failed to stop political opposition from growing and instead compounded the loss of 
legitimacy of state structures. This affeded the state government as well as the land 
reform bureaucracy that did not retain its earlier control over the land redistribution 
process in the land acquisition programmes. 
In the Tbjolabal Highlands, land seizures and violent confrontations did not reach 
the extremes reported for some other regions. Similarly, there were only a few cases 
of state-assisted land acquisitions. This was linked to the f a d that by the 1970s 
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private property had already been greatly reduced and most landowners had already 
left the region. However, in this region, the quest for land also acquired more explicit 
political dimensions. Groups of land claimants sought support in the recently 
created ejido unions to further their demands and longer standing land conflicts 
became caught up in political rivalries. Before presenting a few cases that illustrate 
this point, however, I will briefly discuss the process of political organisation in the 
region of study. 
Political organisations in the Tojolabal Highlands 
As in the Cafiadas region, in the Tojolabal Highlands political organisation began in 
the wake of the indigenous congress of 1974 (Legorreta 1998, Hernandez Cruz 
1999, Meyer 2000). The congress had been organised by the San Cristobal diocese, 
headed by Don Samuel Ruiz, at the request of governor Velasco Suarez. The 
congress became an unprecedented platform for the discussion and denouncement 
of the indigenous population's problems. Aware of his own limitations in the field 
of politics, the Bishop had involved young left wing intellectuals from the Union del 
Pueblo (UP), an organisation from central Mexico (Legorreta 1998: 58). Other organ-
isations followed soon after: PoUtica Popular, which, together with UP formed Linea 
Proletaria, and later (in the 1980s) CIOAC and OCEZ. Bishop Ruiz had initially 
supported the young political activists in whose work he saw an important comple-
ment to pastoral w o r k . 4 1 This synergy would, however, only last for a few years. In 
1978, the Bishop ordered the 'expulsion' of the Nortefios, as they were frequently 
called, from the Cafiadas region (Legorreta 1998:114). They returned, but relations 
with the diocese have remained strained ever since. 
In the Tojolabal Highlands the Nortefios promoted the creation of the Union de 
Ejidos Lucha Campesina which comprised most communities in the Tojolabal High-
l a n d s . 4 2 Lucha Campesina was one of the members of the Union de Uniones (UU), 
an umbrella organisation of which the full name was Union de Uniones Ejidales y 
Sociedades Campesinas de Production de Chiapas, known as ARIC Unidn de Uniones 
as of 1988 (ARIC standing for: Asotiation Rural de Interns Colectivo).43 Lucha Campe-
sina must have been an important member of the UU, because in 1980 the official 
constitution of this organisation was celebrated in Bajucu (Legorreta 1998: 60). 
The Nortefios coupled a strategy of political independence with negotiations with 
the government in order to create scope for demands, a policy known as politica de 
dos cams (Harvey 1998; Flores Felix undated). Under their direction, the ejido union 
focussed on agricultural production and services, land issues being somewhat less 
important . 4 4 The union achieved a transport concession, credits, and the installa-
tion of Conasupo outlets (Flores Felix, undated). 
By the early 1980s, the leadership of the Nortefios was challenged by a group of 
young Tojolabal men, many of whom were members of the first generation of Tojo-
labal bilingual teachers. 4 5 In the opinion of one of the leading figures at the time, 
the Nortefios were 'parasites' that profited from the organisation that the Tojolabal 
people themselves had created obtaining, first a road into the area and second, a 
transport concession. 4 6 The 'outsiders' only became involved at a later stage. Regard-
less of the factual correctness of this account, it clearly expresses the competition 
between the Nortefios and the nascent Tojolabal leadership. The tensions within 
Lucha Campesina eventually led, in 1986, to a split of the union and the creation of 
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ai second union, the Union de Ejidos Pueblos Tojolabales, that included a good deal of 
the former bases of Lucha Campesina (Hernandez Cruz 1999; Mattiace 1998). 
Although the split was caused by a conflict over the five busses Lucha Campesina 
controlled by that time, behind it lay more profound political differences. In 1982, 
the nascent Tojolabal leadership and the Nortenos had chosen opposite sides in the 
elections for the municipal presidency of Las Margaritas. The Nortenos supported 
the PRI (at the same time they also developed closer links with the CNC), whereas 
the group around the Tojolabal teachers supported the CIOAC and the PSUM (the 
forerunner of the present-day PRD). 
The group around the teachers had already proven its strength when it had won 
control over the Consejo Supremo Tojolabal in Las Margaritas, set up several years 
earlier by President Echeverria. 4 7 For the municipal elections they joined forces with 
the CIOAC that had arrived in Chiapas at about the same time as the Norterios, but 
- despite the fact that one of its leaders, Margarita Ruiz, was a Tojolabal from Plan 
de Ayala - had focussed its efforts mainly on the northern region and the mestizo 
communities in the region around Comitan. Together with the PSUM, the CIOAC 
supported the candidacy of Alejandro Aguilar, a Tojolabal from Plan de Ayala, for 
the municipal presidency (see also Chapter Seven). As the Tojolabal candidate lost 
the municipal elections upon suspicion of fraud, the differences with the Norterios 
could not be reconciled and led to the creation of a rival ejido union, called Pueblos 
Tojolabales (Hernandez Cruz 1999). 
The association of Pueblos Tojolabales with the CIOAC stood for quite a different 
line from Lucha Campesina. The shift was away from negotiation with the govern-
rhent towards opposition and confrontation (Flores Felix, undated). It also allowed 
more scope for ethnic demands, which were to become central to the political project 
of Pueblos Tojolabales (an issue taken up again in Chapter Seven) (Burguete, pers. 
com.). Pueblos Tojolabales also paid more attention to the struggle for land, though 
this was never at the centre of the CIOAC's agenda in the Tojolabal Higlands 
(Burguete pers com., Aguilar pers com). The CIOAC assisted groups in their deal-
ings with the land reform office, for example, when the procedures had not been 
completed or documentation was lacking. It also promoted the conversion of 
copropiedades to bienes comunales.4* 
As of 1986, most communities of the Tojolabal Highlands either belonged to 
Lucha Campesina or to Pueblos Tojolabales. In the north of the region, part of the 
munitipality of Altamirano, the OCEZ-CNPA and later ANCIEZ played a significant 
rOle. The fraction of OCEZ affiliated to the Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala, 
whose original stronghold was in Venustiano Carranza, had spread to different 
regions of Chiapas, mduding Las Margaritas and Ocosingo (Collier 1994:76). More 
radical than the CIOAC, it had rejected both the land acquisition poliries of the state 
governments and maintained greater independence from political parties (Harvey 
1998:138-46; Benjamin 1995; Taller 1988). The two organisations frequently collab-
orated, however. Around 1991, the ANCIEZ (Alianza Nacional Campesina Indepen-
diente Emiliano Zapata) emerged, but little is known about its origins. It has been 
suggested that it had close connections with the clandestine FLN (Fuerzas de 
Liberation National, the precursor of the EZLN) and may have been created as a 
cover for it (Womack 1999:39; Harvey 1998:195), but there are also suggestions that 
ANCIEZ was associated with the OCEZ (Collier 1994: 83). 
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Land and political rivalries 
With the creation of ejido unions in the region and their links to wider political 
organisations, land conflicts in the Tojolabal Highlands acquired new dimensions. 
Private properties on the wish list of neighbouring ejidos and unresolved controver-
sies over certain tracts now became embedded in political rivalries. The CIOAC 
played quite an active role in this, as shown by the following two cases. 
The Veracruz and Lomantan ejidos had been involved in a lengthy conflict over 
an area of about 1500 hectares, part of the San Mateo finca (from which land had 
also been taken to create the Veracruz ejido in 1937) and enclosed between the two 
ejidos. Both ejidos had requested the tract under dispute as an extension to their ejido 
lands, but the procedure had not yielded results for either of them. Supported by the 
CIOAC, a group of ejidatarios from Veracruz took possession of the area, not only 
arousing the anger of Lomantan, affiliated to the rival Lucha Campesina, but also 
antagonising factions within their own community. As an armed confrontation 
between Lomantan and the group from Veracruz approached, the CIOAC made an 
attempt to mediate, offering the group from Lomantan a quarter of the area. The 
group from Lomantan rejected the offer. Though the situation was never formally 
resolved, it ended in a de facto victory for the Veracruz group affiliated to the 
CIOAC.49 
The second conflict in which the CIOAC became involved had a long history. The 
dispute between the communities of Buenavista Bawitz (an ejido, affliated to Pueblos 
Tojolabales) and San Antonio Bawitz (a copropiedad, affiliated to the C N C ) 5 0 
regarding a certain fraction of land went back as far as the ejido endowment of 
Buenavista in the 1930s. The Buenavista ejido was to be created on the basis of lands 
from the Bahuitz finca. During the execution of the Presidential Resolution, land 
belonging to the pequena propiedad set aside for the owner, Ofelia Gordillo, was 
mistakenly included in the ejido endowment. The owner contested this (through an 
injunction) and a judge ruled that the mistake should be rectified. But apparently 
this never took effect. Despite the verdict, the ejidatarios from Buenavista refused to 
abandon their claims to this land, which they continued to base on the map with the 
projected endowment, which included the lands under dispute. The problem was 
inherited by the new owners (socios) of the land when they bought it in 1968 after 
having already bought several other sections from the former Bahuitz finca (see also 
earlier in this chapter). The ejidatarios of Buenavista accused the associates of San 
Antonio of invading their ejido land. In the 1980s, the group from San Antonio 
Bawitz, supported by the CNC, confronted the ejidatarios from Buenavista Bawitz 
that were supported by the C I O A C . 5 1 The conflict claimed several lives, especially 
on the side of Buenavista (Burguete 1994). 
A solution was found in compensating Buenavista with lands elsewhere, namely 
on three plots of land on the former Napite finca. Within the framework of the 
Programa de Rehabilitacidn Agraria (PRA), the state government acquired three 
sections from the former Napite finca, of about 100, 200, and 300 hectares respec-
tively, to be transferred to 64 beneficiaries of Buenavista Bawitz. 5 2 The case provides 
a good illustration of how the acquisition program was used to deal with land 
conflicts but ended up creating new ones. The people from the Gonzalez de Leon 
ejido, affiliated to Lucha Campesina, had been using the land in question and felt 
their rights had been violated. In a letter to the Land Reform Ministry in Tuxtla they 
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wrote that they were being wrongly accused of having "invaded" that land, adding 
that they had had it "in their material possession" ever since the ejido had been 
created. 5 3 They resisted the planned endowment to Buenavista for several years until 
the Tribunal Agrario finally agreed that they were in the right in 1 9 9 4 . 5 4 
In the meantime, in 1992, the state government had bought a piece of property 
of about 350 hectares on the south-eastern fringe of the Tojolabal Highlands on 
which to relocate the people from Buenavista. With this land a new settlement was 
formed that was named Nueva Nicaragua. 5 5 This time the acquisition was carried 
Out under the Programa de Concertacion Agraria of which only one other case was 
registered for the Tojolabal Highlands, namely the acquisition of part of Rancho 
Mendoza by peasants from Veinte de Noviembre, who were members of Pueblos 
Tojolabales.56 
According to the ejidatarios of Gonzalez de Leon, the conflict between Buenavista 
and San Antonio had been "provoked" by the CIOAC. This illustrates what I mean 
by the politicisation of land reform since the 1970s. The conflict over that particular 
piece of land, that had lingered on for decades by the time the peasant unions 
became involved, not only pitted one group of peasants against another, but pitched 
lucha Campesina against Pueblos Tojolabales, C N C against CIOAC, PRI against 
PSUM. The struggle over land in the region became embedded in the political rival-
ries between organisations. 
At the same time, state engagement in response to such conflicting claims 
Required a political meaning. The land acquisitions always necessarily favoured one 
group over another (though compensations were made) and were interpreted by the 
interested parties in terms of factional conflict. It has been suggested that state inter-
vention systematically favoured loyal groups and repressed or co-opted opposition 
groups. On the basis of my fmdings for the Tojolabal Highlands I find it hard to see 
£tate intervention as systematic. All land acquisitions by the state government were 
done to benefit groups affiliated to Pueblos Tojolabales I CIOAC; but was this co-opta-
tion or an ad hoc response to conflictive situations? The group from Buenavista lost 
the legal disputes with other groups, not affiliated to Pueblos Tojolabales I CIOAC. Was 
tins repression? They only lost after lengthy procedures in which it was unclear for 
a long time who would eventually win. It should also be borne in mind that the 
Lucha Campesina ejido union kept a certain distance from both the PRI and the CNC 
and cannot be regarded as a warm supporter of the state government (Mattiace 
1998). Thus, it may not always have been quite so clear in practice which groups 
Were actually supposed to be considered loyal. 
The state government of Chiapas has been associated with violent acts of repres-
sion. CIOAC activists in central and eastern Chiapas suffered numerous attacks and 
in 1985, Andulio Galvez, a lawyer working for the CIOAC on land claims, was assas-
sinated by Tojolabal gunmen from one of the Highland communities, apparently at 
the instigation of Ernesto Castellanos (the governor's brother) (Harvey 1998:159; 
Burguete 1994). Although rightly condemned as an act of repression for which the 
state government was at least partly responsible, the assassination can hardly be 
understood outside the political struggles being waged within the Tojolabal High-
lands at the time. It seems to me that state interventions interact with localised polit-
ical rivalries in extremely complicated ways that we are only beginning to under-
stand. Actors within the state government or the land reform bureaucracy may seek 
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to exploit local rivalries and conflicts politically, but they do this without complete 
knowledge of the situation or necessarily accurate assessments of local power rela-
tions and stakes. 
Discussion: the political consequences of land reform 
From its inception, land reform in Mexico has been regarded as a political instru-
ment. As mentioned in the previous chapter, to Lazaro Cardenas, land reform and 
the creation of ejidos were instrumental to a project of nation building, centralisa-
tion of the state and the achievement of greater political control over the country-
side. In this vein, land reform in Mexico is commonly understood as the corner 
stone of corporatist policies that allow for the incorporation and subordination of 
the peasantry. I find this perspective limited, however, for understanding the polit-
ical consequences of land reform in the Tojolabal Highlands. The corporatist view 
of land reform draws on rather abstract notions of control and does not provide 
much insight into the workings of state engagement in particular regions or in the 
ways in which state actions shape concrete political processes. As I have tried to 
point out in this chapter, the use of land redistribution as a political instrument is 
highly complex. The land reform bureaucracy itself is a multi-layered, opaque 
machine that operates through de-centred dynamics. Furthermore, when land redis-
tribution is employed to engineer political processes, its outcomes may be highly 
unpredictable, as it becomes caught up in the agendas of different actors and polit-
ical rivalries. 
However, regardless of whether state interventions in the field of land redistrib-
ution respond to a coherent political strategy, they may have important political 
consequences. Through land reform, interfaces were constructed between Mexican 
state structures and the Tojolabal peasant population that created conditions for the 
operation of a wide range of brokers and have been crucial to local political imagery. 
As Nuijten has so interestingly shown, understandings of state power take shape 
through experiences of land reform beneficiaries with the land reform bureaucracy 
(1998). She speaks in this regard of the state as a 'hope-generating machine'. 
However, in the context of Chiapas, I would add the image of the state as a 'fear-
inspiring machine': a powerful but potentially harmful, often inimical force. The 
state represents a highly contested force that competes with other 'hope-generating 
machines'. A characteristic of eastern Chiapas is precisely the lack of state hege-
mony, since the diocese and peasant organisations form rival political structures. In 
Chiapas, land reform cannot simply be equated with the effective establishment of 
state control. Rather than assuming that land reform ensures peasant compliance, 
we may understand it as generating complex combinations of compliance and resist-
ance. 
There are only a few studies that document the political consequences of state 
engagement in land redistribution ethnographically. For Chiapas, we have the 
insightful work of Rus on the Tsotsil municipality of San Juan Chamula in the 
Central Highlands (1994). Rus found that in Chamula, the Cardenista reformers 
involved with rural communities "had managed to co-opt not only the native leaders 
[...] but also, ironically, the very community structure" (Rus 1994:267). State engage-
ment here implied "the centralisation of political and economic power within 
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communities and the tying of that power to the state" (Rus 1994: 267). As a comu-
nidad revolucionaria institutional Chamula testifies to the success of the corporatist 
project under particular circumstances. Amongst other things, the institutional pres-
ence of the federal state, especially through the Institute National Indigenista (INI) 
was crucial to organising political control and re-engineering local structures of 
authority and power relations (also Collier 1987). 
However, eastern Chiapas presents quite a different picture. As Harvey notes, in 
Chiapas' periphery "the role of federal agencies was much more ambiguous than in 
the core area of the central highlands." (Harvey 1998: 66). The same held for the 
Tojolabal Highlands that, like the Canadas, retained considerable autonomy "vis-a-
vis the mechanisms of control and political mediation created by indigenismo in the 
Highland region... [remaining] on the edge of forms of corporitisation exercised by 
the state" (Flores Felix undated: 8; also Hernandez Cruz 1999). Between 1940 and 
1970 state institutional presence was extremely limited. State engagement in land 
reform had, of course, been crucial to the establishment of the ejidos in the region 
while land endowment had been conditioned by the state's legal framework. The 
Tojolabal were required to use state procedures and channels to further their land 
claims and, particularly during the early decades, to depend on intermediaries linked 
fo the C N C (the Vieja Guardia Agrarista). But once the ejidos were established, the 
land reform bureaucracy seemed a rather distant actor, and one whose role was 
limited to interference in land conflicts. Beyond land redistribution, institutional 
presence was practically nil (Hernandez Cruz 1999). For example, in 1974 Martinez 
Lavin found only 15 teachers for the whole Tojolabal region (to put this figure into 
perspective: in the same year the Kastalia and the Marist Mision de Guadalupe super-
yised 150 catechists in the region; Martinez 1974). The INI, so important in the 
Central Highlands, was only installed in Las Margaritas in the 1970s. 
Until the mid-1970s, bloc votes to the governing party PRI were common 
(Martinez 1974), but it is rather unclear in what ways and how tightly the Tojolabal 
ejidos were incorporated into wider structures of political control. I have the impres-
sion that what Jan Rus concluded for Chamula by the end of the 1930s, namely that 
tno one had bothered to organise them politically" (Rus 1994: 274) was true for the 
Tojolabal region until the mid-1970s. But unlike in Chamula, it was not the 
governing party that undertook this endeavour, but the diocese and leftist political 
organisations. This is why we may conclude with Teresa Fernandez, involved with 
Iinea Proletaria and the ejido union Lucha Campesina in the region, that: "First the 
Church arrived, then we did, the political organisations, and finally the state" 
(pers.com.). 
The situation in the Tojolabal Highlands resembled that of the Canadas, where 
the diocese and the Union de Uniones had constructed a 'domain of sovereignty' 
which mediated and resisted state presence (see also Legorreta 1998, Leyva 2001) . 5 7 
That is, when the Mexican state tried to establish greater political control over the 
region, it encountered political structures that were so strong that it could not 
replace these but was forced to compete with them. Following a Chiapas-wide devel-
opment, state institutional presence increased considerably in the 1970s and 1980s, 
especially in the fields of schooling, health care, infrastructure and support to agri-
cultural production (Harvey 1998, Ruz 1982) . 5 8 However, the Mexican state never 
managed to build an uncontested hegemony. 
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The fate of the regional office of the INI in Las Margaritas makes this quite clear. 
Like the Consejo Supremo Tojolabal it was established as a channel through which the 
PRI and the C N C sought to increase their control of the Tojolabal region, but 
without much s u c c e s s . 5 9 Like in the Central Highlands, the INI started with the 
training of Tojolabal bilingual teachers, but unlike their Tsotsil counterparts earlier 
in Chamula, these did not ensure control over Tojolabal communities (Rus 1994; 
Ruz 1982: 255-256). On the contrary, they posed a definite challenge to the PRI by 
taking over the Consejo Supremo Tojolabal in 1981 and then almost sweeping the 
opposition party PSUM to victory in the elections for the municipal presidency of 
Las Margaritas in 1982 (Flores Felix undated). (This victory was the reason why the 
INI stopped subsidising the Consejo Supremo, which then became self-financed by 
the Tojolabal communities, an experience I will return to when discussing the 
constitution of autonomous municipalities after 1994.) 
The increase of state presence took place within a highly politicised context. Polit-
ical identities were taking shape that in many cases distanced themselves from or 
even explicitly opposed state action. As I said of land conflicts, state intervention in 
general became caught up in political rivalries. The coupling of state intervention 
with selective repression in the 1980s further polarised the rural population. The 
association of the expanding institutional presence of the Mexican state with polit-
ical factionalism has marked the meanings attached to state engagement with the 
region. The state has thus come to be regarded as a highly controversial force. What 
legitimacy it has is at best fragile and contingent on the 'victories' it achieves for 
different political factions. 
It is against this background of highly contentious state involvement that we can 
see how more recently, under Zapatismo, oppositions and conflicts have become 
arranged along the axis of being 'with the government (con el gobiemo)' or 'againsf 
it. This discussion is taken up again towards the end of this book. In the next two 
chapters, I will explore the ways in which the state reached into the communities of 
the region, affecting notions of property, community membership and authority 
structures. 
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Notes 
1 ARA-TG 4 8 0 
2 Presidential Resolution in ARA-TG 4 8 0 
3 ARA-TG 4 8 0 
4 This was the case, for example, in Nuevo 
Mexico/Palma Real, Buenavista/San 
Antonio Bahuitz, Vergel/Vergelito, 
Veracruz/San Mateo, Florida/Chibtik. 
5. On the concept of interface see Long 
1 9 8 9 . 
6j For the revisionist perspective, based on 
empirical research into the archives of 
particular haciendas, see Bock ( 1 9 9 3 : esp. 
2 0 3 - 6 ) ; Nickel ( 1 9 9 7 : esp. 11 -20) . For a 
I critical review of revisionism, see Knight 
( 1 9 8 6 c ) ; part of the article discusses 
peonage in southern Mexico. 
7! This was confirmed by Dona Lolita 
Albores from Comitan, a midwife herself. 
8i In this way, a connection was established 
between adulthood defined on the basis 
of work and specific entitlements (in this 
case marriage), that still plays a role in 
present-day entitlements. 
9 A fictionalised account of such entangle-
ment is given by Rosario Castellanos 
Figueroa in the novel BalAn Cantin, based 
on her own childhood (her family owned 
several properties in the Tzeltal region). 
1 0 Until recently, a plaque with the name of 
Don Pepe and the date of his death (1945) 
could be seen in the wall of the church of 
San Miguel Chibtik. 
i t Though Popkin adopts a critical stance 
towards the moral economy approach, he 
provides a useful summary of it. 
12 Such as the growing presence of the 
national state, commercialisation of agri-
culture and population growth (see 
Ouweneel 1 9 9 6 : 5 4 - 6 ; Popkin 1 9 7 9 : 1 5 ) . 
13 For example, he increased the load of 
maize that had to be carried from his 
maize fields to the settlement from 1 _ to 
2 zontes, which meant four trips a day. 
1 4 Their accounts convey a dear antagonism 
between mozos and cattle, possibly 
related to the increasing presence of cattle 
in the 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 6 0 s . They seem to 
exaggerate the number, mentioning 
2 0 0 0 - 3 0 0 0 head of cattle. A source from 
1 9 5 9 reports a much lower number, 
namely 4 5 7 animals (ARA-TG 1 2 7 5 ) , 
which in turn may be an underestima-
tion. In any case, the presence of cattle 
may have been highly disruptive for the 
mozos. 
15 Schryer ( 1 9 9 0 ) describes a similar change 
from 'old style' to 'new style' landowners 
that were more educated, more busi-
nesslike and did not speak the native 
language. His connection of this process 
to the demise of the moral economy (see 
esp. Chapter 1 0 ) , inspired m e to view the 
changes in the Tojolabal Highlands from 
a similar perspective. 
1 6 This law was replaced by the Agrarian 
Law (Ley Agraria) of President Salinas de 
Gortariin 1 9 9 2 . 
17 Expanses of land of lesser quality are 
derived from those of irrigated land, at a 
ratio of one of irrigated land to two of 
rainfed land to four of good quality 
pasture land to eight of pasture land in 
dry areas or waste land (monte). Pasture 
lands should not exceed the amount 
necessary to sustain 5 0 0 head of cattle. 
18 Although I found school plots in most 
communities, the first U A I M in the 
region was only created in 1 9 8 7 (Plan 
Comitan 1 9 8 8 ) . 
1 9 ARA-TG exp. 5 6 9 
2 0 This compares rather unfavourably with 
the average length of endowment proce-
dures for Chiapas as a whole for the 
period from 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 8 4 , as computed by 
Reyes Ramos at 7 . 3 6 years ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 0 3 ) . In 
Appendix 1 4 , she provides figures for the 
municipalities of Altamirano ( 9 . 2 years) 
and Las Margaritas (5.6 years). 
21 This was attempted, for example, in the 
case of La Ilusion (ARA-TG file 1324) . 
2 2 In the case of the ejido endowment to 
Puebla, for example, it was initially stated 
that the private properties found in its 
surroundings would not be analysed 
because they 'were not going to be 
affected'. This was an anomaly: liability or 
non-liability is supposed to be established 
on the basis of analysis, not a priori. At a 
later stage, two of these properties were 
still induded in the ejido endowment. 
(ARA-TG file 1 1 0 1 ) . 
23 RPP-O 1 9 4 8 - 2 7 , 2 8 , 2 9 
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2 4 RPP-O 1 9 5 4 - 4 , 1 9 6 5 - 0 9 , 1 0 
25 RPP-O 1 9 6 7 - 0 3 3 ; ARA-TG file 7 7 6 
2 6 RPP-O 1 9 6 1 - 0 2 , ARA-TG file 7 7 6 
2 7 See also Benjamin on the role of the 
CNC, overriding the state government as 
the main channel of communication 
between state and national levels ( 1 9 9 5 : 
2 2 6 ) . 
2 8 The maize boom seems to have been of a 
temporary nature, subsequent decline 
probably being related to soil exhaustion. 
2 9 ARA-TG file 5 6 9 
3 0 Letter of September 1 9 , 1 9 4 3 , ARA-TG file 
5 6 9 
31 ARA-TG file 815 , 554 
3 2 ARA-TG file 1 9 2 9 
33 ARA-TG file 1 9 2 9 
34 Under certain conditions, a ceriificado de 
inafectahilidad ganadera could be issued to 
protect property from further liability to 
land redistribution. Such inafectahilidad 
was limited to the land needed to main-
tain 5 0 0 head of livestock, which could 
vary from 3 0 0 to 5 0 , 0 0 0 hectares 
depending on the conditions of the vege-
tation. These certificates are often thought 
to play a major role in the protection of 
cattle ranches in Chiapas (see, for 
example, Reyes Ramos 1 9 9 2 : 1 1 8 - 1 2 1 ) . I 
did not find them to play a similar role in 
the Tojolabal Highlands, where the refer-
ence mentioned above was one of the very 
few I encountered in the files. 
35 ARA-TG file 1 9 2 9 
3 6 ARA-TG 1 9 2 9 ; the remainder of this 
section is also based on this file. 
37 Especially those attached to agencies like 
the Vieja Guardia Agrarista or the Liga de 
Comunidades Agrarias (attached to the 
Confederation National Campesina or 
CNC, created by Cardenas in 1 9 3 8 ) . 
38 See also Nuijten 1 9 9 8 , especially chapters 
8 & 9 . 
3 9 The same criterion could be applied in 
the case of provisional endowments (after 
the governor's decision concluding the 
first stage of the procedure). In practice 
however, when serious complications 
occurred, provisional endowments were 
often not executed, thus postponing the 
problems until the second stage. 
4 0 In view of the neo-liberal reforms to land 
tenure in Mexico, the Land Reform 
Ministry defined this as a serious problem 
and attempted to resolve this, among 
other things, by informing communities 
of the status of their requests. 
4 1 Since the II Vatican Council (19 6 2 - 1 9 65) 
and the General Conference of Latin 
American Bishops in Medellin ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 
the diocese had intensified and re-
oriented its work with the communities. 
The 'preferential option for the poof - as 
the policy of the diocese came to be called 
- inspired a reflection with the commu-
nities on their (harsh) reality in the light 
of the word of God (la Palabra de Dios). 
Samuel Ruiz realised, however, that 
pastoral work was limited in terms of 
offering real alternatives for the current 
conditions in which people lived. 
4 2 With the exception of Veracruz that was 
part of another union, Tierra y Libertad, 
also belonging to the UU; and Chibtik 
that became involved with the OCEZ at 
some point. 
43 The U U split up into two factions, the 
Union de Credito Pajal and the Union de 
Uniones around 1 9 8 2 , the latter subse-
quently becoming the ARIC-UU. Lucha 
Campesina continued with the Union de 
Credito Pajal Ya Kactic. After 1 9 9 4 , 
ARIC-UU split up again. 
4 4 This despite the fact that agrarian 
matters were initially at the heart of the 
organisation in the Cafiadas region. The 
mobilization against the threat of evic-
tion of several ejidos due to the superim-
position of the bienes comunales granted 
to the Lacandon Indians, served as a cata-
lyst for the formation of Quiptic and U U 
(Legorreta 1 9 9 8 ; Leyva & Ascencio 
1 9 9 6 ) . A decree issued by President 
Echeverria in 1 9 7 2 granted 6 6 families a 
total of 6 1 4 , 3 2 1 hectares, ignoring the 
rights of over 3 0 ejidos established there. 
The ejido union Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel 
formed in 1 9 7 4 , was used to counter the 
threat of eviction. Also in the Cafiadas, 
however, a great deal of emphasis was 
placed on productive matters. 
4 5 Partly as a result of the Indigenous 
Congress of 1 9 7 4 , in 1 9 7 6 the Instituto 
National Indigenista (INI) set up an office 
in Las Margaritas to attend the Tojolabal 
region. The INI began with the tiaining 
of young Tojolabal m e n as bilingual 
teachers, as had been done previously in 
104 
the central Highlands of Chiapas. New 
schools were opened in the Tojolabal 
Highlands and an increasing number of 
already existing ('federal') primary schools 
were converted to the bilingual system 
(see also Van der Haar 1 9 9 3 : 2 3 - 6 ) . 
4 ^ According to his account, several commu-
nities joined to trace the best route, then 
obtained government support, and jointly 
purchased a bus together. These forays 
into the field of transport drew the Tojo-
labal into a violent clash with transport 
entrepreneurs from Comitan eager to 
retain their monopoly who seized the bus 
in Comitan. The communities mobilised 
and broke the blockade. On the basis of 
these experiences it was decided to 
formalise the organisation as an ejido 
union and it was only then that outside 
political advisors became involved. Inter-
view with Alejandro Aguilar, February 
2 0 0 0 . 
4 7 In 1 9 7 5 a total of 5 6 o f such supreme 
councils were created that in most cases 
had little to do with existing forms of 
ethnic organisation but were rather 
attempts to pre-empt independent forms 
of organisation that were gaining strength 
at the time (also Mattiace 1 9 9 8 ) . 
4 8 This might explain why CMrtik, not being 
associated with Pueblos Tojolabales, did 
not adopt this solution. 
4 9 In 1 9 9 4 , without further justification, the 
claimants from Lomantan were notified 
by the federal Land Reform Ministry that 
their request for extension did not 
proceed (improcedente), ARA-TG file 6 3 8 . 
It is unclear whether the Veracruz group 
ever obtained formal recognition of their 
possession of the area. 
50 I am not sure whether it was part of 
Lucha Campesina at the time. 
51 ARA-TG file 7 7 6 
52 Confirmed by a document by ARA-TG 
1 9 8 6 : Relation de predios liquidados par el 
Programa de Rehabilitation Agaria; this 
was the only case of acquisitions within 
the framework of the PRA in the region 
of study. 
53 ARA-TG file 815 
54 Diario Ofidal de la Nacion, May 4 , 1 9 9 4 : 
28-31. 
55 ARA-TG file 3 7 8 6 ; the land had formerly 
belonged to the San Mateo finca. 
5 6 ARA-TG file 156-nitre 
57 The term is from Rubin ( 1 9 9 7 ) who uses 
it to describe the control of the COCEI in 
Juchitan. 
58 The rural development programme 
P R O D E S C H , initiated under Velasco 
Suarez in 1 9 7 0 (see Cancian 1 9 7 2 ) also 
played some part in the Tojolabal High-
lands (Martinez 1 9 7 4 ) . 
5 9 The Consejo Supremo was controversial. 
Its members had been picked by the INI 
itself and were said to use the institution 
to further their own interests alone (Ruz 
1 9 8 2 : 255). 
105 
I 
I 
I 


Chapter four 
Land reform and the constitution 
of community 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter to this book I discussed how I encountered 'community' 
in1 the Tojolabal Highlands as a structure of control and as a central social referent 
without which it would be difficult to talk about the region in general or land tenure 
in particular. I proposed to study communities in this region as historically consti-
tuted social configurations and pointed to the particular relevance of land reform in 
this regard. In the previous chapters we saw how ejidos and copropiedades were 
created with groups of former finca labourers on land that had previously belonged 
to fincas as well as some national lands. It became clear that land reform was more 
than a shift in land distribution and had important social and political consequences. 
I outlined how communities of land reform beneficiaries were constituted as terri-
torial and organisational entities linked to the land reform bureaucracy. The present 
chapter focuses on this process of community formation in San Miguel Chibtik. In 
1963, the Tojolabal mozo families of the Chibtik finca acquired the central part of 
the property to which an ejido endowment was added almost ten years later. It will 
become clear that these processes reshaped the patterns of identification and 
commitment of the former mozos, and implied redefinitions of group membership 
as well as the reorganisation of authority and decision-making structures. This part 
of the analysis is based primarily on fieldwork, combined with a few historical docu-
ments produced in the course of the struggle for land in Chibtik. 
The case of Chibtik highlights some of the ways in which social configurations 
in the Tojolabal Highlands were reworked in the process of land redistribution. As 
mentioned earlier, the new communities of land reform beneficiaries were created 
out of the communities of mozos that had existed under the finca regime, with 
which they showed considerable continuity. However, especially as regards land 
rights, community membership, and structures of governance, land redistribution 
involved considerable re-arrangements. Although these were partly minor adapta-
tions to the new conditions, significant discontinuities were also involved. A main 
point developed throughout the chapter is that the particular acceptance of the ejido 
institutional model in the Tojolabal Highlands, involving its almost complete 'ejidal-
isatiori, is related to these discontinuities. By this, I mean the fact that not only most 
Tojolabal communities have come to display all the formal characteristics of ejidos, 
but also that notions from the ejido model have become central to definitions of land 
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Map 4-1 S a n M i g u e l Chibt ik c. 1 9 5 0 
O l d m a p o f t h e p r o p e r t y ( c o u r t e s y o f t h e C a s t e l l a n o s M a c a l family) 
rights and community membership. A second point that I develop on the basis of 
the analysis of Chibtik is that the communities of land reform beneficiaries - or 
collectivities of right-holders to land, as I also call them - asserted themselves as 
structures of governance, exercising control over the definition and allocation of land 
rights. 
From finca to community 
During the time of the patron, the centre of the finca Chibtik was formed by a small 
hill on which the main buildings were located. These used to be the patron's house 
(casa grande), the church dedicated to San Miguel, together with a kitchen, a granary, 
stables and a house for the caretaker or mayordomo. Nowadays, the church, the casa 
grande and the kitchen are still there (the latter transformed into a school and a 
Conasupo outlet respectively), but the other buildings have given way to a communal 
health post, two co-operative shops (one run by the men, the other run by the 
women), and a basketball pitch (cancha). The peon families used to live at the foot 
of this hill, next to the fruit gardens of the patron, in small huts with walls of wooden 
sticks and thatched roofs. 1 Since 1963, when the remaining mozo families bought 
900 hectares of the finca, including the casa grande and their own settlement, the 
housing area has expanded considerably and the quality of the houses improved. 
But these are only some external manifestations of the transformation that has taken 
place as a result of the acquisition, which - though another 900 hectares were 
retained by the landowner in private property - really put an end to the Chibtik finca 
and made it as a community in its own right. 
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In the case of the Tojolabal Highlands, it is difficult to speak of the finca and the 
community" as separate entities. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Tojolabal settle-
ments in the region developed as part of the expanding landholdings. Although we 
may speak of'communities of mozos' within fincas, linked by kinship ties and reli-
gion, it is also important to bear in mind that these communities were in many 
respects indistinguishable from the fincas of which they were an important 
constituent part. This section is dedicated to providing some insight into the kind 
of 'social whole' that the fincas constituted, the linkages between the mozos and 
between the latter and the landowner. Land redistribution implied that new social 
configurations took shape, in which the landowner played a much more marginal 
role and in which the former mozos were positioned towards one another in new 
Ways. Thus, as a result of land redistribution, a process of community formation 
tbok place. 
The central role of the landowner 
Under the finca regime, the landowner or patron played a central role in the organ-
isation of property, production, and labour. He made the decisions concerning the 
transfer, division or expansion of the property and was in charge of overall manage-
ment and investment decisions, mduding the management of labour, fencing, road 
maintenance, and cattle trading. The landowner delegated a number of tasks to the 
overseer, called an encargado or mayordomo, who was directly responsible for the 
daily management of labour and livestock. The mayordomo acted as the representa-
tive of the patron: "the mayordomo is like the patron; he gives orders about the work 
and when the patron is not there, he behaves as [if he were] the patron", I was told. 
He called the people to work by means of blowing a horn (cacho) and sometimes 
inflicted physical punishment. 2 
The entitlements of the mozos derived from their relation to the patron, from 
their condition as 'the men of...'. The patron granted the peons the right to five on 
the estate, to cultivate the hillsides for subsistence, to extract firewood and building 
materials from the forests, etc. Most families owned some poultry that they kept in 
the small plot surrounding their house, and a cow or a horse, provided that the 
patron, who sought to limit the pressure on grazing land, granted them permission. 
As the feeding of the peons' animals was seen as directly competing with the grazing 
of the patrdn's cattle, this had to be compensated for.3 The peons' animals received 
the branding (hierra) of the patron, indicating that inasmuch as the mozos were 'his', 
so were their possessions. The entitlements of the mozos were a consequence of 
their relation to the patrdn and 'earned' though their labour service to him. The enti-
tlements extended to the women and children of the family, who were also required 
to provide labour services (see also next sub-section). As boys grew up, they could 
be admitted as 'men' in their own right. Just as for their fathers, their rights were 
derived from the relation with the patron and directly dependent on labour service. 
From the accounts of the elder Chibtikeros about finca times, I inferred that some 
mozo families received what seemed to be extra privileges or a preferential treat-
ment from the patron. I came across references to a family being allowed to fence a 
plot of relatively good land for maize cultivation, and another one being given 
permission to keep more animals. 4 
The landowner was thus central both in granting rights and in the overall 
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management of the fmca. Furthermore, he acted as the highest authority in many 
matters concerning the mozos, including giving consent for the marriages of the 
mozos, accepting boys as full labourers, but also in conflict resolution (see also 
Montagu 1990 [1970]). When, as a consequence of the land acquisition of 1963, the 
'patron left', a certain institutional vacuum was created in all of these fields, 
prompting considerable re-arrangements. 
Labour and differentiation 
Although the mozo families forged a common identity based on being 'the men o f 
and their residence at the fmca, the 'community of mozos' constituted a differenti-
ated social entity. Labour served as an important structuring principle at the fmca. 
Tasks were differentiated by sex and age (see also the description in Ruz 1982:234-
36). Children and women of the resident families mostly performed tasks related to 
the casagrande. Young boys took turns as porteros (literally gate-keepers), fetching 
water and fire wood and feeding the domestic animals. The women worked in the 
kitchen of the casa grande grinding corn on stones and baking tortillas. Besides the 
patrdn and bis family, extra labourers or visitors (for example the so-called partidenos, 
cattle traders) also needed to be fed. One of the women's other tasks was to grind the 
salt for the cattle. 5 The women also participated in agricultural work, such as 
harvesting coffee on another property belonging the patrdn, but this work was seen 
as additional to their 'services' and was paid for on a daily basis. 
The literature on fincas in Chiapas contains fairly detailed descriiptions of the 
different types of labourers and the stratification amongst them (see for example 
Garda de Leon 1985a: 119-23). As I compared my own findings, based on interviews 
with elderly Tojolabal 6, with the accounts by Garcia de Leon and Gomez & Ruz 
(1992) and the description of the neighbouring Tzeltal region by Montagu (1990 
[1970]), I was confronted with what seemed to be considerable variations in labour 
arrangements from region to region, from finca to fmca, and apparently over time. 
The meaning of the terms to indicate different categories of workers (baldios, mozos, 
peons, semaneros, vaqueros, caporales etc.) shows considerable variation. Garda de 
Leon for example distinguishes between resident labourers (mozos or gananes) and 
day labourers (naborios) (Garcia de Leon 1985a: 119). To one of the elder m e n of 
Chibtik (tatjun Isidro) mozos were those who worked for the patron everyday and 
were given 'rations' (raciones) of maize and beans. He distinguished them from the 
baldianos, who worked for three days a week for the patron in return for permission 
to make their milpas on the land belonging to the finca, but received no food rations. 
Most other people of Chibtik did not make such a distinction and generally referred 
to all resident labourers as mozos. Many people mentioned the occasional hiring of 
day labourers for specific tasks. 
Among the resident peons, two categories were distinguished. On the one hand, 
there were the macheteros (literally machete-boys) who did mainly agricultural work 
- that in those days was heavily dependent on the machete for weeding and 
harvesting - in the patron's fields. The vaqueros (cowboys) on the other hand, took 
care of the cattle herds. Macheteros and vaqueros on the Chibtik finca each had their 
own labour dynamic. The vaqueros worked in groups of three: they worked one 
week 'with the patron' and then 'rested' a week (i.e. were free to work for them-
selves). Apparently, three such groups existed. They were supervised directly by the 
112 
encargado or mayordomo. The macheteros were organised in pandillas or tandas, which 
could be translated as something like 'work shifts'. Each of these groups was headed 
by a man appointed for this task from among them, the caporal or foreman. 7 The 
foreman 'pulled' the men, I was told, and was responsible for mobilising and co-
ordmating them. The agricultural work was done by tarea (in Tojolabal called taregd), 
which literally means task. In weeding, for example, the tarea was '20 brazadas', that 
is an area 20 brazadas long and 20 brazadas wide . 8 This usually meant working 
from dawn to dusk (see also Van der Haar & Lenkersdorf 1998: 54-5). Other tasks, 
such as the transportation of maize from the maize fields near the river to the 
granary at the casa grande was also done by tarea, in this case of 11/2 zontes^ to be 
Carried on a person's back in several trips. 
Garcia de Leon (1985a: 120) discusses a distinction similar to that between 
vaqueros and macheteros I found at the Chibtik ftnca. He follows Waibel (1926) who 
refers to two "completely distinct classes" of labourers, the vaqueros and the milperos, 
and suggests that the former enjoyed a higher status and better position. I have not 
been able to confirm such a status difference between vaqueros and macheteros for 
Chibtik. Most Chibtikeros shrugged their shoulders when I asked them whether one 
of the categories had been 'better off' than the other. 1 0 In fact, many people could 
hardly remember whether their fathers had been one or the other. If differences in 
status and entitlements did in fact exist between vaqueros and macheteros, they do 
not seem to have translated into different entitlements or status positions within the 
copropiedad in any systematic way. 
Apart from differences in the type of occupation, socio-economic differentiation 
between mozos was related to economic success and the relation between specific 
families and the landowner. Extra labour in a family (from children and young 
women) was a source of extra income since it could find an outlet as wage labour 
through the patron. In addition to their work for the patron, many Chibtikero fami-
lies were involved in economic activities of their own, notably raising and selling 
poultry and pigs. As I already mentioned, some families enjoyed special privileges 
from the patrdn that also contributed to their economic success. 
I have not been able to obtain a clear picture of how differentiations based on 
labour or economic success translated into the 'new* landholding community. I have 
the impression that some of these differences were levelled out or de-emphasised 
in the process of land acquisition. Privileges derived from the relation with the 
patron seem to have been discontinued and the distinction between different cate-
gories of labourers lost its relevance after the patron left and all adult men became 
right-holders to land. As we will see later on in the chapter, in the allocation of land 
to the new owners, new criteria were developed in which there was no place for 
distinctions and privileges that had derived from the relation with the patron, thus 
levelling the playing field somewhat. 
Kinship and religion 
Kin groups played an important role in the identifications and loyalties of mozos 
and remain important today. In Chibtik, a few family names predominate at present 
- Alvarez, Santiz, Vazquez and Morales - which are found in all possible permuta-
t i o n s . 1 1 The organisation of labour groups ran mostly along kinship lines. The 
pandillas mentioned above, often comprised a father and his sons or brothers or 
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cous ins . 1 2 Apparently, each kin group had some respected elderly men or women, 
referred to as ancianos. They played a role in settling minor conflicts and giving 
advice to their family members. The existence of such authority figures amongst the 
Tojolabal mozos attenuates the centrality of the patron somewhat and indicates a 
realm from which a more autonomous organisation could be sustained. 
I have the impression that in the religious organisation mvolving the patron saint 
the role of the landowner was less central than in, for example, the organisation of 
labour. The cult of the patron saint seems to have provided a space where the 
community of mozos took shape independently from the patron. Montagu's account 
on the fincas of Ocosingo with a predominantly Tzeltal population suggests a certain 
independence of the mozo population in their religious organisation, which showed 
some similarity with the cargo systems in the Central Highlands (Montagu 1990 
[1970], see also Leyva 1995). I have not been able to obtain a very clear picture of the 
types of religious cargos that existed in the fincas of the Tojolabal region. Nowadays, 
such cargos are only identified with regard to the organisation of the celebration in 
honour of the patron saint, the maintenance of the churches, and the music and 
rituals performed; these are hardly hierarchically ordered (also Montagu 1969). I 
have not encountered references to principales, of central importance in the Central 
Highlands of Chiapas and also mentioned by Montagu (1990 [1970] and 1969). 
The organisation around the patron saint appears to have become a focus of 
common identification as mozos started distancing themselves from their patron. A 
telling anecdote in this regard involves San Miguel, the patron saint of Chibtik. The 
owner of the Chibtik finca is said to have made a deal with the owner of Yaxha to 
exchange their saints, San Miguel and Santa Catarina respectively. However, San 
Miguel returned to 'where he belonged'- he was found by the mozos near a water 
source just outside the settlement area. Another time he was moved to Yaxha, and 
again he returned. Then the landowner gave in and kept him at the finca. The 
mozos clearly claimed San Miguel as 'theirs'; remember that they regarded him as 
their patron saint whereas the last owner, Don Pepe junior, had preferred San Jose, 
which he took with him when he sold Chibtik. 1 3 In other cases, landowners and 
mozos fought over ownership of the image of the patron saint when fincas were 
being dissolved. Next to kinship, ties of common identification with the patron saint 
were mobilised in the process of land redistribution and reworked to sustain a more 
explicit opposition to the former patron. 
Organising to obtain the land 
The Chibtikeros only obtained the land they now regard as theirs after a long process 
with several ups and downs. Trips to the state and federal capitals to mobilise 
support from government institutions meant continuous financial contributions, 
without any guarantee of success. Strategies were redefined according to changing 
circumstances and involved the regrouping of people around the different options. 
Obtaining the land therefore not only required sustained, co-ordinated efforts by the 
people of Chibtik, but also entailed a process of coalition formation and re-forma-
tion. It re-channelled people's loyalties and contributed to the forging of a new iden-
tity around the property. During the process, forms of co-ordination and decision 
making began to take shape that became more elaborate and mstitutionalised when 
the patron left and the former mozos took over the property. 
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Éjido prelude 
In the previous chapter I discussed the numerous problems with both the 
landowner and neighbouring communities which the Chibtikeros encountered in 
their efforts to acquire land. In the present section, emphasis will be on the internal 
dynamics of this process. Whereas in the earlier chapters I treated Chibtik mostly 
as a whole, now some of the different positions and strategies will become visible. 
To begin with, it is useful to recall the background to the sale of the main finca area 
to the Chibtikeros in 1963. Since the early 1940s, several of the families of mozos 
resident at Chibtik had left the finca to settle on ejido land. Some of them founded 
La. Florida, on the former lands of the Chibtik finca; others setded on national lands 
and saw their possession formalised through the San Caralampio and Puebla ejidos. 
Seeing that more and more land was being endowed to surrounding groups, the 
families remaining in Chibtik also petitioned for ejido lands. Obtaining these, 
however, proved to be a complicated matter. 
The request for an ejido endowment was published in 1959 and listed 39 peti-
tioners; two of whom were women, presumably w i d o w s . 1 4 The comité ejecutivo 
agrario, appointed by the petitioners and in charge of representing them in their 
dealings with the land reform bureaucracy, consisted of two elderly Chibtikeros, who 
were présidente and vocero respectively, and a younger man who acted as secretary. 
In the original petition the 39 Chibtikeros asked to be endowed with 962 hectares 
of the Chibtik finca which they had "in their possession" without however, "being 
l e g a l l y protected" (posesiôn... no amparada por la ley).15 What area of land they were 
referring to exactly is not clear from the document. Most people were interested in 
the central area of the finca that included the church and the casa grande. Apparentiy, 
some other people hoped to get the tract known as Yalchibtik, the part of the prop-
e r t y bordering the La Florida ejido, later to be retained by the last private owner of 
the finca, Don Pepe Castellanos junior. The project for the endowment drawn up by 
the C A M , however, included neither of these possibilities. Instead it proposed to 
create an ejido endowment on the basis of a piece of property called K'i'iste or 
Quixthé, adjacent to Chibtik, to be complemented with national lands. The projected 
endowment was a mountainous area to the south east of the central finca area (the 
reader is also referred back to map 3.1). The Chibtikeros were not satisfied with this 
outcome for they considered these lands unfit for either settlement or agriculture, 
and too far away from the existing settlement. Although some families moved to the 
projected ejido lands - only to return soon after - , others were determined to obtain 
the main finca area. 
The Chibtikeros' attempts to buy the main finca area should be seen in the light 
of this prelude: they were a reaction to the unsuccessful attempts to obtain the land 
they wanted in the form of an ejido. When a deal was struck with Don Pepe Castel-
lanos junior in 1963, with the help of the lawyer Rodolfo Orrico and a young man 
named Juan Gomez (about whom more later on), the claims on the projected ejido 
endowment were given up. The would-be beneficiaries only accepted the 90 
hectares to be taken from the El Nantze copropiedad (meant to form a corridor from 
the settlement to the ejido land) and rejected the rest (adding up to more than 1,700 
hectares). This was confirmed by a topographical engineer from the CAM who wrote 
that "the inhabitants refused to accept the other lands which they consider too far 
from their settlement". The CAM was of the opinion that such a rejection lacked any 
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"legal foundation" and apparently, though the land was not accepted by the Chibtik-
eros, the case was never c losed. 1 6 
At the time, Virgilio had been a young boy, too young to be registered as a peti-
tioner, but he has a strong opinion about what happened: 
"... the men were stupid!... they said they didn't want the land anymore. The 
engineer came and wrote down that they don't want the land. They said: there 
is no cedro, no this no that, just ocote (pine tree); that's why they didn't want 
it, the fools." 
He explained that the men at the time did not see the value of pine forests; they were 
interested in mixed forest (fu/ in Tojolabal, also referred to as monte), where they 
could practice slash-and-burn cultivation of maize. Several years after the first 
attempt had foundered, Virgilio, barely twenty, mobilised the m e n to take up the 
ejido claim again. Having discussed the ins and outs of the sale, I will return to the 
continuing story of the ejido endowment. 
Buying the finca 
The efforts first to obtain the ejido and then to buy the finca were supported by most 
adult men in the community. Three m e n (and their families) "stayed [with the 
patron] a bit longer", as the daughter of one of them told me. Indeed, their names 
were not included in the 1959 request for ejido land. These men did, however, join 
the others in lobbying for the sale and made the necessary financial contributions. 
They probably overcame their initial hesitation, which made them refrain from 
signing up as petitioners in 1959, when they saw that there was a genuine possibility 
of buying the finca. When it was finally decided that the property would be sold to 
the Chibtikeros, these men were given the choice of either going with the landowner 
(who was retaining part of the property) or remaining in the community and joining 
the copropiedad. They chose the latter. 
The transaction of the main area of the Chibtik finca between Julia Castellanos 
(represented by her son, Don Pepe Castellanos junior) and 51 socios - all of whom 
were natives of and lived in the San Miguel Chibtik community - was registered in 
the Public Property Register of Ocosingo in 1 9 6 3 . 1 7 The 51 associates were repre-
sented in this sale by a young man from the Tojolabal community of Veracruz, called 
Juan Gomez Gomez, w h o m they had authorised to arrange financial matters for 
them {poder amplisimo para créditos y cobranzas).1& Throughout the whole process 
Juan Gomez had acted, together with the lawyer Orrico, as an intermediary between 
the Chibtikeros and the land reform authorities in Tuxtla Gutierrez and Mexico City. 
By his own account 1 9 the Chibtikeros had asked him to assist them as they knew he 
had had considerable experience in agrarian affairs. He also claims it was he who 
had drawn licenciado Orrico, with whom he had worked on previous occasions, into 
the case. In order to defend the interests of the Chibtikeros, he says, he obtained 
accreditation from the Vieja Guardia Agrarista, part of the CNC. The Chibtikeros 
paid his expenses and apparently agreed to give him a share of the land. Juan also 
married a girl from Chibtik, although subsequent problems forced him to leave the 
community. Perhaps these problems (which involved a division of the community 
and will be discussed at length in the next chapter) help explain why Juan Gomez's 
role is minimised in the present accounts of the Chibtikeros - to the point of being 
almost completely erased. 
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The buyers authorised Juan Gomez to act as their representative in the sale. The 
document giving this authorisation lists the names of the 51 compradores (buyers). 2 0 
Most of these names had also appeared on the list of petitioners in the 1959 ejido 
request. Indeed, 33 out of the 39 ejido petitioners reappear in the 1963 list of buyers. 
Some of the new names on the 1963 document (18 in total) are those of men that 
h|ad been too young to be included in the 1959-petition. 2 1 The 1963 list of buyers 
also includes the names of the three men that had initially hesitated to support the 
ejido initative. We can assume that the 51 buyers included all the men over sixteen 
years of age that were living in Chibitk at the time. 
The 900 hectares of land from the Chibtik finca, including the buildings, were 
sold for the sum of 100,000 pesos of that t i m e . 2 2 Payment of this sum involved a 
great deal of confusion, i f the fragmented and sometimes contradictory accounts I 
was given of the issue can be taken as an indication. Apparently, the initial arrange-
ment was that half the money (50.000 pesos) would be paid by a logging company 
that would be entitled to extract wood for a number of years. The other half would 
be financed by a loan from a bank in Comitan. This account is confirmed by Juan 
Gomez. The logging company never came to get the wood it was entitled to (100 
thousand trees) and after ten years the contract was rescinded. 
The loan with the bank ended up in a rather obscure episode that almost cost the 
Chibtikeros their land. According to Juan Gomez, the debt was condoned after a few 
years and the Chibtikeros never had to pay anything out of their own pockets. But 
Virgilio gives quite a different story: 
"We didn't bother to pay. People forgot about it. And then, when the time [for 
paying the loan] was over, we not only owed the 50,000 but much more, we 
owed another 150,000 in interest." 
How this could have happened is not entirely clear. While Virgilio stresses ignorance 
and neglect, other people claim the problem was due to a set up of the man that was 
the representative of the copropiedad at the time, Fernando A . . 2 3 Fernando was one 
of the buyers himself and had been appointed by them. He had told the people that 
the sum of 50,000 pesos had been condoned, but this turned out to be a lie. When 
Fernando died, the people looked for the property titles (escritura) and couldn't find 
them: they then found out he had pledged them. Things very nearly went wrong. 
The title together with the map of the property were kept at the bank. Another ladino 
landowner had already entered into negotiations with the bank: he would pay the 
whole 200,000 pesos debt and become the owner of Chibtik. Virgilio recalls how 
terrible a perspective this was: "We would be mozos again!" People were discour-
aged. They thought they would never be able to pay the sum and felt it was better 
not to pay at all. Some people fled to the montana, as the national lands towards the 
east are referred to: "You see how you manage, but we are not going to pay for this!", 
they are supposed to have said. They came back again later, however. 
Again with the help of the lawyer Orrico a solution was found: the 150,000 pesos 
of interest were condoned and the remaining 50,000 of the debt were to be paid 
over a period of 10 years. It was told that the lawyer went to Mexico City to arrange 
this, so it is not unlikely that the national government assumed part of the debt. As 
ajresult of this deal, each of the 51 compradores would have to pay 100 pesos per year 
to raise 5,000 pesos each year. A treasurer was appointed whom people could pay 
to bit by bit, by selling a chicken or eggs etc. After ten years all the payments had 
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been fulfilled. Paying for the property was no easy task. As one woman recalls: 
"We all suffered to pay for the land: it was hard to pay; people didn't have 
clothes to wear, there was no money to celebrate the 8th of May." 2 4 
To ease the burden more compradores joined in, in addition to the 51 original ones. 
It was decided to include younger men and even children. It was explained to m e 
that they "entered into the account [entraron en la cuenta] to help them [the original 
buyers] pay it". Apparently this was a suggestion of the lawyer Orrico who had 
pointed out that, since this land was not an ejido, the minimum age of 16 to be enti-
tled to land need not be respected: as co-owners of a copropiedad they were free to 
admit whoever they pleased. In total some five or six 'late buyers' were included. 
Some boys entered right in the beginning, when the debt was being restructured 
and paid their share each year, just like the original buyers. Others entered later and 
had to pay an entrada (literally: admission fee) to bring them up to an equal level 
with the other buyers (more about the phenomenon of entrada later in this chapter). 
A man called Silvio, for example, was one of the last ones to enter as a buyer, and 
told m e he had to pay 600 pesos at the time, for which his family had to sell two 
bullocks. A somewhat different case was that of Humberto Castillo who came to live 
in Chibtik with his family. He was a mestizo, b o m on one of the other fincas of the 
region, who at the time was working as an encargado on Mendoza, close to Chibtik. 
The Chibtikeros invited Humberto Castillo to join in as a comprador. He was a 
respected and feared man in the region as he was a traditional healer (ajnanum in 
Tojolabal, curandero in Spanish) upon whom the Chibtikeros often called. According 
to Virgilio, some of the people did not agree with him coming but they were afraid 
to say anything, probably out of fear of his power to do harm. Lola, Humberto's 
widow, the mother of many children and at the time of the fieldwork one of the most 
important midwives in Chibtik, recalls: "The people from the community told my 
husband that he could take part in buying the finca". She herself was afraid that she 
would not feel at home in Chibtik, but she agreed to go as she wanted her sons to 
have some land. Thus, Humberto Castillo as well as some of his sons became late 
buyers' in the copropiedad. 
Resuming the fight for the ejido land 
Several years after the Chibtikeros bought the main finca area, some men took up 
the claim on ejido land on neighbouring national lands that had been abandoned on 
the acquisition of the copropiedad. Virgilio headed this struggle together with 
Humberto Castillo whose command of Spanish was considered very useful when 
dealing with the land reform authorities in Tuxtla Gutierrez. Rodolfo Orrico also 
supported them this time. As the ejido claim was revived, a serious problem emerged 
which I have also mentioned in the previous chapter: the projected endowments for 
two other settlements, Santo Domingo Corona and San Isidro, partly overlapped 
with the area originally assigned to Chibtik. All these communities were determined 
to defend their claims, i f necessary with violence. Santo Domingo and San Isidro 
impeded the work of the topographic engineer sent by the land reform office to 
measure the over 1700 hectares in favour of Chibtik. A violent clash was avoided, 
however, and a partial endowment of 722 hectares in favor of Chibtik was achieved. 
When problems arose over the ejido land, several of the men from Chibtik wished 
to drop the claim. According to Virgilio, about thirty of them dropped out and the 
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process was continued by only twenty. When those who had dropped out saw that a 
topographic engineer was actually coming to the community, however, they signed 
up again. Apparently eventually all 51 buyers of the copropiedad were involved in the 
renewed ejido claim. As Virgilio remarked: "The 51 compradores entered the list to 
petition for the ejido". This is why, in his view, the number of ejido beneficiaries 
should have been 51. However, when the Presidential Resolution endowing Chibtik 
with 722 hectares of ejido land - the rest remaining pending - was published in 
1972, it listed only 31 beneficiaries. The number of petitioners more than a decade 
earlier had been 39, but in a 1962 C A M report the number of 31 was already 
n|ientioned, the reduction being justified on the basis of the limited availability of 
arable l a n d . 2 5 The ARA-TG file on the ejido endowment to Chibtik does not contain 
a different list of petitioners from the original one in 1959, yet Virgilio's words 
suggest that a new list may have been drawn up when the petition was renewed 
(remember that the endowment procedure was abandoned in 1963 following the 
acquisition of the copropiedad and then taken up again a few years later). What 
sfeems to support the existence of such a 'new* list is the fact that the names of the 
31 beneficiaries listed in the Presidential Resolution correspond with the first 29 
names included in the fist of associates of the copropiedad, albeit in a different order 
(ind one of these 29 does not reappear in the Presidential Resolution). Three new 
names appear on the Presidential Resolution that did not occur on the list of asso-
ciates, which may correspond to the heirs or successors of original buyers that had 
already died. The fact that the Est of associates was largely respected up to a number 
of 31 beneficiaries, omitting the rest, lends some credence to the suggestion that the 
remaining 20 "had been taken off the list" or that "their names had been erased". 
The hypothesis put forward in Chibtik is that this was a ploy by Pepe Castellanos 
junior to safeguard the rest of his property. In view of the irregularities of the endow-
ment procedures involving Chibtik and the political connections of Pepe Castellanos, 
this is at least a possibility. In any case, contrary to what the Chibtikeros had hoped, 
22 of the original buyers were not included in the ejido endowment of 1972, nor 
were their heirs. (I will come back below to how this situation was resolved later). 
When the Presidential Resolution concerning the ejido endowment to Chibtik 
was finally executed in 1975, it was a partial execution of only 722 hectares. The 1050 
hectares that could not be given to the Chibtikeros due to the claims of San Isidro 
and Santo Domingo, remained unavailable to them. Although legally entitled to a 
complementary endowment for these 1050 hectares, nobody really counted on that. 
The hope of obtaining extra land remained, however. In 1977, another endowment 
request was submitted, this time for an extension to the ejido. The request was 
turned down by the CAM due to the lack of land available for redistribution. The 
petitioners from Chibtik suggested the property of Yalchibtik (retained by the former 
owner of Chibtik), but it was considered inafectable, not liable to land redistribution 
since it did not exceed the limits to private property. In 1980 the request was sent to 
the second level (the federal CCA), which confirmed the negative judgement without 
further investigation. In 1992 this was confirmed again, and supposedly definitively. 
The list of petitioners for the extension comprised 71 names, mduding 7 women. 
Although the petition never had any effect, it contains some interesting informa-
tion. Legally, all men over 16 years of age and women that acted as heads of house-
holds, who had not received rights in the original ejido endowment, could be fisted 
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as petitioners in an extension. In the case of Chibtik, the list of petitioners included 
the right-holders in the copropiedad - compradores or their h e i r s — that had not been 
included in the first ejido endowment as well as heads of households (men and 
women) with no rights in either the copropiedad or the first endowment. The peti-
tion of 1977 gives a rough indication of the extent to which an 'unsatisfied demand 
for land' existed, that is of the presence of people who would qualify as land reform 
beneficiaries but could not be endowed with land. 
The question of leadership 
I want to make a brief parenthesis at this point to consider the role of the different 
people that played a key role in the process of land acquisition and endowment of 
Chibtik. The previous chapter discussed the fact that different lands of brokers -
lawyers, engineers but also peasant leaders and ejido representatives - may play 
crucial though not always favourable roles (see discussion on the cultivation of ambi-
guity). Here I am interested in portraying particular leadership figures within 
Chibtik. Unfortunately, the way the Chibtikeros talk about their recent history 
provides little to go on in this regard. Their accounts contain some fascinating biases 
and lacunae. Whereas the role of some key figures is higMighted, others are down-
played or ignored. The accounts often describe a specific individual's role as a collec-
tive effort and people talk about 'we decided to...' or 'the people managed to...'. 
The lawyer Orrico who assisted the Chibtikeros in their dealings is portrayed as 
nothing less than a hero (though as mentioned at an earlier stage, Pepe Castellanos 
junior had a less favourable opinion of him). Within Chibtik, he constitutes perhaps 
the only undisputed protagonist: he stands out as the one who secured their land for 
them. But what about Juan Gomez, the young man the Chibtikeros called upon to 
assist them in their dealings? I understood from the files and from the account of 
former landowner Pepe Castellanos that his role was at least as important as that of 
his 'learned' counterpart, but he was almost totally absent from the Chibtikeros' 
accounts. He was only mentioned when I expKcitly asked about him and even then 
with some reluctance. I suspect that his later problems that ended his involvement 
with Chibtik partly explain the current silence. 
A similar omission from recent local history obtains with regard to Fernando A., 
the first representative of the copropiedad of Chibtik. Then landowner Pepe Castel-
lanos described him to me as "the leader of the Chibtikeros", but nowadays he is 
portrayed - if at all - as the 'bad guy'. He became thoroughly discredited as the 
person responsible for the irregularities in the debt payment that almost cost the 
Chibtikeros their property (see above). He became reduced to a villain, whose 
achievements were forgotten. The role of Humberto Castillo, who joined Virgilio in 
the struggle for the ejido, is also missing from present-day local accounts (by the 
time of fieldwork he had been dead for over ten years). Humberto Castillo was prob-
ably Fernando's main adversary. Piecing together different parts of the puzzle and 
relying especially on an account by Pepe Castellanos of his violent death, I have 
come to the conclusion that Fernando may have been the victim of a power dispute 
with Humberto Castillo. According to Pepe Castellanos, a young Chibtikero man 
had a severe nose bleed. He went to see the ajnanum Humberto Castillo, who "did 
not see eye to eye" with Fernando. "Out of revenge", according to Pepe Castellanos, 
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Humberto Castillo told the sick man that it was Fernando who was "eating him", 
thus accusing him of being a witch. (It should be noted here that 'being eaten' 
means being consumed by a witch, usually until one dies.) Humberto told the sick 
man to kill Fernando i f he wanted to be cured, and this is what happened. This 
suggests to m e that Humberto must have had a certain power base. It is unlikely 
that the assassination of Fernando would have been carried out otherwise and it 
certainly would not have gone unpunished by the community, as it did in this case. 
Perhaps the silence on controversial leaders is part of some kind of tension 
management, a way of overcoming divergences and contradictory positions on 
issues that made different people in the community confront each other. Leaders 
must have a certain group of adherents and their failures could be highly disruptive 
for the community as a whole. Omitting the role of leadership figures is perhaps a 
way of continuing as a group and preventing friction from remrring. With the excep-
tion of Virgilio, who is also the sole survivor, none of the Tojolabal leaders in 
agrarian matters have been able to avoid a fall from grace. After Fernando A.'s death, 
Virgilio succeeded him as representative of the copropiedad, a position he has held 
eVer s i n c e . 2 6 Although his position has not always been undisputed (see also next 
chapter), he seemed to enjoy general recognition at the time of the fieldwork. His 
decisive role in arranging the eventual payment of the finca land and in reviving the 
ejido claim is recognised by many. I was told, for example, 'Virgilio has been the 
representative ever since he fought for the property and we have left it that way 
because there have never been any problems with him.' At present, Virgilio's posi-
tion is backed by an official authorisation to represent the co-owners in legal matters 
and credit. 
The suspicion, voiced in the previous chapter, that peasant leaders capitalise on 
their roles as intermediaries seems confirmed in the case of Chibtik. The lawyer 
Orrico received a percentage of the sum for which the main area of the finca was 
sold, totalling approximately 10%. Both Juan Gomez and Fernando A. also seem to 
have received a certain percentage. Juan Gomez also sought further compensation 
for his services, though he may not have been entirely successful in doing so. In his 
home village Veracruz (where he had achieved an ejido endowment) he had people 
build him a brick house, a great luxury in Tojolabal communities, and in another 
community he was given a share of the land. He also claims to have been included 
aimongst the petitioners for ejido land in Chibtik, and to have obtained his share 
when the lands were finally bought, comprising a housing plot as well as land. His 
name, however, is not included in the 1959 request for ejido land, nor is he listed 
anywhere as an associate to the copropiedad. Whatever arrangement existed, it was 
not made official. He says he started using a pseudonym to avoid problems with the 
landowners, but his pseudonym did not occur on the list either. When he subse-
quently left the community, he must have lost whatever land he held. 
In much of the literature on the Mexican land reform, a central role is attributed 
to local bosses or caciques that enrich themselves and concentrate power on the 
basis of their involvement in the land reform process (see also Nuijten 1998:190). 
Such local bosses also appear in the ethnographies on the Central Highlands in 
Chiapas (on Zinacantan see Edel 1966; Vogt 1969; Wasserstrom 1983). In the case 
of Chibtik however, or more generally, the Tojolabal Highlands I have not come 
across caciques with the degree of power with which they appear in the literature. 
121 
However, in this region certain key figures in agrarian matters also managed- to 
consolidate a power base. Virgilio's words on Fernando A. - "he behaved like an 
ajwalal (lord, patrdri) himself" - contain a suggestion that the latter did hold a 
powerful position. Certain 'abuses' by comisariados ejidales have also been reported 
for other communities of the region, such as enriching themselves on the basis of 
their strategic position vis-a-vis the land reform bureaucracy or through logging 
contracts. In the Piedra Huixtla ejido, adjoining Chibtik, the Perez brothers were the 
local bosses. One of them was the presumed gunman for a brother of governor 
Castellanos in the mid-1980s (see also previous chapter) and his brother was comis-
ariado ejidal of Piedra Huixtla. The case of that commumty also illustrates the conse-
quences of the fall of such a leader when I first visited Piedra Huixtla in 1986, all 
adherents of the Perez clan had left the commumty with him, reducing the commu-
nity to half its previous size. 
However, one should be careful not to overstate the power of the comisariados 
ejidales or other brokers in the land reform process (also Nuijten 1998). The cacique 
of Zinacantan consolidated his position by contiolling both the ejido and the munic-
ipal government (Vogt 1969). Such a connection was absent in the Tojolabal High-
lands and reduced the scope for potential leaders. Furthermore, the extent to which 
the position may provide access to power depends crucially on the conjuncture, the 
gains at stake, as well as the extent to which state interventions create the conditions 
for brokerage. Power holders in indigenous communities may in fact be rather 
vulnerable to state action. For the Central Highlands, Collier (1987) argues that the 
state undermines indigenous leadership as it closes avenues for brokerage or with-
draws its support of particular leaders. I also have the impression that there are 
effective checks by commumty members on power abuse by local ejido authorities, 
perhaps more so now than in the 1970s and 1980s when the greatest abuses were 
reported. 
If there are any caciques in Chibtik today, one would assume Virgiho to be ideally 
placed, with his permanent position as representative of the copropiedad. Yet I have 
found no indications that he or his family enriched themselves as a result of his key 
role in the land acquisition or his current role as representative of the copropiedad 
(which does not, of course, preclude the possibility of my having overlooked some 
of these indications). His house looks more or less the same as other houses and it 
is located on the outskirts of the commumty in what does not seem to be a particu-
larly attractive place. On the other hand, however, he, his brothers and his father are 
among the better off families of Chibtik, which is reflected, for example, in the 
amount of livestock they own. Although this is resented by poorer inhabitants of 
Chibtik, they have made no suggestion that Virgilio may have enriched himself 
making use of his position as power holder. Possibly, however, as reported for cargo 
systems in the Central Highlands, the occupation of certain key positions re-enforces 
stratification between farnilies (Cancian 1989). 
It must be said in Virgilio's favour that he spent considerable time, energy, and 
money in taking up the ejido claim with no guarantee he would be rewarded. He (or 
rather his father, with whom he was still living at the time) did eventually receive 
some compensation for this, as the following anecdote illustrates. One day Virgilio 
explained to me how he got the tiles for the roof of his house (tiles being a relatively 
expensive alternative to grass). Originally, the tiles had been part of the ftnca stables 
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(caballeriza). At the time when he was "fighting for the land", he had still been fiving 
at his parents' house. Virgilio's father had paid a considerable share of his son's trav-
elling expenses to Tuxtla Gutierrez incurred during the course of the process and 
amounting to a considerable sum (Virgilio speaks of about 300.000 pesos). This 
money was considered a debt the community had to Virgilio's father, and in return 
the community let h im have the tiles. "If it had not been for the debt, the commu-
nity would never have let h i m have the tiles," Virgilio explains. His father's house 
used to be fairly large, but when his younger brother left the house (with his family) 
it was made smaller. Consequently, there were some tiles left, which Virgilio's father 
gave him for his own roof. Through this anecdote, Virgilio underlined his pro-active 
role in the struggle for land in Chibtik. But I have also mentioned it here because it 
points to a concern with nobody being unduly privileged - during or after the land 
acquisition - that is quite common in the communities of the Tojolabal Highlands 
and that I will return to in the remainder of this chapter. 
The allocation of land rights 
As noted, under the finca regime, the Chibtikeros' rights to cropland, living space, 
pasture, forests, water and other resources had been derived from their relation to 
the patron. He was also the highest authority in overall management, improvement 
of infrastructure and conflict resolution. Because of the landowner's centralhy in 
administration, property rights, and the organisation of authority, his departure 
created somewhat of a vacuum in this sphere. Consequently, in the communities of 
land reform beneficiaries as well as the copropiedades that arose out of the fincas, 
property rights and authority structures had to be re-arranged. This was done partly 
by drawing on institutions and organising practices that had existed during finca 
times, and partly by adopting elements of the ejido model of land reform. In the 
process, the community asserted itself as a control structure, assuming a major role 
in the allocation of rights to individuals. 
Rights to the copropiedad 
With the acquisition of the copropiedad the Chibtikeros gained direct rights to land 
and other resources. Formally, the copropiedad is a form of undivided, joint private 
property in which the co-owners, or socios, hold equal shares. 2 7 As mentioned earlier, 
the Public Register of Property listed 51 such socios for the copropiedad of Chibtik in 
1963, comprising all adult men in the community . 2 8 In Chibtik, the socios of the 
copropiedad are usually referred to as the compradores, literally meaning 'buyers'. In 
response to problems arising from the payment of the loan with which the property 
was financed, a number of 'late buyers' - mostly younger men and boys - joined the 
existing group of 51 original compradores. As mentioned, some of these joined when 
the debt was being re-structured, while a few more bought themselves in later. The 
inclusion of more buyers was a necessity, as the original group was unable to pay. 
The late buyers had to pay an entrada, a sum to compensate for the efforts and sacri-
fices of the original buyers. It was thought that the original buyers had taken the risk 
Of investing time, money, and creativity in acquiring the land, without knowing 
whether, when, and at what price they would succeed. Conversely, the late buyers 
knew precisely what they were getting into. The entrada was, therefore, not only a 
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financial compensation, but also a recognition of the efforts made by the longer-
standing members. 
'Late buyers' were given the same rights as the original buyers, but this was not 
uncontested. One of the original buyers argued that the latecomers' efforts were 
much less than those of the original buyers: "the ones that entered later on got the 
land almost as a gift". According to him, this should have been reflected in their enti-
tlements. In spite of the opposition of some, the late buyers were, however, admitted 
to the copropiedad as full right-holders. A document drawn up in 1986 confirms this 
equal foot ing. 2 9 This document authorises Virgilio to represent the signatories in 
matters concerning the copropiedad {poder general para pleitos y cobranzas, ados de 
administration, y de dominio) and is signed by 60 men, whose full names appear in 
the document. The difference in number between 1963 (51 sotios) and 1986 (60 men 
that authorise Virgilio, totalling 61 when the latter is included) is ten, and can be 
taken to account for the late buyers . 3 0 Since it is customary to inherit each share of 
the copropiedad undivided, the number of shares remains constant unless new right-
holders are admitted. I was able to identify at least eight late buyers among the 60 
names. O f the 51 original buyers, 26 also appear in the 1986 document. The rest 
had either died or left the community: their shares had either passed on to their 
successor or been allocated to someone e l s e . 3 1 
Unlike the first fifty-one buyers who were listed as sotios of the copropiedad in 
1963, the late buyers have never been officially registered as such in the Land 
Registry. They have, however, been included in a local list, referred to in Tojolabal as 
lista or cuenta (from the Spanish for 'list' and 'account' respectively). Such lists are 
essential in backing property rights locally. To 'be on the list' or 'to have been 
included on the list' (och lista, ti ayon lista), or to 'enter into the account (och kwenta) 
means being a recognised holder of rights to a specific patrimony and a part of the 
group of right-holders. So far, we have talked about the copropiedad, where the right-
holders are called 'buyers', but similar terminology is also used for ejido land and for 
associations such as the women's co-operative shop. In Chibtik there was also a list 
of all the adult men in the community. I must admit that in the case of the copropie-
dad I have never actually seen the list of right-holders to the copropiedad or of all 
adult men, except at a distance. The lists were used at meetings where activities such 
as communal labour were organised and were often referred to when people talked 
about their situation (the types of rights they had). These fists seemed, together with 
certain other documents, to have a great symbolic value. Having the list and the 
knowledge of who is on the list, was associated with power and the possibility of 
controlling the community. 
Initially, the legal registration of sotios in the Land Registry Office had coincided 
with the local attribution of land rights to individual right-holders but the parallelism 
between the two was not maintained for long. We have already seen that rights were 
extended to more right-holders than those officially registered. Furthermore, official 
registrations are rarely up to date. In Chibtik, the local list of right-holders includes 
the names of the successors of the original (or late) buyers, but most of these 
changes have not been registered at the Land Registry Office. I was told that once 
ten young men were officially registered as their fathers' successors. This turned out 
to be an expensive exercise, since it involved a public notary, and was not repeated. 3 2 
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Rights to the ejido 
With the ejido endowment, a process of inclusion of right-holders similar to that of 
the copropiedad took place. In addition to the ejidatarios that were officially recog-
nised by the land reform bureaucracy, a considerable number of other men were 
also included. As I mentioned in a previous section, the Presidential Resolution of 
1972 concerning the ejido endowment to Chibtik listed fewer names than those that 
had appeared in the 1959 request and were far less than the number the Chibukeros 
thought should be included. According to the Chibukeros, all the 51 associates of the 
copropiedad should be beneficiaries of the ejido endowment, because all of them had 
supported the renewal of the ejido claim. 
To resolve this situation it was decided in Chibtik to recognise all the men that 
had supported the request for ejido land as right-holders to the ejido. In the words of 
Vjrgilio: "the agreement is that anyone that has paid his contribution can work there 
[on the ejido land]". As in the case of the copropiedad, where the fact that they had 
'helped pay" underpinned the rights of the late buyers, here, too, 'efforts' made to 
obtain the ejido land are portrayed as crucial in local recognition of property rights. 
As with the copropiedad, official registrations are corrected and amended at the level 
of the community in view of the 'injustices' they contain. For the allocation of rights 
within the community, the local registration has primacy. This does not mean, how-
ever, that official registrations are not important. On the contrary, there is consider-
able concern about who is or is not listed, since official registration is crucial in the 
defence of land rights vis-a-vis the land reform authorities. Bringing official regis-
tration in line with locally recognised rights involves particular difficulties, however, 
while extending the number of right-holders is extremely complicated if not impos-
sible. As mentioned earlier, for copropiedades, transferring rights to heirs involves 
considerable costs. For ejidos, a periodical update (depuration censal) is supposed to 
register transfers of ejido rights. These updates do not involve direct costs but, in the 
Tojolabal Highlands, seem to have been carried out rather irregularly. 
Notions of property 
'Right' and 'right-holder1 
Having described how the Chibtikeros allocated rights to the copropiedad and the 
ejido endowment amongst themselves, I shall now briefly address how land rights 
are conceived of amongst the Tojolabal. I found that the Tojolabal of the Highland 
region understood rights as a package of entitlements and obligations, referred to 
as derecho or 'right'. This package is vested in or conferred on an individual, usually 
an adult m a l e , 3 3 but extends to his dependents, generally the wife, children, retired 
parents, unmarried brothers and sisters, and possibly others. A man with this 'righf 
is said to 'have a right' (ay sderecho), used as an equivalent of 'having land' (ay 
slu'um). With local variations, such a man is generally referred to as derechero or 
hdsico (the ejidatario hdsico being the original land reform beneficiary). In Chibtik, 
the term derechero is used interchangeably with comprador. I have opted to use the 
concept of 'right-holder' as a translation for these local terms and to refer to the 
derecho, the package of entitlements and obligations, as a 'right' (singular). 3 4 The 
entitlements range from private rights to housing and cultivation plots to a number 
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of rights in the common grazing and forest areas. Duties may comprise physical 
tasks such as fencing, but also participation in meetings in which rules for use and 
distribution of land are designed and enforced. 
A right may be transferred to another individual, usually a successor to the orig-
inal right-holder or another non-right-holding adult. Alternatively, it may be 'kept' 
by the community until a suitable purpose arises. Amongst the Tojolabal, ultimo-
geniture predominates, that is, the youngest son - designated by a special term, Vox 
or xut - succeeds the father as the right-holder.35 It is common for newly married 
couples to live in the paternal house for several years before they set up an individual 
household (initial patrilocal residence). During those first years they are seen as 
dependents of the parental household and are gradually prepared for their future 
independent status. The youngest son, however, does not leave the parental house, 
but inherits it from the parents, also acquiring the duty to take care of them in their 
old age. In this pattern of ultmio-geniture, the youngest son 'takes the place of the 
father'. He not only lives in the parental house, but also keeps the land titles and 
other documents, and replaces the father in his duties to the community. In prac-
tice, another of the younger sons may also take on this role. 
Although there is only one successor, parents pass on certain resources to their 
other children was well. When a married son leaves the paternal house to set up his 
own household, he usually receives financial support in the construction of his 
house as well as some animals and land for cultivation from the father's share. Such 
transfer of resources is called herencia, which literally means inheritance. Daughters 
also receive such an herencia when they leave home to marry, but in their case it is 
usually hmited to animals. In some communities, the intergenerational transfer of 
property approaches that of partible inheritance, each child receiving a share of the 
parents' resources, the youngest receiving the paternal house and housing plot (see 
Ruz 1982:169). In Chibtik, however, I found a more ambiguous situation. Although 
those sons that do not succeed their fathers receive plots of land, their rights to land 
continue to be seen as deriving from their father's r ight . 3 6 Ideally, they should arrive 
at a status similar of their fathers, with a right of their own, but the stagnation of 
land redistribution has made this difficult. 
The collectivity of right-holders 
Amongst the Tojolabal, land rights are closely related to group membership. A 
derecho or 'right' as I have described it, is understood as a share in the patrimony of 
a circumscribed group. This notion of property fits in with Hann's characterisation 
of individual property as being 'expressed in degrees of responsibility for and enjoy-
ment of the group property' (Harm 1998: 26). Individual rights to land derive from 
having shared in the burden of the group - 'fought for", having made financial 
contributions - to acquire a particular tract of land. I have chosen to call such a 
circumscribed group comprising the sum total of right-holders as recognised at the 
level of the community, the 'collectivity of right-holders'. In Tojolabal communities, 
property of land is ultimately vested in such a group. It is the collectivity that 
'governs' the rights to land within the community. Although specific rights (espe-
cially to housing and cultivation plots) are assigned to individuals, the collectivities 
of right-holders control the terms of access to such land and regulate the duties to 
be folfilled to maintain or improve the resource. They also define what entitlements 
and duties make up the 'right'. 
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The collectivity of right-holders is best described as a corporation, denned by Eric 
Wolf as "an enduring organisation of rights and duties held by stable membership" 
(1966: 86). The corporate nature of the copropiedad of Chibtik is clear, for example, 
from the fact that later buyers were said to have been 'admitted' by the existing 
group, and had to pay an entrada, an 'entrance fee'. When outlining the basic 
features of a specific type of peasant community that he called the 'corporate 
community', Wolf concluded that "The community, rather than the individual, has 
the ultimate domain to land" (1966: 68). In doing so, he rightly pointed to an impor-
tant feature of such communities, namely that land rights fall into the collective 
rather than the individual domain. Insofar as their landholding capacity is 
concerned, then, current Tojolabal communities are correctly understood as corpo-
rate, that is ejidatarios and copropietarios have organised around land in a corporate 
manner. However, two points need to be made in this regard. First, community and 
corporation should not be equated. The corporation or, as I prefer to call it, the 
collectivity of right-holders, is not simply 'everybody* or 'the whole community'. 
Collectivities of right-holders are circumscribed groups within communities; they 
are sub-sets within the population as a whole. Being a right-holder also implies a 
specific status within the community. This brings me to the second point, that of the 
presumed boundedness of the collectivities of right-holders. These are certainly 
bounded groups, not only in terms of their controlled membership but also in terms 
of the resources involved. As in the case of Chibtik, some men are right-holders in 
the copropiedad, others in the ejido endowment, some in both and others (a growing 
number) in neither. Though critics of the concept of the corporate community have 
rightly pointed to the fluidity of such group boundaries, boundedness remains a 
basic feature of collectivities of right-holders. The importance attached to the local 
registrations or lists I mentioned above testifies to this. However, the boundaries are 
not simply there but continuously constructed. Where the boundaries are drawn, 
who is included and who is excluded from the collectivity and why, is not a given but 
rather the subject of negotiation and contention at critical junctures. Talking about 
land rights thus implies talking about group boundaries. 
In this chapter I have made a start with showing how such boundaries have been 
drawn in the case of Chibtik. This is to be followed - in the next chapter - by an 
analysis of how boundaries change in relation to community dynamics, especially 
internal conflicts and population growth. That discussion will underline the impor-
tance of distinguishmg between collectivities of right-holders and the community 
as a whole. When the Chibtikeros bought the copropiedad, in 1963, all the resident 
adult men became right-holders, and subsequently some of the younger boys. Since 
all women, children and elderly were directly related to a right-holder, there was a 
symmetry between the resident population as a whole and the collectivity of right-
holders. In other words, community membership and right-holdership were not 
clearly distinguished. At present, however, this has changed with the collectivity of 
right-holders becoming a restricted sub-set of community-members. 
Most of the Tojolabal communities in the region of study acquired land rights 
due to support of the Mexican state. This was not only true for ejido endowments, 
but also for the acquisition of copropiedades that, as in the case of Chibtik, were 
settled through intermediation and sometimes the financial support of the land 
reform authorities. This situation does not imply that the Tojolabal see their land 
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primarily as a 'favour' from the state. As mentioned earlier, under the fmca regime, 
resident families had considered the fmca already 'theirs' though their rights were 
mediated by their relation to the landowner. A sense of property also derives from 
the sacrifices made to get the land, which - as I pointed out - was a costly and time-
consuming affair. It is important to underline this at this point, since it explains why 
the collectivity of right-holders asserts its dominion, its capacity to control land 
rights, not only in relation to its own members but also vis-a-vis state structures, 
such as the land reform bureaucracy. 
The role of the land reform legislation 
Land reform in Mexico contains a clear claim to re-stating property rights. The 
Mexican state claims ultimate control over land as well as the right to define criteria 
and procedures by which individuals may establish property rights. Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution states that ownership of land rests originally with the nation 
and the land reform legislation regulates the conditions under which individuals 
may retain land in private property or are entitled to request land endowments. 
Furthermore, extremely detailed regulations exist regarding the administration of 
land rights within ejido endowments, including matters such as inheritance, suspen-
sion and re-adjudication of rights to individuals, and conflict resolution. The asam-
blea of ejidatarios has a certain importance in these issues, but ultimate authority 
rests with the land reform authorit ies. 3 7 This means that in line with the formal 
design of the ejido, the autonomy of land reform beneficiaries in the internal allo-
cation and adrninistration of rights is curtailed and subject to state control. This situ-
ation has been heavily criticised by several authors (see specially Gordillo 1992) who 
advocates greater autonomy of the ejidos vis-a-vis the state. My aim in this section is 
not to enter this debate but rather to look at the ways in which state control enters 
into the definition and allocation of land rights in Tojolabal communities of land 
reform beneficiaries in practice. My conclusion is that although several of the criteria 
and procedures stipulated in the land reform legislation have been adopted by Tojo-
labal communities in the region of study, the extent to which the land reform 
bureaucracy controls the allocation and administration of land rights is far more 
limited than the legal statements suggest. In this region, land reform re-defined 
property rights in crucial ways, but even here it interacted with existing definitions 
of property rather than replacing them. As I pointed out in a previous chapter, Tojo-
labal mozos had developed a sense of property towards the lands of 'their patron' 
and generally fought state actions that sought to allocate these lands to other groups 
(with varying success). As regards the internal regulation of land rights, the collec-
tivity of right-holders played a far greater role than that allowed for by the land 
reform legislation. 
I described above that the Tojolabal understanding of land rights is related to 
group efforts to acquire specific tracts of land. This contrasts somewhat with the 
primacy of the Mexican state in the definition and allocation of rights as it formally 
exists. In practice, however, the two conceptions of property have been compatible 
to a certain degree. The legal figures of copropiedad and ejido both recognise the exis-
tence of circumscribed groups of people that hold rights to an at least partly, shared 
piece of property. The copropiedad is a somewhat ambivalent form of property which 
in fact gives the copropietarios considerable scope for organising property rights 
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among themselves as they see fit (note that the copropiedad is not a juridical person 
and therefore does not require legal representation, according to De Pina 1998). 
Though the ejido, on the other hand, is curtailed by a host of regulations regarding 
internal administration, in practice the Tojolabal ejidos have also been able to 
organise property rights much in line with their own understanding. That is, control 
over the entitlements and obligations of the individual right-holders has largely 
rested with the collectivity. 
This does not mean that land reform legislation has not informed local property 
arrangements. As mentioned earlier, local registrations of right-holders were gener-
ally developed on the basis of formal registrations generated in the course of the land 
rejform process. Some criteria for allocating land rights or procedures for internal 
administration have been incorporated into local institutions. This holds especially 
for regulations that were systematically enforced by the land reform bureaucracy 
during the process of land endowment, such as having to be at least sixteen in order 
to be considered as land reform beneficiary, the creation of a school plot, and the 
appointment of a comisariado ejidal. The concept of right-holder itself fits in very well 
with, and may indeed be partly derived from the formal definition of ejidatarios. In 
land reform legislation the ejidatario is the one who holds the right, the derecho 
agrario, on behalf of his wife and children t o o . 3 8 The practice of the youngest son's 
inheriting the father's right-holdership combines the emphasis in ejido regulations 
on undivided inheritance with the pattern of the youngest son taking over the 
parental home. The land reform model possibly reinforced prior conceptions of 
right-holdership, such as the attribution of rights under the finca regime, where 
being a full 'man' was associated with a package of entitlements and obligations. 3 9 
Even in a copropiedad like Chibtik, elements of the ejido legislation have been 
adopted. I have already mentioned the use of the word derechero, obviously borrowed 
from the ejido model. Though the legal definition of associates in a copropiedad is 
gender-neutral and contains no requirements as to the associate being a head of 
household, right-holders in the copropiedad are mostly males just as in the ejidos. The 
age limit of sixteen for considering a boy as a potential right-holder to land was also 
applied in Chibtik until a lawyer pointed out that they were not required to do so. 
Thus, land reform has decisively shaped property arrangements in Tojolabal 
communities. However, we also saw that local listings increasingly diverged from 
formal ones and local listings had primacy for internal purposes. Furthermore, 
many of the detailed regulations of the land reform law play no role in internal 
administration of land rights. On the one hand, they are unknown to Tojolabal land 
reform beneficiaries (which is hardly surprising since the 1971 law consists of 480 
Articles). On the other hand, most of these regulations have not been enforced. As 
Bouquet & Colin (1996) concluded for Oaxaca, I found that many of the possibili-
ties contained in the land reform legislation to exercise direct control over the allo-
cation of rights within ejidos were not actually used. (Though, as we will see in the 
next chapter, state authorities could and did interfere at critical junctures.) My view 
is that the land reform bureaucracy simply did not have the manpower necessary to 
monitor practices within ejidos closely let alone bring them into line with formal 
legal principles. 
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The development of governance structures 
The land reform process also had a powerful impact on the way authority and deci-
sion-making were organised among former mozos. As I did for property rights, I 
will now show that the development of such structures of governance both drew on 
and diverged from official regulations. As mentioned, the patron had played an 
important role in the organisation of auhority on the fincas, creating a certain 
vacuum when he left. The existing structures of authority among the mozos could 
not simply be transplanted to the new situation. 
The organisation of authority 
During the land reform process, the authority structures operating in the commu-
nities of the Tojolabal Highlands suffered considerable changes. In order to petition 
for land and carry out dealings with the land reform offices, a comité agrario ejecu-
tivo had to be formed, which was later turned into the comisariado ejidal after the 
endowment was a fact . 4 0 The land reform communities in the Tojolabal Highlands 
adopted this authority structure, which included, in addition to the comisariado ejidal 
and several other officials (referred to jointly as the autoridades), the asamhlea, the 
regular meeting of right-holders. Both have become crucial to the organisation of 
decision making, authority and representation in the Tojolabal communities and 
have developed a sphere of competence far beyond the agrarian issues for which 
they were originally devised. Nowadays, these institutions are seen as highly char-
acteristic of Tojolabal communities, insofar as they are currently considered 'tradi-
tional' authorities. 
The authority structures that existed amongst the mozos under the finca regime, 
only partly continued in the new situation. The caporales had only had limited tasks 
(in the organisation of labour) and their authority had derived directly from the 
patron; their position seems not to have served as the basis for leadership under the 
new conditions. Similarly, the religious organisation that had existed around the 
Patron Saint, was maintained but did not develop into a real power structure. Rather 
than pre-existing structures, the authority structure required by the land reform 
bureaucracy itself provided the basis for the organisation of authority and leadership 
in the Tojolabal communities. I found it difficult to develop a good understanding 
of precisely how this happened and how much conflict the process involved. It has 
been suggested that the traditional systems of authority that operated in the Tojo-
labal communities, especially those that centred around the ancianos or elders, were 
displaced as the ejido model was imposed (Hernandez Cruz 1999:171-91) . This 
account contains the suggestion that the land reform bureaucracy refused to accept 
the leadership of the elders. I have found it difficult to gauge either the degree of 
leverage of the elders under the finca regime or the degree of coercion involved in 
the appointment of the representatives of the Tojolabal would-be land reform bene-
ficiaries vis-à-vis the land reform bureaucracy. 4 1 If councils of elders indeed existed 
in Tojolabal communities, as Montagu (1969) has suggested, by the 1980s these had 
disappeared- virtually without leaving a trace (also Ruz 1982:192). It is unclear to 
what extent the land reform bureaucracy directly influenced the appointment of 
specific agrarian representatives or whether its influence was mostly indirect. We 
can assume that the land reform process created conditions for a new leadership to 
emerge, mostly from amongs the somewhat younger men, who saw opportunities 
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in the new conjuncture and had more of the skills required for dealing with the land 
reform bureaucracy. Most of the elderly were not able to provide the necessary lead-
ership, though they may have played an important backstage role in supporting 
particular initiatives. To date, the elderly in Tojolabal communities enjoy consider-
able prestige and perform important tasks in religious rituals. They do not, however, 
'govern' and remain rather marginal to the authority structure centred on autoridades 
and asamhka (see also Leyva 1994 who reaches similar conclusions for the Canadas). 
The adoption of the ejido model in the Tojolabal Highlands seems to be related 
oil the one hand to the need for accreditation by which the leaders of the endeavour 
acquired recognition vis-à-vis the land reform bureaucracy. On the other hand, 
hbwever, the Tojolabal communities of land reform beneficiaries took up the ejido 
model for authority and dedsion-making in the context of the institutional vacuum 
that had been created by the departure of the patron. Coming from a situation of 
peonage, in their new condition as direct controllers of land, the Tojolabal were in 
need of a model on which to build their institutions for internal co-ordination and 
representation to the outside. The ejido provided such a model at least partially. 
In the Tojolabal Highlands, in addition to the comisariado and his two 'compan-
ions' (secretario and tesorero), the local authorities indude the comité de vigilancia (the 
surveillance committee required by the land reform regulations to check up on the 
comisariado ejidal), the agente municipal (the representative of the municipaHty at the 
community level) and possibly others, such as the représentante de la copropiedad in 
Chibtik. They are referred to as autoridades or ja ma ay sch'ol, the latter literally 
meaning: those that are entrusted with something, that have an office or assignment 
(ch'ol translates as cargo in Spanish). As is common in other indigenous regions of 
southern Mexico, authority is thus conceptualised as a 'service' to the community. 
There is a certain 'divison of labour' between the different authorities, but the system 
is flexible and it is not always dear exactly what issues correspond to which of the 
cargo-holders. 
The appointment by the community (for three years, in keeping with official 
regulations) takes place through the asamblea, to which the authorities remain 
accountable. Thus, the collectivity bestows authority on individuals, which is why 
we may speak of'delegated authority'. As a symbol of authority the comisariado ejidal 
and the agente municipal possess the cacho, the instrument by which the mozos used 
to be called to work in the days of the finca. It is the cacho that gives the authorities 
the power to convoke the people. Accreditation by the land reform bureaucracy is 
also of course important, espedally in relation to the representation of the commu-
nity. The comisariado ejidàl keeps the seal of the community required to endorse any 
letters or petitions to government agencies. In the local conception, however, the 
authorities are ultimately answerable to the asamblea, understood as embodying 'the 
community'. To dte a religious leader from the neighbouring Cafiadas region: "I am 
just the authority, I don't rule" (yo solo soy autoridad, no mando) (in Leyva 1995:399)-
That the asamblea is the highest authority not only in name is underlined, for 
example, by the fact that the authorities cannot use the seal without prior permis-
sion from the asamblea. In one community in the region of study, the comisariado 
ejidal paid for his use of the ejido seal without such prior consultation, with two days 
of confinement in the community pr ison. 4 2 
The workings of this authority structure differ in many respeds from the civil-
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religious cargo-system as it has been described for the Central Highlands. First, 
cargos in the Tojolabal Highlands are not arranged in a definite hierarchy, though 
some cargos are considered more important (more 'burdensome') than others. The 
secretario and tesorero are perceived as 'helpers' of the comisariado ejidal. I had the 
impression that the agente municipal (who is also appointed by the community) was 
considered a lower position than that of the comisariado, expressed in the fact, for 
example, that men who could not read or write were often appointed to this post, 
which is highly unlikely to happen in the case of a comisariado. In addition to these 
important posts, there are several other minor positions, such as serving on one of 
the numerous committees concerned with health care, education or specific proj-
ects. The performance of particular individuals in these roles certainly serves as a 
test of their suitability for a future role as comisariado or tesorero. Second, among the 
Tojolabal, the traditional religious cargos, such as alfereces (in charge of organising 
the celebration in honour of the patron saint) and musicians, are not counted as 
autoridades. Elderly people, including women, play a relatively important role in 
precisely these roles. A third difference with the Central Highlands is that the 
authority structure in the Tojolabal Highlands does not include municipal govern-
ment, which restricts the extent to which the authorities may concentrate power. 
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the authorities are accountable to the asamblea. This 
is a feature the communities of the Tojolabal Highlands share with the Tojolabal and 
Tzeltal communities of the Cafladas region (see Leyva 1994). Finally, expenditures 
of the authorities as well as religious celebrations are typically co-ordinated through 
asambleas and paid through contributions from all the families of the community. 
The people in charge of organising the feast (alfereces) axe exclusively responsible for 
the logistics, but the financial burden is shared. 
In addition to the ejido authorities, the catechists, trained by pastoral teams from 
the San Cristobal diocese, and people holding certain posts within the ejido unions, 
should also be mentioned. They can develop considerable power within communi-
ties. Leyva has grouped them with the authorities (1994: 382), but I myself tend to 
see them rather as parallel to these, since they deal with different issues and address 
a somewhat different constituency. Generally speaking, the comisariado deals with 
land matters (broadly defined), inlcuding only men, whereas catechists address 
issues concerning Catholic religious organisation, including both men and women. 
In practice, though, the dividing lines are not always clear. Mending fences or organ-
ising upcoming baptisms provide no room for confusion, but internal conflicts are 
likely to involve both (it is also important to bear in mind that different arrange-
ments may exist in different localities). In any case, catechists as well as the commu-
nity representatives vis-a-vis political organisations are both appointed by and 
accountable to the asamblea and act as intermediaries between their constituencies 
and wider structures (the diocese and peasant organisations). They also have a 
considerable voice in community affairs. 
Quite outside the authority structure described so far are individuals believed to 
control supernatural powers, most importantly the ajnanum or pitachik, like 
Humberto Castillo in the case of Chibtik (for a more detailed description of healers, 
see Ruz 1982:196-99). They escape the control of the asamblea (they are not 'dele-
gated authorities') nor are they accredited by larger institutions, but they can accu-
mulate considerable power. In some cases, as we saw, for example, with Humberto 
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Castillo in Chibtik, they may also seek to hold some formal office, which increases 
their power. 
The asamblea 
The asamblea, an important element of the model for ejido administration, became 
a crucial institution in communities in the Tojolabal Highlands. In the ejido model, 
the asamblea - comprising all the ejidatarios - nominally figures as the highest 
authority, although executive power rests with the comisariado ejidal. Stipulations 
concerning ejido administration are, as I mentioned, quite detailed and cover both 
the procedures by which asambleas axe to be held and its sphere of competence, 
notably the election of ejido authorities, assigning private plots within the ejido 
domain, inheritance, and conflict resolution (see also Land reform law Articles 22-
50). In the Tojolabal Highlands I found the asamblea to play a crucial role in land 
tenure matters. It is through the asamblea that the collectivity of right-holders organ-
ises and exercises control over individual members. Through the asamblea, right-
holders define what a 'right' entails, condition membership, co-ordinate duties and 
enforce sanctions. 
Though the Tojolabal have adopted the ejido nomenclature for local decision-
making procedures and authorities, these labels tell us little about how either are 
organised in practice. The regulations as laid down in the land reform law regarding 
when to call asambleas, how to organise them, and when to involve higher authori-
ties are somewhat irrelevant to governing practices in Tojolabal communities. The 
importance of the asamblea, ox junta ox tz'omjel as it may also be called, in most Tojo-
labal communities goes far beyond that attributed to it in the ejido model. Whereas 
land reform legislation requires the ejidatarios to hold one asamblea general per 
month, in most Tojolabal communities they are held far more often and may involve 
all adult m e n rather than ejidatarios only. The scope of the issues which Tojolabal 
asambleas (and the ejido authorities) attend, extend far beyond 'ejido matters'. In fact, 
their authority extends to virtually anything defined as a common concern. Further-
more, they govern 'the community' comprising the totality of the resident popula-
tion, rather than the ejidatarios per s e . 4 3 The authority positions and decision-
making procedures for administration of the ejido have been appropriated and 
re-signified in Tojolabal communities. In view of their scope and importance, the 
governance structures developed in Tojolabal communities, with the asamblea as the 
centrepiece, constitute a die facto local government. 
The workings of de facto local government 
The structure of authorities and asambleas in Tojolabal communities is best 
described as a local government. It is more than the sum total of different forms of 
mutual assistance such as labour exchange or pooling arrangements. Whereas such 
arrangements belong to the private sphere, the authority and decision-making struc-
tures described in this chapter assume public functions at the community level. In 
other words, they contain claims to governance both vis-a-vis individual members 
and vis-a-vis state structures such as the land reform bureaucracy. To a certain extent, 
the governing capacity of communities of land reform beneficiaries is formally 
recognised, but only insofar as administration of land tenure is concerned. 4 4 In 
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practice, however, governance structures operating at the communal level go beyond 
land matters to all issues that are somehow defined as being of public concern 
within or between communities. Because of the importance of such structures of 
governance for understanding the dynamics of Tojolabal communities, I have 
decided to devote a few pages to their workings, focussing especially on the asam-
blea. I speak of de facto local government because local structures of governance are 
not formally recognised as such. The Mexican constitution establishes three levels 
of government: federal, state, and municipal. 
Governing through the asamblea 
Many observers have been struck by the importance of the asamblea in Tojolabal 
communities, in terms of the many issues considered to be of its concern as well as 
the coercion it exercises over individual community members. Martinez Lavin, a 
Marist priest working in the area, wrote, for example: 
"The force that the community exercises over individuals is very noticeable 
in the Macizo Tojolabal [roughly coinciding with the Tojolabal Highlands as 
denned in this book]. [...] The community decides upon the type of religion 
of its members, the admission of a stranger that wishes to spend the night, 
the sending of young men to receive some technical teaming, the sanctions 
to be applied to the juvenile delinquent that lets his cattle into neighbouring 
fields, the trips that need to be made by the authorities, the use to be given 
to the water sources, any assignment received from the outside system, such 
as [appointing someone to] be in charge of the water, the school, preparing 
food for visitors, the contributions to a celebration, the place where a hydrant 
should be installed, the number of benches that the school needs to have, 
how visitors should be treated, what is to be done with a mentally ill person, 
the entrance of a doctor, the installation of a mill, etc. [...] Power does not lie 
in the individual but in the community. The mission of the authorities, the 
comisariado, is simply to convoke a meeting and enforce the decisions made 
at the asamblea" (Martinez Lavin 1975: 8,9). 
In a similar vein, Leyva and Ascendo wrote of communities in the Canadas, where 
asambleas play a similar role to the one they play in the Tojolabal Highlands: 
"[it is] the totality of inhabitants of a settlement that, gathered in a meeting, 
dictate the norms that govern every sphere of local sodal life. For example, 
the meeting programs the work in the communal milpa, the construction of 
public buildings (casa ejidal, casa de salud, dassrooms, etc), and creating or 
deaning footpaths; and it designates dvil and religious authorities." (1996: 
161). 
These authors' appraisals coindde in several regards with my own experience. Like 
them, I was astonished by the sheer scope of matters considered to be of communal 
concern and dealt with at the asambleas. This indudes many issues that outside 
observers like myself would consider personal (like the choice of religion), but also 
several that could be considered the province of public administration, such as the 
provision of services such as schooling and the administration of justice. In the Tojo-
labal Highlands (as in many other indigenous regions of Mexico) community 
competence stretches far into the personal sphere and encompasses much of what 
in other contexts makes up the domain of government agencies. I also agree that 
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the community may be understood as a control structure (though I would not go as 
far as Leyva does for the Canadas region, equating asamblea and community, or 
comôn as she calls it, using the Tzeltal/Tojolabal term; Leyva 2994: 382). Amongst 
the Tojolabal, there is an understanding that the community 'governs' and that it 
does so through the asamblea. Statements such as 'the community decided' or 'the 
community did not want i f usually refer to the outcome of an asamblea. The asam-
blea can be understood as some sort of instantiation of community, where the 
'public opinion* is formed and expressed and the 'collective interesf is being denned. 
This also makes the asamblea a space where community itself is being defined, 
performed, and contested. 
However, several points need clarification. The relation between asamblea and 
authority is not as unproblematic as Martinez Lavin suggests, nor can the asamblea 
be equated with the 'totality of inhabitants' as Leyva and Ascencio maintain. To 
assume that authorities simply 'execute' the will of the community overlooks the 
facts that different ideas or factional interests may exist within the community and 
that, as local power holders, the authorities may also pursue personal interests. 
Furthermore, assistance to asambleas is mostly restricted to adult males and may be 
even further conditioned. The asamblea needs to be problematised to a greater extent 
than it has been so far . 4 5 To make a start with that, I propose to understand the 
asamblea as an arena in which decision-making takes place but meaning is also 
produced. I use the concept of arena as it has been defined by Long who speaks of 
arenas as "social locations or situations in which contests over issues, resources, 
values, and representations take place" and "where actors confront each other, 
mobilise social relations and deploy discursive and other cultural means for the 
attainment of specific ends, including that of perhaps simply remaining in the 
game" (2001: 59). Although the asamblea is not the only arena of relevance to Tojo-
labal communities, it is certainly a central one. 
During my fieldwork in Chibtik, it was not uncommon to see the m e n 
summoned to meetings two or three times a week. Any of the authorities, the repré-
sentante of the copropiedad, the comisariado ejidal or the agente municipal, could 
convene a meeting. Members of the community or outsiders can ask the authorities 
to call for such a meeting when they have a certain issue {punto) they want treated. 
In Chibtik, meetings were mostly called in the early morning, before people left for 
the fields, or in the late afternoon, as they were returning. Blows on the cacho 
warned the men that something was up or reminded them that a meeting had been 
set. After the first or second call of the cacho, the men slowly gathered in front of the 
church or - i f it was raining - in the corridor of the s c h o o l . 4 6 They formed small 
groups and chatted, or just sat and waited. This time might last up to an hour and 
a half or so. After the third call and when the person who had convened the meeting 
saw that quite a few men were there, he would start it by saying 'Well, it seems that 
quite a few of us are here. Maybe we should starf. Some others would confirm: 'Yes, 
quite a few of us are here, why not start?' The authority that had called the meeting 
introduced the issue to be dealt with. If outsiders like myself were involved, they 
would be introduced and the background to the issue provided. Some people would 
ask for clarification, others would repeat some of the points raised, and still others 
might give their point of view. If the point were of any interest, a great deal of discus-
sion would ensue. To me, the dynamics usually seemed disorganised and non-
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transparent. Everybody talked at the same time, with the volume rising and then 
again falling. Points of view were being suggested, repeated, added to, appraised, 
and possibly confirmed. In the midst of this decentralised confrontation of opinions 
and weighing up of pros and cons, a pause would sometimes be made and a point 
put forward forcefully by someone, after which the discussion would resume. At 
some point someone, usually the person who had convened the meeting, would 
phrase an agreement that might be acceptable to many of the men present. He 
would ask for explicit confirmation of this agreement by saying " akwerdo ma'" [is 
there agreement?]. This would then be answered by an affirmative "akwerdo" [there 
is agreement!] of the part of those present. Decisions so taken are called akwerdo, 
from the Spanish acuerdo, meaning agreement. 
The above is no more than a rough sketch of the dynamics of meetings in 
Chibtik. The asamhleas would certainly warrant more detailed study than I have been 
able to conduct at this stage. I have only been present at meetings where I had a 
point to raise, and then, only for as long as my own 'poinf was being discussed. Yet, 
even if I had been present at more of the meetings, I probably would still have felt 
the process escaped my understanding. With many things happening at the same 
time it would probably be difficult (even for those present) to trace exactly how deci-
sions had been reached. Asking various people what had happened at an asamblea 
sometimes elicited quite different versions of the events. 
As in other arenas, in asambleas in Tojolabal communities, forces are measured 
and interpretations constructed, in ways never entirely free of a degree of manipu-
lation and coercion. None of the people involved in making decisions is not also an 
interested and affected party, tempted to use every possibility of reaching a 
favourable outcome. In the process of decision-making, certain objections will be 
marginalised and eventually overruled, certain alternatives may be ignored and 
others promoted. Those other than the official authorities may exercise power 
during the meetings, which is reflected in the attention paid to their suggestions and 
the degree to which they are supported. It would, however, be inaccurate, to my 
mind, to view the meetings as mere rituals for legitimising decisions already made 
by small cliques. Disagreements did arise and sometimes prolonged the meetings 
for hours. Real confrontations did take place. Controversial issues sometimes 
remained unresolved and pending, to be returned to at a later stage. Issues that 
strongly divided people sometimes postponed decision-making for some time. 
The fact that decision-making is couched in consensual terms, and labelled as 
'agreements', does not mean that people have a naive belief in consensus or collec-
tive interest. On the contrary, people are acutely aware of the politics of decision-
making. Consensual language does not mean that everybody agrees with everybody 
else, or that people all necessarily accept a certain decision with the same enthu-
siasm or for the same reasons. Neither does it prevent differences from resurfacing 
at a later stage. Acuerdos are probably best understood as 'accorded coercion". Though 
considered legitimate, they are clearly understood by the individual members of the 
community as constraints on their behaviour and may be experienced as imposi-
tions. It is important to bear in mind though, that whereas it is true that people may 
agree to certain decisions because they feel forced to agree, not because they think 
the agreement is the one most in line with their individual interests, it is also true 
that giving in to a reasonably acceptable agreement may be preferable to lasting 
disagreement, the outcome of which cannot be predicted. 4 7 
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Through the asamblea, the community appears as an externalised, objectified 
instrument of authority and discipline. In line with the disciplining force that 
Sabean found property to exert in his historical study of family and property, one 
can understand the Tojolabal community as a 'disciplining' regime (Sabean 1990; 
ajso De Vries & Gilvonio 2001 for a similar use of the concept). Such 'disciplining' 
may involve outright coercion, but it also operates in more informal ways, through 
self-constraint and by influencing people's aspirations and expectations. Property 
'disciplines' in the sense that the prospect of acquiring, the fear of losing, or the need 
to legitimise claims to property, condition people's behaviour. I have already pointed 
out that the community exercises an important degree of control over land rights, 
\yhich gives it its disciplinary power. Agreements have a law-like status at the 
cbmmunal level; they are bmding and enforceable rules. They are also often referred 
to as orden, or 'order', which underlines this law-like status. I have encountered 
frequent references to restrictions and prohibitions that were an outcome of asam-
bhas in terms of mey orden, meaning 'it is not allowed'. It is interesting to note that 
people refer to prohibitions from state agencies in these same terms, suggesting a 
certain equivalence or commensurabihty between the two types of regulation, which 
points to the existence of a certain degree of legal pluralism. When community level 
decisions are considered very important, they may be put in writing in actus. A full 
reglamento may be produced, outlining some of the most important prohibitions and 
their corresponding sanctions. 
The most common form of sanctions in Chibtik is that of the multu, a monetary 
fine. The multu is a payment to the community for infringing its rules . 4 8 The money 
from multus generally goes into a caja (box, or fund) and is used, for example, for 
trips by the comisariado ejidul to arrange certain matters for the community. Specific 
fines are stipulated for specific infractions (for example letting one's pigs to escape 
or failing to attend an assembly without a legitimate reason). In other cases, the fine 
will be negotiated at the asamblea. Let m e provide a brief account of my own expe-
rience when I was working as a schoolteacher in Piedra Huixtla more than ten years 
ago to illustrate the issue of fines. When I told the men at a meeting that it was very 
difficult for m e to work with the children being absent so often, they decided that 
there should be an acuerdo for everyone to send their children to school. A fine was 
set (I found the idea of a fine appalling until I discovered that this type of arrange-
ment was very common). The fine was paid to the community, rather than the 
teachers, since not sending children to school constituted an infringement of a 
community regulation. The agreement did not improve the situation greatly, since 
the children's labour was greatly needed at home. In an attempt to comply with the 
agreement, however, some mothers sent another child instead of the one who 
usually attended school. This solution was perfectly in line with how meeting one's 
obligations is understood. (In view of the situation, I never insisted on compliance 
with the new agreement.) 
The asambleu also plays a role in the construction of boundaries between inner 
and outer spaces. It marks the boundary between those who are community 
members and those who are not. Establishing the recognised constituency oiasam-
bleas is a way of defining community membership, which operates next to a defini-
tion on the basis of land rights. In Bajucu, for example, all 16 year old boys were 
enrolled on the list of asambleistas giving them the right to participate in the meet-
ings but also obliging them to contribute to all sorts of communal duties and 
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expenses. In Chibtik a list of 'men' was drawn up next to a list of'right-holders'. In 
principle, attending asambkas is both a privilege and an obligation for all adult male 
members in the community. Women, like outsiders, only take part in the meeting 
when (and only for as long as) they wish to discuss a point or at the explicit invita-
tion of the people . 4 9 Asambkas are thus constructed as an insiders' sphere, a realm 
protected from outsiders. This is at least partly due to the fact that people are well 
aware that their capacity for collective action lies largely in these meetings. The 
power to influence decisions, the advantage of knowing what these decisions are and 
what one may expect from the behaviour of those present, is restricted to insiders. 
To open up this arena would also mean making it vulnerable to manipulation by 
outsiders, and giving up one of the greatest advantages communities have in their 
dealings with government representatives, for example. The meetings give the Tojo-
labal the power to act quickly and unitarily. Accorded action would be far less effec-
tive i f it were known to outsiders beforehand. Furthermore, at the meetings, internal 
tensions are brought into the open that could easily be exploited by 'interested 
outsiders' (read: actors with a political agenda). In situations of political tension, 
protecting the insiders' sphere becomes more important than ever. 
I have stressed the fact that being part of the meeting's constituency is a privi-
lege. It should also be noted, however, that it is often experienced as more of a 
burden. Although meetings may deal with issues of crucial concern, on many other 
occasions they deal with extremely routine, tedious matters, such as the co-ordina-
tion of communal labour (e.g. maintenance of fences or roads) or some minor 
problem that nonetheless needs to be resolved. It is not always a pleasure to have to 
spend hours in the cold or darkness when one could be sitting at home by the fire. 
Furthermore, one always runs the risk of being enrolled for some 'commission' or 
other to resolve a particular issue in town, to co-ordinate an event, or to accompany 
one of the authorities on a trip to a government office. People's natural reluctance 
to come to meetings is perhaps the reason why attendance at meetings is one of the 
obligations right-holders have, while in some cases, non-attendance is sanctioned. 
The role of religious and political organisations 
Asambkas have not always had the central role I found them to have. When 
Montagu described Tojolabal social and political organisation in her contribution to 
The Handbook of Middle American Indians in 1969, she did not mention the impor-
tance of meetings of adult men (1969). She speaks of a so-called junta but defines 
this as a group of about five individuals appointed by the adult men to attend to local 
affairs. Montagu's account was not based on thorough research and she may have 
overlooked the role of community meetings. The importance of the asambkas may 
also have increased since the time of her work. As a result of the engagement of the 
diocese and the Nortenos with the Tojolabal communities since the 1970s, structures 
of authority and decision-making have been slightly re-structured. 
Both organisations tried to introduce more participatory methods of decision-
making and more horizontal forms of organisation within communities (Leyva & 
Ascencio 1996:153-166; Harvey 1998). Legorreta describes how within the frame-
work of the Lucha Campesinaejido union and in line with the idea of working 'from 
the base upwards', attempts were made to strengthen the asambkas and make 
leaders more accountable (Legorreta 1998). This may have contributed to asambkas 
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acquiring a more central role. On the other hand, however, attempts to 'democra-
tise' asambleas by dividing the community up into sections with their own asambkas 
or the inclusion of women, were not very successful (Teresa Garcia, pers. com.). 
According to Leyva (1995), the participatory methods pastoral workers applied in the 
training of catechists were introduced by the latter into asambkas in communities 
in the Canadas. A similar development may have taken place in the Tojolabal High-
lands. Furthermore, the pastoral workers and catechists attempted to turn the 
Sunday church services into forums for reflection and discussion. Contrary to the 
asambkas, in the church services, women are also present and have a voice. The 
involvement of pastoral teams may thus have pluralised the spaces for decision-
making and the construction of meaning. It has also been suggested that pastoral 
work may have strengthened community discourse (Legorreta 1998, Meyer 2000 
Leyva & Ascencio 1996: 161). This has led some observers to suggest that the 
community is a creation or invention of the diocese (e.g. Legorreta 1998). In my 
view, this misconstrues the process of community formation in which several 
processes played a role and in which the intervention of the diocese, like that of the 
pplitical organisations, built upon already existing structures of governance and 
constructions of collectivity rather than creating them. The invention of community 
had begun long before these organisations entered the scene in the 1970s, through 
experiences of collective action in the process of land reform and the formation of 
collectivities of right-holders to land. 
An important result of both the religious and political organisations in the Tojo-
labal Highlands was to open up more channels for leadership, in addition to the 
existing ejido authorities: catechists, deacons (koltanum in Tojolabal, tu'unel in 
Tzeltal), representatives and, delegates. This implied a pluralisation of the leadership-
base and it became quite common for the same individuals to alternate between the 
different posts. However, the process was not free from antagonism. According to 
Legorreta, the catechists developed into caciques resisting the formation of leaders 
within the structure of the peasant unions that might challenge them (Legorreta 
1998). Hernandez Cruz (1999) claims that both the new religious and political lead-
ership discredited the mystical and spiritual sources of power and thus antagonised 
the elderly Tojolabal that had previously taken up leadership positions. I tend to 
interpret these accounts in the light of the political agendas of both authors, who 
have been stakeholders in the process of political organisation themselves. I have 
the impression that the different channels for leadership were dealt with as much 
as possible as parallel (rather than as mutually exclusive or antagonistic) options by 
the population concerned. 
Principle of equal shares 
The asambkas in Tojolabal communities are concerned with the administration of 
shared resources and the provision of collective goods such as mfrastructure, serv-
ices and conflict management. One important mechanism is what I have called 'the 
principle of equal shares'. Fencing as it is organised in Chibtik provides a clear 
example: each right-holder is required to contribute a set amount of money, the 
same for all right-holders, barbed wire, a number of poles (to be fetched from the 
woods) and a number of days of work. All this is carefully registered, usually by the 
authorities or a special commission. In the case of fencing, book-keeping of mone-
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tary, material and labour contributions is carried out on the basis of right-holder-
ship. In other situations, for example, maintenance of a water source, all adult men 
will have to contribute. Failure to comply with these obligations will usually incur 
sanctions. A record is kept of contributions that have not been made, which are 
conceptualised as a 'debt' to the community or the collectivity of right-holders. In 
extreme cases of failure to comply with regulations, a person jeopardises his rights, 
and may ultimately be expelled from the community (this issue will be taken up at 
length in the next chapter). 
Such strict regulation may be understood as a means of limiting free-riding, that 
is of reducing the chances that individual members might enjoy the benefits of 
shared resources without sharing in the efforts of provision and maintenance, and 
avoiding friction over allocation and provision dilemmas. Free-riding, or more 
precisely the fear that others might free-ride, has been identified as one of the major 
obstacles to co-operation and pooling (see Ostrom 1990, Popkin 1979, Baland & 
Platteau 1996). As we saw, in Chibtik, m e n other than those 'listed' could only 
acquire rights to the copropiedad i f they were admitted by the existing group of right-
holders and upon payment of a compensation for the efforts made, the entrada. 
Conditioning membership and payment of an entrada are measures that seek to 
ensure that the efforts of those that took the risk are not simply given away. It also 
serves as an incentive for people to be 'on the list', for if they do not share in the 
efforts, there is a distinct risk that they will not be able to join in later, or only at a 
high cost. If provision is costly, as in the case of Chibtik, when the debt had to be re-
structured, admitting new members is attractive to the existing collectivity of right-
holders. If a resource is scarce, membership is likely to be restricted (examples of 
which we will see in the next chapter). 
The 'principle of equal shares' is a procedure for organising the allocation of 
benefits and the provision of goods which is best understood in relation to the possi-
bility of conflicts arising over these issues, as has been suggested by Popkin in his 
study of village institutions in Vietnam (1979). To limit such conflict, Popkin argues, 
"criteria that are highly visible and easily defendable" and "fixed ascriptive rules" 
(1979:41; 57) do the job best. Popkin develops this point in relation to taxation, but 
it is also valid for other situations where the burden of provision or maintenance of 
shared resources is to be distributed over individual families. An example involving 
land distribution will be discussed in the next chapter; here I will give an example 
of catfle slaughtering for November 1st, the so-called ko taktin. Nowadays Tojolabal 
families pool their resources to buy an adult animal to slaughter, once provided by 
the patron. This can be done on a community basis, but is more often done by 
groups of people within a community. I witnessed such a slaughter once in the 
Veracruz community, where about twenty families shared one animal. Three men 
had been commissioned to buy it (it had cost almost 3000 pesos), and the price per 
share was established. 5 0 It should be noted that it was possible for a man to buy 
more than one share. The animal had been killed by the men appointed for the task 
on a field just outside the settlement. All the families that had bought shares sent 
someone with a bucket; one bucket per share. First everyone got a share of the blood, 
which children ran home to deliver to their mothers. Then, the people with the 
buckets formed a circle around the animal and butchers and an elaborate procedure 
began whereby each part of the animal (good meat, poorer quality meat, offal) was 
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cut up into as many pieces as there were shares and thrown into the buckets; once 
clockwise, then anti-clockwise. It took hours under the hot sun. The experience (as 
I sat there with my own bucket) made me realise more clearly than ever what pains 
people take to prevent anyone from feeling disadvantaged, for it is precisely this 
sensation that can give rise to frictions. The dividing up of the animal reflected the 
concern with avoiding suspicions of anyone being favored over others. When 
inequalities do occur, they can be attributed to 'fate' (le toco): nobody but chance 
(suerte) can be blamed. Success of the method is never fully guaranteed, as I estab-
lished later that day. That afternoon in several kitchens I could here critical discus-
si|ons about the quality of the share that they had received in comparison to what 
they felt others had received. 
If distribution cannot be fair, for example because a resource cannot be split up, 
another solution has to found. The buildings formerly belonging to the finca, the 
casa grcmde and the church, have been turned into public buildings, rather than allo-
cated to a particular individual. In fact, it would have been inadmissible for any one 
individual family to appropriate something like the casa grande to which none of the 
former mozos was any more entitled than anyone else. Humberto Castillo and his 
family stayed in the casa grande for a while, when he became a late buyer in the 
copropiedad. Unlike the Chibtikeros, they had no house of their own in Chibtik, for 
they had never lived there. "When we came, we didn't have a place to stay. For several 
months we stayed at the casa grande, where the school is now", Lola, Humberto's 
widow, recalled this episode. I joked - pretending I did not know I was suggesting 
an 'impossible' solution to the problem of where they should live - "You should have 
stayed there, it is a nice house." She answered: "No, no, the community wouldn't 
have wanted that! No, they told us where we would stay and made us the house." 
The procedures in line with the 'principle of equal shares' do not mean, as Popkin 
has also pointed out, that greater equality in endowments is promoted or that 
existing differences between families are levelled out (1979). He argues in the case 
of taxation in Vietnam that the equal shares being paid by each of the adult male 
villagers implied that tax was in fact regressive, implying a relatively higher burden 
on the poorer members. In Tojolabal communities, the principle of equal shares 
may produce similarly 'unequal' effects. The same financial contribution is more 
costly to families with less cash than others. A day's work is more costly to those 
with fewer adult men. Furthermore, equality is related to shares or, in the case of 
laind, to the 'righf attached to a right-holder. In the case of the cow-slaughter, fami-
lies with enough cash to buy two or more shares were allowed to do so. In the case 
of the Chibtik copropiedad, the decision to open up the possibility of buying a share 
to young boys led to a situation where some families ending up having two or three 
or more shares where others only had one, which became the basis for further 
differentiation. 
Discussion: the constitution of community 
In this chapter I have described several of the ways in which land reform has shaped 
the communities of land reform beneficiaries in the Tojolabal Highlands of Chiapas. 
Summing up the main findings, we may conclude in the first place that land linked 
groups of people that often shared a history of living on a particular finca as well as 
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kinship ties, in concentrated settlements with contiguous, exclusive territories. They 
were given direct control of this land though they were also subjected to a number 
of rules and procedures. Second, some of these rules and procedures permeated the 
institutional repertoire of the communities of land reform beneficiaries. Third, old 
distinctions between the mozos, derived from their labour relation to the patron or 
from special privileges assigned to them, were eliminated in the process. The 
playing field was levelled somewhat as they were all treated as land claimants with 
equal rights by the land reform bureaucracy. The assignation of land rights itself 
became a source of further differences. Fourth, the land reform process promoted 
the emergence of new types of leadership figures, namely the ejido authorities, 
acknowledged by the land reform bureaucracy as representatives of the collectivity 
of right-holders. In addition to the regular meetings of adult men, these authorities 
dealt with matters other than those of land and function as de facto local govern-
ments. To conclude this chapter I shall address the issue of why the ejido, as a 
construct of state policy, was able to structure the identifications and commitments 
of the population of the Tojolabal Highlands so strongly and how such structuring 
is best understood. 
The centrality of community in the Tojolabal Highlands 
I mentioned in the introduction to this book that 'community* is an important refer-
ence in the Tojolabal Highlands, without which it is difficult to speak about land 
rights but also more generally about social organisation, conflict and change. 
Although the ejido model is a policy construct, it has become central to the way the 
Tojolabal identify and organise themselves. It has been observed by several authors 
that the Tojolabal have constructed their identity around the ejido, in much the same 
way as they did around the finca (Flores Felix undated.; Hernandez Cruz 1999; 
Mattiace 1998). Elements of the ejido model have become identity markers, within 
communities as well as for outsiders. Inside the community, different categories of 
members are distinguished on the basis of 'agrarian' categories (derechero or 
ejidatario). Maps and official documents drawn up in the course of land redistribu-
tion are central to the construction and re-affirmation of a community in relation to 
other communities. The commitments of the Tojolabal in the region of study are 
also tightly structured around the community. Vital entitlements (and their corre-
sponding duties) derive from community membership, including not only access to 
land, but also access to a number of other resources and services, political repre-
sentation and having a say in local matters. 
The community of land reform beneficiaries created in the process of land redis-
tribution is more than a land holding collectivity, though this capacity gives it great 
strength. It is also locality and local government. The land endowments and acqui-
sitions of communities not only constitute the patrimony of a specific collectivity 
but also constitute a domain or sphere of influence. In other words, 'community' in 
the Tojolabal Highlands is a social configuration in which territorial, juridical, 
administrative and social boundaries largely coincide. It should be added that the 
community does not enjoy undisputed hegemony over any of these dimensions. 
Juridical and administrative boundaries may be challenged by higher level state 
structures; different land endowments may correspond to different, only partly over-
lapping, sets of right-holders within a locality; social boundaries may at times 
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crosscut territorial boundaries, when families witfiin a community organise around 
a factional interest or when several communities join together in a peasant union. 
Nonetheless, overall the community remains the principal referent of identification 
and local government. 
This is particularly clear when contrasting the Tojolabal Highlands with the 
Central Highlands of Chiapas where both higher and lower levels of association and 
governance play an important role. Family groups and municipal structures, rather 
than localities, have been identified as crucial to identifications and commitments. 
For example, the localised patrilineages of Zinacantan described by Vogt (who called 
these sna) control land which they allocate to their members over whom they also 
h^ve juridical authority (Vogt 1969; 140-44). 5 1 Although among the Tojolabal house-
hold and family groups (especially groups of brothers) are important, for example 
in the organisation of agricultural labour and certain pooling arrangements, these 
are subjected to the level of the community as far as their control over land and 
conflict settlement are concerned. In the Central Highlands, small settlements 
(usually called hamlets or parajes) exist that resemble the communities of the Tojo-
labal Highlands somewhat, but do not control land independently in the way 
communities in the Tojolabal Highlands do: most parajes do not coincide with ejidos 
or land acquisitions but are part of larger ejidos or bienes comunales (this holds, for 
example, for Zinacantan and Chamula). Furthermore, through the cargo-system, the 
parajes are integrated into the municipal structures in ways quite unknown to the 
Tojolabal (see Vogt 1969). In fact, most scholars writing on the Central Highlands 
have used the word 'community' to refer not to individual localities but rather to the 
mumtipality, governed by the ceremonial and government centre, the cabecera. This 
holds for most of the Americans working in the Harvard project as well as Mexican 
scholars attached to the INI, such as Aguirre Beltran. 5 2 The situation in the Tojo-
labal Highlands is quite different. Whereas it may be common to speak of Zinacan-
tecos, referring to inhabitants of any of the setdements that pertain to the munici-
pality of Zinacantan, it makes little sense to talk, in analogy to this, about the people 
of the Tojolabal Highlands as Margaritenses. Instead, people identify themselves as 
Jotaneros, Bajukuberos or Chibtikeros. Systems of governance amongst the Tojo-
labal in this region are built up around and between communities but have not, until 
very recently, included municipal government (for recent developments see Chapter 
Seven). 
The centrality of the community in the Tojolabal Highlands resembles the 
Canadas region somewhat. This is not surprising, for many of the settlers - in 
Leyva's estimate up to 8 0 % (Leyva 1995: 376) - came from the Tzeltal and Tojolabal 
finca belt. Leyva's description also stresses the central role of asambleas, the dele-
gated nature of authority, and the far-reacMng competence of local governance struc-
tures (1995). In both regions, the association between control over land (notably ejido 
endowments) and locality is very strong and links to the municipality are weak. In 
both cases, land redistribution acted as a structuring element in the organisation 
and governance of groups of people emerging from fincas. Leyva as well as others 
have related the type of community as it developed in the Canadas with the process 
of 'exodus' from the fincas and the creation of a 'new social order' (1995: 401). A 
similar 'remaking of community' - as Harvey (1998) has called it - took place in the 
Tojolabal Highlands. There, former mozos were confronted with the need to re-
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invent community under new conditions in which they directly controlled the land 
and the landowner was no longer a central authority. 
An institutional vacuum 
In the Tojolabal Highlands as in the Canadas, the figure of the ejido was quite easily 
accepted by the population. The ejido never had the connotation of 'imposition' or 
illegitimate form of 'state domination' that Nugent and Alonso registered for 
Namiquipa, in the north of Mexico (Nugent & Alonso 1 9 9 4 ) . On the contrary, to the 
Tojolabal the ejido was associated with 'liberation', the end of subordination to the 
landowners and a means by which they could claim what they considered, in some 
ways, already theirs. I mentioned the fact that in many cases land redistribution had 
not given the former mozos exactly the land they wanted, in terms of location or 
size, and in other cases involved an experience of dispossession. Nonetheless, the 
figure of the ejido has been widely accepted in the region of study, without producing 
a sense of submission to the state. 
For an explanation of such an acceptance of the ejido model we probably have to 
look at the finca context in which the new ejidos were created. Schryefs ( 1 9 9 0 ) find-
ings on Huejutla (Huasteca region) support this idea. In the northern half of 
Huejutla, previously dominated by hadendas, Schryer found 'real ejidos', created by 
transferring hacienda land to former peons. This contrasted with what obtained in 
the southern part of the region, where powerful authority structures and communal 
land tenure existed prior to land reform and the ejidos were only 'virtual', that is, 
existed only on paper without altering the previous organisation of land tenure. Land 
reform thus had quite a different i m p a d in various regional contexts. In the Tojo-
labal Highlands, land reform was so successful that it entailed its almost complete 
'ejidalisatiori. It 'produced' real ejidos, with all their attributes: ejidatarios, comisari-
ados ejidales, asamhleas, actas, etc. Reviewing the case of the Tojolabal Highlands, I 
suggest that the adoption of elements from the ejido model is probably related to the 
discontinuities involved in land redistribution, as fincas were transformed into ejidos. 
Indeed, present day communities in the Tojolabal Highlands also continue to draw 
upon on organising practices from finca times, espedally where the organisation of 
communal labour (komon a'tel), related to the maintenance of common property 
resources or the provision of collective goods, is concerned. The men are now called 
to meetings with the same cacho which summoned them or their grandfathers to 
work during finca times, and communal labour is co-ordinated by means of tareas 
now as it was then. But the mozo families had no 'tradition' of allocating rights 
amongst themselves or of organising authority beyond the level of the family group 
on which to fall back in the new situation. The land reform legislation furnished 
them with a basis to develop these. 
I distinguish two different elements that contributed to the acceptance of certain 
criteria and procedures for the distribution of entitlements, the co-ordination of 
duties and the organisation of authority. The first relates to the nature of the rela-
tions between the Tojolabal land reform beneficiaries, the other to the cohectivist 
orientation of land reform policy. Starting with the latter, we can condude that the 
Mexican state only partially filled the institutional vacuum created by the departure 
of the landowners. Land reform was organised to deal with would-be benefidaries 
as a group with elected representatives and placed the responsibility for ejido admin-
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istrarion on the collectivity. Despite what land reform legislation suggests, little 
control was exercised over the allocation of land rights within communities or the 
mnctioning of ejido authorities. The new ejidatarios were only vaguely familiar with 
the detailed regulations that existed for ejido administration and land reform offi-
cials paid little attention to them. Consequently, especially those criteria and proce-
dures that played a role during the endowment process became incorporated into 
local institutions. Many other elements of the ejido model as it existed on paper, 
however, never actually played any role. Land reform thus regulated property rights 
t<j> some extent, but in practice left the land reform beneficiaries to govern them-
selves as they pleased. 
The impact of the ejido as a model of land tenure and local organisation on the 
cbmmunities of the Tojolabal Highlands is probably primarily explained by the 
advantages it offered in terms of presenting certain standards that could be used as 
a starting point for organising entitlements and procedures for regulation and less 
by the efforts of the land reform bureaucracy to forcefully impose it on them -
though the land reform legislations left room for such imposition. My hypothesis is 
that the acceptance of the ejido model was related to the fact that the new commu-
nities of land reform beneficiaries emerged from the fincas as 'communities of 
equals', that is, they approached what Elisabeth Colson has called 'a society of equals' 
(1975). I have already mentioned that the new communities began by levelling the 
playing field in several regards. The earlier distinction between vaqueros and 
macheteros was not maintained and the special privileges granted by the patron were 
largely abolished. As far as allocation of land rights in the finca domain was 
concerned, nobody could claim a priori authority over others. Earlier differences may 
further have been de-emphasised in view of the need to form the coalitions neces-
sary to acquire the land. (All this did not preclude, as we will see, the possibility of 
new differentiations occurring.) Colson argues that among such 'societies of equals' 
there is always the threat that conflict will become uncontrollable and different 
mechanisms are employed to prevent friction from getting out of hand. The (almost 
obsessive) concern with nobody being advantaged over others expressed in the rigid 
application of the principle of equal shares, together with, for example, the role of 
envy, resonate with Colsoris description of societies of equals (1975). If my hypoth-
esis is correct, the need to agree on some rules and criteria to be able to live together 
as a group among the Tojolabal land reform beneficiaries must have been particu-
larly pressing. 
Endowment and appropriation 
In this chapter I have shown how notions of property and governance in the Tojo-
labal Highlands reflect concepts from the ejido model, but I have also shown that 
behind the ejido labels he institutions that have assumed a much broader sphere of 
competence than that of ejido administration. The communities of land reform 
beneficiaries in the Tojolabal Highlands have developed forms of local government 
in which elements of the ejido model have been incorporated but which are not 
limited to this model. The role of the ejido model is, in my view, best understood as 
a point of departure in the definition and allocation of property rights as well as in 
the development of authority structures and decision making procedures. It 
informed local institutions, but did not prescribe them. In the partial institutional 
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vacuum that occurred with the dissolution of the tineas, the ejido model offered 
certain elements, certain criteria and procedures for the distribution of entitlements 
and the co-ordination of duties, that were re-tooled and re-signified by the former 
mozos as they developed new notions of property and authority. The process of 
endowment within the framework of land reform then also implied a process of 
appropriation of the ejido model. For Chibtik I discussed, for example, how rights to 
the copropiedad and the ejido were extended to others than those formally registered. 
I also showed how the model for administration of the ejido was reworked into a 
much more all-encompassing local government. This is how the comisariados ejidaies 
and the comités de vigilancia could become the Tojolabal 'traditional authorities' as 
much as the sindicos and the jueces are for the Tzotziles (see Vogt 1969). 
A last important point to be made in this chapter is that Tojolabal communities 
of land reform beneficiaries assert themselves as governance structures, both in rela-
tion to their own constituencies and vis-à-vis state structures. This governing 
capacity is exercised especially in the fields of granting or withdrawing entitlements, 
the organisation of authority and decision-making and conflict resolution. Although 
the land reform bureaucracy formally has considerable control over these issues -
see the section regarding the election of the ejido authorities and the internal allo-
cation of rights in the 1971 land reform law - a policy of non-enforcement was 
generally adopted. As a form of local government, the Tojolabal ejidos maintain a 
certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state at the same time as they are linked to 
it in many ways. Local government does not necessarily challenge the authority of 
the land reform bureaucracy. It often simply takes on tasks of regulation and co-ordi-
nation that no other institution performs. However, at critical junctures, commu-
nity level governance and government agencies may enter into opposition. This is 
explored in the next chapter. 
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Notes 
1 Rosario Castellanos' 1924 will speaks of 
" 2 6 houses for servants (sirvientes)", Testi-
monio 1 9 2 9 . 
2 People remember several encargados 
having worked at Chibtik, all of w h o m 
were mestizos, though most of them 
spoke Tojolabal. In general, encargados 
usually came from smaller rural settle-
ments or poorer, urban populations. 
3 In the previous chapter, the Chibtikeros 
tell how their horses had to 'earn [work 
for] their own food', by carrying produce 
for the patron, and relate the death of Don 
Pepe senior to a conflict over this issue. 
4 Granting such privileges would seem in 
line with what Popkin has noted about 
the need for the patron to keep relations 
dyadic and prevent collective bargaining 
on the part of the mozos (1979). 
5 References were made to reddish lumps 
of salt. 
6 See also Van der Haar & Lenkersdorf 
1 9 9 8 : 53-8. 
7 Montagu found a similar arrangement in 
the Tzeltal fincas of Ocosingo (1990 
[ 1 9 7 0 ] : 350-351). 
8 The brazada is measured from the finger-
tips of one hand to the fingertips of the 
other with the arms stretched. 
9 A zonte is a measure of 4 0 0 ears of 
maize. 
10 Someone answered, after a m o m e n f s 
thought: "Well, I guess the vaqueros were 
worse off, because they had to get up very 
early, while it was still dark". 
11 Endogamy is notable in the present-day 
communities; it has been suggested that 
this may be traced back to the finca era 
when landowners sought to retain their 
labourers. 
12 The Tojolabal terminology does not differ-
entiate between brothers and cousins, 
though it does reflect the age difference 
to ego. 
13 Leyva notes in the same vein how people 
migrating from the finca region into the 
Canadas brought the patron saint of the 
finca with them ( 1 9 9 5 ) . 
1 4 ARA-TG file 1 9 2 9 . Women could only be 
legally accepted as ejidatarias when they 
were heads of households. Although as 
we will see below the Tojolabal generally 
only consider m e n as right-holders, they 
must have understood that the inclusion 
of widows was a means of obtaining more 
land as a group. 
15 Solicitud 1 3 - 0 5 - 1 9 5 9 , ARA-TG, file 1 9 2 9 
i S ARA-TG file 1 9 2 9 
17 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 0 2 1 
18 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 0 0 5 
1 9 In an interview conducted in 1 9 9 8 by 
Martin de la Cruz Lopez Moya, who 
generously shared it with me. 
2 0 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 0 0 5 
2 1 The m i n i m u m age to be considered as an 
ejido beneficiary was 1 6 , which in our 
case means that the petitioners on the 
1 9 5 9 list must have been b o m in 1 9 4 3 or 
before. I am certain that six of the m e n 
newly included on the list reached the age 
of 1 6 after 1 9 4 3 , but this may hold for 
others too. I could only establish dates of 
birth for people that appear in the 1 9 9 7 
community census, which does not 
include those that had died or left the 
community in the mean time. 
2 2 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 0 2 1 
23 In one version, Juan Gomez and 
Fernando are depicted as being jointly 
responsible for the situation, having used 
the people's contributions for their own 
advantage. 
2 4 The celebration in honour of the patron 
saint, San Miguel. 
25 ARA-TG file 1 9 2 9 
2 6 In contrast with the e/Wo-authorities there 
are no legal impediments to the office of 
representative of the copropiedad 
remaining with the same person. 
2 7 For a legal treatment of the issue, see, for 
example De Pina 1 9 9 8 : 1 0 7 - 1 9 . 
2 8 RPP-O 1 9 6 3 - 0 2 1 
2 9 The document, entitled Testimonio de la 
escritura publica, drawn up in Comitan, 
0 7 / 0 1 / 1 9 8 6 , by Fernando Reyes Cortes 
was found among Don Pepe Castellanos 
junior's papers. I have no idea why it was 
there; he himself is not mentioned in it. 
Perhaps the document was related to sale 
of timber and Pepe Castellanos acted as 
an intermediary. 
3 0 In my talks with the Chibitkeros 5 6 -
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rather than 60 - was the number that 
came up time and time again. I think I 
can explain this by the fact that a conflict 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
involved several families leaving Chibtik; 
at least 4 of them were compradores, so 
the figures seem to tally. 
31 Estabhshing this was quite difficult: 
comparing names was complicated by 
inheritance and the transfer of 'rights' as 
well as different spellings of names. I was 
able to establish the deaths o f ten of the 
original buyers, the rest must also have 
died or left since they do not appear on 
the 1997 Chibtik census, drawn up by 
local health workers. 
32 A probate proceeding was used to decide 
on the inheritance. 
33 The Tojolabal generally see only m e n as 
'right-holders' though there are some 
indications that this has changed in recent 
years, due amongst other things to 
growing importance of male migration 
(see also Cordova 2000) and human 
rights discourse. 
34 I use prefer the concept of'right-holder" to 
the more common 'rights-holder' because 
the former brings out more clearly that 
rights are conceived of as a package and 
that who holds such a package enjoys a 
specific status. 
35 The pattern of ultimo-geniture and 
patrilocal residence seems to be wide-
spread amongst the indigenous popula-
tion in southern Mexico (see also Cordova 
2000). Amongst the ladino population 
inheritance patterns are quite different, 
however, and partible inheritance to all 
children, male and female, is the rule. 
36 It is important to note that the intergener-
ational transfer of resources is governed 
by affinity and specific circumstances as 
much as it follows certain rules. As 
Sabean has noted (1990) 'care' may serve 
as a means of daiming property. Though 
there is no room to go into detail about 
these issues here, it is important to bear 
in mind that inheritance is somewhat 
more complicated in practice than I have 
described it here. 
37 The definitive withdrawal of ejido rights 
{privacion), for example, needs to be 
confirmed by the Mexican president, 
according to the 1971 land reform law. 
The land reform bureaucracy is also 
involved in the updating of the census, the 
inspection of the use of private plots, the 
settlement o f conflicts, and the dection of 
the ejido authorities. 
38 The original male bias of land reform 
legislation was subsequently corrected 
somewhat as the possibilities for women's 
recognition as heads o f household were 
extended. 
39 Amongst the Tojolabal, the status of right-
holder is linked to notions of masculinity 
(see Lopez Moya 1999). 
40 The comisariado ejidal is a council that 
consists of three members, presidents, 
secretario and tesorero. As is not 
u n c o m m o n in Mexico, in the Tojolabal 
Highlands the term comisariado is used to 
designate the presidents rather than the 
committee as a whole. 
41 That Hernandez Cruz regards the ancianos 
as the ' red ' traditional authorities is best 
understood, to m y mind, in the context of 
a political project which centres on a more 
explidt ethnic or Indian profiling of the 
Tojolabal (Hernandez Cruz 1999). 
42 With thanks to Martin de la Cruz Lopez 
Moya. 
43 In some communities different meetings 
attending to either the population as a 
whole or to right-holders only may be held 
(see also later chapters). Arrangements 
may vary from one community to the next. 
44 In Article 23 the Land Reform Law grants 
ejidos and communities legal capadty 
(personalidadjuridica). 
45 Studies o f the workings of asambleas are 
rare, the analysis by Maria Teresa Sierra of 
an Otomi communal asamblea being a 
fortunate exception (Sierra 1987). 
4 6 Unlike several other communities, Chibtik 
had no casa ejidal. 
47 I often encountered a fear of uncontrol-
lable conflict related to the l a c k of agree-
ment', resonating with the work of Colson 
on conflict and friction in sodeties with 
minimal or diffuse government structures 
(1975)-
48 W h e n damage to one or more persons is 
involved the sanction will involve paying 
compensation to the victims. 
4 9 Schoolteachers working in the community 
are not generally admitted to asambleas. 
Apparently cases of abuse have reversed 
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the earlier practice of admitting them. 
5 0 After subtracting the revenues from the 
skin that was sold separately. 
51 Collier (1975) describes the sna as a 
cluster of about four to six domestic 
groups, usually sons o f one father, and 
finds it a central unit in organisation and 
factionalism. 
5 2 It was precisely this association between 
community and municipality that allowed 
Cancian to speak of a 'decline of commu-
nity' in Zinacantan, referring to a loss of 
control of the municipality as individual 
localities became strengthened ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
Aguirre Beltran ( 1 9 9 1 [1953]) quite consis-
tently equates community and munici-
pality in his work on indigenous govern-
ments. 
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Chapter five 
Privatisation and conflict in Chibtik 
In the previous chapters I have outlined how the process of land reform took place 
in the Tojolabal Highlands and how it re-configured not only the land tenure situa-
tion but also patterns of identification and commitment amongst former mozos. In 
this chapter, the focus remains, as in the previous chapter, on the internal dynamics 
of the communities of land reform beneficiaries, again with special reference to 
Chibtik. The chapter explores the processes whereby tenure arrangements were 
privatised against a background of continued population growth and the stagnation 
of land reform. The material on Chibtik also indicates some of the repercussions 
privatisation and exclusion have on the constitution of community itself, especially 
the growing differentiation between right-holders in copropiedad and those who are 
not. In Chibtik, more privatised arrangements have been associated with critical 
junctures of conflict and factionalism. This is why the two are addressed together 
here. The conflict discussed also sheds light on the way state structures and state 
legislation come to play a role in internal power disputes. Privatisation thus provides 
a vantage point from which to appreciate the contours of community control over 
land, which is being claimed by communities as their province and defended as 
such vis-a-vis the state. The chapter ends with a critical reflection on evolutionary 
perspectives on land tenure change. 
Shares and measures 
General rights to the copropiedad 
The Chibtik finca had been organised around extensive livestock ranching. When 
the mozo families of Chibtik acquired the copropiedad in 1963, it consisted of 900 
hectares of apparently rather degraded land that contained no fenced sub-divisions, 
except for two walled fruit gardens and an enclosure for livestock. Grazing had 
resulted in a rather open landscape of grassland with some thorny bushes and 
further off, some scattered pine trees, a landscape locally referred to as agostadero, 
meaning summer pasture. 1 The area allocated for housing the mozo families was 
considerably smaller than it is today. After the acquisition, each family was free to 
choose the location of their housing plot and although some remained where they 
were, others moved into the former landowner's fruit gardens and the surrounding 
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pasture lands. The expansion of the housing area allowed for bigger plots around 
the houses (the solar in Spanish or maha in Tojolabal). During the time of the patron, 
maize cultivation of the mozos had been limited mostly to slash-and-burn cultiva-
tion on the hillsides since they had not been allowed to cultivate the flat lands 
surrounding the settlement. With the acquisition of the finca, people began to make 
their maize fields in this flat, open area surrounding the houses. This involved 
clearing, burning the grasses, and fencing the plots with sticks. Maps 5.1 and 5.2 
indicate these changes before and after the sale of the Chibtik finca. The expansion 
of the housing area and the creation of maize fields around the settlement can be 
seen. 2 (The house in black indicates the location of the casa grande). On the second 
map one can also see also the barbed wire fence erected around the settlement area, 
designed to keep the cattle out. I was told why: 
"In former times, the cattie destroyed everything. The animals turned the 
streets into pure mud. The cattle were everywhere, they destroyed everything. 
You couldn't leave any clothes hanging on your fence to dry, because the cattle 
would eat them. When we bought this [property], we did it differently; we said 
to each other so the cattle will stay out of the community, let us fence it, so that 
they will not be inside." 
Although the presence of cattle had been greatly reduced by the departure of the 
patron, the former peons had some livestock of their own, cows as well as horses, 
that made this measure necessary. 3 
Individual families had already held private rights to housing plots under the 
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finca regime. However, no private rights to particular plots had existed to the 
remainder of the area of the copropiedad, with a few exceptions - some small areas 
having previously been fenced for cultivation. General (to borrow a term from 
Boserup 1993 [1965]) rights predominated in most of the area during the first decade 
after the acquisition. People were free to make their maize fields 'wherever they 
wanted' and the remainder of the area could be used without restrictions for grazing, 
fetching firewood, collecting mushrooms, extracting building materials, etc. Since 
then, property arrangements have been modified in a number of ways, with enti-
tlements becoming more precisely circumscribed geographically and attached to 
individual right-holders. I refer to this process from more general to more specific 
rights ( the latter term is also from Boserup) as privatisation. My use of the term 
therefore differs from more formal definitions of privatisation implying the estab-
lishment of freehold tenure through private titles. Privatisation is linked to growing 
pressure on land related to population growth, but (as I will argue towards the end 
of this chapter) not always in linear ways. 
Measuring plots 
The first move towards privatisation of property arrangements came some 15 years 
after the acquisition of the copropiedad - in about 1978 - and was related to private 
plots for maize cultivation. The existing arrangement in which everyone was free to 
clear and fence as much land for cultivation (in suitable areas) as they could, had 
become unsatisfactory in a number of ways. Fencing each plot was extremely time 
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consuming - the wooden sticks had to be replaced every two or three years and 
needed constant repairs - and production levels were dropping as the soil was 
exhausted. However, another problem was perhaps even more important. The 
arrangement created conflicts as inequalities between families became evident and 
problematic. Families that had a large number of young adult males were at a 
distinct advantage as regards clearing and fencing more land, or were able to do so 
faster, than others. As one woman told me: 
"At that time, you could make your plot wherever you wanted, it [the land] 
was not measured yet (mi to b'isub'al uk).4 You made it however big you 
wanted it, but a man who did not have grown up sons to help him, couldn't 
clear a big area." 
To solve the problem, permanent maize cultivation was transferred to an open area 
previously used as grazing land and known as la Planada or niwanjob, which trans-
lates as the Plain or the Great Grassland. The area set aside for maize cultivation is 
some 300 hectares in size; map 5.3 shows its location in the northern part of the 
copropiedad. At a number of stages different areas were measured, beginning with 
the fertile land at the foot of the hill (yib witz), followed by the land adjacent to the 
river. At that stage, two plots were measured for each right-holder, including both 
the original and the late buyers. Gradually, the other parts were also measured and 
each right-holder was assigned an equally sized plot in each area. By the time of the 
fieldwork (1997), each right-holder possessed seven different plots of different sizes 
and soil qualities, adding up to some five hectares. 5 
154 
Map 5.4 Private p l o t s o f t h e P l a n a d a 
D r a w n by y o u n g m e n f r o m Chibt ik 1997 
The 'measurement of the Planada' - as it is referred to in Chibtik - followed the 
principle of equal shares outlined in the previous chapter, not only in the allocation 
of plots but also in the costs of measuring and fencing. Each right-holder partici-
pated in the measuring and contributed to the fencing with a certain number of rolls 
of barbed wire and a number of poles. With the help of a rope, quadrangular and 
rectangular plots were set out, separated by small ditches. The plots assigned to a 
right-holder are referred to as radon, or portion, a term that is used in Tojolabal for 
equal shares of something. Those that spoke to me about this emphasised that the 
division was done in such a way as to give each man an equal share "in order that 
there would not be any problems later on". Because people like to work in couples 
(e.g. two brothers or father and son), the plots were allocated in pairs (by cuadrilla); 
the allocation itself was settled through negotiation. 
The measurement of the Planada was clearly an endogenous process. It was 
defined by locally identified needs and criteria, and was carried out with locally avail-
able means. The measurements were made without the intervention of an official 
engineer, and using the locally common standard, the hrazada (literally meaning 
'arm's length'). 6 The re-allocation of maize-cultivation rather neatly solved the prob-
lems of conflicts over unequal access to crop land. But it had further implications. 
With the measurement, what had been a general right - being able to clear a field 
somewhere in the copropiedad - became a more clearly defined right attached to 
specific, standardised plots. Since the plots in the Planada were reserved for original 
and late buyers only, the new arrangement drew a sharper line between right-holders 
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and those who were not. Thus, the contours of later differentiation had already 
begun to emerge. 
A similar process of individual allocation and measurement that reinforced this 
differentiation was used for the housing plots. It was established that there could 
only be one plot per right-holder and that it would no longer be permitted for young 
couples to establish new housing plots on the outskirts of the settlement. The size 
of the plots was fixed at one hectare. People whose housing plots were smaller than 
this but were locked in by other housing plots, were assigned a 'complementary plof 
(smojol) elsewhere. Again the Chibtikeros carried out the measurement themselves 
with a tape measure. One account of the process is as follows: 
"We did it ourselves, 100 square meters [by which he means 100 long, 100 
wide]. For many people, it did not come out complete and they got another 
bit somewhere else. My maka [housing plot] for example, is only half a 
hectare. That of Santiago [brother of the one who speaks] is complete, but 
that is because he is up there in the open. My mojol is close to Santiago's 
maka. We did this [measurement] because some people were angry that some 
had a bigger maka than others, and it was better to make it even. It was also 
agreed that everybody would make the pigsty in their own maka, because 
they were making it anywhere, but that shouldn't be the case anymore." 
As for the Planada, measurement of the housing plots highlighted the difference 
between right-holders and others. Until then, any of the Chibtikeros had been free 
to build a house anywhere within the settlement area, regardless of whether they 
were right-holders or not. Many younger families constructed their houses on the 
outskirts of the locality, causing the house area to expand (visible on map 5.3). From 
the measuring of the housing plots onwards, however, adult children could only 
build their houses on the plot belonging to their father or another relative. The 
complementary plots were often used to accommodate elder sons, i.e. those that 
would not succeed their father. The new arrangements had the advantage of 
reducing friction over resources to which claims became increasingly conflictive, 
but the more unequivocal circumscription of rights to some implied limiting the 
rights of others. The new arrangements were not only more spatially circumscribed 
but also more exclusionary, that is, after access to maize fields now the right to a 
housing plot had also become restricted to right-holders. The common area of the 
copropiedad and that of the ejido, however, was to remain unaffected by such privati-
sations for a while and open to all residents of the community. Although it was 
divided into 60 individual sections or strips ifracciones), one for each right-holder, 
about ten years ago, it was not until very recently that grazing and fire wood collec-
tion were limited to people's own strips. 
Splitting up 
How could the refusal of some families in Chibtik to contribute to the fencing of a 
common grazing area {potrero) eventually lead to the segregation of the cornmunity 
and the creation of a separate settlement? This is the question I attempt to answer 
in this section. The conversion of some families to Adventism, the division of the 
copropiedad, and the creation of the small settlement Nueva lerusalen on the edges 
of the copropiedad, were different aspects of one of the most penetrating and violent 
conflicts that Chibtik has known. Although a certain political rivalry seems to have 
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been involved, the conflict is basically framed as being over entitlements and obli-
gations. In this section, I explore how the conflict led to the division of the 
copropiedad and the segregation of the community. In the next section, I provide a 
broader discussion of the conflict, relating it to understandings of community and 
to factional struggle. 
Accounts of the conflict 
I encountered different accounts of the conflict between Adventists and Catholics. 
^Kfhat is clear, however, is that the tensions between families that had converted to 
ApVentism and the Catholic majority of Chibtik escalated about ten years ago, and 
lejd to the division of the copropiedad and the segregation of the settlement. Two 
accounts of the conflict are as follows. The first is from Pedro, one of the leading 
Catholics, who had played a mediating role at the time; the second is from a woman 
in her late fifties, born in Chibtik but now living in the new settlement Nueva 
Jerusalem Pedro told m e the following: 
"They [the Adventists] had a lot of days of debt to the community, 120 days!, 
from when the potreros were established. And they were indebted in terms of 
money also, they did not co-operate for the barbed wire, nor for any of the 
fiestas. This man Oscar 7 really misbehaved. The community got angry and 
they [the Adventists] were almost going to get killed. But I calmed the people 
down, for by that time I already had my cargo. Then they left with their 
things. As the people saw that they had not destroyed their houses, they set 
these on fire. They did set them on fire, yes, but the people were already out 
then. 
They [the Adventists] came back with the Seguridad Publica, but then the 
people told the police about the debts and how they didrit want to pay. Oscar 
said that that was a he, that these potreros were not his. But then [who would 
believe him, for] his own cattle was walking there! 
The judiciales said they could not do anything because of the debts. They said 
to them [the Adventists]: "The rules of the community have to be respected 
and you violated them'. But Oscar wasn't satisfied and they came back again 
with the Seguridad Publica, and three men were taken to prison, for one 
month." 
On a visit to Nueva Jerusalen, I asked a couple why they were no longer living in 
Chibtik. The man answered first: "Well, everybody...the point is that our fraction 
ended up here, and we decided to come over here." A little while later his wife came 
back to the subject: 
"We left [Chibtik] due to some sort of problem. Oscar, the one married to 
Refugia, started with the Palabra de Dios. The community got angry, they 
kicked him out, they burnt down his house. He left, with one of his brothers, 
to Puerto Rico [a neighbouring community]. But it wasn't right [mey orden] 
that they kick him out, because he was on the list [of associates of the 
copropiedad; she literally said: och kwenta], he had paid for the land! So he 
came back and lived there for another few years, and then the problem flared 
up again. So, we came to where we are now. Julio [her husband] did not 
approve of the way they were treating Oscar - Oscar was a relative of his -
and so he decided to come over here as well". 
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By piecing together the different accounts I outlined the developments as follows. 
Catholicism was the dominant religion throughout the Tojolabal Highlands -
Chibtik had become involved with the pastoral workers of La Kastalia in Comitan in 
the 1970s - but Protestant churches were actively engaged in gaining converts. 
Oscar, whose wife Refugia was from another ejido where the Adventist church had 
already managed to establish itself, became one of the first converts in Chibtik. As 
a result of his proselytism Oscar elicited the anger of the Catholic Chibtikeros: they 
threw him out of the community and burnt down his house . 8 After the situation 
calmed down, however, he returned, claiming his rights. 
A few years later the trouble started again. Perhaps the problem was, as Pedro 
and others claim, that the Adventists refused to do their share of the fencing of one 
of the common grazing areas. Perhaps the refusal of the Adventists to co-operate in 
the communal work (komon a'td) and to pay their contributions, led to an intoler-
able situation (remember the discussion on the need to limit free-riding in the 
previous chapter). Perhaps also, there were more profound differences and rivalries 
behind the immediate conflict. The fact is that the tensions led to the expulsion of 
the Adventists from the community in - as Pedro noted - a rather violent way. They 
were threatened and their houses were burnt down. 
The Adventists left, but the expulsion did not fully succeed, however. Oscar and 
his men were determined to defend themselves. They managed to earn the support 
of the municipal president of Altamirano and came back, accompanied by the police 
(Seguridad Publico, or judiciales). The Adventists argued that their expulsion was ille-
gitimate in view of the fact that four of the Adventist m e n were associates of the 
copropiedad. As one woman said: 
"When the community evicted the Adventists they wanted to evict them once 
and for all. But the municipal president of Altamirano did not permit this, 
because the land had been bought". 
The CathoHc Chibtikeros in turn argued that they had every right to evict the Adven-
tists: having failed to contribute to the fencing of a grazing area and to comply with 
other community obligations, they had jeopardized their rights. Although the police 
initially agreed that 'the rules of the community must be respected' and withdrew, 
Oscar returned once again with police support. This time the leaders of the Catholic 
majority were sent to prison for about a month. 
Segregation 
The Adventist faction was too powerful to be evicted from Chibtik, but their 
continued existence in the community would have been very difficult after the 
corifrontations, and would probably have led to continuous friction. A solution was 
therefore found in the spatial and organisational segregation of the rival factions, 
into two different settlements, each with their own share of the copropiedad. In fact, 
two new groups of right-holders were created, each with their own circumscribed 
membership and their own territory - a solution very much in keeping with the 
institutional repertoire of the region. 
Following complicated negotiations involving both factions and the municipal 
president, the following deal was struck: the whole copropiedad area would be meas-
ured and divided into 60 narrow strips or sections (fracciones), one for each right-
holder (note that this includes late buyers). The strips run from north to south but 
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respect the Planada and the settlement area and have been numbered from west to 
east. A professional topographic engineer did the job, paid partly by the munidpaUty 
of Altamirano, partly by the right-holders. Four adjacent strips on the eastern 
extreme, closest to El Nantze, were allocated to the Adventist right-holders, who 
created a new settlement there called Rancheria Nueva Jerusalen. It is a twenty 
minutes' walk from the original settlement of Chibtik. The rest of the strips, 56 in 
total, were allocated to the remaining right-holders. They were randomly allocated-
o r a s the Chibtikeros say: "where chance fell (ko swerte)" - in order "to avoid prob-
lems". As in the Planada, the plots of land were assigned in pairs. 
By means of this arrangement, the Adventists secured their share of the 
copropiedad. They were, however, forced to give up their housing plots as well as their 
plpts in the Planada, the maize growing area. A propos of this, Cesar, a Catholic, 
remarked: 
"They lost their rights to the ejido and the Planada. They did not want that, 
but that is how it was settled. They said: But how will we eat? And the other 
people replied: you can make your milpa on your own piece of land (pedazo) 
[referring to the divisions]". 
Cecilia told me how her parents, both Advenrists, lost their housing plot: 
"When they were evicted, my father's maka became the community's. That 
was how the community ruled: that the lands of those that are evicted will be 
the community's. Before he left, my father said to me: 'they will throw me 
out, we will have to leave; but you will stay here because you are married 
here, you will stay where your husband is. I want to leave you my maka 
because I don't have any male children that are going to stay here, and your 
husband doesn't have land. But the community refused. The coffee on the 
plot was harvested and sold and the money was for the community." 
She finds it hard to accept: "the community is so tough \jel tzatzja komoni]." The 
housing plot was not assigned to anyone in particular, but subsequently used for 
common purposes, first the collective vegetable gardens of the women and later 
(during the time of my fieldwork) for the construction of a secondary school. 
The Adventist families were compensated for the loss of their housing plots and 
maize fields by the Altamirano munidpality in the form of fifty sheets of galvanised 
iron (lamina) for each family; "this was the payment for the land they left behind". 
The Adventists also had to give up their daims to the ejido land. Unlike the 
copropiedad, the ejido was not divided and remained controlled as a whole by the 
Catholic Chibtikeros. They dedded to incorporate six other people among the right-
holders to the ejido, mostly young men without land rights of their own, to take the 
place of the Adventist men. This situation was never formalised, however, at the 
Land Reform Ministry in Tuxtia Gutierrez. 
The division of the copropiedad into individual strips did not take full effed, 
however, for a number of years. The dividing line between the 56 Catholic and 4 
Adventist plots of land was fenced, but within each of these domains the individual 
strips were not fenced- although the dividing lines between them were marked by 
signs such as stones or trees (difficult to see for an outsider, but clear to the 
Chibtikeros). Until very recently, the Catholic area was still managed much as before, 
with general rights predominating. In spite of the involvement of the municipal 
authorities, the division has not been translated into legal terms. Had the division 
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been registered at the Land Registry Office, this would have meant the end of the 
copropiedad as such: formally, the division of a copropiedad converts it into a number 
of individual private properties (Diccionario 1994:751). 9 Legally therefore, the whole 
area acquired as a copropiedad in 1963, continues to be a single property. 
Conflicting claims and definitions of property 
The way the conflict between the rivalling factions in Chibtik was resolved, brings 
to mind some of the elements of the institutional repertoire outlined in the previous 
chapter. To recapitulate, property is conceived of as a share in the achievements of 
a circumscribed group, and definitions of property are tied up with concerns over 
group membership and the fulfilment of obligations. Expulsion is the 'ultimate' 
sanction of non-compliance with community regulations, forcing one to give up all 
one's rights, including residence. One reading of the conflict in Chibtik, that is 
dominant in the accounts of the Chibtikeros, is precisely that the refusal of the 
Adventist families to comply with their obhgations, jeopardised not only their rights, 
but also their membership of the community. In this section, I reflect on this 
reading by looking, first, at the way the conflict has been cast in a property idiom, as 
a confrontation over rights and duties, and second, by bringing out other possible 
dimensions of the conflict. 
A property idiom 
In the Chibtikeros' accounts, the struggle between the two different factions in 
Chibtik was staged as a conflict over rights and obhgations. What we see happening 
here is the use of a 'property idiom' (Sabean 1990:418) to understand and describe 
the multiple contestations between the two factions. In his account, Pedro sum-
marised the contention over entitlements and obligations into which both parties 
entered. He attributed the problems to 'debts' the Adventist families had to the 
community (in terms of money and days of work) and has Oscar, the leader of the 
Adventists, counter that argument in the same terms, stating that he had no obli-
gation to contribute to the fencing of the potreros that 'were not his'. This argument 
is then ridiculed by Pedro who points to the fact that his livestock were still grazing 
there, for all to see and which is why Oscar could be obliged to fulfil his obhgations. 
These arguments were also reported to the police officers, who - in Pedro's account 
- approached the dispute on the same terms: on hearing that the Adventists were 
indebted to the community, they assumed that there was nothing they could do for 
them. 
The accounts of the episode provide other examples of social interaction being 
inscribed in a property idiom. Pedro dtes the fact that the first time the Adventists 
left, they did so without destroying their houses as a provocation to the Catholics. By 
leaving their houses intact they challenged the expulsion (which, as mentioned, 
implies the loss of the right to residence) and, by his account, it was this provoca-
tion that triggered the violent reaction of the Catholics. Just as the act of the Adven-
tists contained the message 'we might come back", the burning of their houses was 
a clear statement of the opposite, 'you are not coming back'. Conversely, some 
accounts dignified the departure of the Adventists by attributing it to the fact that 
that was where their strips happened to be. Cecilia, whose parents moved there, 
160 
dairns: "They went where they have their plots of land". And Cesar said: "They were 
lucky to get the land there, and that's where they went to live". 
Factionalism and political rivalries 
The conflid between Adventists and Catholics in Chibtik has been framed as a 
struggle over property, rights and obligations. Although the Adventists' refusal to 
comply with their obligations was central to the conflid, it appears that it also had 
other dimensions. The refusal may have served as a means of challenging commu-
nity rulings and the leadership of the copropiedad, and it was also understood as such 
a challenge. As Baland and Platteau have noted, complying with community regu-
lajtions is a testimony to the individual's "willingness to share the life of the group 
and his understanding that everyone has to participate at some level in collective 
efforts to make the group viable." (1996:119). Refusal to comply with community 
regulations can therefore also be understood as a way of making it clear that one 
lacked such 'willingness' and no longer shared that 'mderstanding'. It is likely there-
fore, that the conflid over the monetary and labour contributions was more than 
just that. Let us consider the terms of the dispute. It is plausible that contributing 
to the fiesta in honour of the patron saint was incompatible with the new religion of 
the Adventist families. But does the same hold true of their refusal to partidpate in 
communal labour? The Adventists could not partidpate on Saturdays because this 
is their day of rest. But why would the Catholics insist on setting communal labour 
on Saturdays if this caused such problems? Any other day of the week, except 
Sunday, would have solved the problem. 1 0 And how does one explain the refusal of 
the Adventist families to contribute to the f e n d n g of the potrero, what religious 
objection could there be to that? The conflict that was fought in terms of property 
arrangements is likely to have entailed a struggle over community control itself. 
Contesting regulations (such as the fendng of the potrero) can then be understood 
as a means by which Pedro contested the dominant position of certain leaders and 
perhaps also the course community affairs were taking. Likewise, conversion to the 
Adventist religion can be understood not as the cause of the problems in Chibtik, 
but as part of a power struggle between two factions, each with their own ideolog-
ical label. Note how in his account Pedro had recourse to a hegemonic ador, 'the 
community' which a small group, 'they', contravened. He thus de-legitimises the 
Adventist families as representing a factional interest, while at the same time exon-
erating the Catholics from representing similar factional interests. The Adventists 
under Oscar, however, challenged the hegemony daimed by the Catholics and 
denied their control over land rights. 
Although I have not been able to grasp all the dimensions of the conflid, it seems 
to me that the struggle over the Adventists" land rights was linked to a power struggle. 
The conflict involved, for example, mutual recriminations between Oscar and Vkgilio 
over having lost the map of the copropiedad. Furthermore, there were frictions in 
Chibtik over political affiliation. Although explidt references to this issue are absent 
from local accounts of the conflid, the following letter from April 27 ,1990, suggests 
that they played a role. Several men from Chibtik (who, judging from their surname, 
belonged to the Adventist faction) wrote to the then governor of Chiapas, Patiocrnio 
Gonzalez Blanco, for his support in view of the threats of expulsion: 
"We have all been born here and have lived in peace but one day, when the 
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majority of our companeros came to the agreement that they would start to 
take part in the organisation Unidn de Pueblos Tojolabales and because that 
organisation belongs to the Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstruction 
National, and because we have resolved not to affiliate ourselves to that 
organisation, in view of the fact that we are of another conviction where 
parties are concerned, they have given us a date to leave the ejido,11 or other-
wise they will evict us [nos desalojarin] on May 7 of this year." 1 2 
The existence of such political opposition and more particularly, the move on the 
part of the Catholics to affiliate with the ejido union Pueblos Tojolabales would help 
to explain why the municipal president acted in support of the Adventist fraction. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the political situation of the time was marked by the 
advance of leftist peasant unions and opposition parties in the Tojolabal Highlands. 
Pueblos Tojolabales was involved with the C I O A C and, as also mentioned in the 
letter, opposition political parties. Furthermore, the OCEZ was extremely active in 
the Tseltal region bordering Chibtik. Supporting the Adventists may well have been 
a ploy intended to secure political support for the governing party at those critical 
times. It is in this light that we should also interpret the repression of the Catholic 
faction, three of whose leaders were imprisoned. 
Contested definitions of property 
The Catholic Chibtikeros justified their attempts to evict the Adventist families on 
the grounds of the tatter's failure to comply with commumty rulings, drawing on an 
understanding of individual property rights derived from community membership. 
In this understanding, rights to the copropiedad are based on having taken part in 
efforts to acquire the land, but need to be constantly legitimised by participating in 
the maintenance and improvement of the resources shared and adhering to commu-
nity regulations. The Adventist families opposed the attempts to evict them by 
resorting to a different definition of property rights, based on legal norms, according 
to which the expulsion was an unlawful deprivation. They contested community 
rulings on the basis of property definitions contained in civil law (had it been an 
ejido, land reform law would have applied). However, though different norms were 
confronted in the process, the conflict between Catholics and Adventists in Chibtik 
was not primarily a conflict over norms or definitions of property rights, but rather 
a conflict between groups of people using different norms as one of their resources 
in the struggle. 
Irrespective of the legal basis, the Adventists could not have overruled the 
Catholics had it not been for the support of the municipal president of Altamirano. 
To my mind, the intervention of the municipal authorities in defence of the Adven-
tist families needs to be interpreted more as a political than a legal act. That the 
municipal president choose to 'enforce the law" against community rulings, must 
be understood within the context of ongoing political struggles. In fact, the devel-
opment of the conflict supports my earlier suggestion that what were defined as 
'internal affairs' of communities were respected to a considerable extent by higher 
level authorities (at the municipal level or at the level of the land reform office in 
Tuxfla). Consider the initial reaction of the policemen, when they agreed that 'the 
rules of the community have to be respected'. Only later did the municipal president 
contest the expulsion. As long as conflicts were solved internally, even in ways not 
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in accordance with civil or ejido legislation, higher authorities had little reason to 
enforce the law. Their ability to do so was also extremely limited as long as commu-
nities closed ranks. It was precisely when one of the factions in the conflicts called 
on them for support, that they were given an opportunity to intervene. 
Even then, the municipal authorities were less interested in the defence of the 
Adventists' property rights per se than with the maintenance of public order and the 
possibilities the situation offered for political clientelism. The intervention of the 
municipal authorities must have involved some concern with bringing local prac-
tices in line with legal norms, but finding a legally perfect solution does not seem 
to have been a priority. The conflict was resolved through the use of force: by 
sending in the police and the imprisonment of several men, the Catholics were 
forced to abandon the expulsion and enter negotiations. Furthermore, the munic-
ipal authorities showed no interest in formally registering the division of the 
copropiedad, and the question of the ejido was completely overlooked. They may, in 
fact, even have preferred a certain degree of ambiguity. As Jones (1998) has 
suggested, ambiguity creates scope for settling a conflict in a way in which nobody 
is a total loser and nobody is a total winner, which is more likely to be acceptable to 
the various parties involved. 
The pending issue of the ejido 
As mentioned earlier, the whole ejido was claimed by the Catholics who transferred 
the rights of the Adventists to the same number of young men with no land rights. 
This transfer of ejido rights was never officially registered, possibly because the Land 
Reform Ministry was never involved in the settlement of the conflict. In 1998, 
however, a lawyer was involved in teying to achieve such formalisation. I met her in 
Chibrik and later had an opportunity to interview her. She confirmed my under-
standing of the situation: several people had left the community "due to problems 
of religion"; they retained their rights in the copropiedad but "do not work the ejido 
any longer". Other people had taken over their rights, but without this being offi-
cially confirmed. She was involved because the Chibtikeros wanted to formalise the 
situation, that is, to obtain a certificate of derecho agrario for the 'new 1 right-holders. 
Legally, one possibility would be to strip the previous ejidatarios of their rights and 
assign these to other people . 1 3 Such a procedure could be justified on the basis that 
the original ejidatarios had not worked the ejido all this time, a fact that classified as 
'abandonment* and is specified as a reason for the loss of rights. However, the lawyer 
was afraid that stirring up the case again would entail certain risks. The depriva-
tion/adjudication procedure necessarily involved the ejidatarios that had left and 
might encourage them to take up the issue again to try and reclaim their rights. She 
came up with a safer option, namely that of adding the six new men to the existing 
ejidatarios (raising the official number of ejidatarios from 31 to 37). This procedure 
could be carried out without either the presence or the consent of the ejidatarios of 
Nueva Jerusalen, who had been evicted but were officially still registered. 
Fencing the strips 
Dividing the copropiedad into two different communities was a way of neutralising 
tensions between two rival factions in Chibtik. Although it involved the creation of 
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individual strips it did not entail the privatisation of property arrangements as the 
measurement of the Planada had. When I began my fieldwork in Chibtik (in early 
1997) the remaining (Catholic) families continued to manage their part of the 
copropiedad largely as commons, that is, the division of the copropiedad into sepa-
rate plots of land remained largely 'unconsummated' or 'virtual'. Livestock could 
graze anywhere and people were allowed to fetch wood anywhere. I was told that "It 
was decided that not everyone would have his own potrero, but it would stay like it 
was" and "There was an agreement that the animals could walk over the whole 
potrero, and in the whole potrero you could search for firewood". And when in 1998 
a logging company began its activities, it was agreed that the revenues would be split 
equally between all 56 right-holders irrespective of whether the trees were felled on 
'their" section. In 1997, only a few entitlements to the copropiedad had been priva-
tised, most importantly, the slash-and-burn cultivation of m a i z e . 1 4 Also a few people 
had small, fenced, coffee plantations on their plots of land. 
The creation of individual strips had been designed as a form of privatisation. 
Each individual right-holder was given a map of his plot of land and people recall 
that the engineer involved in the measurements told them: "it is important that 
everybody fences his part, that everyone makes his own potrero, and that each one 
have water so that the animals can drink". This was why he designed the sections as 
strips, with each one including access to a river. But although the fence between the 
area allocated to the right-holders of Nueva Jerusalem (four strips), and the 
remainder of the area in the hands of the right-holders of Chibtik was drawn up 
quickly, by 1997 none of the individual strips had yet been fenced, either in Chibtik, 
or Nueva Jerusalem Possibly the fact that there were no immediate management 
problems - as had been the case for the Planada - explains why the division of the 
copropiedad failed to translate into a similar privatisation of rights. Identifying the 
plots of land did however bring privatisation through fencing closer. By the end of 
1999, the fencing of individual strips had begun. 
Controversies over livestock 
The fencing of strips in 1999 was related to controversies over livestock. Debates 
over changes in the institutional arrangements concerning communal pastures had 
been at a standstill for several years. The available grazing land consisted of'natural 
pastures', which were partly open, partly forested, with undergrowth. In the rainy 
season the ejido lands were also used for grazing. Since the late 1980s, the 
copropiedad area had already been subdivided into several large sections, called 
potreros, in order to allow for better rotation of the catde (see map 5.5). The conflict 
with the Adventist families had occurred while these sub-divisions were being 
created. The creation of the sub-divisions was not a form of privatisation: cattle 
continued to be moved jointly according to the necessities and possibilities of the 
pastures and on the basis of agreements reached in the asamblea. But pressure for 
more privatised arrangements in livestock management was recurrent. 
A first step was the creation of a number of corrales, enclosures for catde instead 
of the large, communal one that had been left by the patron. It had been maintained 
jointly by the Chibtikeros for decades, but when major repairs were needed, some 
men preferred to build separate, smaller enclosures, in groups of five or six men. 
The majority, however, constructed a joint enclosure although on a different site 
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from the previous one. Virgilio and his brothers, who together own a considerable 
number of catde, were pushing for further privatisation: they wished to fence their 
own plots of land in order to be able to sow improved pastures . 1 5 They did in fact 
fence part of their strips (fractiones), but the experience was short-lived. The 
remainder of the community obliged them to provide for passages for the other 
catde, thus practically boycotting the privatisation. Consequendy, they were forced 
to take the fences down again. 
The existing system of common grazing lands, however, created tensions. The 
main controversy revolved around the share of work to be done in the maintenance 
of the fences of the sub-divisions. The prevailing arrangement was that every adult 
man was obliged to join in the communal work (komon a'tel) regardless of the 
number of animals he had. It had been discussed in asambleas whether those that 
had more animals should do more work and those that had no animals at all would 
not have to join in the work, but an agreement had not been reached. The discus-
sion was not totally new. Suggestions about making contributions to fencing 
dependent on the number of animals had been recurrent. When the outer limit of 
the copropiedad was being fenced (in conjunction with the neighbouring communi-
ties) a similar debate had taken place. Some men had proposed that the work done 
on the fencing should be proportional to the number of animals one owned, 
meaning that those that had none would work for one day and those that had ten 
should work for ten days. Isidro, Virgilio's father, owned a considerable number of 
animals himself and had opposed this arrangement, arguing that no one should be 
'punished' for having more animals than anybody else because they had achieved 
what they had as a result of their efforts. 1 6 Furthermore, he argued, others might 
have more animals in the future and would then benefit from the work of others. 
Either his arguments were sufficiently convincing or else no one had dared to 
oppose him. In any case, it had been agreed at the time that everyone would 
contribute equally to the fencing of the copropiedad. 
This did not mean that tensions related to the differences in possession of catde 
- which make up a large portion of people's wealth -had been resolved. In fact, in 
1997 such tensions had been rather pronounced. Apparently, many of the 
Chibtikeros had sold their animals in anticipation of the Zapatista uprising, some 
because they needed to buy w e a p o n s ; 1 7 others because they were afraid that if 
anything went wrong and the Mexican army came in, they might lose their animals 
(it is easier to run with money in your pocket than dragging cows along). In 1999, 
several families had no animals at all or had just been buying one or two, while a 
few families had over twenty animals. There was a particular shortage of draft 
animals which take years to train. The year I did my fieldwork in Chibtik, many 
people had to plant maize on their plots on the Planada without having been able to 
plough. The field had just been burnt to remove the vegetation remaining from the 
year before and the maize was sown with a digging stick direcfly into the relatively 
soft earth amongst the previous year's stems (the surrounding earth was as hard as 
stone). Only those who owned draft animals, such as Virgilio and his brothers, were 
able to plough in time. They were said to be reluctant to hire their animals out. 
When I left Chibtik by the end of 1997, the impasse over livestock management 
had still not been broken. But when I returned for a brief period in the beginning 
of 2000, the northern half of the plots of land of the copropiedad were being fenced 
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Map 5.5 S e c t i o n s o f g r a z i n g land in t h e c o p r o p i e d a d 
D r a w n by y o u n g m e n f r o m Chibt ik in 1997 ( b e f o r e t h e individual 
s t r ips w e r e f e n c e d ) . T h e p i c t u r e s h o w s a s u b - d i v i s i o n in s e v e r a l 
s e c t i o n s i n d i c a t e d by t h e s t r a i g h t l ines wi th t h e o p e n c i r c l e s . O n e m a y 
t h e d i s t i n g u i s h t h e f o l l o w i n g n a m e s for t h e di f ferent potreros: 
Jasamaltik, mixolaltik, loxob ak, ch'in ya'al ixaw. A l s o n o t e t h e P l a n a d a 
in t h e l o w e r part o f t h e p i c t u r e . T h e p i c t u r e p o i n t s s o u t h w a r d . 
with barbed wire. Again, Virgilio had been one of the initiators of this privatisation 
of grazing land. Although his earlier attempt had failed, this time he had managed 
to drum up support. 
Drawn by young men from Chibtik in 1997 (before the individual strips were fenced). 
The picture shows a sub-division in several sections indicated by the straight lines with 
the open circles. One may the distinguish the foUowing names for the different potreros: 
Jasamaltik, mixolaltik, loxob ak, ch'in ya'al ixaw. Also note the Planada in the lower part 
of the picture. The picture points southward. 
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Fences at last 
Several factors combined to bring about the agreement to fence the individual strips. 
As mentioned earlier, Virgilio and several others had been interested in estebhsbing 
private pastures for several years to ensure better livestock management but had not 
been able to gather enough support. What helped break the deadlock was that 
several people whose plot of land was located near the settlement began to support 
the idea of fencing as a result of their 'annoyance' at the depletion of the firewood 
on their plots of land. Another element, however, spurred the agreement on fencing. 
In 1998 a new schism had occurred in Chibtik over the adherence to the Zapatista 
movement. About half the people opted out of 'the organisation', as it is commonly 
called, and 'returned to the government or 'became PRF. As a result of this schism, 
the need to avoid friction was more pressing than before. Given the political tensions 
at that time, any conflict could potentially lead to uncontrollable violence. Both 
factions vvithin Chibtik now began to hold separate asambleas on a number of issues. 
Fencing the plots of land facilitated that arrangement: it reduced the need for both 
groups to hold joint meetings and thus served as a measure for avoiding or 
containing conflicts arising between them. For different reasons then, various 
people supported the fencing of the strips. The inclination in favour of fencing was 
possibly also influenced by the fact that people had more cash at that time, since they 
were earning income from wood sales. In many cases fathers and sons, or brothers, 
fenced their adjacent plots of land together and have sown improved pastures. 
As a result of fencing, grazing became partly restricted to the individual strips. 
By early 2000, however, grazing was also still permitted on the ejido lands and the 
(smaller) southern part of the strips (which are still unfenced), albeit with some 
restrictions. 1 8 Several other entitlements that had been joint before, also became 
restricted to the plots of land, perhaps most importantiy, the collection of firewood. 
And although revenues from wood sales to the logging company were still being 
evenly split by all right-holders - as had been agreed prior to the fencing - people 
could buy planks for construction only from wood extracted from their own 
section. 1 9 
A n interesting side effect of the fencing of the strips was that chronically unsuc-
cessful attempts to enclose the pigs could finally be effectively enforced. For several 
years local health workers (who had been trained by the nuns of Altamirano) had 
tried to get people to prevent pigs from walking around freely. Pigs are a crucial link 
in the spreading of intestinal infections and parasites and the health workers argued 
that children's health in particular would greatiy improve if the pigs were enclosed 
in pens. They never managed to gain enough support, however, and although a fine 
of 50 pesos had been agreed upon, non-compliance was rarely sanctioned in prac-
tice. This changed when the strips were fenced, although it was related less to 
concern over parasites than over pigs ruining pasture lands. Pigs had ruined 
pastures also before, but now this directly affected the interests of the owner of the 
section in question. The fine was now being seriously enforced and people had 
begun to keep their pigs penned in. As a result keeping pigs became much less 
attractive and the number of pigs had sharply declined. 2 0 
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Table 5.7 P o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h in Chibt ik 
Locality 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Chiptic 178 220 124 137 86 152 n.d. 269* 435 
la Florida 19 187 75 106 n.d. n.d. 176 
Puebla 77 108 232 n.d. n.d. 144 
For 1970 and 1980 no census-data at the level of individual localities are available. The figure given for 1980 
is approximate, it derives from a census carried out by the Comisi6n Agraria Mixta in 1978 (ARA-TC file 1929). 
Privatisation and processes o f exclusion 
With the fencing of the strips, the process of privatisation that had begun with the 
measurement of cultivation plots in the Planada, was carried even further. After the 
right to cultivate plots for maize and beans, to occupy housing plots (determining 
the possibility of building a house, but also of cultivating fruit trees and animal 
husbandry), the rights to cultivate slash-and-burn milpas, to keep livestock, to extract 
wood for construction, and finally, to collect fire wood, became restricted to people's 
'own' section. Thus, an increasing number of entitlements stopped being general 
and instead became more precisely defined geographically and restricted to indi-
vidual right-holders (buyers, late buyers, or their successors). Privatisation thus 
implies that entitlements are shifted from the communal domain to the domain of 
individual right-holders. 
Land scarcity and privatisation 
In other communities of the Tojolabal Highlands, similar processes of growing 
specificity and individual ascription of land rights have taken place. Such privatisa-
tion seems to be a response to continued population growth in the region together 
with the stagnation of land reform. In the Tojolabal Highlands, population growth 
has shown a fourfold increase from 1940 (when land redistribution started) to 1990, 
from around 3,700 to over 1 5 , 0 0 c 2 1 In Chibtik, population grew from 152 in i960, 
to around 500 in 1996 (see table 5.1). 2 2 At the same time, the possibility of obtaining 
extensions to ejidos or colonising national lands towards the eastern regions, had 
become limited. The new, more privatised, properly arrangements in Chibtik and 
other communities have to be understood in the light of the growing number of 
people depending on the land. 
In Chibtik the changes added up to limiting an increasing number of entitle-
ments to right-holders only and have an exclusionary effect especially on adult men 
who are not right-holders. As mentioned earlier, upon acquisition of the copropiedad 
all adult men in Chibtik were right-holders. As long as this was the case and many 
crucial entitlements were general to all residents, right-holders barely stood out as 
a group different from the community as a whole. This has changed, however, and 
nowadays Chibtik - like several communities in the region - distinguishes between 
right-holders and those who are 'just residents', generally referred to as vecindado, 
from the Spanish avecindado, which means resident. In 1997, there were almost as 
many avecindados in Chibtik as there were right-holders. The right-holders were 56, 
the total number of 'men, was 102. In certain other communities avecindados were 
a majority. 
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In most communities, privatisation has implied a differentiation of rights 
between different sets of people. In Piedra Huixtia, for example, a community close 
to Chibtik with only a small portion of flat land, the remainder being mountainous, 
all adult m e n have been internally listed as ejidatarios and no avecindados exist. 
Concomitantly, slash-and-bura cultivation is open to all men. However, when a 
decade ago small individual plots for permanent maize cultivation were created, 
these were assigned only to the adult men listed at the time and it has proved impos-
sible to open up more land for their sons. In Bajucu, all men reaching the age of 16 
were listed as asambleistas which meant they were obliged to pay a certain contribu-
tion as well as being entitled to rights to the commons, including a share in the 
revenues from logging. However, this arrangement came under increasing pressure. 
As more and more entitlements are restricted to right-holders only, avecindados 
become directiy dependent on a related right-holder (in most cases their fathers or 
brothers) for an increasing number of entitlements. This situation does not mean 
that men without a 'right' of their own no longer have any access to housing or can 
no longer keep catde or grow crops. The point is that they will have to build their 
house on their father's housing plot, keep their livestock on his fraction and culti-
vate his land. In this way, resource scarcity is partly privatised, making individual 
access to vital resources less of a communal concern and more a matter to be 
arranged by individual families (compare Netting 1993:167) . The right-holder is 
expected to share his rights with his dependants and is free to allocate parts of his 
land to them as he wishes. 
Transfer of property and pooling arrangements 
The new, privatised arrangements in Chibtik imply that m e n that are not right-
holders are more heavily dependent than before on their fathers' land. This 
continued dependence on their fathers is locally defined as problematic. As pointed 
out in the previous chapter, young married couples live in the house of the paternal 
parents for several years before they set up an individual household. During those 
first years they are seen as 'dependants' of the parental household, yet preparing for 
their future independent status. The process of growing independent is gradual, 
stat ing with the young couple's own cow, a plot they are assigned to work 'for mem-
selves', and possibly their own house next to the parents'. However - with the excep-
tion of the would-be successor - the dependence of adult men on their fathers is 
seen as a temporary condition. Eventually, they should achieve a status similar to 
that of their fathers: with their own house, their own plots and their own livestock. 
Ideally, the sons should become right-holders on their own behalf, for example 
through an extension to the ejido endowment. The stagnation of land reform, 
however, left little hope for non right-holding men to become land reform benefici-
aries of their own. 
In practice, ways are found to accommodate the non-right holding men, both at 
the level of individual families and at the level of the community as a whole. Though 
the position of right-holder is only transferred to one of the sons, certain entitle-
ments may be given to the other sons, which provides ways of ensuring access to 
housing and crop or grazing land for the other sons. Furthermore, a wide variety of 
pooling arrangements between relatives mitigates the effect of privatisation. The 
housing plot may be divided up, parts of the crop land may be given to sons or 
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worked in a joint fashion, grazing land may be shared. Consequentiy, for many fami-
lies the herencia has been transformed from 'help' in getting started to the main 
means of access to land. 
Sergio, for example, built his house on the edge of the settlement area, on the 
complementary plot of his father who also gave him some milpa to work and harvest 
for himself. Manuel lives with his wife and two daughters on his father's comple-
mentary plot, where he also grows some maize and has planted banana trees. 
Manuel, his brothers and his father work the batter's land together. The father gives 
them a share of the harvest so that they can feed themselves, and all share in the cost 
ofj chemical fertiliser. Jose has been luckier. The eldest of several sons (in his mid-
twenties at the time of fieldwork) he inherited the 'right' of one of his father's 
brothers who died without leaving a family, and became right-holder on his own 
account. In his house, he told me, it had been decided that the second youngest 
brother would take over the father's right. As for the other boys, they "will take my 
father's land together, they will work it together. This is also what we do now: we 
work our father's land together. From that, they will eat." 
Pedro had similar luck. Both his parents died young and the father's 'right' was 
transferred to one of the elder brothers, Cesar (currently one of the two health 
workers). Being the second last son, Pedro himself had no 'right', but he inherited 
that of an elder brother who died. The eldest brother, Santiago, was one of the late 
buyers of the copropiedad and therefore is a right-holder himself. Only Miguel, the 
youngest, has no right. Pedro: 
"We are working together (en komon); we work our milpas together, and we 
eat from them together. Just because you had the bad luck of getting bad 
land, does not mean you will not eat: we're in this together. That is how we 
work, we the Mendez (mendesaltik). But not everybody is like that, there are 
others who work individually, each one on their own. If you are lucky to have 
something, you work, if not, you don't work." 
The pooling arrangements are partly prompted by the fact that two of the brothers 
(Pedro and Cesar) have a job that takes up a large amount of their time. The other 
brothers help them out with the work while they, especially Cesar, share some of 
their monetary income with the others. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that 
Pedro and his brothers do everything together. In practice, a whole set of pooling 
arrangements operates between the brothers, some involving them all, some pairing 
the families two by two, and others involving other families next to them. Pedro and 
Cesar work their fields together, for example, but do not share their livestock. 
These examples show that pooling arrangements are flexible, often temporary 
solutions for dealing with particular combinations of endowments and limitations. 
Apart from maize cultivation, many of the pooling arrangements centre on animals. 
Pooling serves as an important means of providing for the avecindados. Nonetheless, 
there is no doubt that their position is viewed as problematic, both by themselves 
and by the rest of the community. They are referred to as 'the landless ones' and are 
said to 'eat from their fathers' table'. 
The existence of men 'without land' is a matter of concern in Chibtik, as in other 
communities of the Tojolabal Highlands. As mentioned, the rights of the Adventist 
families that left Chibtik to settle in Nueva Jerusalen, were transferred to several 
'landless' young men. Where once access to more land had been a frustrated aspi-
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ration for some twenty years, it suddenly became a real possibility with the Zapatista 
uprising of 1994. The Chibtikeros co-operated in the seizure of the adjacent rancho 
Yalchibtik, which has remained under Zapatista control. The land on this and other 
occupied properties was reserved for the men without land rights of their own. 
Differentiation 
The arrangements based on stricter allocation of rights to individual right-holders 
has not only created a sharper division between right-holders and those who are not, 
but also tends to reinforce socio-economic differences between families with more 
and those with less right-holders, depending on how many of the men and boys had 
purchased their share in the copropiedad. Unequal numbers of'rights' increasingly 
translate into differences between families, the resource-base of families with only 
one 'right' being clearly limited in comparison with families with several right-
holders. 
The differentiation in entitlements between right-holders and avecindados is also 
reflected in their participation in asambleas and communal labour (komon a'tel). 
Since the individual strips have been fenced, the avecindados no longer join in 
communal labour for maintaining the fences in the copropiedad. In view of the link 
discussed earlier, between entitlements and obligations, their exclusion can be 
understood as a means of underlining the differentiation in entitlements. Avecin-
dados are not excluded from meetings, but unlike right-holders, they are not obliged 
to attend. Their presence is allowed, but they are not supposed to speak when 
matters regarded as solely concerning right-holders to the copropiedad are brought 
up. In asambleas then, a difference has begun to be established between matters of 
concern to all, to the 'whole community' and matters of concern to right-holders 
a lone . 2 3 The problem is that what right-holders define as being exclusively their 
concern also affects others. The fencing of the strips is a case in point. The avecin-
dados were not supposed to express their views on the fencing or to challenge the 
proposed arrangements, yet the restriction of grazing and firewood collection to indi-
vidual strips directly affected them. Privatisation has therefore also limited avecin-
dados'possibilities of contesting arrangements that are unfavourable to t h e m . 2 4 
Land rights and community jurisdiction 
Despite the successive privatisations in Chibtik, community jurisdiction over land 
has been maintained. Individual rights continue to be understood as deriving from 
membership to a circumscribed group, while the collectivity remains the mtimate 
authority on withdrawal and adjudication of rights. On the other hand, however, 
people seek to assert their private rights to plots. The balance between private and 
communal control over land is not given, but negotiated at particular junctures. This 
is particularly evident in cases where succession is complicated and the community 
demands a degree of control over the allocation of land. The current prohibition in 
Chibtik on selling land attests to the ways in which community control is maintained. 
Complicated re-allocations 
Community intervention in land allocation usually occurs in situations where 
succession is ambiguous or when a right-holder leaves the community. When a man 
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dies \vithout leaving a male son, his right is usually transferred to a male relative 
without land rights of his own (I mentioned the cases of Jose and Pedro, who both 
inherited from their uncles). Another example from Chibtik is that of Cecilio who 
inherited his grandfather's right in the copropiedad, when he was killed after being 
accused of practising witchcraft. The couple had six daughters, but their only son 
had died when he was still a child. Thus, Cedlio - a grandson - took on the role of 
the youngest son. He lives with his grandmother and 'takes care of hef . Cecilio had 
iri fact been born in his grandmother's house - shortly after her marriage, his 
mother had moved back home where she gave birth- and lived there ever s ince . 2 5 
Cecilio's case was fairly dear-cult and his d a i m to his grandfather's right was not 
disputed. In view of the fact that women usually have great difficulty daiming the 
land rights of their deceased husbands on their own account, the arrangement was 
also favourable to Cecilio's grandmother. 
Anticipating a possibly more controversial case, Isidro (Virgilio's father) is 
making daims on the housing plot of his sister, Maria, who is single and has only 
one daughter (already married). An adopted son - who has now left the community 
- left her a housing plot but according to Isidro, she is unable to take care of it prop-
erly. This is risky, he argues, for it might give someone in the community the idea 
that the land is 'abandoned' meaning that it could be given to some one else. "Since 
I do not want the land to remain abandoned, then it is better that one of my grand-
sons gets it, when she dies". Maria, however, wanted to keep the plot for her grand-
children. 
A general understanding in Tojolabal communities is that leaving the commu-
nity means giving up one's rights, which is justified on the assumption that a person 
who no longer lives in the community is unable to meet all his obligations. The land 
the person leaves behind is given to the collectivity who may decide on its fate. As 
we will see in the following examples, this principle leaves some room for 
manoeuvre, although it does condition people's options when leaving. 
Humberto Castillo and two of his sons had become late buyers of the copropiedad. 
When Humberto died, he was succeeded by his youngest son, with whom his 
widow, Lola, now lives. The other two other sons, Arturo and Remigio, had left 
Chibtik, and Lola explained what had happened to their land: 
"They lost it, the community didn't allow them to keep it... to avoid problems 
they had to leave it. They wanted to pay for the land. [They recognised that ] 
It had been costiy to put the fence all around the Planada and they wanted to 
pay the community [compensation]. But the community didn't accept this, 
they said: you had better leave all together." 
Another member of the family confirms this: "the plots in the Planada went to the 
community." And, talking spedfically about Arturo: 
"It was his own dedsion to leave [meaning, he left because he wanted to, he 
was not expelled], and he said he had no intention of coming bade. So the 
community dedded the plots would be theirs." 
The housing plot was allowed to be kept by his mother. Arturo was a much loved 
man in Chibtik, yet when he said that he had no intention of returning to the 
community in the future, he forfeited his rights to the plots in the Planada. 
Lola's other son, Remigio, caused considerable controversy. One of his cousins 
explains: 
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"He left his housing plot to his sister Sylvia, because her husband Gustavo 
doesn't have any land. This way, they would have a means of feeding them-
selves. However, this was not done through an acuerdo and they say the plot 
will be measured again, and Gustavo will only keep part of it, because there 
are a lot of people who do not have land. Other houses could be built on the 
plot." 
As for Remigio's plots in the Planada: 
"Gustavo works some, but not all of them. The community didn't allow it. 
They say: How can he have it all, if there are many who don't have land?" 
The woman speaking acknowledges there is a problem with Gustavo's occupation 
of the plot: "There are many people without land here, and where will they find it?" 
Here, Remigio's decision to give his land to his sister and her husband has been 
contested on the grounds that the latter has no more right than the other m e n 
without land. Although there was genuine concern about families with no land 
rights of their own, the dispute was also about control. Remigio treated his land as 
if it were private property and tried to avoid a community claim on it by giving it to 
his sister and her husband, but this challenge to community control did not go 
unanswered. The collectivity is clearly confirming its jurisdiction regarding the plots 
of land belong to that leave the community. 
The allocation of rights is not a matter of merely applying established norms 
regarding community membership and the justification of claims. Rather, partic-
ular cases are solved after considerable negotiation in which such norms do play a 
role, together with other considerations. Similar cases may be brought in, but the 
reputation of the person is also involved. Just how the different elements come into 
play is also related to people's perception of their own interest. Several people may 
have deemed it undesirable to tolerate Remigio's challenge to the rules for setting a 
precedent. Possibly too, they were annoyed by the fact that he single-handedly 
decided to benefit his sister and her husband, while their own sons or brothers have 
no such access to land. Perhaps some people had already thought who they would 
give part of the housing plot to. Personal interests are bound to play a part in such 
processes of re-allocation and some people come off with better deals than others. 
The flexibility of the arrangements in particular circumstances is well illustrated 
by the case of Carmelina, a widow from Piedra Huixtla who now lives in the town 
of Las Margaritas with her children. Several years before our conversation took place, 
her husband had been murdered after a violent fight. She left the community shortly 
afterwards and moved to a small Tojolabal neighbourhood on the outskirts of Las 
Margaritas. During that time she had been allowed to retain the right of her late 
husband. Her eldest son, Miguel, had been about 12 when his father was killed, and 
the idea was that he would succeed his father when he reached the age of sixteen. 
When he turned sixteen, however - a couple of months before our conversation took 
place - he decided he did not want to go back. Carmelina was unsure as to what 
would happen to the right. People from Piedra Huixtia had advised her to restore 
the house on the housing plot, to make clear that she had not abandoned the idea 
of coming back. Perhaps she could claim the right for her youngest son Juanito, 
now ten years old, some time in the future. On another occasion Carmelina told m e 
that the community agreed to reserve the land for Juanito provided she took care of 
her housing plot. Her land has been registered in Procampo (the national program 
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to support maize growers, amounting to several 100 pesos per hectare) and she was 
getting half the money, while the community was getting the other half. I asked her 
i f she had not thought of selling her land, to which she replied that in fact her 
compadre Nicolas was interested in buying it, but that "the community didn't want 
that". 
Because Carmelina left her community due to tragic circumstances, the norm 
that leaving implies losing one's rights has not been strictly applied. Instead, the 
rights of her late husband are being 'reserved' for her son. However, she is required 
to prove that she has not abandoned the community completely, by keeping her 
housing plot in order. As the arrangement concerning the Procampo revenues 
shows, she finds herself in an intermediate position. The case also illustrates how 
the community's restrictions on sales operate. 
Restrictions on land sales 
Private rights to land in Chibtik do not include the right to sell. Chibtik - and the 
Tojolabal Highlands in general - thereby confirms the general picture for indige-
nous communities and ejidos where land sales, not only to outsiders, but also inter-
nally, are restricted. (In contrast with what has been reported for other regions of 
Mexico, where legal restrictions on the sale of ejido land had become a dead letter 
long before president Salinas issued his reforms to the ejido in 1992). Conversely, 
temporary land leasing occurs with some frequency. I was told that for a while the 
Chibtikeros rented land from San Caralampio, a small, adjacent community with 
lots of mountainous forest land. The Chibtikeros paid San Caralampio (not anyone 
in particular, but the community as a whole) by the almud26 cultivated, but they 
stopped doing this as it became too expensive. When possible, the Chibtikeros culti-
vate slash-and-burn milpas on their own property. This had happened about two 
years before my arrival. A considerable area (then referred to as wayum alaj -
'sleeping milpa' or acahual in Spanish) had been cultivated by about 30 people, in 
areas of 20 by 20 brazadas that had been m e a s u r e d . 2 7 The use of this area was 
limited to those whose 'section ran there', but I was told of people, not interested in 
cultivating it themselves, renting it to others. 
Compared to most communities in the region, in Chibtik, theoretically there are 
relatively favourable conditions for land sales. For land in copropiedad there are no 
legal prohibitions regarding sales of people's rights while the creation of individual 
strips brought the possibility of timing the land into a number of private properties 
even closer - although, as I mentioned earlier, the partition was never formally regis-
tered. Nevertheless, after the creation of individual section, it was agreed to main-
tain the previous restrictions on selling. Apparently, there had been considerable 
discussion over the issue. One person remarked: 
"At first we thought that whoever wanted to sell could do so, but then, nobody 
does... And then they thought it better not to permit it, because the money 
[from a sale] doesn't last and it is better to have land." 
Somebody else answered my question about whether it would be possible for him 
to sell his land i f he wanted: "No, well... it is partitioned now, but stilL.you see... 
everybody worked for those lands." And Virgilio had definite views on the matter: 
"Who would want to sell? They know it is difficult to get another piece of 
land. We don't like people to sell their land, because the kids are growing up. 
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Whoever sells his land will go back to being a mozo again! Where will he 
live? He will have to build his house in the middle of a road!" 
The possibility of allowing land sales had been considered, and eventually rejected 
because of the risk of dispossession. Developments in the neighbouring village of 
El Nantze, where the copropiedad was in fact split up into separate private proper-
ties, may have played a role in this: some families there sold their land out of neces-
sity and now own nothing, not even the housing plot, where they are only allowed 
to live because of a concession by the new owner. 2 8 To most Chibtikeros the lesson 
to be drawn from El Nantze is clear if land sales are permitted the richest are able 
to concentrate land at the expense of the most needy. Allowing land sales means that 
land rights are no longer derived from group membership, but dependent on the 
purchasing power of the individual. Yet land sales also reduce the community's 
patrimony and hence the possibility of covering future needs (note Virgilio's refer-
ence to the coming generation). Furthermore, with land sales, rights to land would 
start to escape community jurisdiction, thus completely changing the terms on 
which community governance operates. 
Reworking notions of community 
Though privatisation in Chibtik shifted crucial entitlements from the communal 
domain to the private domain of individual right-holders, a considerable number of 
entitlements remains general to all community members. Avecindados and right-
holders alike are entitled to enjoy all the services that the community offers - school, 
road, health care, but also the administration of justice, mediation, and representa-
tion vis-a-vis external agents - as well as participation in community-wide pooling 
arrangements such as the shop or truck. Although this was to change later as 
Chibtik split over affiliation to the Zapatista movement, at the time I did most of the 
fieldwork (1997) both the shop and the truck were endeavours in which 'all men' 
(and not just the right-holders) participated. As far as the organisation of such serv-
ices and benefits is concerned, the distinction between right-holders and avecindados 
was considered irrelevant. They are defined instead as achievements of the commu-
nity as a whole. Rather than seeing a need to apply an exclusionary criterion, it is felt 
that, on the contrary, community-wide participation is beneficial to the kind and 
quality of services and goods that can be provided. 
The provision of collective goods for the community as a whole is run along 
similar lines to those established earlier (in the previous chapter): there is control 
over membership through lists of all those that hold rights to and hence need to 
share in the provision or maintenance of such an asset. Taking the co-operative shop 
as an example: right-holders in the shop are called socios, each of whom was required 
to contribute the same amount of money at the beginning and to comply with a 
rotating scheme for attending the shop (two men a day). A president and a treasurer 
were appointed at an asamhlea to co-ordinate and oversee the management of the 
shop. Likewise, the assortment and acquisition of products in Comitan were organ-
ised through asambleas. The women adopted a similar structure and have their own 
shop, their own meetings and their own presidenta. Their constituency originally 
consisted of 'all women*, meaning all resident women and teenage girls (solteras). 
Similarly, services such as infrastructure and education are also regarded as 
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collective goods, as the 'achievements of a circumscribed group'. The communities 
of the Tojolabal Highlands tend to see these not as public goods provided by the 
government, but as collective goods for which they have had to make many sacrifices. 
This probably derives from the fact that most of these services have indeed been the 
result of active lobbying with government agencies and were invariably built with 
the work of people from the community. This gives people a sense of ownership as 
well as a degree of control over, for example, the school and the road. To take an 
example from the realm of education: in many Tojolabal communities it had been 
common for the people to provide food for the schoolteachers, sharing the burden 
among the cormnunity. This changed as people realised that the schoolteachers were 
receiving a salary from the government, a substantial amount by their standards, 
and most communities agreed to have schoolteachers pay for their food (Van der 
Haar 1993). 
The processes of privatisation in Chibtik however, also acted on the constitution 
of community itself. Recalling with Sabean that "society and property are constituted 
in the same act" (1990:17), we may expect to find changes in property arrangements 
have repercussions on social configurations. If property is a relation "between people 
about things" and - as Sabean states, following Rousseau (1990:18) - fences are 
meant not to lock land in but to lock the neighbours out, we may expect processes 
of privatisation to affect people's comrnitments and sense of identification. 2 9 
Above all, the collectivity of right-holders has started to manifest itself as some-
thing different from the community as a whole, comprising the totality of residents. 
I expect contradictions between different categories of community members to arise 
especially along this divide. Furthermore, as the family (especially parents) become 
a more important source of property rights for such crucial entitlements as housing 
and cultivation land, the family might become a more important arena than before 
- as compared to the community - for claiming and contesting entitlements. This 
might also imply that people become less willing to submit to community control. 
More detailed research than I have been able to do might perhaps shed light on the 
ways in which the transferral of significant benefits from the realm of the commu-
nity to the realm of the more exclusive collectivity of right-holders, affects people's 
loyalties. 
Yet, the consequences of privatisation cannot merely be equated with the 'erosiori 
of community. Rather, the dissociation between the community as a whole and the 
collectivity of right-holders, - a process that is still underway - provides scope for 
attaching new meanings to community. Definitions of community centred on land 
tenure are challenged especially from the edges of the collectivity of right-holders, 
from the side of men without land rights of their own, and from the side of women. 
In ways that are still incipient, they rework notions of community that displace land 
tenure somewhat and instead place services, organisation and representation at the 
centre of community. 
Discussion: land scarcity and privatisation 
I have shown in this chapter that since the acquisition of the copropiedad in 1963, 
changes in properly arrangements in Chibtik have taken the form of gradual and 
partial, yet progressive privatisation. This pattern is repeated for the Tojolabal High-
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lands as a whole, although the rate and nature of changes in property arrangements 
are specific to each community, and linked to its particular combination of 
resources, the make-up of its population and specific social processes. Privatisation 
takes place against the background of population growth and reduced possibilities 
of finding more land to accommodate sons with no land rights of their own. Thus, 
the dynamics in the Tojolabal Highlands seem to follow the pathways of privatisa-
tion under conditions of increasing land scarcity, such as those that have been 
oufiined in evolutionary perspectives of land tenure change. To conclude this 
chapter, a critical reflection on this issue seems in place. I will first address the ques-
tion of how land tenure change may be related to land scarcity, and then turn to the 
involvement of state agencies in bringing about new property arrangements. 
Evolutionary perspectives on land tenure change 
In both Esther Boserup's theory of agricultural intensification (1993 [1965]) and the 
school of thought that has been labelled the 'evolutionary theory of land rights' 
(ETLR) population growth figures as a cause of land scarcity and more private land 
tenure arrangements. Esther Boserup stresses land use changes (intensification) as 
the prime mover behind privatisation, a perspective also adopted by Netting (1993; 
especially Chapter 6). The ETLR, as summarised by Platteau, 3 0 emphasises the 
conflicts that arise over allocation. Both perspectives agree on this point: as people 
use more land or use land more permanentiy, this increasingly involves overlapping 
and conflicting claims. Both approaches explain changes in tenure arrangements 
on the basis of relative costs and benefits. In short: a more private arrangement may 
(but does not necessarily) come about when the existing arrangement becomes 
'costly" in terms of management or litigation, and the benefits expected from a new 
arrangement are estimated by those involved to exceed the costs of bringing it about 
(these costs including coming to an agreement, measuring, fencing and externali-
ties produced). 
The evolutionary frameworks seem quite useful for understanding some of the 
land tenure changes in the Tojolabal Highlands. The measurement and individual 
allocation of plots for maize cultivation on the Planada, the restrictions on housing 
plots and the more recent estabHshment of private grazing areas ('fencing the strips') 
in Chibtik can be at least partly explained by management problems, frictions over 
allocation, and an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the new arrangements. 
However, although the perspectives are right about the general tendency towards 
privatisation under population growth, they are less able to explain when and how 
new property arrangements are developed. 
The division of the copropiedad in Chibtik is a clear example. A crucial step in the 
process of privatisation in Chibtik, it cannot be accounted for on the basis of the 
evolutionary perspective. First, it is impossible to reduce the conflict between the 
Catholic and Adventist factions, which gave rise to the division of the copropiedad, to 
'competition over scarce resources'. Rather, as I have argued, the conflict seems to 
have involved a more complex struggle over leadership and the make-up of commu-
nity. Second, the measurement of individual section did not in itself produce more 
private arrangements and people continued to manage the land largely as commons 
for another ten years. 
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The process by which the individual strips were eventually fenced, follows the 
general pattern predicted by the evolutionary perspectives, while indicating some of 
their limits. Though related to resource scarcity, fencing was embedded in complex 
processes of negotiation and contestation. The already existing preference of some 
of the people with the most livestock to improve the pastures (which had not gained 
support earlier), coupled with the annoyance of others over the fact that the firewood 
on their strips was being depleted (which in itself would have been insufficient 
reason to fence), against the background of the deadlock over the distribution of 
work on the communal fences for the potreros, had paved the way for a change in 
existing arrangements. Furthermore, as a result of the schism that took place over 
the adherence to the Zapatista movement, the need to avoid friction became 
stronger than before, and with the revenues from logging activities, people were 
more able to afford barbed wire. The fact that the strips had already been measured 
facilitated the fencing. Without this, the cost of the complicated measurements 
might have been prohibitive; as it was, only the fencing itself needed to be financed. 
A different combination of factors might have changed the timing of the fencing or 
resulted in a different arrangement, not centred on geographical circumscription, 
but on the regulation of extraction. The scarcity of firewood in another community, 
for example, involved limiting the number of donkey-loads of wood each right-
holder was allowed to collect. This arrangement also implied a cost, of vigilance, but 
was easier to achieve with existing resources. 
Institutional change thus appears to be embedded in complex social processes 
and related to critical junctures. New institutional arrangements are not a linear 
response to increasing scarcity; they may involve incremental changes but also 
sudden shifts. When and how existing arrangements are modified depends not only 
on problems of declining productivity or increasing conflicts, but also on factors 
such as the differential effects of the existing and proposed arrangements on 
different users, the ability of these different sets of users to influence decision-
making, the degree of support for the proposed arrangements, and the need to 
control or solve conflicts. Less than an institutional optimum, land tenure change 
reflects a compromise between different options, drawing on a hybrid institutional 
repertoire and responding to several problems at once. This embeddedness of 
privatisation in complex social processes makes it difficult to isolate land scarcity as 
the single factor directly accountable for more private arrangements in Chibtik. On 
the basis of scarcity alone, it would be difficult to explain when new property 
arrangements are developed and what these look like. 
It is clear from my description of tenure change in Chibtik that I do not regard 
private and common rights as mutually exclusive. Privatisation is a gradual and 
partial process, relating to certain entitlements but not to others. Multiple arrange-
ments of general and specific entitiements co-exist (see also Netting 1993; Hann 
1998). Private rights exist within a situation in which properly is seen as a share of 
a pool of benefits offered by the collectivity. Settlement of inheritance disputes and 
long-term alienation of land continue to be a community responsibility, rather than 
a private one. 
It has been noted by a number of authors that changes in tenure arrangements 
have varying effects on different sets of members in the user community, being 
especially unfavourable for those with subsidiary rights (e.g. Platteau 1996). 
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Changes in property arrangements have been particularly unfavourable to avecin-
dados who have also been marginalised from the decision-making process. Right-
holders have safeguarded their own access to and control of vital resources, limiting 
the options of their sons and daughters. It is important to stress at this point that 
land tenure change involves conflicts of interest and reflects power differentials. 
The presumed necessity of state involvement 
The material I have presented on the privatisation process in Chibtik suggests that 
people were quite capable of designing and enforcing privatised tenure arrange-
ments in response to locally defined problems and within the prevalent institutional 
repertoire, displaying a capacity for endogenous institutional change as noted by 
Boserup (1993 [1965]), Netting (1993), and Ostrom (1991). The evidence in this case 
clearly defies the necessity of state involvement to bring about privatisation, which 
is one of the central tenets of the evolutionary theory of land rights (Platteau 1996; 
Jones 2 0 0 0 ) . 3 1 Following Platteau's summary, only "supply of land titling or regis-
tration by the state" can resolve land disputes under conditions of increasing scarcity 
(Platteau 1996: 35, Figure 1). However, privatisation in Chibtik did not critically 
depend on state interference. Contrary to what ETLR holds, tenure security, espe-
cially regarding the allocation of rights within the community domain, relies prima-
rily on community governance. Although state legislation does, as we have seen, 
play a role in the norms and criteria employed, people have not sought direct state 
involvement to bring about more private arrangements, or the legal confirmation of 
these arrangements. 
State intervention in the division of the copropiedad might seem an exception, but 
it was not. As I have argued, the intervention of the municipal president was 
explained less by a concern for establishing private property than by the need to 
restore order and, probably, to further a political agenda. In stepping in on behalf of 
the Adventists and defending their interests, the municipal president's role was far 
removed from that of the neutral arbiter envisaged by the ETLR. Rather, his involve-
ment should be understood in the light of factional struggles. State intervention 
appeared as a direct challenge to community rulings regarding internal allocation 
of land rights. The confrontation that took place between community rule and state 
authority in Chibtik is best understood in terms of competing claims to governance, 
that is, exerting control over resources and people. In episodes such as the one 
discussed here, the contours of community governance in relation to state control 
of land tenure are drawn more clearly than before. Internal allocation of land rights 
was clearly being claimed as falling within the field of community jurisdiction, based 
on a practice of considerable autonomy in internal affairs. In the dispute, this 
competence was now defined in explicit opposition to state control. At the same 
time, an understanding of state legislation as different from and at critical points 
incompatible with local definitions of property was formed. 
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otes 
1 A n aerial photograph of 1973 shows 
rather open vegetation, probably the 
result of the degradation of the forest 
cover due to over-grazing prior to the 
transfer. The Chibtikeros attribute the 
open landscape that had existed to the 
yearly fires to stimulate the growth of 
young grass. See also Van der Haar 
(2000b). 
2 These fields are clearly visible on the 1973 
aerial photograph. A report from 1982 
mentions, probably in reference to those 
same fields "70 hectares of cropland 
(temporal): maize, beans, banana,"(ARA-
T G file 1275). 
3 For a time the community had an 
arrangement with a cattle-owner allowing 
his livestock to pasture there. 
In Tojolabal the verb Visa which I have 
translated as 'to measure', combines the 
meanings to measure and set aside, to 
divide and partition. 
5 The plots are referred to by their size: the 
veinticinco or the cuarenta. 
6 The hrazada was a fairly common 
measure throughout Central America 
(Esther Roquas pers. com.), but was not 
used in official land redistribution proce-
dures, where the hectare was the standard 
measure. 
7 I have used pseudonyms. 
8 ; This explains why he does not appear in 
the 1986 document that lists all right-
holders in Chibtik, authorising Virgilio as 
their representative; see previous chapter. 
9 This happened, for example, in the case 
of neighbouring El Nantze, bought in 
1955 by 38 individuals as a copropiedad, 
and divided into that number of indi-
vidual properties in 1970. 
10 To my knowledge communal labour can 
indeed take place on any day of the week. 
11 Note that the term ejido is used here as 
equivalent o f settlement or locality. 
12 Cited in Nunez Rodriguez, 1 9 9 9 . 
13 A procedure officially called privation de 
derechos agrarios followed by adjudication, 
1971 Land reform law, Art. 426- 429. 
14 The fact that slash-and-burn cultivation 
was one of the first entitlements to be 
restricted to one's own section, probably 
reflects its scarcity: slash-and-burn culti-
vation was highly valued - being less 
labour intensive and yielding specific 
products such as native varieties of 
pumpkin and beans - while the possibili-
ties in Chibtik were extremely limited. 
15 Two types o f grass known asjaragua and 
estrella, commonly used for improved 
pastures in the region, were mentioned. 
Note that separate grazing would also 
allow for better breeding control. 
16 He had said to the other men: "Look, do 
not think badly of those that have 
animals. Use your heads: buy yourself an 
animal, like we do, when we sell a pig, we 
use the money to buy a calf, even if it's 
just a small one, it will grow if you take 
care of it." 
17 This has also been reported for Zapatista 
sympathisers in the Cafiadas. 
18 It was not permitted, for example, to have 
novillos -young bulls - graze there. 
19 Logging activities in a community typi-
cally also lead to people renovating and 
enlarging their houses, or young families 
constructing new ones, in which case the 
wood does not have to be paid for. Only 
the work of the person operating the 
wood-saw - not from Chibtik - has to be 
paid for, rather than the wood itself. 
20 Many women told m e the pigs died as a 
result of being penned in, possibly 
because this made them more vulnerable 
to disease. 
21 Corresponding to a population density of 
roughly 25 inhabitants per square kilo-
metre for the region as whole. 
22 The official census for 1990 cites 430, but 
a count by the women in 1997 came to 
520. 
23 Chibtik, unlike certain other communi-
ties, does not have different types of 
asambleas for different lands of issues, 
where some are open to all m e n and 
others are restricted to right-holders. 
24 Likewise, the women's exclusion from 
asambleas puts them at a disadvantage. 
Since they are responsible for most of the 
firewood collection, they were directly 
affected by the new arrangement. For 
some w o m e n the distance they have to 
181 
travel to fetch firewood increased consid-
erably, though they got around the new 
rules by going to fetch wood together on 
the plot of land of only one of the women, 
which was the closest one. Also the deci-
sion to enclose the pigs, affected women 
strongly. 
25 Such arrangements whereby one of the 
grandchildren stays on with the grandpar-
ents, are quite common in Tojolabal 
communities. 
26 The almud is a volume measure often 
used when talking about slash-and-burn 
milpas. 
27 This roughly corresponds to one almud, 
the measure for slash-and-burn cultiva-
tion. 
28 The vast majority of the over 30 copropi-
etarios of El Nantze were mestizos, several 
of them had other houses and sources of 
income besides what they owned in El 
Nantze. Rather than favouring a 
communal regime, as in Chibnk, most 
people from El Nanzte probabaly regarded 
the copropkdad as a temporary solution, 
until they were able to afford separate 
shares (most of them had been in debt to 
the leading figure in El Nantze who had 
lent them the money). 
29 A similar perspective on property as 
central to identity construction is devel-
oped in Hann (1998). 
30 For m y analysis of the ETLRI rely on the 
summary provided by Platteau (1996). 
Although he focuses on Africa in this 
article, his discussion of ETLR is of a more 
general nature. In his summary, ETLR 
predicts that increasing scarcity o f land as 
a consequence of either population growth 
or increased market opportunities, 
prompts more individuaHsed land tenure 
arrangements; I only consider population 
growth here. 
31 Though the more dynamic version of 
ETLR allows for some endogenous innova-
tion of land tenure institutions, according 
to Platteau, these also regard state enforce-
ment o f private property as indispensable. 
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Chapter six 
Land occupations under the banner of 
Zapatismo 
Since the 1970s, the continued demand for land in the Tojolabal Highlands had 
focussed on the few remaining private properties. Although there were some 
successes, most of these attempts failed. However, with the Zapatista uprising of 
1994, acquiring land became a real possibility. The uprising unleashed a wave of 
land occupations all over Chiapas and entailed a ck facto land redistribution that has 
probably been one of the most tangible and far-reaching effects of the uprising 
within Chiapas. 
The uprising 
Background 
The repercussions of the Zapatista uprising - which started with the occupation of 
four towns (San Cristobal, Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas) by insurgents 
calling themselves the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberation National - have been felt at 
different levels. Nationally, the uprising added considerably to the discredit of the 
PRI and boosted the cause of indigenous peoples' rights. Internationally, the 
uprising shattered Mexico's democratic, progressive image, exposing poverty and 
human rights abuses. The Zapatistas thus became an important symbol in the 
disputes over the Mexican national project, in the defence of indigenous rights, and 
in struggles 'against neo-liberalism'. Within Chiapas, the consequences of the 
uprising were contradictory. Many families finally saw their chance to acquire some 
land of their own, but many others fled their communities - fearing the Zapatistas, 
the Mexican army, or both - and settled at the fringe of urban centres such as 
Comitan and Las Margaritas. 1 The peace dialogues of 1995 and 1996 brought hopes 
of a considerable improvement in the living conditions of Chiapas' rural poor and 
an end to repression and exclusion, but these hopes vanished as talks collapsed and 
militarisation progressed. The uprising occasioned an unprecedented flow of 
resources to the state, but government involvement only added to the hardening of 
political differences in the countryside. The political landscape of Chiapas became 
extremely complicated and increasingly fragmented. Peasant unions such as the 
ARIC-Union de Uniones and the CIOAC experienced serious divisions, while new 
organisations mushroomed, some of them paramilitary. In the indigenous regions 
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of Chiapas, struggles broke out over the control of municipal government. 
In this chapter and the next, I focus on the local dimensions of the Zapatista 
uprising, leaving their overall treatment to others. 2 I discuss cases of land occupa-
tions in the Tojolabal Highlands, placing them in the larger context of Chiapas. 
Drawing on the case of Yalchibtik, in particular, I address the embeddedness of the 
invaded properties in the Zapatista autonomous municipalities (munitipios 
autonomos) which imply a reframing of the regulation of land tenure and a displace-
ment of the land reform bureaucracy. I begin the chapter with a short discussion of 
the ways the communities of the Tojolabal Highlands were involved in the Zapatista 
movement. 
'The organisation' in the Tojolabal Highlands 
When on January i 1994 the organisation calling itself the Ejirtito Zapatista de 
Liberation National (EZLN) erupted onto the public scene - with a declaration of war 
on the Mexican government and the seizure of four towns - it had already existed 
clandestinely for some ten years. Its leadership, influenced by Maoist ideas and 
promoting a revolutionary agenda, became involved with a group of settiers with 
considerable experience of political organisation that had suffered from marginali-
sation and numerous hardships. CapitaHsing on the work of both the San Cristobal 
diocese and the Union de Uniones, the 'armed movement (first called FLN - Fuerzas 
de Liberacidn National - and then EZLN) increased its presence throughout the 
Canadas region, its stronghold to this day (Legorreta 1998, Harvey 1998, Leyva & 
Ascencio 1996). 
To my knowledge, most of the Tojolabal Highlands had not been involved with 
what is regionally referred to as la organization, prior to 1994. Chibtik's engagement 
with ANCIEZ - recognised by most authors as the legal arm of the EZLN with links 
to the OCEZ (see also Chapter Three) - was an exception to the region as a whole, 
though common to the region around Altamirano. A few men from Chibtik had 
become interested in 'the organisation' that recruited people through the existing 
channels of the diocese, such as courses and catechists' meetings. They subse-
quentiy drummed up support for 'the organisation' within Chibtik. 
Like several of the neighbouring communities, Chibtik became a 'civil support 
base' (base civil de apoyo) for the EZLN, comprising what Leyva has called the 'polit-
ical structure' of the EZLN as distinct from the 'mOitary structure' (Leyva 1998:78). 
During my fieldwork, the Chibtikeros never referred to themselves as Zapatistas -
that label was only used by outsiders. Their adherence to 'the organisation' was 
reflected in many ways, however. Most notably, Chibtik had taken part in the occu-
pation of nearby Yalchibtik and was making claims to that properly to accommodate 
families with no land rights of their own. Moreover, Chibtik became embedded in 
Zapatista governance structures, particularly that of the autonomous municipality 
'17 de Noviembre' (named after the founding date of the FLN in 1983). The head-
quarters of this autonomous municipality were located in Morelia, an ejido to the 
north of Chibtik, then a stronghold of the EZLN. 
In 1994, the communities grouped together in the ejido union Pueblos Tojolabales 
embraced the Zapatista cause and became civil support bases. However, the EZLN 
interacted with ongoing political processes in highly complex ways and created 
further conflicts. My own research has only dealt with these developments tangen-
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tially so I can provide no more than a very rough outline. Unlike Pueblos Tojolabales, 
the other ejido union, Lucha Campesina, had, like the ARIC-Union de Uniones in 
the Canadas region, opposed the EZLN prior to 1994 and continued this opposition 
after January 1 (see also Legorreta 1998: 284-94). 3 Some communities thus clearly 
sided with the EZLN. Other communities, such as Santa Rita Sonora - one of the 
sites I had had in mind for fieldwork - were divided (and in fact it was the faction 
supporting the EZLN that had opposed my coming, as discussed in the introduc-
tion). For Pueblos Tojolabales, affiliation to the EZLN entailed a confusing process of 
conflicts, fissures and re-alignments. 4 
At some point, supporters of the Zapatista movement in the region had enough 
leverage to create an autonomous municipahty. A sign along the road from Comitan 
to Altamirano showed where to enter the dirt road that would take one to the head-
quarters of the municipio autonomo Miguel Hidalgo, just south of Nuevo Mexico (one 
of the leading communities in Pueblos Tojolabales and another possible location for 
fieldwork that was rejected). This autonomous municipality never seems to have 
gained the strength of '17 de Noviembre', however, and when I returned to the 
region in 1998 the road sign had gone and 'Miguel Hidalgo' seemed to have disap-
peared without a trace. 5 Pueblos Tojolabales split over the issue over adherence to the 
EZLN. By the spring of 1997, the internal division had resulted in the occupation of 
the CIOAC-ofEces in Comitan by one faction, to the exclusion of the other. The 
faj^ion that broke away from the EZLN formed a new organisation, apparentiy called 
either Nueva organization Pueblo Maya - which is what I was told during my field-
work - or Tzomanotik sokja yajk'achil k'iptiki (meaning Nueva Fuerza Tojolabal) 
(Salinas & Moguel n.d.). 
Reviving Zapata 
Rewriting the land reform law 
In 1994, several communities affiliated to the EZLN, including Chibtik, occupied 
the Yalchibtik rancho, which had remained in the hands of private ladino 
landowners. This was just one of many land seizures that took place in the wake of 
the Zapatista uprising and of which the municipality of Altamirano obtained a 
considerable share. Land occupations were an integral part of the Zapatista insur-
gents' agenda. Their revolutionary agrarian law (Ley agraria revolutionaria) 
proclaimed expropriations of private property. It was published together with a 
number of other revolutionary laws in the document through which the EZLN first 
addressed the public, El Despertador Mexicano, dated December 1993. This docu-
ment also contained the well-known 'Declaration of the Lacandona Rainforest', the 
first of a regular flow of communiques and declarations by the EZLN. 6 The revolu-
tionary agrarian law takes the persistent demand for land as a point of departure and 
redefines the rules of the game called land reform. It starts as follows (in Womack* s 
translation): 
"The struggle of poor peasants in Mexico continues to claim land for those 
who work it. After Emiliano Zapata and against the reforms to Article 27 of 
the Mexican Constitution, 7 the EZLN takes up the just struggle of rural 
Mexico for land and liberty. With the purpose of estabhshing a general rule 
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for the new agrarian redistribution of land that the revolution brings to the 
Mexican countryside, the following REVOLUTIONARY AGRARIAN LAW is 
issued." (Womack 1999: 253). 
The law claims validity for all properties throughout national territory. The third 
article stipulates which properties are liable to redistribution and reads: 
"All tracts of land that are more than 100 hectares of poor quality and fifty 
hectares of good quality will be subject to revolutionary agrarian action. From 
landowners whose properties exceed the aforementioned limits, from them 
the excess land will be taken away, and they will be left with the minimum 
allowed, so that they can stay as small landowners or join the peasant move-
ment of cooperatives, peasant societies or landed communal associations." 
(Womack 1999: 253). 
The fourth article exempts communal lands, ejido lands or lands held by co-opera-
tives from affectation. The articles that follow stipulate how the land shall be used -
namely collectively and geared to subsistence production - and who is entitled to 
receive it - namely landless peasants. I will come back to these stipulations and their 
impact on the properties seized by the Zapatistas later in this chapter. 
The Revolutionary agrarian law is clearly modelled on the official land reform 
legislation as most land reform beneficiaries of Mexico had known it (before it was 
thoroughly revised in 1992). Like official land reform legislation, the revolutionary 
law sets criteria for hability of private properties, though these are considerably lower 
than in the original law (about half the amount permitted in the land reform law of 
1971). Like the official legislation, the revolutionary law allows some land to be 
retained by the landowner, sets criteria as to who may be considered beneficiaries 
of land reform, and determines how the land should be used (the latter in more 
exclusive terms than the land reform law). This indicates that the land reform legis-
lation as issued by the Mexican state is an important reference in the ways the 
indigenous peasants of eastern Chiapas - who drew up the text - conceive of land 
tenure, though also other influences are present (most notably, the Maoist emphasis 
on collective agriculture). At the same time, however, the revolutionary law defies 
the exclusive capacity of the Mexican state to legislate over matters of land tenure 
and carry out land redistribution, thereby testifying to the ambitions of the EZLN in 
the field of land tenure regulation. 
I do not know how far the possibility of land seizures had been a crucial element 
in the Zapatista project prior to 1994, but it should be noted that the EZLN was 
especially appealing to young men with no land rights of their own, who had much 
to gain from the occupations. It is likely therefore, though I have no direct evidence 
of this, that the Zapatista project included an explicit promise of land, to be taken 
from neighbouring landowners. 
Land occupations in the Tojolabal Highlands 
In the Tojolabal Highlands virtually all properties that still remained in the hands of 
non-indigenous landowners were occupied after January 1 1 9 9 4 . (They are all indi-
cated on map 6.1 below.) These included the lands known as Yalchibtik, retained by 
Pepe Castellanos junior after he sold the central area of the Chibtik finca in 1963, 
sold several times and fragmented since (see Chapter Two). By 1993, 6 sections 
registered by different owners, comprising a total of 650 hectares, constituted a co-
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operative society named 'Yalchiubtic\8 As mentioned in previous chapters, requests 
by neighbouring communities, including Chibtik and La Florida, to affect these 
properties for land redistribution, had been turned down. The land reform author-
ities regarded them as unsuitable for redistribution since they were under the 
maximum limits for private property. By 1994, Yalchibtik - as I will continue to call 
the properties that make up the cooperative society - was devoted almost exclusively 
to livestock raising and included a number of improved grazing lands. 9 None of the 
owners lived on the property. There was a rather modest house that Pepe Castellanos 
b i d built, together with a smaller one for the caretaker. 
The caretaker of Yalchibtik, fearing what might come, abandoned the property in 
early January 1994. The owners denounced the occupations but were unable to do 
anything about it. According to one of the Chibtikeros: "[The owners] wanted to send 
in the army, but this could not be done since we are in the conflict z o n e . " 1 0 In 1995 
the owners wrote to the land reform office in Tuxtia Gutierrez that when they bought 
these lands they "could not have imagined that these would become part of the 
conflict zone and denounced having been the "victims of robbery and plundering" 
as a result of which they are "suffering from a brutal economic crisis" for which no 
solution has been f o u n d . 1 1 
On the property of Mendoza, bordering on Yalchibtik to the north, the Diez de 
Abril settlement (called after the day Emiliano Zapata was assassinated) was created 
by Tzeltales who were subsequently joined by Tojolabal families. This militant 
Zapatista community eventually played a significant role in the conflict and a civil 
peace camp (campamento civil pox la paz) was installed to protect the population from 
military incursions. In El Nantze, east of Chibtik, land occupations also took place, 
but here the situation was somewhat different. This former copropiedad had been 
split up into individual private properties, each section totalling approximately 30 
hectares. Prior to 1994, the population of El Nantze had been divided in political and 
religious terms: only a minority was Catholic and supported the Zapatista move-
ment, the rest was Protestant, affiliated to the PRI, and had opposed it. Most 
members of the latter group had abandoned El Nantze after the uprising, and were 
waiting for the situation to calm down. Their land was claimed in 1994 by the 
Zapatista families of El Nantze. 
All the occupations mentioned here were carried out under the banner of 
Zapatismo. They were characteristic of the first wave land occupations, beginning 
immediately after the uprising and particularly affecting eastern Chiapas (Villafuerte 
et al. 1999:131). But the wave of land occupations that swept over Chiapas was not 
the work of Zapatista supporters alone. During the second wave, groups of a variety 
of political sympathies used the opportunities at the time to acquire lands once out 
of their reach (see also Villafuerte et al.: 1999:132). This was the case of rancho San 
Mateo, located on the eastern fringe of the Tojolabal Highlands, in the municipality 
of Las Margaritas. It was taken by a group of Tojolabal peasants from the Veracruz 
ejido, with links to the CNC. They had not supported the EZLN, but told me they 
were 'grateful to those that had had the courage to stand up to the governmenf. Like 
Yalchibtik, San Mateo had remained in the hands of private ladino landowners 
despite the insistence of groups of Tojolabal ejidatarios to obtain the land as an ejido 
extension. As recently as 1993, the property had been affected for an endowment to 
the newly created Nicaragua ejido, leaving San Mateo with an area of some 230 
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Map 6.1 C u l m i n a t i o n o f land redis tr ibut ion 
in t h e T o j o l a b a l H i g h l a n d s 
T h e a r e a s m a r k e d u n d e n 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 r e p r e s e n t 
t h e i n v a s i o n s . 
hectares. The property included a rather large, well kept casa grande, was devoted to 
fairly intensive livestock ranching and contained a share of irrigated land. 
Occupation by the CNC-group - locally referred to as pri-istas - was arranged with 
the landowner who, given the threat of land occupation, preferred to lose his land 
to a group with which he could negotiate. The other faction present in Veracruz, 
affiliated to the CIOAC, was also interested in San Mateo and contested the occu-
pation. They re-invaded the property by forming a circle of tents around the already 
existing camp. The state government intervened to avoid an escalation of the conflict 
and bought the CIOAC-group out by giving a fixed sum to each of the 'invaders'. The 
claim of the pri-istas was respected and as of 1996, the families comprising this 
group began building houses there. 
As can be seen from the map, land occupations in the Tojolabal Highlands 
completed the process that state-led land redistribution had begun in the 1940s. As 
of 1994, private properties that had survived land redistribution were also brought 
under the control of Tojolabal communities. The seizures were justified on the 
grounds of the increasing number of adult men who did not have land rights of their 
own. In view of their dependence on land for subsistence, the Tojolabal argued that 
they needed the land more than ladino landowners who had other economic 
options. In the eyes of the Tojolabal, the need of landless families weighed more 
heavily than the law, but they could only really challenge that law within the new 
context that arose in 1994, with widespread support for the EZLN and the need to 
contain conflicts in the countryside. 
Land seizures also provided an opportunity to settie accounts between rival 
factions in the region. In many cases, an element of revenge seems to have been 
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present, against landowners that had mistreated the peasant population, but also 
among different groups within communities (see also Legorreta 1998 for the 
Canadas region). One case that attracted the media's attention was that of general 
Absalon Castellanos (governor of Chiapas from 1982-1988) whose properties in the 
valleys of Las Margaritas were occupied, he himself being taken hostage by the 
Zapatistas who judged him guilty of severe crimes, but released him after 45 days 
(Tello 1995:194-5; Benjamin 1995: 281). But accounts were also being setded with 
opponents of a quite different calibre. As Burguete notes: 
"The Zapatistas not only distributed large properties and small ranchos, but 
also the smallholdings of other peasants that had been their opponents, 
rewarding their supporters with these lands. Success in obtaining a piece of 
land from the Zapatista government was reason enough to remain loyal to 
the Zapatista cause." (1998a: 260). 
To the pri-istas of the Veracruz ejido, the occupation of San Mateo was also a way to 
outmanoeuvre the faction aligned with the CIOAC that had occupied and claimed 
for themselves an area of 1500 hectares of mountainous land (this case was 
discussed in Chapter Three). In El Nantze, families that opposed the EZLN paid for 
the initial triumph of the Zapatistas with their houses and land (though some of 
them returned to the settlement later). Although there was a certain socio-economic 
inequality between Tojolabal and mestizo families in El Nantze, some of the latter 
having houses and other properties elsewhere, they could hardly be regarded as 
"large landowners' in the way Absalon Castellanos, the owners of Yalchibtik, or the 
'big ladino' (niwcmjnal) of San Mateo could. 
A wave of occupations 
Land occupations such as those described above took place throughout the conflict 
zone (which comprises the municipahties of Altamirano, Ocosingo and Las Margar-
itas). Altamirano was one of the municipalities most heavily affected by land occu-
pations. Vwafuerte et al. report a total of 199 occupations for Altamirano, totalling 
more than 19 200 hectares, which account for more than 8 0 % of the total area held 
by properties larger than 5 hectares in size (1999: 354, 135). One of the affected 
landowners was Pepe Castellanos junior. He lost his El Tulipdn ranch, located north 
of Chibtik, where he had concentrated his livestock activities after selling first 
Chibtik and then Yalchibtik. Ocosingo was also severely affected, with 298 occupa-
tions totalling almost 22 800 hectares. Las Margaritas underwent 57 occupations, 
some 5 400 hectares in total. In Chiapas as a whole, there were over 1,700 occupa-
tions, totalling nearly 148 000 hectares (Villafuerte et al. 1999:134). About 60 000 
hectares were occupied during the first half of 1994, mainly in eastern Chiapas. As 
of August 1994, land occupations also reached the coastal regions and central 
valleys. Venustiano Carranza for example, was another municipality that was heavily 
affected. 
Although the figures presented above are likely to contain numerous inaccura-
cies, they give some indication of the scope of the phenomenon. Land invasions 
Were hardly new in Chiapas - they had been resorted to previously as a means of 
making claims to land or even of speeding up the endowment process - but what 
happened in 1994 and 1995 was unprecedented. Never before had land invasions 
occurred on this scale, either in Chiapas or in Mexico as a w h o l e . 1 2 Although previ-
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ously, in the 1970s and 1980s, occupations had also been part of the broader polit-
ical agendas of peasant organisations, they had been far more incidental and 
localised. The wave of invasions now sweeping Chiapas threatened virtually every 
single private property. Data on the properties occupied indicate that most of these 
properties were smaller in size than the maximum established by official land 
reform legislation. The average for Altarnirano was 85 hectares while for Las Margar-
itas and Ocosingo the figure is 95 and 76 hectares respectively (Villafuerte et al. 
1999: 354). For Chiapas as a whole, half the properties seized were less than 50 
hectares in size, a quarter were over 100 hectares while only 4 % exceeded 300 
hectares (Villafuerte et al. 1999:136). In fact, land occupations in Chiapas went even 
further than the Zapatista revolutionary agrarian law had foreseen. Many of the 
properties seized were smaller than the areas stipulated by the Zapatistas (50 
hectares of good andioo hectares of poorer quality land) and only be exception did 
landowners retain some of their land. De la Grange and Rico refer to several of these 
cases (1997: Chapter 16) while Legorreta reports the dispossession of ejidatarios that 
had opposed the EZLN in the Canadas region (1998: 294-301). 
Land redistribution under siege 
Renewing an old recipe 
Land occupations confronted the state and municipal governments as well as the 
land reform authorities of Chiapas with a serious problem. Affected landowners 
were calling for evictions, with violence if necessary. However, official reaction to the 
occupations was guided mainly by the need to avoid an escalation of the conflict and 
to keep the situation under control. The cease-fire declared unilaterally by President 
Salinas on January 1 2 1 9 9 4 limited the type of intervention that could be carried out 
in the conflict zone. Violent evictions would only exacerbate the situation and were 
avoided where possible. 
In view of the need for contention, policies were geared to compensating 
landowners for the loss of their property and regularising the invasions. This 
formula was somewhat similar to earlier land redistribution policies, when, through 
the Programa de Rehabilitation Agraria and the Programa de Concertatidn Agraria 
(discussed in Chapter Three), properties that were not liable to land redistribution 
were acquired and financed by the state government in response to peasant pres-
sure, though this was contingent on the landowner's willingness to s e l l . 1 3 Along 
similar lines, an initial scheme for the acquisition of occupied properties (techni-
cally referred to as via subsidiaria) was launched in April 1994. Some 40 000 
hectares were bought in this way (VilHafuerte et al. 1999:139-40). The scheme was 
an emergency solution which led to serious irregularities and political favouritism 
(see also Harvey 1998: 211-17). 
This first scheme depended critically on negotatiations with the CEOIC (Consejo 
Estatal de Organizations Indigenas y Campesinas), created in early 1994 as a broad 
coalition of social and political organisations in Chiapas. The CEOIC had experi-
enced acute internal tensions ever since it was formed and broke up over the state 
level elections in the summer of 1994. The organisations aligned with the Zapatista 
project formed a new organisation, the A E D P C H (Asamblea Estatal Democrdtica del 
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Pueblo Chiapaneco), in support of the opposition candidate Amado Avendano (Villa-
fuerte et al. 1 9 9 9 : 1 6 6 - 6 9 ; ^ s o Legorreta 1998). Avendafio's loss of the elections 
(together with the threats on his life) gave rise to considerable popular indignation 
and a variety of forms of'civil resistance' as well as a fresh wave of land occupations 
(Vluafuerte et al. 1 9 9 9 : 1 6 6 - 1 6 9 ) . I n view of this situation, towards the end of 1994, 
a second measure for the acquisition and régularisation of occupied properties was 
implemented, that has become known as the Acuerdos Agrarios. 
Acuerdos Agrarios 
Like earlier schemes, the Acuerdos Agrarios centred on the acquisition of properties 
in favour of land occupiers while incorporating a new instrument, the fideicomiso 
or trust (for technical details see Villafuerte et al. 1999:140-42) . 1 4 Negotiations over 
the properties to be acquired began in 1995 and were led by an inter-institutional 
commission, consisting of the state-level delegate of the Land Reform Ministry, 1 5 a 
representative of the Procuraduria agraria16 and the state ministry of agrarian devel-
opment. 
The agreements took the form of contracts with specific groups of land claimants. 
Interested peasants could apply through an organisation or as an independent 
group. Negotiations took place directly with the applicants in an attempt to circum-
vent possible manipulations by the leaders of peasant organisations. The agrarian 
history of the group of applicants was thoroughly investigated, and, in order to avoid 
the mistakes of the past, an effort was made to reduce the possibilities of'cultivating 
ambiguity' that had become common in agrarian dealings (see also Chapter Three). 
In the framework of the Acuerdos, a maximum of five hectares could be granted per 
individual claimant, with a maximum price of 4,000 pesos per hectare (approxi-
mately $500-600 U S D at the time). The Acuerdos allowed for the legalisation of 
invaded properties, but could also be used to acquire unaffected properties. The 
applicants themselves were required to identify a piece of property they were inter-
ested in and to negotiate the sale with the legal owner. The costs of acquisition were 
to be paid by the fideicomiso. Originally the scheme envisaged the use of 
PROCAMPO-subsidies to cover about half the credits, but this was later abandoned 
with the costs of land acquisition being fully assumed by the fideicomiso. After ten 
years the beneficiaries would be able to select the tenure regime of their choice . 1 7 
With the Acuerdos, the Mexican authorities sought not only to regularise land occu-
pations but also to prevent further invasions. They were meant to settle and put an 
end to land redistribution in Chiapas (the so-called finiquito agrario). The negotiations 
would deal with all reasonable demands, but no further land claims would be allowed 
after that. Peasant organisations entering the negotiations were forced to agree to 
refrain from new occupations and to vacate any land they might have invaded that 
was not covered by the agreements. They were also expected to acknowledge the end 
of land redistribution. In the words of Becerra O'leary: "They signed for the yes, but 
also for the no." This orientation initially dissuaded most organisations in the 
A E D P C H from entering the negotiations but they eventually came around in late 
1995 and early 1996. One reason was that other negotiations with the government 
had failed to yield the desired results, but the organisations also felt forced to join in 
view of the increasing number of evictions (Villafuerte et al. 1999:189). 
Within the framework of the Acuerdos over 2000 cases were considered, 
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amounting to about 500000 hectares. Eventually, after the investigations and nego-
tiations, the Acuerdos covered around 240 000 hectares, approximately two-thirds 
of which had been formally transferred by May 1998. Sixty agreements were signed 
with peasant organisations and ninety-five with independent groups. The total 
number of groups attended was around 1,200, totalling 60,000 people (Vfflafuerte 
et al. 1999:147). 
In March 1996, following the signing of the last set of Acuerdos, President Zedillo 
declared that "The struggle over land has now ended" (La disputapor la tierra quedo 
superada) expressing his confidence that the Acuerdos Agrarios would 'fully re-estab-
lish legality in rural Chiapas' (La Jornada, March 20 1996). However, his declara-
tion was premature. As Reyes (1998) has pointed out, the limitations of the 
programme were spelt out daily in the newspapers, since despite the efforts to create 
clarity, the implementation of the agreements involved considerable confusion. It 
proved rather difficult to circumvent the leadership of traditional peasant organisa-
tions and deal directly with the groups of beneficiaries. Throughout the process, 
groups of peasants switched between organisations or opted for independence. The 
possibilities of providing tenure security and restoring a climate of legality were 
clearly limited by the political conditions of the time. Though a reduction in land 
occupations was reported - by 1997, some 120 properties (about 10%) outside the 
conflict zone continued to be occupied - this was only achieved through evictions 
by force (this held for about one third of the properties according to Villafuerte et al. 
1999:146) . Invasions could not be stopped and re-invasions by competing groups 
were recurrent (Reyes 1998: 42,43). Peasant organisations tried to work their way 
around their commitment to refrain from further occupations and to abandon those 
lands not covered by the Acuerdos. The CIOAC, for example, one of the principal 
beneficiaries of the acquisitions, refused to abandon a number of other properties, 
which seriously strained relations with the land reform authorities and jeopardised 
the process of acquisition. The land reform authorities stopped the acquisition 
procedure for groups linked to the CIOAC and the threat of violent evictions was 
used. 
Another problem was that a large number of the properties occupied, especially 
wifliin the conflict zone, were outside the scope of the Acuerdos. The EZLN refused 
to enter into any kind of negotiation over the properties their adherents had occupied, 
numbering between 300 and 400 and covering a total of approximately 60,000 
hectares. This explains why in Altamirano, for example, with its high incidence of 
land seizures, only about 560 hectares (out of more than 19 000 hectares reported 
occupied) were included in the Acuerdos Agrarios (Villafuerte et al. 1999:363). 
Properties out of reach 
The Acuerdos Agrarios were seen by many landowners as the best way out in view of 
the circumstances. Entering the agreements at least ensured them some money for 
the land, though not as much as they considered fair, and allowed them to retain a 
basis for negotiation, such as being able to take out cattle and machinery. San Mateo 
is a case in point. But for landowners whose properties were located within the 
conflict zone and seized by Zapatistas, selling property was not an option. Yalchibtik 
provides a good illustration of the situation such landowners are in. The owners of 
Yalchibtik attempted to settle the matter by trying to sell their properties to people 
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from one of the adjacent communities. Had they agreed to the deal, they would have 
been able to claim all the property for themselves rather than having to share it with 
other Zapatista communities. There seems to have been some interest in this at first, 
since the files of the land reform office in Tuxtla contain a request by the group to 
the state government to purchase Yalchibtik and Mendoza . 1 8 They later withdrew, 
however, as the EZLN hardened its position and forbade negotiations with the 
government over invaded properties. The owners of Yalchibtik attributed the with-
drawal to "mtimidatioif from the adjacent communities that were "sympathisers of 
the armed g r o u p " 1 9 - but the situation is likely to have involved more complicated 
considerations. Accepting the offer of land acquisition would have jeopardised their 
position as a civil support base of the EZLN. 
Landowners like those of Yalchibtik had been entitled to a certain compensation 
payment in early 1994, but this scheme was larded with irregularities. In keeping 
with the same strategy of containment that had given rise to the Acuerdos Agrarios, 
the state government and land reform authorities came up with an ingenious solu-
tion, a credit scheme called FIAPAR {Fideicomiso de Aparceria Bovina y Proyectos 
Productivos) (Viilafuerte et al. 1999:144-6). Working its way around the impossibility 
of buying the properties, FIAPAR involved pledging land and using it as collateral 
for credit to be used for buying livestock in a sharecropping arrangement. The credit 
scheme, formalised in 1996, consisted of a payment of 4,000 pesos per hectare (the 
same standard as used in the Acuerdos) spread out over four years. If the conflict 
with the EZLN were resolved within that time and the land vacated or sold (which 
nobody expected to happen), the credit could be paid and the owner would recover 
his or her land. However, it was far more likely that the debtors would not be able 
tp pay the credit, and would therefore have to forfeit their land to the trust. In 
Becerra's words:"This way we will have something to negotiate with the EZLN when 
the time comes". The programme covers about 400 landowners, who together own 
about 40,000 hectares. The money was spent on livestock kept on ranches in 
Chiapas itself as well as several other states in southern Mexico. 
As I was writing this, 'the time' to which Becerra referred had not yet come. After 
a promising start, peace talks between the EZLN and the governmental negotiation 
commission COCOPA broke down in 1996. The first round of debate had dealt with 
the issue of indigenous rights and resulted in the San Andres Accords. However, as 
President Zedillo refused to support a proposal for legislative reform based on the 
San Andres Agreements, the EZLN withdrew from the peace talks, implying that 
the round on land matters would also be postponed indefinitely. Consequentiy, no 
solution to the properties occupied by Zapatista groups seems likely in the foresee-
able future. 
Land tenure under Zapatismo 
In this section we will take a closer look at the occupation of Yalchibtik, especially 
at the way property rights were defined and allocated. To recapitulate briefly: the 
occupation was jointly undertaken by a number of Zapatista communities around 
Yalchibtik. Two or three other communities apart from Chibtik and La Florida, 
which both border directiy on the property, also participated. When I began my field-
work in Chibtik, a number of families from Chibtik and La Florida were moving to 
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Yalchibtik, which was renamed Nueva Esperanza. The occupation had taken place 
under the banner of Zapatismo and the property was embedded in the governance 
structures that Zapatistas were developing in eastern Chiapas, known as 
autonomous municipalities. This also meant that, in principle, the revolutionary 
laws drawn up by the EZLN were to be respected. This section explores what this 
situation implied for the ways in which land tenure was organised and some of the 
tensions this involved. It is important to note that I never had access to higher levels 
of the movement and my account is based primarily on the preoccupations and 
considerations at the local level. 
The ejido-model again 
During the early years of the occupation of Yalchibtik, 1995 and 1996, the property 
had mainly been used by people from La Florida and Chibtik for slash-and-burn 
cultivation and grazing. By early 1997, some of the milpas from the previous year 
had become favourite sites for gathering firewood. They were close by, with the half-
burnt remains of trees felled providing a readily available source of firewood. The 
more open areas near the road were used as pastures. In 1997 a number of families 
from Chibtik and Florida settled on the property, on either side of the road, around 
the remains of the former owners' buudings. 
The new setdement was called Nueva Esperanza, but was often referred to simply 
as nuevo centre-, meaning 'new setdement, echoing the term nuevo centre- depoblacion 
ejidal, which is what new settlements of land reform beneficiaries are called in the 
ejido jargon. There were a total of about thirty families in Nueva Esperanza, two 
thirds from Chibtik, the rest from La Florida. Most of them were young families, all 
of them without land rights of their own in their home communities. This was in 
keeping with the agrarian revolutionary law, which states in Article 6 that 
"PRIMARY RIGHT of application [for expropriated land] belongs to the collectives 
of poor landless peasants and farm workers, men, women and children, who duly 
verify not having land or land of bad quality." (Womack 1999: 253). I will return to 
the way allocation was organised; at this point it is important to recognise that 
reserving the occupied properties for the 'landless' families fitted in well with the 
conception of legitimate land redistribution as found in the Tojolabal communities. 
The latter considered it a priority to accommodate the avecindados, whose lack of 
land rights of their own was seen as a problem. The practice also coincides with the 
formal exclusion of previous land reform beneficiaries from ftirther endowments, 
as stipulated in the land reform legislation. 
The properties seized were regarded by the Tojolabal population much as ejido 
endowments which was reflected in the way Nueva Esperanza was organised. 
Strictly speaking, Nueva Esperanza was not an ejido of course: the land had not been 
regularised in any way by the land reform authorities. But despite the fact that the 
setdement operated completely outside the reach of the ejido regulation, the endoge-
nous ejido-model of land tenure and governance found in Tojolabal communities 
was transferred to the occupied property. The occupied properties, however, were 
embedded within the governance structure of the EZLN, which challenged the ejido 
model on a number of points. The tensions created by this situation illustrate the 
extent to which the ejido model and the resulting notions of property had been 
appropriated by the Tojolabal, as I argued in Chapter Four. 
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Nueva Esperanza was organised much like the ejidos in the region. Housing plots 
of a standard size were assigned to individual families. In addition, the right-holders 
to this new land acquired a general right to grow crops, keep animals and otherwise 
Use the forest in Yalchibtik, much like the situation would have been had the land 
been an ejido endowment. Likewise, a comisariado and other authorities were 
appointed and regular asamhleas were held. 
The families settled in Yalchibtik sought to establish themselves as the exclusive 
right-holders to the properly, on equal footing with adjacent communities such as 
Chibtik and La Florida. However, their autonomy was curtailed in a number of ways 
as the other Zapatista communities asserted their right to intervene in the defini-
tion and allocation of rights within the property, which people were not used to. This 
intervention was contested by the new right-holders to Yalchibitik. 
Yalchibtik/Nueva Esperanza was embedded in the autonomous municipality of 
'17 de Noviembre', the headquarters of which were located in Morelia. More specif-
ically, the Common de Tierra y territorio administered the allocation of land rights to 
the properties invaded under the banner of Zapatismo. This commission monitored 
the selection of possible beneficiaries wishing to move to the new settlements, 
rjeviewed their requests and checked whether they genuinely had no land rights in 
the community of origin. Such a regulation of would-be beneficiaries was quite 
acceptable to the Tojolabal families involved and resembled the situation obtained 
under the ejido system, where land reform officials had taken on that role. The fact 
that the autonomous land commission also specified the size of the housing plot 
strained the limits of what people found acceptable, however. Under the usual 
regime in Tojolabal ejidos, such a specification would have been the joint decision 
o|f the right-holders, rather than imposed from above. The autonomous land 
Commission restricted the size of the plot in view of later generations that might also 
be in need of land. The families in Yalchibtik would have preferred larger housing 
plots than the thirty by thirty meters that they were allowed to claim now and which 
were rather small when compared to the one hectare plots in Chibtik. 
A serious point of contention arose over the fact that the autonomous munici-
pality continued to lay certain claims to the resources present in Yalchibtik/Nueva 
Esperanza. The autonomous municipality justified its claims by arguing that the 
occupied properties had been a joint effort of the Zapatista civil support bases and 
should therefore not be fully monopolised by particular groups of beneficiaries. As 
I heard in Chibtik: T h a t land is not just theirs, but belongs to many people, because 
many joined in the occupation," and "They are only taking care of it, it belongs to 
the whole zona,20 because there are many people without land." The autonomous 
munitipality also badly needed the revenues that could be generated. Initially, cattle 
from the occupied ranchos served to cover operational expenses, while logging also 
provided a significant source of income. In Nueva Esperanza, logging became an 
issue over which the strength of the new right-holders vis-a-vis the autonomous 
municipality was put to the test. Under the usual regime, as we saw in Chibitk for 
example, all revenues from wood sales would be distributed amongst the right-
holders. In Nueva Esperanza the autonomous municipality claimed part of the 
revenues. Eventually, the issue was settled by giving a certain percentage of the 
revenues to the autonomous municipality. 
The above highHghts how the Tojolabal both adjusted to and challenged the aspi-
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rations to governance and land tenure regulation of the EZLN in the new settle-
ments. They did this drawing on the notions of property and institutional arrange-
ments that had been developed in Tojolabal communities, incorporating a number 
of elements from the ejido model. This was also clear in their reaction to the 
proposed collectivisation of agricultural production. 
Collective agriculture re-worked 
The Zapatista agrarian law, to which I referred earlier, stipulates that all property 
redistributed under the new revolutionary conditions be managed collectively. Article 
five reads as follows: "The lands affected by this agrarian law will be redistributed to 
landless peasants and farm workers who apply for it as COLLECTIVE PROPERTY 
for the formation of cooperatives, peasant societies or farm and ranching produc-
tion collectives. The land affected must be worked collectively." (Womack 1999:253). 
The emphasis on collective land tenure and production appears in a number of 
other articles as well. Article 7 provides for the means of production of the proper-
ties affected by the revolutionary agrarian law, such as machinery and fertilizers, to 
be given to "poor peasants and farm workers, with special attention to groups organ-
ized as cooperatives, collectives and societies." (Womack 1999:253) Article 8 states 
that "groups benefited by this Agrarian Law must dedicate themselves preferentially 
to the collective production of foods necessary to the Mexican people" (Womack 
1999: 253). And Article 10 states that: "The purpose of collective production is to 
satisfy primarily the needs of the people, to form among the beneficiaries a collec-
tive consciousness of work and benefits, and to create units of production, defense 
and mutual aid in rural Mexico."(Womack 1999: 254). 
This collectivist orientation probably reflects the Maoist background of some of 
the EZLN leaders, notably subcomandante Marcos, and may have drawn on some 
earlier experiences with collective production in the Canadas region, fostered by 
pastoral teams from the San Cristobal diocese. The practice of collective agriculture 
diverges rather widely, however, from land use practices in the Tojolabal Highlands 
and failed to gain wide acceptance in Nueva Esperanza. In Nueva Esperanza the 
properly arrangement common for most communities in the region was repro-
duced, combining individual rights to cultivation plots with general rights to the rest 
of the territory. Rather than full collectivisation of agricultural production, the 'collec-
tives' became an activity carried out in addition to rather than instead of, people's 
own production activities. 
In Nueva Esperanza, a collective milpa as well as a collective vegetable garden were 
created with the help of a regionally operating NGO. The collective fields were 
managed in ways similar to the so-called school plot (parcela escolar) that had been 
introduced with the creation of the ejidos and were present, though not necessarily 
operative, in most communities. As with the school plots, the collective fields were 
worked on a rotational basis by all the right-holders (vegetable growing usually being 
the responsibility of women). I was told in Nueva Esperanza that the collective fields 
were meant to generate funds to finance some of the community's operating costs. 
This made the scheme acceptable to people since it implied contributing with work 
to generate money for collective expenditures. This is more attractive to many people 
than having to make direct financial contributions. However, in Nueva Esperanza the 
collective fields were not an unqualified success. The collective vegetable garden was 
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only taken care of as long as the NGO mentioned was directly involved and moni-
tored the work. In 1997 the collective milpa was not worked at all. I encountered 
similar problems with collective agricultural production elsewhere. In actual fact, 
collectives were not only a requirement in the occupied properties, but in all locali-
ties that were Zapatista dvil support bases. In Chibtik, too, attempts had been made 
to create a collective milpa, but were later abandoned. This suggested that the arrange-
ment had inherently unattractive features, since the collectives could hardly have 
failed due to a lack of experience in pooling and co-ordination, of which I had seen 
so many examples. Rather, if the collectives foundered, there must be other reasons. 
The collectives had an important symbolic function, since they represented a 
community's commitment to Zapatismo. Not wishing to oppose the collective para-
digm direcdy, people opted to undermine collective fields through 'benign neglect'. 
The collective maize fields provide a case in point. In Nueva Esperanza people told 
me it had proved impossible to mobilise tractors in time to prepare the field; else-
where, the collective maize field was abandoned because people had failed to collect 
the money needed to buy fertiliser. As the reader may recall from the earlier discus-
sion of privatisation in Chibtik, maize cultivation is one of the first domains in 
which private rights are developed in Tojolabal communities. Apparentiy there are 
good reasons for organising maize cultivation that way. In private cultivation, higher 
and more timely labour investments and management translate into higher produc-
tion levels, which is more difficult to achieve through collective labour. Collective 
maize cultivation provides no economies of scale, unless tractors are used, but that, 
l}ke fertiliser, requires financial contributions which people are reluctant to make. 
Furthermore, maize does not yield high finandal revenues. Another reason people 
may not have been very interested in collective maize cultivation may have been the 
fact that it was likely to conflid with labour requirements in people's own maize 
fields. In short, the collective milpas were far removed from what people regarded 
as a logical and profitable arrangement. This probably explains why most of them 
were short-lived. 
Collective vegetable gardens and chicken keeping were somewhat more 
successful, as were collective cable (often the catde that had been on the property 
when it was occupied) and coffee and fruit plantations. In Nueva Esperanza the 
collective herd (kolektivo wakax) totalled more than a hundred heads in 1 9 9 7 . 2 1 The 
most successful collective enterprises, however, were the co-operative shops similar 
to those that had existed before the uprising. These are a good example of a pooling 
arrangement that provides a benefit or service that would not otherwise have been 
provided (not only the availability of produds, but also lending facilities). It does not 
compete with subsistence activities and, after an initial contribution, supports itself 
finandally (money generated is re-invested in the shop). 
Old and new communities 
Moving out 
The creation of new settlements on the occupied properties met the need for land 
for landless families in Tojolabal communities. At the same time, however, settie-
ment was promoted by the EZLN leadership as part of their political strategy. As the 
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Chibtikeros told me: "they are looking for people". During my fieldwork, especially 
in 1997, the possibility of moving to one of the seized properties kept the 
Chibtikeros fairly busy. A number of young families had moved to Yalchibtik, but 
there were other options. One particularly choice site was the El Tulipan ranch, 
which had belonged to Don Pepe Castellanos junior, the last owner of Chibtik, until 
1994. Several of the Chibtikeros knew the property, where they once went to earn 
money harvesting coffee. El Tulipan was located on the other side of the Tzaconeja 
river and could be reached by horse in about four hours. Several of the Chibtikeros 
had gone to visit the new settiement that had been established there, called Ocho de 
marzo. Others were considering a property called San Marcos, somewhat further 
away. Both settlements were located at a lower altitude than Chibtik (tierra caliente) 
allowing for higher yields, as well as coffee growing. People invariably told me: 
"Over there, the maize grows on its own, you do not have to use fertiliser. The land 
is very good there, it produces much more than the land here." 
In spite of the temptation, making a decision was not easy. For several months, 
the decision about who would go remained pending. Every time I asked people, I 
was given a new number of families that would move. Apparently, people were 
signing up and then removing their names from the list. The receiving settlement 
was exerting pressure on the Chibtikeros to join them soon, but people were hesi-
tating, trying to weigh up the situation. In Chibtik, several families decided not to 
move despite their desire to acquire land, or came back after a first attempt. I found 
the process interesting, as it showed what people valued about Chibtik. The attrac-
tions in the nuevos centros were clear, but leaving Chibtik implied giving up not only 
personal support networks, but also the services the community provided: school, 
church, water, road, transport etc. Moving would mean starting all over again and 
building up many things virtually from scratch. People weighed up the costs, risks 
and benefits of moving very carefully. Proximity to Chibtik was an important reason 
why some people opted for moving to Ydchibtik, rather than to tierra caliente which 
was a better option in terms of production. Eventually, only four people moved to 
Ocho de Marzo, of the thirty that had signed up initially. A totally different situation 
obtained for San Isidro, located not far from Chibtik. This small community that 
lacks several of the services that Chibtik has and has only mountainous land 
witnessed a veritable exodus to the new setdements. It should also be stressed that 
moving did of course imply a considerable risk. Alhough evictions had been rare in 
the conflict zone, no-one could tell whether the lands seizures would eventually be 
respected by the government. 
Drawing boundaries 
Moving meant becoming part of a new community and leaving the old one. It meant 
giving up the old collectivity of right-holders, its resources and its rules, and 
becoming part of a new collectivity of right-holders, with its own resources and rules. 
It was in this light that moving was handled as a community affair, rather than as a 
purely mdividual choice while community membership was quite strictly regulated. 
Efforts were made to regulate the transition from one community to the other and 
to avoid ambiguity over 'where people belonged'. 
In principle, it was agreed in Chibtik that only the avecindados could move to one 
of the new settlements, but there was considerable flexibility in the arrangements. 
202 
It was agreed, for example, that Simon, a man in his mid-forties, could move to one 
of the setdements in tierra caliente provided his son took his place in Chibtik, instead 
of having the landless son himself move (who in any case did not want to leave 
Chibtik). The case of Catarino, a widower and one of the oldest catechists of Chibtik, 
is also interesting. In spring 1997, he was living together with one of his sons and 
his family, as well as his youngest daughter, who was about 17 years o l d . 2 2 With his 
son taking over his derecho in Chibtik, Catarino had wanted to move to Ocho de 
niarzo together with his daughter, but as she refused, he dedded to go alone. He had 
negotiated his situation with the people of the new setflement, he told me, and they 
had agreed to the following arrangement. He would live in Ocho de Marzo but 
would be allowed to go to Chibtik every weekend for food (his daughter would make 
him a lot of tortillas to last him several days) and get his domes washed. This would 
also allow him to continue to play a role in the Sunday morning church service in 
Chibtik. It soon turned out that the arrangement involved too many tensions, 
however. He had been asked to serve as a catechist in the new settlement which was 
very hard to combine with his continuing attachment to Chibtik. After several 
months he moved back to Chibtik. 
Catarino's continued attachment to Chibtik had, at least initially, been tolerated 
because of his difficult position as a widower. Ramon and his wife met with less 
understading. He and his family had offidally moved to Nueva Esperanza, but ran 
into trouble as they kept on tending their house and housing plot in Chibtik and 
often spent the night there. In order to bring this to a halt, Nueva Esperanza fined 
them for every night they spent away. 
A good deal of boundary drawing was going on between Chibtik and Nueva Esper-
anza. For example, the women split up the co-operative shop in Chibtik. The women 
that left were compensated for their share and started up a shop of their own in 
Nueva Esperanza. Whereas this was done in a way that proved satisfadory to both 
groups, other issues created considerable friction. As I mentioned earlier, before 
new families had settled in Yalchibtik and founded Nueva Esperanza, use of the 
property had been open to people from Chibtik and La Florida. As families setded 
there, it was agreed that the right to cultivation and grazing would be restrided to 
them, though the Chibtikeros were allowed to gather the produce from the slash-
and-burn milpas they had staked out there earlier. Contention arose over firewood 
collection. The Chibtikeros liked to gather firewood in Yalchibtik, where it was fairly 
abundant. Conversely, the families at Nueva Esperanza were pushing for an agree-
ment to put an end to this. Whereas the people from Nueva Esperanza were in fact 
defending a right that would have been perfectly acceptable had it been an ejido, the 
Chibtikeros based their d a i m on the fact that the occupation had not been their 
achievement alone, but that of a far greater number of people. 
Risks 
1997 was a year of construction in Nueva Esperanza. With money from a German 
foundation Nueva Esperanza ereded its own church, inaugurated in autumn of that 
year. Violent conflict seemed remote. In fad, in 1 9 9 71 was able to go in and out of 
the region without passing military checkpoints and without seeing army or police 
presence. But a military excursion in the first days of 1998 proved just how vulner-
able the families on the occupied properties were. The year of construction that 1997 
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had been, came abrupdy to an end. People took down their houses and moved back 
to their communities of origin, some for good, others in anticipation of better times. 
In the summer of 1998, only the pink-and-white church recalled the existence of 
Nueva Esperanza. By the end of 1 9 9 9 , however, some families had moved back, 
though far fewer than in 1997. In early 2000, Yolanda and her family were staying 
with her mother-in-law and wondering about whether to go back to Nueva Esper-
anza. She and her husband wanted to, because "we have no land here and there is 
plenty over there, i f my son grows up, he can get his own land there". What is 
holding them back is that the children got very scared. Also, her mother-in-law 
prefers to have them with her. 
Discussion: taking land reform to its limits 
The land occupations I have examined in this chapter are a testimony to the limita-
tions of state-led land redistribution in Chiapas. With the occupations, groups of 
peasants took the process of land redistribution beyond the point where the Mexican 
state had left it. Defying the 'end to land reform' as declared at the formal level, they 
took up the initiative, drawing the state government and the land reform authorities 
into a new phase of land reform. Land occupations were not in fact the land reform 
'that never was', but rather a way of pushing land redistribution beyond the limits 
the state had set. 
Pending issues 
It has been known for some time that the land reform process - not only in Chiapas, 
but in Mexico as a whole - had a lot of'loose ends', unanswered requests, persisting 
ambiguities, un- or half-resolved conflicts. Chiapas had a particularly bad record in 
terms of such 'loose ends' or rezago agrario as they were officially labelled, the 
backlog in agrarian matters. 
With the reforms in agrarian legislation in the beginning of the 1990s, the loose 
ends in the files of the Land Reform Ministry became the fist of'things-to-do'- to be 
resolved as soon as possible. What was classified as the 'administrative backlog' only 
required completing the administrative procedures: sending beneficiaries the indi-
vidual agrarian certificate they had never received, adding missing documents to the 
ejidos' basic file (carpeta bdsica), issuing an official rejection of certain petitions that 
had never received an answer. 2 3 The more complicated cases involving conflicts and 
controversies could not be resolved by a stroke of the pen and instead were referred 
to the newly created tribunals for agrarian matters, the Tribunal Agrario National. In 
1992, Chiapas had almost 800 files to be transferred to the Tribunal Agrario (Villa-
fuerte et al. 1999:139). 
Although politicians stated that land reform in Mexico had been completed, the 
backlog was still clearly felt in many regions, and further commitment of the 
Mexican state was demanded. Chiapas provided a case in point. Conflicts had been 
re-channelled rather than resolved, 2 4 the unsatisfied demand for land persisted, 
while land occupations brought the land reform machinery back into full swing. 
Having unilaterally declared land redistribution to be over, the Mexican government 
was unwittingly drawn back into it. 
Were the land occupations in Chiapas the grassroots answer to the backlog in 
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agrarian matters? Possibly, thought the agrarian authorities in Chiapas as they 
embarked on the negotiations for the Acuerdos Agrarios. Definitely not, they 
concluded after having researched the cases under consideration. Their investiga-
tions revealed an astonishing number of irregularities and inconsistencies in the 
files of the Chiapas division the Land Reform Ministry, but the exercise also made 
it clear that the vast majority of claimants were 'nev/ to the bureaucracy and had no 
prior record as land claimants. The groups wishing to be included in the agreements 
were made up mosdy of young men without land rights of their own and with litde 
hope of ever getting these through the land redistribution system. The agreements 
thus revealed the contours of the unsatisfied demand for land in Chiapas yet since 
these were 'new" demands, rather than 'old' mishandled ones, they were officially 
not regarded as part of the backlog.This contrasts with the way the backlog is defined 
in practice, namely as the continued responsibility of the Mexican state to find a 
solution to the unsatisfied demand for land. 
The Mexican state has not provided any real answer to the unsatisfied demand 
for land in Chiapas, particularly in regions where land redistribution took place in 
ear l ier decades. The Acuerdos Agrarios do not provide an answer either. The land 
atquisitions in favour of groups of young peasants are at best a means of buying 
time. Or, as Becerra O'leary put it: "we bought peace for another 15 years." 
The land of our ancestors 
With the Zapatista uprising, land occupation - not in itself a new phenomenon -
acquired new dimensions. The land question became framed in an ethnic discourse 
related to the demand for indigenous autonomy. In Diez de Abril, for example, a few 
kilometres away from Chibtik, the land occupations were presented as 'recovering 
the land of our ancestors'. In the words of one of the leading figures in that commu-
nity: "These lands belonged to our ancestors (ahuelos), it was taken from them and 
they were sent into the mountains. This is ours, because we are Mayas." 
References to the 'recovery of ancestral territory' have become quite common in 
Zapatista official discourse and are best understood, to my mind, in relation to the 
increasing role of the EZLN in defence of the indigenous cause. In their earlier 
discourse, the emphasis was somewhat different. A communique from early March 
1 9 9 4 , 2 5 for example, is written in a more 'agrarian' spirit, calling for "the big tracts 
of land that are in the hands of finqueros and national and foreign landlords and 
others who occupy much land but are not peasants, to pass into the hands of our 
peoples who totally lack land" (in Womack 1999: 2 7 1 ) . 2 5 This is closer to the 
discourse I encountered at the local level. 
The Tojolabal frame land invasions primarily in relation to their needs and the 
shortcomings of the land reform process. They justify the invasions by arguing that 
state-led land redistribution did not complete the task it began with ejido endow-
ments in the 1940s, namely, to transfer the land in the region to the peasant popu-
lation most in need of it. The emphasis on subsistence needs and incomplete land 
reforms is not incompatible with the discourse that stresses ancestral rights, but it 
is important to bear in mind that the 'ancestors' the Tojolabal identify are the mozos 
that lived on the fincas and were able to assert their rights to land through the land 
redistribution policy of the federal government. Likewise, the notion of'territory' 
they use is a territory constructed from the fincas through land redistribution, a terri-
tory dominated by Tojolabal ejidatarios. 
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The EZLN's introduction of the ethnic perspective and the use of the term 
'recovery" might lead one to understand indigenous land claims in Chiapas prima-
rily in relation to their ancestors having been driven off their land by Spanish 
conquistadors or land hungry ladinos in the 19th century. This is what 'recovery" 
traditionally refers to in Mexico. To my mind, however - and in keeping with the 
early statements - it is not the displacement of the original population through 
colonisation or the liberal reforms that are the crucial issues at stake here, but rather 
the impact and limits of land redistribution. Experiences of dispossession, injustice 
and neglect - to name but a few of the central grievances voiced by the Zapatistas -
are closely linked to the process of land redistribution they experienced. 
Land redistribution and beyond 
In my view, land occupations in the context of the Zapatista uprising are best inter-
preted as a reaction to the hrnits of state-led land reform in Chiapas. Although land 
reform was widespread in eastern Chiapas too, it stagnated and had certain, though 
not always definite, limits. As I have argued before, within the confines of the land 
reform legislation, there was little hope of adding properties still in private hands to 
the existing ejidos. Nevertheless, it is also true that every now and then peasant insis-
tence managed to push land reform beyond its own limits and every now and then 
landowners agreed to sell their property as part of a scheme supported by the 
government. The land occupations in the wake of the Zapatista uprising are another 
instance of such a pushing of state-led land reform beyond its hrnits, in defiance of 
the end of land redistribution as announced by the Mexican state. In the Tojolabal 
Highlands land occupations constitute the culmination of land reform, leaving no 
more properties to occupy. 
Since 1994, the idea that land redistribution in Chiapas has been largely ineffec-
tive - diverted by powerful landowners, twisted by corrupt officials - has gained 
renewed currency. The struggle against land concentrations provided a logical (and 
easily defensible) explanation for the uprising. The EZLN itself strengthened this 
idea by referring, as in the quote used above, to large landowners holding on to land 
that peasants need. But the lack of land for peasants without other economic options 
should not be confused with the lack of land reform. Land scarcity in eastern Chiapas 
may certainly have fuelled the uprising, but it can hardly be sustained that no land 
reform took place in Chiapas. On the contrary, as I have also pointed out in Chapter 
Two, land reform in Chiapas has been considerable, as reflected in the fact that over 
5 0 % of the land currently belongs to ejidos and communities. In fact, the data on 
occupied properties support this: the properties involved had an average size of less 
than 100 hectares. These are certainly considerable areas when compared with what 
the average ejidatario owns, but well within the limits set by land reform legislation. 
Larger properties exist, such as those that once belonged to Absalon Castellanos, but 
they are the exception rather than the rule. Insisting that land reform has not taken 
place in Chiapas gives the erroneous impression that poverty and marginalisation 
could simply be solved by further land redistribution. 
Though the uprising can hardly be explained by the lack of land reform does not 
mean that land reform has been irrelevant. On the contrary, the process of land 
redistribution in eastern Chiapas contributed to the uprising in a number of ways. 
Paradoxically, the problem of unsatisfied demand for land was particularly acute in 
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eastern Chiapas, where land redistribution has been considerable. It was there that 
it was most clearly felt that the Mexican state had no answer to the demands of the 
landless sons and grandsons of the original land reform beneficiaries, certainly not 
within the confines of the land reform legislation. However, rather than land scarcity 
in itself, a crucial element in the gestation of the Zapatista uprising has been the 
increasing lack of legitimacy of the Mexican state. Communities in eastern Chiapas 
had, of course, relied directly on the land reform bureaucracy to ensure their land 
rights, but (as I pointed out in Chapter Three) that institution increasingly lost legit-
imacy as it turned down new requests for land, failed to resolve incomplete endow-
ments and lasting conflicts, and became involved in the political strategies of the 
state government. 
It was against this background of an unsatisfied demand for land, a deadlocked 
process of land redistribution, and a severely delegitimised and controversial state 
apparatus, that the peasants in eastern Chiapas received President Salinas' declara-
tion of the end to land reform. The message was clear to the Tojolabales and 
Tzeltales of eastern Chiapas: they had nothing to expect from this government (see 
also Mattiace 1998:137-8). It may have been realistic to recognise the limited possi-
bilities of the state to provide land for the sons and grandsons of ejidatarios, but it 
aljso meant giving up what had been the main 'offer' of the Mexican state to peas-
ants in eastern Chiapas. No longer able to rely on the state's services to confront 
private landowners or seme conflicts, they no longer felt bound by its laws. Never 
having been particularly concerned with following the land reform law to the letter 
witiiin their communities - though recognising its validity in defending then bound-
aries - they could now do away with the land reform legislation of the Mexican state. 
The land invasions discussed in this chapter are of course related to the political 
conjuncture that arose with the uprising and the understanding that the occupations 
were probably the last chance to get any land for some time to come. But it was also 
significant that under Zapatismo peasants chose to cast aside official laws and make 
their own instead. 
The EZLN has made its ambitions in the field of government quite clear and it 
confronts the Mexican state as the source of legislation and governance. The revo-
lutionary agrarian law, in fact, claims land tenure as a field of autonomous govern-
ment, challenging the power of the state to govern people and resources. This is not 
just discourse. The Zapatista uprising has clearly set limits on the ability of the 
Mexican state to regulate land tenure in Chiapas, as shown not only by the land 
occupations but also the fate of PROCEDE, the programme intended to carry out 
the titling and registration of ejidos, allowing for their eventual conversion to private 
property. Preliminary interviews with ejidos in eastern Chiapas had begun prior to 
the uprising but were immediately suspended in the conflict zone. Modification of 
Article 27 was put on the negotiation table, but the EZLN failed to secure its inclu-
sion in the San Andres Accords. 
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Notes 
1 There were about 30,000 of such 
desplazados or rejugiados in Chiapas. 
2 More general descriptions of the uprising 
can be found in: Collier 1994, Harvey 
1998, LeBot 1997, Latin American 
perspectives special issue March 2001- all 
of w h o m write about Zapatismo with 
considerable sympathy; more critical 
standpoints are adopted by Tello 1995, 
Legorreta 1998, and De la Grange & Rico 
1997. 
3 Though by 2000, their position was 
described to m e as 'neutral'. 
4 The picture o f organisations spotting up 
is repeated for Chiapas as a whole: the 
ARIC-Uniôn de Uniones, the CIOAC, but 
also the C N C split up (Villafuerte et al. 
1999:174,175) . 
5 Burguete 1998b refers to the split in the 
CIOAC, mentioning a CIOAC-histôrica 
and a CIOAC-Zapatista. 
6 For an English version and comments, 
see Womack (1999). 
7 The reforms referred to not only paved 
the way for the privatisation of the ejidos, 
but also abolished the constitutional obli-
gation of the Mexican state to provide 
land for landless peasants. 
8 The sociedad cooperativa de production 
rural agropecuaria Yalchiubtic was regis-
tered in 1989 (ARA-TG 480). 
9 ARA-TG 480; an inspection report from 
1993 found relatively good pastures, 
including jaragua, estrella as well as 
natural pastures {paste comûn de la 
region). A total of 523 animals were regis-
tered, all suizo-cebu (common in tropical 
areas). 
10 The 'conflict zone' as it has been called 
since 1994, is usually taken to include the 
municipalities of Ocosingo, Altamirano 
and Las Margaritas. 
11 Letter from September 1995, in ARA-TG 
file 480. 
12 By way of a comparison, the land occupa-
tions in the 1970s in Huejutia on which 
Schryer has reported, amounted to only 
23, 000 hectares (Schryer 1990: 209). 
13 On the continuities and discontinuities 
between the different programmes, see 
Reyes 1998. 
14 The measure was first implemented on a 
minor scale, involving only the C N C and 
S O C A M A and subsequently generalised. 
15 In January 1995 this post was occupied by 
Becerra O'leary, who provided much of 
the information on which this section is 
based during a meeting in October 1997 
at the CESMECA in San Cristobal. See 
also Becerra, Castanares and Perez 1 9 9 6 . 
16 A new organization with responsibilities 
in the field of land rights and land 
conflicts, which could be translated as 
Prosecutor's Office for Agrarian Matters. 
17 By 1 9 9 9 , many of the copropiedades were 
already being converted to the ejido 
regime (Marta Diaz, pers. com.) 
18 ARA-TG file 480; letter from March 
1994. In the letter, it is also recalled that 
an earlier request to use these lands for 
an extension of the ejido endowment had 
been turned down in 1981. 
19 ARA-TG file 480, letter dated September 
1995. 
20 Subdivision within the autonomous 
municipality. 
21 Note the use of the word kolektivo here, 
instead of komon, that is used for animals 
jointly owned by two or more families. 
Some problems were mentioned with the 
care of these animals, the breeds being 
different from the local breeds and 
needing more intensive care (such as 
food and vaccinations). 
22 His other sons had left Chibtik. 
23 I found several examples of the latter in 
the ARA-TG files, straightforward letters 
mforming people that their case was 
closed. 
24 Reyes (1998, note 5) reports over 600 
cases involving boundary conflicts being 
submitted to the Procuraduria Agraria in 
Chiapas during 1992-1993. 
25 The Comunicado del CCRI-CG, Pliego de 
demandas 1 marzo, closing statement of 
the first round of peace talks in the San 
Cristobal Cahedral. 
26 They are presumably referring to figures 
such as Absalon Castellanos, but also to 
smaller private landowners. 
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Chapter seven 
Autonomy at the margins of the law 
At the national level, the resolution of the conflict in Chiapas reached an impasse 
towards the end of 1996. Peace talks between the EZLN and the Mexican govern-
ment were broken off after President Zedillo refused to support the initiative for the 
recognition of indigenous rights that had emerged as a result of the negotiations. 
Hppes were renewed with the election of opposition candidate Fox, but the impasse 
continues at the time of writing. In the mean time, in Chiapas itself, a number of 
developments have taken place. In eastern Chiapas, the Zapatista structures for 
autonomous government, the 'autonomous municipalities' (municipios autonomos), 
were consolidated at the same time as they became the focal point of counterinsur-
gency measures. In this chapter, I first oudine the background to the autonomous 
municipalities and then focus on 17 de Noviembre, the autonomous municipality 
which first the whole, and later only part of the population of Chibtik supported. I 
also discuss the ways 'autonomy' is being implemented in practice and some of the 
tensions it entails. The autonomous municipalities deserve a closer look in the 
framework of this book for a number of reasons. First of all, they act directly on land 
tenure in the occupied properties, as I made clear in the previous chapter. Further-
more, they are built on earlier experiences in local governance and testify to the 
capacity of indigenous communities in eastern Chiapas to devise and organise 
governance beyond state structures. Finally, the autonomous municipalities bring 
out the kind of corurontations that occur between the autonomous governing struc-
tures and different state agencies. Where we saw earlier that Tojolabal communities 
had a certain degree of autonomy in practice, such autonomy is now explicitiy 
claimed and defended as a right. 
The deadlock over indigenous autonomy 
The first round of peace talks between the C O C O P A (Comision par la Concordia y la 
Paz) - the negotiating commission created by the Mexican federal government - and 
representatives of the EZLN began in April 1995 in San Andres Larrainzar (renamed 
San Andres Sakamch'en de los pobres) and dealt with the issue of indigenous rights 
and culture. It resulted in the so-called San Andres Accords, signed on February 16 
1996, promising greater autonomy to indigenous communities, granting them 
rights in the fields of local government and political organisation, adrninistration of 
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justice, but also education and the media (Hernandez Navarro 1 9 9 8 , 1 9 9 9 ) . 1 It also 
allowed for re-munipalisation in municipalities with a sizable indigenous popula-
tion. The Accords had been regarded by both the Zapatistas and their sympathisers 
as an important step forward in the recognition of indigenous rights and enjoyed 
the support of important sectors of indigenous movements all over Mexico. United 
in the CNI (Congreso National Indigcna) a broad range of indigenous organisations 
decided to embrace the Accords on their first congress (12 October 1996). 
In 1996, though a second round of talks had started on democracy and justice, 
serious doubts arose as to the federal governments commitment to the San Andres 
Accords. For months, no moves were made to install the COSEVER (Comisidn de 
Seguimiento y Verification) supposed to monitor compliance with the agreements, or 
to translate the agreements into the legal plane, which was necessary to make the 
proposed indigenous rights effective. Meanwhile, tensions in Chiapas grew as land 
evictions were carried out and two supporters of Zapatismo were incarcerated 
(Hernandez Navarro 1999,1998) . In September, the EZLN suspended their partic-
ipation in the negotiations. To solve the crisis the C O C O P A drew up a proposal for 
constitutional changes, known as the 'COCOPA proposal', based on the San Andres 
Accords. After initially positive signs from the federal government, President 
Zedillo, however, refused to underwrite the proposal, daiming that it needed to be 
'adjusted' on a few minor points before it could be considered for legislative reform. 
What he called 'minor points' was understood by the Zapatistas and many others 
sympathetic to the indigenous cause as completely voiding the proposal of its 
meaning. Feeling betrayed by the government, the EZLN withdrew from negotia-
tions in January 1997. 
As a result, the peace dialogue and the issue of legal recognition of indigenous 
rights reached a deadlock. The situation generated heated debates on the issue of 
indigenous autonomy at different levels of sodety. The main points of contention 
were the recognition of indigenous communities as entities of public law, the recog-
nition of autonomy beyond the level of the community, land tenure regimes, and 
the linking of indigenous administration of justice to official systems of jurisdiction. 
In attempt to force a breakthrough and in need of "some good press" after the Adeal 
massacre (Womack 1999: 308), President Zedillo launched a counter-proposal for 
legal reforms in March 1998, but this died a silent death. The deadlock was passed 
on to his successor, Vicente Fox, e leded as president in July 2000 and installed 
December 1 that same year. Although Fox boasted during his campaign that he 
would solve the Chiapas problem in fifteen minutes, he has not been able to get the 
COCOPA-proposal through the federal congress. After a mobilisation of the 
Zapatistas that achieved worldwide media coverage, in April 2001 a reduced version 
- containing none of the highly controversial points - was passed that was unac-
ceptable to the EZLN and the indigenous movements united in the CNI. As a result, 
peace negotiations have not been resumed. 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities 
Although no progress was being made in the field of legal reforms, the Zapatistas 
behaved as i f approval of the COCOPA-proposal was a foregone condusion. They 
did this by means of the so-called autonomous munidpalities, which constituted a 
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de facto, though not fully realised, re-munidpalisation. After the suspension of the 
peace talks, the autonomous municipalities moved from backstage to centre stage 
and became the focus of the Zapatista project (Burguete 1998a). Before assuming a 
key role in defiance of the de-legitimised structures of offidal government, they had 
been constructed in silence. Even before the San Andres Accords, organisational 
structures had been created amongst the Zapatista support bases that had initially 
been called 'rebel munidpalities' (municipios rebeldes) in 1995. The Accords provided 
a I strong legitimisation for these structures that now became increasingly referred 
t(j> as 'autonomous munidpalities' (Burguete 1998b; Lopez & Rebolledo 1999). In 
kfeeping with the promise of autonomy, the Zapatistas disregarded existing munic-
ipal boundaries, seized the right to appoint their own authorities and took local 
administration into their own hands. They justified this on the basis of Article 39 of 
the Mexican Constitution which they read as follows: "that the people have the right 
to dedde their form of government at any moment, and we have dedded to govern 
ourselves in the form of autonomous municipalities as part of the Mexican 
Republic." (Zapatistas dted in Lopez & Rebolledo 1999:120). 
The fractured landscape of autonomy 
By 1998, over thirty autonomous munidpalities had been dedared throughout the 
indigenous regions of Chiapas (Lomeli 1999: 260; Burguete 1998a). The landscape 
of autonomy was fractured and diverse, with various projeds of autonomy overlap-
ping and assuming different charaderistics in different regions. Within the munic-
ipality of Ocosingo, for example, some nine autonomous municipalities were 
formed, which, together with other autonomous munidpalities in the conflid zone, 
constituted the 'autonomous regiori known as Tierra y Lihertad. In the conflid zone 
the autonomous munidpalities gained considerable strength yet even there never 
controlled the totality of the population. In other regions, they co-existed or 
competed with other projects, such as that of the regiones autdnomas pluri-6tnicas or 
RAPs, supported by political organisations such as the CIOAC that were part of the 
CEOIC (later AEDPCH) (Stephen 1997). Furthermore, a struggle to reform the 
existing municipalities was taking place, in the Central Highlands as well as, for 
example, in Ocosingo (Burguete 1998a). There, organisations united in the COAO 
(Coalition de Organizations Autdnomas de Ocosingo)2 formed a plural municipal 
council (consejo municipal) together with a progressive faction of the PRI, that 
governed between 1996 and 1998 (Burguete 1998a; Leyva 2001). 3 The EZLN, on 
the other hand, refused to partidpate in munidpal elections in 1995 and 1998. 4 The 
situation was thus highly complex. 
In the Tojolabal Highlands, two autonomous municipalities were particularly 
important. Miguel Hidalgo was fully Tojolabal and its cabecera (central locality from 
which it was governed) was located right in the middle of the region, just south of 
one of the most active communities of the Pueblos Tojolabales ejido union. It was 
contained within the territory of the municipality of Las Margaritas. The other 
munidpaHty, 17 de Noviembre, that will occupy us in this chapter, was located in the 
northern part of the Tojolabal Highlands, and included several Tojolabal communi-
ties, amongst which Chibtik, as well as a considerable number of Tzeltal commu-
nities. It mostiy fell within the municipality of Altamirano, but also encompassed 
part of Chanal. At the beginning of the year 2000, when I made a short visit to the 
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region, Miguel Hidalgo had apparency disappeared. The road sign mchcating where 
to leave the road in order to reach the cabecera had gone. If it still existed in some 
form, its importance had certainly declined. This was possibly related to the divi-
sions witiiin the region and the distancing between the CIOAC and the EZLN. The 
situation of 17 de Noviembre, part of the Zapatista autonomous region Tzotz Choj 
was quite different. 5 In early 2000 it was thriving, and had come to constitute a 
major competitor of the official municipality of Altamirano. 
The autonomous municipality 17 de Noviembre did not become hegemonic in 
the region around Chibtik, but operated next to - and at times in direct opposition 
to - the official (or as Mexicans say 'constitutional') municipality of Altamirano. 
What exists is a situation of partiy geographically overlapping governance structures 
- that of the municipalities of Altamirano and Chanal and that of the autonomous 
municipality of 17 de Noviembre - each of which claims control over people and 
resources. In fact, 17 de Noviembre does not represent a continuous geographical 
territory. Rather, it is defined through adherence of groups, be these entire commu-
nities or parts of them. Thus, the official and the autonomous municipahty co-exist: 
some communities or factions in communities adhere to one, while others support 
the other municipality. In the period from 1995 to 1997 Altamirano was governed 
by a PRD municipal president who made reasonable arrangements with the 
Zapatista communities. After the PRI recovered the municipality in 1998, relations 
deteriorated. 
A visit to 77 de Noviembre 
What does Zapatista autonomy in 17 de Noviembre amount to? In essence, it consti-
tutes a rival structure of municipal government, an overt challenge to existing struc-
tures of municipal government which are cast aside as iHegitirnate and ineffective. 
The existing municipal boundaries and the municipal authorities of the municipaHty 
of Altamirano are rejected and instead, the autonomous municipahty is led by a four-
man consejo municipal. Public functions traditionally performed by the 'official' 
municipality are taken oven 17 de Noviembre has a civil registry (registro civil), a 
justice system (honor dejusticia) and a police force (policia), as well as a number of 
commissions dealing with issues such as education, health, human rights, and - as 
we saw in the previous section - land redistribution. 
The cabecera or headquarters are located directly besides the Morelia ejido, a 
Zapatista stronghold during the early years of the uprising that appeared in many 
reports and news items. Although there has been a separation between the autono-
mous munidpaHty and the Morelia ejido, the cabecera is still often referred to locally 
as Morelia. The cabecera is the seat of the autonomous government, and a central 
meeting point for the dvil support bases (the communities or parts of communities 
that belong to the autonomous munidpaHty). It is not, however, a residential centre. 
A mural of Emiliano Zapata welcomes visitors to the autonomous cabecera with 
a sign that reads: "Welcome to Aguascalientes IV for cultural events for the indige-
nous in the hope of freedom, justice and democracy". In 1995 this was the site of 
Aguascalientes IV, one of the five meeting centres (centros de convenciSn) that the 
Zapatistas built after their first Aguascalientes, located near their headquarters at La 
Realidad, was destroyed by the Mexican army. 6 The convention hall, made from 
bricks and wood, is certainly the most impressive building of the site and looks as 
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though it could house hundreds of people. Other bundings are simple wooden struc-
tures and on closer inspection turn out to contain the seat of the municipal govern-
ment, dormitories, Mtchens and workshops. 
The cabecera of 17 de Noviembre is located some 10 kilometres from the official 
cabecera of Altamirano. Whereas Altamirano is dominated by mestizos that oppose 
the Zapatista movement (many of them lost their properties and suffered from the 
general decline in cattie trade), as soon as one turns onto the dust road that takes 
one to Morelia, it is clear that one is entering Zapatista territory. Houses for sale bear 
slogans such as this: "Here we are, we are the rebel dignity, the forgotten heart of 
the fatherland. Zapata lives! Bastards!". 7 A banner across the road recalls the victims 
of Acteal, the 45 refugees from the Las Abejas organisation who were shot in a 
church in December 1997, in a massacre that shattered all illusions about a peaceful 
or smooth solution to the conflict in Chiapas. Along the road one finds empty 
houses: abandoned by the owners as their properties were occupied by Zapatistas. 
Next to the ruins, many of them with the roof taken off, are the simple houses of the 
new owners; freshly cut planks, bright aluminium roofs- just like in Nueva Esper-
atiza. 
I paid a visit to the cabecera in January 2000 after several of the Chibtikeros had 
told me about it, so enthusiastically that I became really curious. I turned up with 
no advance warning or the accreditation (mandamiento), that I was informed, on my 
arrival, that 'outsiders' were required to carry. A consultation by radio, probably with 
Chibtik, was enough to gain permission for m e to look around and talk to the 
autonomous authorities. A walk around the premises suggested that I had come to 
a meeting place for the different communities and groups involved, as well as a 
breeding ground for new ideas, new institutional models, and new alliances with 
outside actors. The various buildings, such as kitchens and dormitories, seemed 
designed to hold a great number of people. Signs on all the buildings advised people 
in three languages (Tzeltal, Tojolabal and Spanish) to throw then trash in the proper 
places, use the latrines etc. Many buildings were decorated with slogans and with 
graffiti that bore the mark of some metropolitan artist. In addition to a workshop for 
processing coffee beans, there was a brand-new workshop for welding activities, 
Where a young man explained about the structures for clay ovens they were making, 
that would allow people to reduce the amount of firewood necessary in the kitchen. 
While the authorities, the consejo municipal, were in a meeting with representatives 
from the different localities, a group of women were taking a course in herbal medi-
cine and some men were inspecting the fields and greenhouse dedicated to organic 
agriculture. A pickup truck belonging to what I assume must have been an NGO, 
arrived with the latest newspapers. 
After their meeting, I had a chance to talk to two of the members of the consejo 
municipal. The conversation took place in the building that was the equivalent of the 
'municipal presidency"; a wooden structure like the others, with two desks in it, as 
well as a typewriter, empty boxes of computers in a corner, basketballs and other 
items stored in the back. The trappings of power found in a normal municipal pres-
idency were also in evidence here: next to the batons used by the municipal police 
to maintain order, the wall behind the main desk bore a full-colour photograph of 
the commander-in-chief, not President Zedillo in this case, but Subcomandante 
Marcos. 
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The autonomous mode of rule 
One of the men, a Tzeltal, took the lead in the conversation. We talked mainly about 
the institutional set up or organisational structure of the autonomous mumdpality. 
How the autonomous mumdpality works on a day-to-day basis is, of course, another 
matter, and one that that I am not able to develop fully in this study (although I will 
discuss some of the tensions below). The autonomous municipality is headed by 
four men, called the consejo municipal, two of whom are Tzeltal, two Tojolabal. The 
autonomous municipality has its own civil registry, police, and commissions in 
charge of different aspects of munidpal administration. The autonomous structure 
refleds all the spheres usually regarded as being the munidpality's responsibility, 
but also encompasses others such as the commission for land and territory. A partic-
ularly important element of the institutional structure, as it turns out, is the honor 
dejusticia, the office charged with the administration of justice and conflid resolu-
tion. 
The autonomous mode of rule centres around asambleas at different levels. 8 Each 
community or part of a community that is 'with the organisation', in other words, is 
a Zapatista civil support base, appoints a representative to a d as an intermediary 
between the municipality and the community. Between the localities and the 
cahecera an intermediary structure exists, that of the 'regions' or zonas. The author-
ities mentioned above, as well as the members of the various commissions are 
appointed through an asamblea. Roughly speaking, dedsions are first discussed and 
proposed at an assembly of representatives of the participating communities, and 
then taken to the regional and eventually local assemblies where they are accepted, 
rejeded or modified. This outcome is reported by the representatives to the general 
assembly. In some cases it may take several rounds of consultation before a dedsion 
is reached in the form of an acuerdo. 
This organisation of authority and dedsion-makmg - for which the Zapatistas 
have coined the term mandar obecediendo, government through obedience or to 
command obeying - shows dear similarities with governance structures at the local 
level. Elements that the reader might recognise from the earlier discussion on 
Chibtik indude organising authority through cargos, duties, the central importance 
of the asamblea and decision-making on the basis of acuerdos. Assigning people 
special tasks by means of comisiones is also a common practice that predates the 
autonomous munidpality. Furthermore, the autonomous municipality builds on 
local practices in the adrninistration of justice and registration of members that have 
now become mstitutionalised under the headings honor dejusticia and registro civil, 
borrowed from munidpal nomendature. 
I would venture to say that it is this budding upon earlier practices and structures 
that lends the autonomous mode of rule strength and legitimacy vis-a-vis its 
constituency. However, tensions may arise between the political strategies of the 
EZLN leadership and locally defined needs. As has been rightly pointed out by 
Burguete (1998: 254) the autonomous municipality is governed by certain EZLN 
guidelines, contained in the Ley General de Municipios Rebeldes y Autdnomos. This 
may involve certain tensions in practice. As noted in the previous chapter as regards 
the collective organisation of production, elements that are 'too radical' from a local 
point of view, are attenuated in practice. The fuller partidpation of women as advo-
cated by the EZLN leadership (in the Ley revolucionaria de Mujeres)? may serve as an 
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example. In recognition of the objectives in this field, in 17 de Noviembre there had 
been an 'attempt to appoint women to the consejo municipal, although authority at 
this level still effectively resides with men. 
The Zapatista project as embodied in the autonomous municipalities is organ-
ised as a kind of'do-it-yourself autonomy'. The whole structure is sustained by the 
people's own contributions and labour. Operating as they are on the fringes of the 
law, autonomous municipalities lack the financial support official municipalities are 
entitled to. Moreover, the Zapatistas increasingly reject any type of government assis-
tance. The autonomous municipality thus places high demands on its members in 
terms of labour (requiring participation in one of the numerous commissions) and 
material (sometimes also financial) contributions. In keeping with common practise 
in the region, people who fulfil duties do not receive a wage, though their expenses 
(such as travel) are paid for through contributions by the population they represent. 
At the time of my visit, this was becoming an unsatisfactory arrangement especially 
for the four members of the consejo municipal, whose job kept them virtually occu-
pied full-time. They practically lived in the cabecera; since two of them always had to 
bje on hand to deal with any situation in which they might be needed. This meant 
tijxat their duties conflicted with their own agricultural activities. At the time of my 
v|sit, ways were being sought to arrange for some kind of compensation for the 
consejo, e.g. through contributions in kind to offset the fact that they are unable to 
work their fields. NGO involvement seems crucial to sustaining 17 de Noviembre. 
They provide logistical support, fund specific projects and serve as an important link 
in terms of providing information and image building. Several of the Chibtikeros 
underlined the importance of'projects of other nations'. 
In co-ordinating the various levels of government (communities, zones, and the 
highest level, that of the municipality itself) people draw upon earlier experiences 
in supra-communal organisation. Although linked to the new discourse on indige-
nous autonomy, the organisation of such structures is not wholly new. 
Beyond the community 
Supra-communal organisation 
In previous chapters, I have discussed the fact that social organisation in the Tojo-
labal Highlands is strongly centred on the community, which controls land and 
resources and holds primary jurisdictional power over its members. Since the 1970s, 
however, forms of organisation beyond individual communities had been taking 
shape in the process of political organisation guided by, on the one hand, the diocese 
of San Cristobal, and on the other, the 'political advisors' from (originally) radical left 
organisations (see Chapter Three). This involvement had certain consequences for 
the internal organisation of the communities, but their main importance was prob-
ably related to the supra-communal level of organisation and the linkage they 
provided to wider networks. Both the diocese and the political advisors of Linea Prole-
taria (LP) created structures and platforms for co-ordination between and repre-
sentation of the member communities. The diocese set up networks of catechists, 
organised by zonas, while LP facilitated the constitution of the Union de Ejidos Lucha 
Campesina (affiliated to the Union de Uniones). Both structures held regular meet-
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ings and used feedback structures that have been taken up in the organisation of the 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities. 
The EZLN benefited from the supra-communal structures and organisational 
experience that had developed in eastern Chiapas since the 1970s. As Legorreta has 
pointed out, the FLN (later EZLN) began its recruitment in the Canadas region 
through the channels and structures of the U U and the diocese, which allowed it to 
identify potential leaders but also to operate in ways invisible to outsiders (Legorreta 
1998). The civil support bases of the EZLN were organised along similar lines, as 
confederated structures of tightly organised communities. The model is replicated 
in the autonomous municipalities. 
The attempts at organising an autonomous structure of government in the 
Tojolabal Highlands, now under the banner of Zapatismo, are therefore not wholly 
unprecedented. It is worth taking a look at two such experiences carried out between 
the communities that belonged to what would subsequentiy become the Pueblos 
Tojolabales ejido union. In 1981, a nascent Tojolabal leadership (most of them recentiy 
trained to be bilingual teachers) assumed control of the Consejo Supremo Tojolabal 
in Las Margaritas, that had thitherto been controlled by the CNC. As the INI 
eliminated the subsidies to the Consejo Supremo, the new leadership rented a 
building in the town of Las Margaritas, paid for through contributions by the 
Tojolabal members. Thus, the Consejo Supremo "as converted into a kind of indige-
nous government office parallel to the municipal presidency, which was identified 
with ladino rule and avoided by the Tojolabal." (Chirinos & Flores 1990: 15). 
The group around the Consejo Supremo fought unsuccessfully for the municipal 
presidency of Las Margaritas, and was displaced from the Consejo Supremo itself in 
1984 (Chirinos & Flores 1990), although their governing aspirations found another 
outiet. 
Later, between 1987 and 1989, a so-called Tojolabal Government (Gobiemo Tojo-
labal) was created amongst the communities constituting Pueblos Tojolabales, now 
formally separated from the Lucha Campesina ejido union (see Chapter Three) 
(Burguetei998b, Mattiace 1998, Hernandez Cruz 1999, Chirinos & Flores 1990). 
The Tojolabal Government was an attempt at ethnic re-construction, at the same 
time as it presented clear continuities with the structure of the ejido union. The Tojo-
labal Government was headed by a Great Council, representing the different Tojo-
labal 'powers', mduding traditional healers as well as health workers, catechists, and 
ejido authorities. The Tojolabal Government thus reflected elements from the ejido 
model as well as more explidtiy 'indigenous' ones. What Burguete mentions about 
the police force that was established brings this out nicely: the policemen were called 
'Guardians of Tojolabal Power' and had an ID card stating 'Given by the Tojolabal 
Power' [Dado por el Poder Tojolabal] (Burguete 1998b- the source does not mention 
whether the inscription was in Spanish or Tojolabal). 
Dedsion-maldng and the exerdse of authority were not organised hierarchically 
but through what Hernandez Cruz (one of the leaders at the time) has called a 
'spidef s web' (telarana). It is graphically represented as a series of concentric d r d e s 
with the coordination general at the centre, occupied by Hernandez Cruz himself (see 
Hernandez Cruz 1999:190). The Government held two weekly meetings, each time 
in a different community, concerning itself with land issues, the provision of serv-
ices (such as transport) and the administration of justice. Moreover, more serious 
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cases that could not be solved at the level of individual communities were now 
resolved internally. In the words of Hernandez Cruz: 
"Before the existence of the Consejo [in charge of administration of justice] 
many of these cases were channelled to the municipal cabecera of Las Margar-
itas to be resolved through the powers of the state. The novelty was the 
displacement of these external powers, in order that we, the Tojolabal, could 
resolve our own matters." (1999:188). 
The experience of the Tojolabal Government ended as a result of increasing internal 
antagonisms, but the ejido union and the CIOAC continued to play a role in medi-
ation between communities and representing them in the region (Mattiace 1998). 
The Tojolabal Government testified to the governing aspirations of the new Tojo-
labal leadership, but also incorporated the ethnic dimension in ways that were totally 
new to the region. Hernandez Cruz depicts the Tojolabal Government as an attempt 
at Tojolabal unification and the recovery of Tojolabal strength and self-awareness 
that had been weakened by outside influences, such as the diocese and the 'political 
advisors' that had marked the development of the Lucha Campesina ejido union 
(Hernandez Cruz 1999). The ethnic project was carried further in the FIPI (Frente 
Ifidependiente de Pueblos Indios), also created by Tojolabal of the region, initially 
within the framework of the CIOAC (from which it later separated). The FIPI has 
become an important reference in the struggle for indigenous autonomy in Mexico, 
and since 1994 has been a prime supporter of the project for the multiethnic 
autonomous regions in Chiapas. It should be noted, however, that the FIPI operates 
largely independently from the Tojolabal region and does not act as its representa-
tive. Mattiace, looking into the autonomous experiences in the Tojolabal region, 
noted a considerable distance between the FIPI project centred on regional 
autonomy and local understandings centred more strongly on the community 
(Mattiace 1998, see also discussion). 
The experiences with the Consejo Supremo Tojolabal and the Tojolabal Gvernment 
convey similar aspirations to building structures of governance that go beyond indi-
vidual communities as do the Zapatista autonomous municipalities. Another conti-
nuity is found in the challenge to established municipal governments. However, 
unlike the autonomous municipalities at present, the temporary establishment of 
such rival structures in the previous decade went hand in hand with a struggle to 
win municipal elections. 
Earlier struggles over municipal government 
The first time a Tojolabal candidate competed for the municipal presidency was in 
1982, as a candidate of the P S U M (precursor of the present PRD). By taking this 
opposition path, the nascent Tojolabal leadership openly disputed the 'outside' lead-
ership of the Lucha Campesina ejido union, a situation that translated into a split and 
the creation of Pueblos Tojolabales as a rival ejido union several years later. In 1982, 
the PRI's hold on the presidency of Las Margaritas could not, however, be broken. 
The PRI claimed victory in 1988 too, when a young Tojolabal candidate, Antonio 
Hernandez Cruz (the same one referred to above), again contended for an opposi-
tion party (this time the PMS). The 1988 elections took place against a background 
of military threat and sabotage, which is why large sections of the rural population 
were unable to vote. The situation elicited considerable popular protest. The organ-
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isation that had supported Hernandez* candidacy, the CODM (Coordinadora de Orga-
nizaciones Democrdticas de Las Margaritas), in which the CIOAC was a strong partic-
ipant, refused to accept the victory of the PRI candidate and installed Hernandez 
Cruz as a 'parallel municipal president'. Initial threats occurred but swift popular 
mobilisation safeguarded this parallel government (La Jornada, May n 1989). With 
the help of a dozen collaborators, Hernandez Cruz attended to matters such as the 
adrmnistration of justice, rural development, agricultural production, education and 
legal assistance over a period of six months (Chirinos & Flores 1990). 
The episode brings out two closely connected dimensions that are equally present 
in the autonomy project of the Zapatistas. On the one hand, for the Tojolabal lead-
ership, the struggle for the control of municipal government was part of a broader 
project of organisation along ethnic lines, into which the constitution of the Tojo-
labal Government also fitted. In an interview with La Jornada newspaper, the 
'parallel municipal president' explained that, "We want to elaborate a project of our 
own, a complete one, [ranging from] the recovery of nature to self-determination. 
[...] We will seek to restore traditional values for self-government." (La Jornada, May 
10,1989). This was coupled, however, with a challenge to a critically de-legitimised 
municipal government. In the words of Hernandez Cruz: "[if they] want to impose 
[their will on us], we will not accept that, because we have seen that the authorities 
only help those who have most money and we, the innocent, are the ones that will 
end up in prison. We are going to devise ways and means of solving our own prob-
lems" (La Jornada, May 10 1989). 
The claim to Tojolabal autonomy was thus embedded in a struggle against munic-
ipal government dominated by the PRI, that was highly unresponsive to needs 
voiced at the local level and instead played an active role in the repression of oppo-
sitional groups (1988 was also the year Absalon Castellanos' rule ended). This chal-
lenge to the PRI government resonated with wider opposition in the mumtipality. 
In fact, the support of non-indigenous sectors of Las Margaritas, grouped together 
under the banner of neo-cardenismo, was crucial to Hernandez Cruz' candidacy. 1 0 
The approach of war 
In 1998 and 1999, Zapatista autonomous mumdpalities became the main target of 
the anti-insurgency strategy of the state government. As a result, tensions in the 
region increased and political opposition polarised. Chibtik had its share of the 
trouble. 
The army comes in 
Near Christmas 1997 I was back in the Netherlands and followed the events in 
Chiapas mostiy through the Internet. The drama of Acteal, in which 45 refugees 
were massacred in a church, had shattered the image of the conflict being under 
control, implicating police officers and leaving little doubt as to the existence of 
armed, thereafter known as 'paramilitary*, groups. The repercussions were soon felt 
in Chibtik. In the first days of the new year, the Mexican army entered Nueva Esper-
anza where apparently a Zapatista weapon deposit was discovered, a find that 
received a lot of air in the media. The EZLN denied having anything to do with the 
weapons and argued these had been planted by the army itself. The military incur-
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sion was justified in relation to the Acteal massacre, but it should be noted that the 
two localities are over 40 kilometres apart in a straight line. It was probably an 
attempt to re-assert the image of an army in control of the situation and to stress the 
danger of the EZLN. The incursion should also be understood, however, against the 
background of local dynamics in Chibtik, involving a split over affiliation to the 
Zapatista movement. As I learnt later, the soldiers had not stopped in Nueva Esper-
anza, but entered Chibtik as well. 
That day in January, the soldiers were brought into Nueva Esperanza by three 
masked guides who led them directly to a small house where the weapons were 
hidden. The soldiers entered several houses and the two co-operative shops, threat-
ening people, destroying some things, taking others. They then proceeded towards 
Chibtik, where their guides attempted to take them to the houses of the Zapatista 
representatives. They never succeeded in capturing them. First they got the wrong 
person but by the time they realised this, their companions had been surrounded 
by women and girls who were blocking their way. Armed with sticks, the women 
called them all the dirty names they could think of. As one of them recalls: 'We said 
to them, "You bastards, what are you doing here? Nobody asked you to come here, 
ypu should just get out of here." The soldiers were apparently taken aback by the 
apsertiveness of the women and at a loss as to how to proceed. 
The women were sure they recognised the masked guides as boys from Chibtik. 
They seized one of them and tried to take off his mask, but before they were able to 
he was freed by the soldiers, who quickly drew h i m into their vehicle and left the 
community. They remained stationed in Nueva Esperanza for several days more, 
however. All this time, the women from Chibtik as well as from some of the sur-
rounding communities, encircled them. The incursion dealt a hard blow, however, 
to the families that had settled on the former Yalchibtik ranch. They abandoned the 
settlement (literally taking down their houses so they could re-build them in their 
communities of origin). Only some of them ventured to move back at a later stage. 
About half a year after these events, I was back in the region and had a chance to 
hear people's accounts. On many kitchen doors in Chibtik I saw photocopies of the 
articles that had appeared in the La Jornada newspaper and that I had seen on the 
Internet, featuring one photograph of a boy ringing the church bell of Chibtik to 
warn the people and another of women confronting the soldiers (La Jornada, 
January 3 and 4 1998). As they told me about the episode, women and girls seemed 
to relive the excitement of the time when they drove the soldiers out of their commu-
nity. They spoke about it with pride, exclaiming: "Let them come again! We'll chase 
them away again!" 
They assured me the guides had been local boys and figured they had wanted to 
take revenge on 'the community' because of a problem one of them had had. He had 
been accused of stealing a stereo-player from one of the truck drivers working for a 
logging company that had begun to work in Chibtik. Following what had become a 
common practice on many of the roads in the region, he had put on a balaclava and 
robbed the driver. Upon the hitter's complaint to Chibitk's authorities, an investiga-
tion was carried out and the stereo was found in the youth's house. He was fined a 
considerable amount of money. On his turn, he filed a complaint with the munic-
ipal presidency of Altamirano and the community was summoned to a meeting. 
Chibtik sent several representatives and a person from the human rights office in 
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San Cristobal accompanied them. The punishment agreed on in Chibtik was 
affirmed and a day was set for the boy to pay the fine. He failed to turn up, however. 
This boy and his friends may have approached the soldiers in Altamirano with a 
desire for vengance, but probably also felt encouraged by the political fissure that 
was taking place in Chibtik at the time. Several families had decided to withdraw 
their support from the EZLN. 
Chibtik divided 
The signs of the upcoming division had been present in the autumn of 1997, but I 
had failed to interpret them as such. On the celebrations for November i s t (All 
Saints' Day), I had noticed a strong increase in the use of alcohol, something that 
was prohibited by Zapatista rule. During the more important community celebra-
tions in May in honour of the patron saint San Miguel, the ban had been respected 
and in general, nobody dared drink in public in Chibtik. I later understood that the 
overt disobedience of the Zapatista ban on alcohol in November indicated a chal-
lenge to Zapatista rule, but at the time I attributed it to an overall declining interest 
in complying with Zapatismo rather than a challenge by a particular group. 
However, at the time a list was being drawn up with a number of families that 
wished to withdraw from the Zapatista organisation. 
The division became fairly violent at the beginning of 1998 and involved a 
number of confrontations between both camps. In early 2000 the issue had settled 
down somewhat. There were now, I was told by people from both sides, 'two groups' 
in Chibtik. Each group held separate assemblies, but the church service was still 
held jointly. Two separate lists of 'meri had been drawn up, with the Zapatista-
supporters constituting about a two-third majority of the total of adult men. The 
group that had opted out - referred to by their opponents as the 'Pri-istas' - had 
appointed their own authorities and obtained their own seal, with the Zapatista 
faction holding on to the official ejido seal. The Zapatista faction had also managed 
to retain control over a number of goods. As had happened with the division of 
Chibtik and the creation of Nueva Jerusalen a decade earlier, factionalism involved 
not only a re-alignment of people (a redefinition of group membership) but also 
translated into new institutional arrangements. The families that decided to leave 
the organisation' had had to forfeit the co-operative shops, as well as the white 
community truck that was seen as an achievement of the insurgency. 1 1 Likewise, 
the groups that had 'returned to the government' could no longer stake any claims 
to Yalchibtik, the property seized in 1994 (see previous chapter). That it was out of 
the question that families that had withdrawn from the organisation could settle 
there, was understood without further debate by both parties. However, the non-
Zapatista group was reluctant to accept the ban on fetching firewood from this prop-
erty. Added to the restriction of firewood collection to 'one's own section' - as I 
described in Chapter 5 - this particularly complicated women's fives.12 
When formal teachers were replaced by educadores, young men from within the 
community that received training and supervision from the autonomous munici-
pality, the people that had opted out of the organisation refused to send their chil-
dren to school in Chibtik any longer. Instead, their children attended the small 
school in the adjacent Nueva Jerusalen - with families that had formerly lived in 
Chibtik - with which they had aligned politically (though not necessarily religiously). 
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Opting out 
Not only in Chibtik did families decide to opt out and 'return to the government'. 
The pattern was repeated in several of the neighbouring communities. Moreover, in 
El Nantze, which in 1997 had been more supportive of the movement than Chibtik, 
the situation had become rather delicate by 2000. Many of the original inhabitants, 
opposers of Zapatismo, had returned to the locality and reclaimed their rights, while 
the Zapatista sympathisers had been reduced to a small group of a few families. 
Even Morelia, hosting the Aguascalientes IV (the headquarters of 17 de Noviembre), 
h^d become divided over the Zapatista cause. The same had happened in other 
communities of the Tojolabal Highlands that had sided with the Zapatistas but later 
withdrawn - a situation related to the split of the CIOAC into a 'Zapatista' and an 
'official' branch. 
Although each one might have a variety of other, personal reasons, ex-Zapatistas 
would invariably attribute their decision to opt out to the high demands the 
autonomous municipahty placed on them. As one of the Chibitkeros explained, they 
"were tired, and wanted to take a break, it was a lot of work, there were always trips 
tp be made, always contributions to be paid." As mentioned earlier, sustaining the 
autonomous structures was extremely demanding. And what were the payoffs? 
""vvhat had become of all the promises the Zapatistas had made? A n American jour-
nalist recorded the following words from a former Zapatista in Morelia: 
"I don't love the government, but they [the Zapatistas] promised more than 
the government and hasn't given it. [...] We decided it is better to go back with 
the government. [...] Since the armed movement we haven't gotten anything, 
the roads here aren't paved; only half of the houses have electricity. This is an 
opportunity to get what we want." (Michael Riley, The Chronicle, 7 July 1999). 
Added to the fatigue were the intensified efforts on the part of the state government 
to dismantle the autonomous municipalities, increasing the pressure on the 
adherent population. A woman in close contact with Chibtik throughout this period 
mentioned that in view of the growing pressure, a meeting was held in Chibtik in 
which everyone was asked whether they were willing to continue 'with the organi-
sation' or not. She had been told the following about this meeting: "They said to 
everyone: Think carefully about whether you want to continue. Things are going to 
be very tough. If you do not want to stay in, get out now, there will not be any sanc-
tions." And things did indeed get tough ^ 1 9 9 8 and 1999, when governor Albores 
made the autonomous municipahties his main target. The climate became increas-
ingly polarised. 
Autonomous municipalities under fire 
Albores strikes back 
Governor Albores' attempts to dismantle the autonomous municipalities combined 
direct repression with other measures such as the expulsion of foreigners, unilat-
eral re-municipahsation, and pouring government resources into the state, a strategy 
best called 'development offensive'. In the first two weeks of 1998 alone, there were 
over fifty military incursions such as the one into Nueva Esperanza and Chibtik 
(Lopez & Rebolledo 1999). Throughout 1998 and 1999, Zapatista autonomous 
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munidpalities suffered from direct attacks or threats, and low-flying helicopters and 
planes became a current phenomenon. 
At the same time, the immigration office redoubled efforts to keep foreigners out 
of the communities by means of a spedal task force (opemcidn arcoiris). A consider-
able number of foreign N G O s and pastoral workers supporting the autonomous 
munidpahties were expelled from the country as they were found to be engaging in 
activities out of line with their status as tourists (in view of the ever more restrictive 
polides for obtaining residence permits for Chiapas, many of them only had tourist 
visas). Though the measure was insuffident in itself to dismantie the autonomous 
municipalities, it did seriously complicate the work of the NGOs involved. 
In what has been generally understood as a dired provocation of the EZLN, 
governor Albores also proceeded with a unilateral plan for re-municipalisation. 
Claiming that he was just carrying out what had been established in the San Andres 
Accords, he envisioned the creation of over thirty new munidpahties. In July 1999 
he began with the creation of seven new municipalities in areas where the EZLN 
was strong and installed new municipal authorities under the PRI banner . 1 3 The 
establishment of several more munidpaHties was on his agenda, but never carried 
out because of the tensions and public outrage this policy elidted. 
In addition to these measures, the 'development offensive' of the state and federal 
governments was also intensified. Ever since 1994 Chiapas has been bombarded 
with funds and projects in unprecedented ways, while the number of paved roads, 
hospitals and water systems has grown exponentially. Officially presented as finally 
giving the poor of Chiapas the benefits of modern sodety they had demanded, and 
redressing the negled they had previously suffered, offering projeds became a care-
fully orchestrated counterinsurgency strategy. In regions where Zapatista sympa-
thisers predominated, people were promised housing projeds, cattle, and other 
benefits if they would agree to abandon the civil support bases and 'return to the 
government. A number of supposedly former Zapatistas were shown on television 
handing over their weapons to the government and promising to return to law-
abiding behaviour. The Zapatistas denounced these events as set-ups, but the 
strategy at least partially achieved its goal. In several communities of the Tojolabal 
Highlands, people opted out of Zapatismo as a result of promises of livestock and 
housing projeds. 
In response to the political use of government aid, the Zapatistas became more 
rigid in their rejection of anything that came from the government. As one of the 
Chibtikeros dedared: "We no longer want to have anything to do with the govern-
ment (gobierno)." This anti-government discourse was not new, but there was more 
outright rejection of government projeds as political antagonism hardened. In 1998 
the Chibtikeros had still accepted a government projed on drinking water, because 
- as I was told - it would relieve the work of the women. However, in 2000 they had 
dismissed the primary school teachers paid by the Public Education Ministry (SEP) 
replacing them with their own teachers, the educadores, trained by the autonomous 
munidpality. Furthermore, one of the youths that was studying at an offidal insti-
tute (the Conalep) to become a teacher, was called back. 1 4 The EZLN regulations stip-
ulated that no longer could anyone could hold a government paid job (such as 
teacher or health worker). 
The intensely political nature of government assistance in Chiapas was perhaps 
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never brought out more clearly than during this period. It is in this light that 
Zapatista supporters of the Amador Hernandez community in the Canadas region 
opposed road construction, arguing that 
"We know very weh that the roads that the government has constructed have 
not brought a single benefit to the indigenous population. With those roads 
no doctors came in, no hospitals were built, no teachers arrived, no schools 
were built, no materials were sent to improve the houses of the indigenous 
population, the price of the products that the peasants sell did not improve 
nor are the items that the indigenous population needs to buy, any cheaper. 
[...] Any road that the government has built proves to bring no benefit, except 
for those that enrich themselves at our expense, or come to kill us, imprison 
us or humiliate us." (Communique from Amador Hernandez, August 1999). 
A military show of force and the use of tear gas were necessary to destroy the block-
ades and continue construction. In the aftermath of a demonstration by the 
Zapatistas from 17 de Noviembre in support of their companions from Amador 
Hernandez, violent confrontations occurred in Morelia. 
The attack on the autonomous munidpahties not only increased the cost of being 
autonomous, but also contributed to drawing a sharper divide between those 'with' 
and those 'against the government. In response to the growing repression against 
the autonomous munidpahties the autonomous governance projed became increas-
ingly framed as 'resistance'. 
The 'development offensive' at work 
The 'development offensive' was a war over people's loyalties. Coupling material 
support with a show of force was a powerful formula, though it was not always effec-
tively applied. A n example from Nantze shows how the 'development offensive' 
worked in practice, while indicating some of its limits. When I visited Chibtik in 
2000, Nanzte happened to receive a number of high-profile visits: President Zedillo 
and governor Albores were flown in by helicopter on a Wednesday morning to open 
a sawmill. The sawmill had been construded just off the settlement of Nantze as a 
joint effort by various pro-government groups from Nanzte and neighbouring 
communities (such as Nueva Jerusalen located between Chibtik and El Nantze) that 
had formed an association. 1 5 That the sawmill had benefited from government 
money provided the official reason for the visit, but the arrival of such important 
figures must be understood primarily against the background of the symbolic war 
for people's loyalty that was being waged all over eastern Chiapas at the time. In 
1999, President Zedillo had an average of almost a trip per month to Chiapas, a priv-
ilege of which no other Mexican state could boast. The visit to Nantze, like other 
such visits, was meant to convince the people that the government cared about them 
and was a powerful ally. The visit also obviously carried a threat to the neighbouring 
Zapatistas. I found that not everybody was equally impressed by the message, 
though, not even inside the pro-government camp. 
I visited El Nantze the day after President Zedillo (attending the event itself 
seemed unwise), and on my way back I passed through Nueva Jerusalen. One of the 
women was washing clothes outside her house, next to the road, and struck up a 
conversation. This gave m e an opportunity to ask her about the day before. She 
confirmed that both the governor and the 'government i tsel f (el men gobierno), 
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meaning the president, had been there. People had prepared a big party, there had 
been food and so on. But the president and the governor had only stayed very briefly, 
some twenty minutes, and had not eaten anything. She was obviously annoyed 
about the visit. Not only because they had been given virtually no advance warning 
that the president himself would be coming - she said they had only known about 
it three days beforehand - giving them little time to prepare the party properly, but 
also because the visit had come so late, after the sawmill had been operating for 
almost a year. She was especially upset, however, by the fact that they had pretended 
the sawmill had been a favour from the government, which was not true, she 
claimed, since it had been the work of the campesinos themselves. I was curious 
about what the visitors had said, but she hardly found that worth recalling. Rather, 
she underlined what the people had said to them. They asked for their logging 
permit to be extended ^definitely and for the road to be paved (with asphalt), getting 
no more than a promise in return on both counts. 
The woman's account of the visit brings out some interesting features of people's 
ideas and attitudes towards the government. In the first place, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, the government is associated with asking favours (such as the road and 
the logging permit). More interestingly, though, was the criticism of government 
implicit in the woman's words, even though she confirmed to me - in keeping with 
the Adventist doctrine - that state authority is sanctioned by God. In view of the fact 
that the sawmill had been constructed partly with a credit from a state agency, it 
must have seemed quite natural to governor Albores and president Zedillo to claim 
it as help or a gift from the state. However, they made a crucial mistake in 
presenting what people saw as their own efforts as favours from the state for which 
they should be grateful. As it turned out, even those that are pro-government 
resented such misappropriation. The traditional paternalistic formulae contrast 
strongly with the Zapatista discourse centred on dignity and empowerment and have 
perhaps lost some of their effectiveness since 1994. 
The material side of things 
The development offensive placed serious strains on the Zapatista autonomy project 
as its material benefits placed people in a very real dilemma. If the strategy did not 
undermine the autonomous municipalities more than it did, this was probably 
partly due to its failure to revamp its political imagery (as suggested above) and even 
more so to the perpetuation of traditional political vices. The state apparatus simply 
failed to 'buy people ofF effectively and fell prey to corruption. In one of the commu-
nities in the northern half of the Tojolabal Highlands, the people were shocked to 
discover that they were expected to pay half the cost of the new houses they had been 
promised. In many other cases, promised livestock were never delivered, and I fear 
the comment that "that cattle that never arrived, it is probably grazing on some 
politician's ranch at the moment" was probably quite accurate. All this translated 
into disappointment with the government's offer, undermining the effectiveness of 
the development offensive. 
That people may have opted to 'return to the government' for material reasons, 
might sound rather banal to some readers. However, both in the decision to opt out 
as well as in the decision to continue to support the Zapatista project, considerations 
regarding the offer, both of material benefits and of certain services, play an impor-
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tant role. Much has been made of the symbolic importance of the Zapatista move-
ment, its new political imagery, its embodiment of values such as democracy, trans-
parency and accountability, and with good reason (see also Nuijten & Van der Haar 
2000). Ideas about the state apparatus and the development of a new repertoire of 
governance, authority and nation building, are important features of the Zapatista 
project as elaborated in the autonomous muniripalities. At the same time, however, 
ft involves an assessment of the costs and benefits of each of the sides one could 
align with. Both 'governments' are continuously compared in terms of what they 
Offer and their performance. Whereas those that 'returned to the government' enjoy 
special credits and projects, those that 'stayed with the organisation' mode the unful-
filled promises the other side is faced with, and instead emphasize the projects they 
have benefitted from, supported by NGOs and 'other nations'. Whereas the former 
boast about special attention and visits from high-ranking government offidals, the 
latter receive visits from people from all over the world. 
As I have stressed throughout this book, loyalty or adherence to a particular group 
or organisation has a strong material basis. This is apparent again here. Certain 
collective goods are understood as the privilege of a drcumscribed group and group 
membership and enjoyment of a particular good or service are closely connected. 
The fact of using or not using a certain good is a statement of one's adherence. This 
Was dearly refleded in the fact that even before 1994 most Chibtikeros avoided the 
hospital built by 'the government' in Altamirano and continued to take their sick to 
the San Carlos Hospital, run by nuns under the diocese of San Cristobal. Many 
Ctbibtikeros continued to do this, despite the fact that in the San Carlos Hospital they 
were obliged to contribute to the cost of medicine and treatment, whereas in the 
IMSS everything was free. The people that opted out of the organisation, however, 
were reludant to go to the San Carlos Hospital any more. Moreover, I think the fact 
that 17 de Noviembre was still thriving despite all the pressures from the govern-
ment was partly due to the sizable number of invaded properties controlled by the 
Zapatistas. These properties represented a very real 'offer' from which defectors 
would be exduded. 
Rival claims to government 
I have described the situation obtaining in the region around Altamirano as one in 
which two governance structures or jurisdictions co-exist. The two systems are 
mutually exdusive in terms of then constituency - people belong to either one group 
or the other - yet they overlap and interad in a number of ways. The administration 
of justice provides a useful window on the confrontations and accommodations that 
take place in practice. 
As mentioned earlier, in 17 de Noviembre, a system of administration of justice 
and conflict resolution, the so-called honor dejusiicia, was in place. If we can believe 
the men I talked to in the cabecera, there was a great demand for this service, not 
only among their own people, but also sometimes among non-Zapatistas from the 
region: 
"If people have a problem and they go to [the municipal presidency at] 
Altamirano, their problem does not get solved, and they only come out with 
a bigger problem. There they do nothing to solve people's problems. If you 
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go there, they laugh at you: ha!, if you want your problem solved, why don't 
you go to the Zapatistas, they can help you!" 
The record of the 'official' justice system in eastern Chiapas is such that many people 
prefer to resort to other institutions, such as the autonomous mumtipality. Media-
tion and dispute settiement between communities was also a recurrent theme in 
earlier experiences with supra-communal forms of organisations amongst the Tojo-
labal, as we saw earlier in this chapter. 
The justice system in 17 de Noviembre operates on the basis of a written regla-
mento, drawn up by constituent members, in which several rules are specified and 
punishment for non-compliance is stipulated. Apart from fines and a night in 
pr ison, 1 6 punishments consist mosdy of work, such as weeding the premises of the 
cabecera. As the case below shows, when a case involves injuries inflicted on private 
individuals, the autonomous municipality serves as a mediator in the payment of 
compensation. 
Claimingjurisdiction: a road accident 
In January 2000, just before I visited Chibtik, an accident had happened involving 
the white three-ton truck (now belonging only to the Zapatista faction of the commu-
nity). It had flipped over on a very sharp curve on its return from Altamirano, 
landing upside down in the ditch next to the road, mjuring several of the passengers 
and killing one, a young man from La Florida. The driver that day had been 
Severino, one of the young men appointed by the community for this job. 
Pedro and his brother who had recentiy assumed the post of comisariado ejidal, 
had been in Comitan that day when they heard the news, just as it had happened 
and rushed to the scene of the accident. It must have taken them about an hour to 
get there, just in time to prevent the Seguridad Publico, and the State Prosecutor from 
taking the matter into their hands. These Altamirano authorities had just arrived on 
the scene and planned to impound the vehicle and take the driver in for further 
questioning. A n argument started. The Chibtikeros opposed the intervention 
arguing that they would handle the matter themselves, and stating that they would 
not have anything to do with the government. One of the authorities from Altami-
rano is supposed to have said - after having ascertained that both the driver and the 
passengers were supporters of the autonomous municipality -: 
"Well, all right, you have your own organisation, your own government, you 
take care of this yourselves. But make sure the injured are taken care of, take 
them to hospital and make sure their expenses are paid; and as for the dead 
man, make sure his family receives a good compensation, for this is a big 
loss." 
Pedro praised the good sense of the man in allowing them to deal with the matter 
themselves. 
Another argument arose over the vehicle. The Chibtikeros refused to surrender 
it. If it were taken to the car pound, they would be unlikely to see it again. They 
insisted on taking it out of the ditch themselves. They arranged for a tractor, pulled 
it out and left it parked in front of the house of the agente municipal in Chibtik for 
the duration of the case. (The truck needed some repairs and the conflict with La 
Florida over compensation for the dead man needed to be resolved.) The truck's 
papers, however, had been taken to the municipal presidency in Altamirano. The 
Chibtik authorities had been told they could recover these in return for a consider-
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able sum (15,000 pesos, equivalent to $150 US dollars, was mentioned). The 
Chibtikeros refused to submit to what they called 'blackmail' and several weeks later 
managed to recover the papers without paying anything. 
The accident was a major drama. All the injured passengers had been checked 
into the hospital and most of them had returned home with only minor complica-
tions. One woman was more severely injured and had been transferred to the 
hospital in Tuxtla Gutierrez. A key issue, that was being resolved during my stay, 
was how to compensate the family of the deceased. The matter had severely strained 
relations between La Florida and Chibtik, which made it an obvious case to bring 
before the autonomous municipality. The case was primarily between the family of 
the deceased (the father of two children, who had still been living with his parents, 
who were demanding the compensation) and the Zapatista faction of Chibtik. The 
accident was regarded as the collective responsibility of the group that owned and 
used the vehicle and had contracted the driver, rather than the sole responsibility of 
the latter. The driver, Severino, was obliged to pay approximately 5000 pesos to cover 
medical expenses. The compensation for the deceased was to be paid for by all the 
Chibtikeros 'belonging to the organisation'. (The problem did not involve the 
Chibitkero families that had left Zapatismo, for they had no longer anything to do 
with the vehicle). The parents of the deceased had demanded a considerable amount 
of money, in the region of 30.000 pesos. The Chibtikeros rejected the sum as being 
excessively high, arguing that they were only peasants and that it would be impos-
sible for them to raise that sum of money. The family of the deceased threatened to 
bring the case before the State Prosecutor's Office in Altamirano, but they were pres-
sured by the authorities of the autonomous municipality to abandon that idea. The 
settlement was fixed at 13,000 pesos, based on the fact that in two previous accidents 
in the region, in which official police cars had caused deaths of local women, a sum 
of 10,000 pesos had been paid. The Chibtikeros agreed to pay a higher sum than 
that, to show that they valued a person!s life more highly than the 'government did. 
The sum would be shared by all right-holders in the Zapatista group of Chibtik. 
About two thirds of the sum could be paid out of the revenues from the truck. 
The remainder was to be paid through contributions by the Zapatista faction of 
Chibtik. Within the community, a discussion arose as to who was to share in the 
p a y m e n t of this sum. Whereas some argued that all those entitied to use the truck 
had to contribute, the avecindados successfully claimed that only full right-holders 
should pay. The difference between right-holders and avecindados had recently been 
re-enforced through the privatisation of grazing areas - Chapter Five - and this was 
the first opportunity for the latter to strike back. 
A plurality of jurisdictions 
In discussing this example, I do not wish to go into the question of whether the solu-
tion arrived at by the autonomous municipality was 'fair' or better or worse than 
what could have been achieved had the family of the deceased involved the official 
authorities of Altamirano. More detailed work on different cases, bringing out the 
different viewpoints of the parties involved, would be required to reach a more 
profound understanding of how the system of justice works, how different kinds of 
problems are dealt with, whether it works systematically in favour of some categories 
of people and to the detriment of others, or how the outcomes are rated by the 
different groups involved. Rather, I want to use the case to point out that first, a situ-
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ation of de facto legal pluralism was operating in the region, and second, that this 
raises a series of questions as to the articulation and interaction of these different 
'legal' spheres. 
The analysis of land tenure earlier in this book showed that the internal regula-
tion of rights - the definition and allocation of specific entitlements - was claimed 
as a sphere of community jurisdiction. In the context of the Tojolabal region, 
designing, changing and enforcing rules is not therefore a monopoly of official state 
structures. Communities also act as a governance structures and claim their right 
to establish rules. Community jurisdiction includes not only land tenure but also 
drawing up regulations for behaviour and dispute settlement, such as between 
spouses or neighbours.) Conflicts transcending the boundaries of individual 
communities might, as we saw, be taken to other forums, notably supra-communal 
structures of organisation created since the 1970s. In very serious cases, for example 
those involving deaths, as well as in cases involving non-community members or 
taking place outside of the community domain (for example, in town or on the 
road), the municipal presidency was called in. 
The jurisdictional powers of communities or the structures to which they choose 
to belong do not enjoy legal recognition, rather, it is a jurisdiction that is imple-
mented in practice. This happens in the first place, because they have the capacity 
to 'exclude the state '. Moreover, in conflictive situations, despite their 'non-legal' 
nature, they are given a certain degree of leverage by the official authorities involved. 
As illustrated by the conflict between Catholics and Adventists in Chibtik and again 
in the truck incident, in many cases land reform or municipal authorities seem to 
opt for a negotiated settlement between the different jurisdictions rather than choose 
an unilateral imposition of the law. How matters are settled depends on a variety of 
factors, related to the case as well as the context. Considerations regarding who is 
involved, where an offence or transgression took place, and how serious the events 
are, but also political agendas are brought to bear on particular cases. It is important 
to note that the cases involve weighing up the strength of each of the structures 
making a claim to jurisdiction. In practice, through specific cases, communities, 
supra-communal organisations, and government agencies define their spheres of 
competency vis-a-vis each other. Anticipations as to the possible reaction of the other 
party, evaluations of their own and the other's strength and the capacity to interfere, 
as well as the foreseeable social and political costs in the event that a challenge to 
the other's jurisdiction were unsuccessful, all play a role. In this way, as Sierra has 
pointed out, multiple "interrelations, confrontations and mutually constitutive 
processes" occur (1995: 229). 
In the truck accident, the autonomous municipality was given considerable 
leverage to rule, possibly because the people involved were all supporters of 
Zapatismo and probably also because the case was an accident. It is unlikely that a 
case of manslaughter or murder would have been transferred to the autonomous 
municipality with the same ease. In contrast to the case of the accident, where the 
autonomous municipality successfully claimed jurisdiction, in other matters it opts 
to refrain from intervening. I came across a case involving one of the Chibtikeros 
who had been imprisoned without trial after having been caught while he was -
whether knowingly or not - transporting illegal immigrants (indocumentados) from 
Guatemala. When I asked the authorities of 17 de Noviembre whether they would 
intervene in this case, they reacted: 
228 
"No! It is none of our business, it is a private matter. There is a rule: no trans-
porting of illegal nnmigrants. This guy did not respect that rule, now he has 
to face the consequences. Others are involved with drugs. That is not allowed 
either. If they run into trouble, we don't defend them." 
A possible reason for remaining aloof of cases involving drugs and illegal immi-
grants may be that they involve too many risks. Such cases involve direct confronta-
tion with state authorities who could easily take advantage of the opportunity to 
repress or damage the autonomous municipality (the war on drugs has been one of 
the favourite reasons for military incursions in the Canadas region). Autonomous 
jurisdiction thus involves a continuous shifting of positions in relation to govern-
ment authorities. 
The truck accident also shows the permeability of the administration of justice to 
norms, criteria and procedures used in the official system (see also Sierra 1995). As 
mentioned, the amount of compensation agreed on was related to previous cases 
involving policemen. The latter cases are unlikely to have involved a legal procedure, 
but rather a private settlement, yet this served as a reference for 'how the govern-
ment settles things'. Legal anthropologists have also pointed to the use people make 
of the plurality of legal systems when they try to defend their cases, a phenomenon 
referred to as forum shopping. In the settlement of the truck accident, the threat of 
involving the Altamirano authorities was used in the process by the parents of the 
deceased and the possible advantages and risks of this were at the back of the minds 
of all of those involved when reaching a settlement. In addition, a wide range of 
other new norms are penetrating people's frames of reference. Both EZLN guide-
lines (remember the revolutionary laws) and norms voiced by NGO's play a role: 
human rights, women's rights, but also considerations regarding the sustainable use 
of resources (especially forests) are becoming part of local notions. 
Summarising my findings, in early 2000,17 de Noviembre was operating as a 
structure of governance in its own right, with its own jurisdiction, alongside the offi-
cial jurisdiction of the municipality of Altamirano with which it interacted in 
complex ways. The autonomous municipality's capacity to rule draws on earlier prac-
tices in which control over people and resources was organised beyond state struc-
tures, in communities and supra-communal forms of organisation. A n important 
difference with the recent past, however, is that this governing capacity is now not 
only asserted in practice but claimed as a right to be respected by higher level author-
ities on the basis of legal notions and agreements. The present autonomy project 
builds on 'autonomous practices' at the communal level - to use a term employed 
by Mattiace (1998) - but goes beyond these to constitute a 'parallel government' 
(Burguete pers. com.). 
Discussion: Autonomy as a challenge 
The government of neglect 
"The government does not care about us, he [!] cares more about his cattle than 
about us". These words were uttered rather casually and with a combination of 
bitterness and resignation by a man from one of the communities neighbouring 
Chibtik during a conversation we had concerning their involvement in 17 de 
Noviembre. I was struck by these words, not only because of the anachronism they 
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seemed to contain, but also because they pointed to one of the central tensions in 
the Zapatista autonomy project. Replace the word 'government' (he spoke Tojolabal 
but used the Spanish gohierno), with that of landowner or patron (ajwalal in Tojo-
labal) and we have a phrase commonly used to refer to the times of the finca in the 
region. Like the patron, the government today is associated with oppression, neglect, 
abandonment - and it is in this sense that I could agree with Benjamin's phrase that 
in Chiapas 'the government and thefinqueros are the same thing" (1995). A clearer 
statement of the lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of state structures is difficult to 
imagine. However, the words of this man also contained a moral claim: like the 
patrones before it, the government has a moral obligation to 'care for his men', an 
obligation that it is obviously not fulfilling but that nonetheless may be appealed to. 
The Zapatista project of autonomy can be summarised as 'standing up to the 
state'. To my mind, this should be understood as a challenge to the state, rather than 
an outright rejection of it. The discourse of the 'autonomous' Tojolabales comprises 
different elements: it contains assertions of its own ability to govern, accusations of 
government abuses and neglect, but also demands that the state fulfil its promises 
and respond to people's needs. Rather than an outright rejection of the Mexican 
state, Zapatista autonomy embodies a call for reform. It reflects the lack of legiti-
macy of the present government, without however dismissing the idea of govern-
ment in itself. There is a tension between the simultaneous assertion of autonomy 
and the demands placed on the state, but this should not simply be dismissed as an 
inconsistency of the Zapatista project. In fact, such tensions are widespread in 
attempts to achieve the recognition of indigenous rights in Latin America, where 
the struggle for fuller participation by indigenous peoples in the state structures, 
goes hand in hand with the demand for greater respect for and recognition of 
autonomous political and juridical systems (Assies, van der Haar & Hoekema 1999). 
It seems useful to understand autonomy projects in terms of a 're-negotiated nation-
alism' (Stephen 1997, also Mattiace 1998) in which notions of what the state should 
be, how it should operate, what it should provide, and how it should relate to local 
or regional forms of governance, are being articulated, confronted and re-worked. 
This is largely uncharted territory. 
The very figure chosen for Zapatista autonomy, that of the muniripality, is obvi-
ously grafted on the state model for government. What gives the autonomous 
municipahties strength and coherence is, as I have suggested, the fact that it builds 
on earlier governing practices. However, it obviously refers to the state model in 
many ways. As mentioned, 17 de Noviembre reflects all the functions associated with 
municipal government. Their own performance was being compared with that of 
the official municipaHty of Altamirano. Furthermore, the symbols of power associ-
ated with municipal government were adopted, such as the portrait of Marcos in the 
main office. Taking the existing municipality as such an explicit reference seems to 
m e to testify on the one hand to the scope of the ambitions of the Zapatista projects, 
while at the same time showing how much the imagery of power is grafted onto 
experiences with state administration. The municipal presidency is associated with 
power - such as the power to command a police force, to confine people, or to 
permit or obstruct road construction. Apparently, power, authority and governance 
are imagined by drawing at least partly on state symbols, which are subsequentiy 
both appropriated and re-signified. 
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The ethnic dimension 
Since 1994, claims to governance have been framed as an ethnic issue and are 
referred to as 'indigenous autonomy'. The ethnic dimension should not, however, 
be understood in narrow cultural or identity terms. For the Tojolabal, understand-
ings of identity or ethnicity centre as much on language, music or dress as they do 
on the experience of discrimination, political exclusion and government abuse. I 
agree in this respect with Mattiace who argues that "ethnic identity is not constituted 
apart from politics, but is constitutive of them" (1998:157). In the earlier experiences 
with the Tojolabal Government and the struggle for control of the municipality of 
has Margaritas, an ethnic project (of Tojolabal reconstruction) was coupled with 
other struggles involving access to resources and services. As has also been pointed 
out by Mattiace (1998: Ch. 5), what outsiders would readily dassify as either 'Indian' 
or 'peasant demands were dosely assodated in practice. The struggle to set up bilin-
gual schools in Tojolabal communities during the late 1980s had everything to do 
with the political projed of the first generations of Tojolabal teachers, considerations 
regarding the use of Tojolabal in primary education being of lesser importance. 1 7 
This ethnic projed implied a search for 'traditional' elements. Lacking a system 
of positions of authority such as that present in the Central Highlands and having 
adopted so much of the ejido model, a distind effort was made to re-construct what 
were understood to be more traditional forms of leadership (healers and elders) and 
to de-emphasise the ejido appearance of communities in the region. Mattiace dtes 
Araceli Burguete, one of the advisors at the time (later one of the leaders of the FIPI, 
hot a Tojolabal herself) as saying that: 
"The ejido has been a divisive experience. [...] We felt that we had to divide the 
ejido borders and return to the idea of a Tojolabal territory. [...] Their identity 
was based on the ejido, and we did not want to reinforce that ejido identity. 
For us, ejido identity constituted an obstade to conceptualising a Tojolabal 
identity." (in Mattiace 1998:184). 
The calls for ethnic re-construction, however, were heard witiiin a general insistence 
on access to land, credits and services. 
Whereas several of the leading figures in the FIPI conceived of the Tojolabal focus 
on the community as an obstade to the projed of regional autonomy, local CIOAC 
leaders continued to stress the centrality of autonomous practices at the local level, 
saying, for example that "People are autonomous, but in their own way, from their 
own community, as they see it" (Mattiace 1998:189). Nomwilhstanding the efforts 
of political advisors, in the Tojolabal region loyalties and governing powers, and in 
connection with the latter, identities, have remained strongly centred on the commu-
nity. One implication is that the Zapatista projed of autonomy also needs to incor-
porate the legitimacy of the community as a structure of governance. 
Open questions 
I was positively impressed by the vitality of 17 de Noviembre and the extent to which 
its governance structures had developed by early 2000. My interest in the experi-
ence had been aroused by the enthusiasm with which several people I esteemed 
highly in Chibtik had talked about it, and my expedations were confirmed rather 
than disappointed during my short visit to Morelia. It seemed to m e that 17 de 
Noviembre enjoyed a considerable degree of legitimacy and had achieved a degree 
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of effectiveness in terms of governance that the official municipal governments 
never even approached (if they had aspired to it at all). My initial impression there-
fore was that the autonomous municipalities meet the need for a legitimate and 
effective supra-communal government. In a workshop at which I presented a paper 
on 17 de Noviembre, I ventured to suggest that the autonomous municipalities 
might be a way in which the indigenous population of Chiapas seeks to exercise citi-
zenship, keeping a de-legitimised state structure at a distance, appropriating and re-
working municipal government, and shaping it in accordance with its own n e e d s . 1 8 
I was then cautioned by some of the other workshop participants that my evalu-
ation of the autonomous municipalities might be overly optimistic. I was corrected 
especially on two points: first, the autonomous municipalities are also an imposi-
tion from the military command of the EZLN and second, they create a great deal 
of tension in practice. Referring to then own knowledge of the Cafiadas region, these 
participants questioned the legitimacy of the autonomous municipalities that I had 
praised. They mentioned that people were forced to make heavy contributions to 
maintain the military structure of the EZLN (something that I had not come across 
in 17 de Noviembre) and felt caught between two armies, trying to please both, yet 
not knowing who would eventually win. They described experiences of people regis-
tering with the civil registries of both the Zapatistas and the official one. These 
remarks made me rethink some of my initial conclusions. In fact, the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the autonomous municipalities should be treated rather as 
hypotheses for further research into the actual workings of governance under the 
banner of Zapatismo. Questions to be asked include whether and if so, why people 
feel committed to the autonomous municipalities vis-a-vis other options and strate-
gies, what tensions the structure involves, what benefits people feel it has to offer. 
My account of 17 de Noviembre then should be understood as presenting elements 
for an agenda of research into the development and articulation of governance struc-
tures in Chiapas, rather than a conclusive statement. 
During my stays in Chibtik I could certainly sense some of the tensions 
inherent in 17 de Noviembre. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Chibtikeros 
dealt with the EZLN regulations regarding collective agriculture in more or less the 
same way they used to deal with laws from the state: as a frame of reference, which 
could be adapted, refined, neutralised and partly resisted. Some of the regulations 
were more difficult to avoid and strongly resented, such as the expulsion of govern-
ment-paid primary school teachers. In one of the communities adjacent to Chibtik, 
I was told the system of educadores trained by the autonomous municipality did not 
work well and that people were very worried that their children were not receiving 
any education. Apparently, the educadores were not spending much time on the 
school. They had families of their own and complained that it was impossible for 
them to attend both the school and their own fields. The community had devised an 
arrangement whereby they woul work with the children for three days and have the 
rest of the week to tend their own fields, but even this had only worked for a few 
weeks. The anti-government discourse thus conceals some of the difficult choices 
people face and the costs involved in rejecting government assistance. 
Though Zapatismo operates through a 'federate' structure of asambleas at various 
levels, elected representatives, and feedback mechanisms, this was sometimes over-
ruled by military dynamics whereby the 'top' dictates orders to the base. There were 
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further tensions related to power differentials within the autonomous mumripality. 
The Tojolabal often claimed that the Tzeltal got more privileges. The Tzeltal, who in 
general were more militant than the Tojolabal and at times overruled them, labelled 
the Tojolabal as 'backward' (atrasado). The distribution of projects and resources by 
the autonomous mumripality among the various localities also seemed to create fric-
tion. Chibtik being one of the favourites this was not felt as much as it was in some 
other communities. 
Despite all these tensions and weaknesses, my impression is that the 
autonomous municipality compared favourably in many respects with the official 
municipal government structure. It opened up a new arena in which people, 
confronting relative equals - in terms of culture and economic possibilities - rather 
than bureaucrats, had more leeway for contesting the rules of the game. At the risk 
of over-simplifying I would venture to say that the autonomous municipahty is more 
of an 'inside' arena in which people feel less powerless than they do 'outside' in the 
official municipality. 
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Notes 
1 T h e Accords bui ld o n the ILO Conven-
tion 169 on indigenous peoples. 
2 W i t h the participation o f the A R I C -
independiente and the O R C A O , the 
regional coffee growers ' association. 
3 T h e installation o f the counci l was 
related to the political tensions in the 
conflict z o n e that m a d e it impossible 
to hold elections. 
4 Ironically, this particularly w e a k e n e d 
the P R D , al lowing the PRI to w i n back 
munic ipa l presidencies in a n u m b e r o f 
municipal i t ies , i n d u d i n g Altamirano. 
5 Installed September 26,1997, 
according to Burguete 1998b. 
6 T h e National Democrat ic Convention, 
a c r u d a l encounter between the 
Zapatistas a n d Mexican 'dvi l society" 
w a s held here in the s u m m e r o f 1994. 
7 Echoing the opening phrases o f the 
Fourth Dedarat ion o f the Lacandona 
Rainforest, January 11996 (see 
W o m a c k 1999). 
8 T h e highest level is apparentiy called 
parlamento. 
9 For an English translation o f this law 
see W o m a c k 1999: 255. 
10 A s in the election o f another o f the 
central Tojolabal leaders, Margarito 
Ruiz , as federal deputy for the P M S 
(later PRD). 
11 T h e truck h a d previously belonged 
jointiy to several c o m m u n i t i e s that 
h a d u s e d it during the N e w Year's Eve 
upr is ing in 1994. It h a d b e e n seized 
by the army b u t was later released 
thanks to the efforts o f the Chibtikeros, 
w h o t h e n a s s u m e d exdus ive control o f 
it. 
12 Possibly the w o m e n ' s r d u c t a n c e to 
accept the rule was also related to the 
fact that w h e n Yalchibtik h a d b e e n a 
private property the w o m e n u s e d to 
fetch f irewood there, so they do not 
consider it fair for the Zapatista faction 
to m o n o p o l i s e that now. 
13 T h e n e w m u n i d p a l i t i e s w e r e created in 
the territories o f Chenalho , Ocos ingo, 
Las Margaritas, A n g e l A lb ino Corzo , 
Simojovel a n d San A n d r e s Larrainzar. 
14 It w a s t h e n agreed that h e b e sent to 
U C I R I ' s - one o f the major coffee 
g r o w i n g organisations' tiaining centre 
i n Oaxaca. 
15 A n S S S , S o d e d a d de Solidaridad S o d a l 
16 A small w o o d e n structure. It should b e 
noted that m o s t c o m m u n i t i e s in the 
region have their o w n prison or r o o m 
for cornining people. 
17 I sensed this w h e n carrying out m y 
study on bi l ingual teachers but failed to 
grasp all the aspects o f the p r o b l e m 
(Van der Haar 1993). 
18 T h e paper entitled 'Del ejido al 
m u n i d p i o autbnomo: la construct ion 
de e s p a d o s autbnomos e n u n a region 
indigena de Chiapas' , w a s presented at 
the workshop Conflicto y reconstruccidn 
social en Chiapas y Guatemala, 
Toulouse, May 28-30 2000. 
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Chapter eight 
Fields of contention: land reform 
between endowment and appropriation 
In the previous chapters, I reviewed several aspects of land reform in the Tojolabal 
Highlands. I discussed the geography and politics of land redistribution (Chapters 
Two and Three), the establishment and development of land tenure arrangements 
in the communities of land reform beneficiaries (Chapters Four and Five), and land 
invasions as a part of the Zapatista political project (Chapters Six and Seven). In this 
final chapter, I will address the social and political consequences of land reform in 
Mexico in more general terms, pointing to new avenues for understanding these. In 
tlje light of my research on the Tojolabal Highlands, I find the understanding of land 
reform as an instrument of political control, as it is commonly depicted in Mexican 
hlerature, rather unsatisfactory. Land reform has set in motion highly complex social 
and political processes that cannot be summarised under the heading of'domina-
tion'. I propose instead to approach land reform as part of processes of state forma-
tion. This is followed by a discussion of some of my fmdings in this light. I conclude 
with brief critical reflections on understandings of community, ethnicity and current 
directions in land policy. 
Three observations and a paradox 
In reviewing the findings on the Tojolabal Highlands, one of the first observations 
is that land reform has been so successful that practically the whole region has been 
'ejidalised'. In terms of land tenure, ejidos and the related tenure regime of bienes 
comunales have come to dominate most of the region. Furthermore, the ejido is the 
basic form of socio-political organisation. Both land tenure and local governance 
possess all the required attributes of ejidos and I would venture to say that the ejidos 
in the Tojolabal Highlands are as much ejidos as you might find anywhere in Mexico. 
A second observation is that land reform played an important role in the creation of 
the communities found in the region today. As we saw, land reform grouped people 
together around resources that they were required to petition for and administer as 
a collectivity and supplied them with the institutional model for doing so. In the 
process, the communities of land reform beneficiaries not only assumed the external 
features of the state's institutional construct, the ejido, but also developed into an 
effective structure of governance at the local level. As I have pointed out, commu-
nities assert their power to govern not only in land tenure matters, but also far 
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beyond these. This was at least partly an outcome of the collectivist design of the 
ejido and of the lack of other recognised structures of local government, an issue that 
I will also return to below. Third, and finally, a certain tension may be observed 
between community governance and the exercise of control by state agencies. De 
facto community control enters several spheres formally defined as the competence 
of state structures, especially the land reform bureaucracy but also state-level and 
municipal governments. Communities of land reform beneficiaries contest the 
state's capacity to govern not only insofar as the regulation of property rights is 
concerned, but also in the fields of the administration of justice and local develop-
ment. 
Taken as a whole, these observations reflect a certain paradox. Land reform bene-
ficiaries have both adopted much of the ejido model and sustained multiple chal-
lenges to state control. Through land reform, the Mexican state created the commu-
nities in the Tojolabal Highlands very much in its own image, yet at the same time 
it seems to have created the basis for resistance to state interference. The paradox is 
especially acute if we consider the ejido as an instrument of political control. Such a 
view - part of what Rubin (1990) has called the 'corporate myth' - cannot explain 
how land reform could at the same time have so obviously 'succeeded', in creating 
ejidos, yet 'failed' so dismally in terms of controlling the peasant population. To solve 
the paradox, it is necessary to abandon state-centred perspectives of land reform and 
include in the analysis the numerous contentions that state engagement in land 
tenure has involved in both the past and the present. In other words, land reform 
has to be understood from a perspective that encompasses both conditioned endow-
ment 'from above' and processes of appropriation 'from below". In this chapter I 
attempt to develop such a perspective, drawing especially on recent work on state 
formation processes in Mexico but also encompassing notions from institutional 
analysis and legal anthropology. I begin by oudining the state-centred vision of the 
ejido. 
Ejidos and the state 
Avenues of state control 
In much of the literature on Mexico, land reform is depicted as an instrument of 
control for keeping the peasant population in check. Gledhill expresses this 
succinctly when he states: "To be a campesino is to be politically dominated" (1991: 
26). As mentioned in Chapter Two, the ejido has generally been thought to be one 
of the cornerstones of the corporate state in Mexico. Lazaro Cardenas, the godfather 
of redistributive land reform in Mexico, was also one of the principal architects of 
the modern state, embarking upon a project of nation-bunding that has been known 
cisforjando patria (forging a nation). Land reform and the creation of ejidos in rural 
regions were crucial elements in this project. They would serve as the means for 
achieving pacification, increased legitimacy and the institutional presence of the 
state in rural areas as well as the development of the national economy. Since the 
1960s, scholars have consistentiy argued that this integration of Mexico's rural popu-
lations also implied their subordination. 1 In this view, inspired by ideas from 
dependency theory, cultural ecology and Marxism, land reform was an instrument 
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of political control employed to curtail rural unrest and facilitate the development 
of capitalism. 2 Land reform is viewed as either instrumental to structural exploita-
tion and subordination of the peasantry (Gutelman 1974) or as being unable to 
counter their unfavourable position within the economic system as a whole (Grindle 
1986). Much of the debate on the peasantry relates to the fields of agricultural 
production and commercialisation, and explores the unfavourable impact of price 
structures, credit facilities and technological developments on the reform sector. I 
will not pursue this issue further here, since it falls largely outside the scope of this 
book. Instead, I will restrict myself to two parallel avenues of state control distin-
guished in literature, that could be called the 'political-bureaucratic' or 'corporate' 
and the 'bureaucratic-institutional'. The first highlights the corporate organisational 
structure of the reform sector while the second underlines the ability of the land 
reform bureaucracy to control land tenure and the internal organisation of ejidos. 
The corporate route to control addresses the incorporation of land reform bene-
ficiaries into a single peasant organisation, the C N C (Confederation National 
Campesina), created by Cardenas in 1938 and closely connected to the governing 
party (PNR first, later PRI) ever since. The CNC is generally understood to defend 
state interests and it has been argued that it guaranteed 'peasant quiescence' 
although national policies were detrimental to the interests of the reform sector. 
Warman, for example, identifies "political control" as the most important function 
of the CNC, meant to ensure that peasants "keep quiet, don't make a noise, don't 
organise and don't exert pressure" (1982 [1972]: 106). Grindle puts forward a similar 
argument, stating that "the inclusive organization of the CNC and the dependence 
of ejidatarios on the state became the primary means for co-opting and controlling 
political demand-making and protest in the countryside" (1986:177). Moreover, for 
decades, corporate control over the peasantry guaranteed the PRI electoral victories. 
The dependence of land reform beneficiaries on the CNC and the state bureau-
cracy creates ample scope for their manipulation and subordination. As Warman 
(1972,1976) has eloquentiy stated, peasants may be enticed by promises, trapped in 
endless procedures, and become victims of extortion and 'divide-and-rule' policies. 
Likewise, Grindle stresses the power of the land reform bureaucracy 'to disaggre-
gate, co-opt, diffuse or relocate potentially threatening peasant protest' (1986:175). 
Although these manipulative tactics are generally seen as part of the corporate 
strategy to keep the peasantry in check, they may also indicate the limited success 
of incorporation. That is, such constant recourse to manipulation and divide-and-
rule tactics seems to reflect an awareness of the frailty of peasant compliance and a 
fear of possibly explosive protest rather than confidence in a stable and secure polit-
ical incorporation of the peasantry. 
The other route to state control, that I have called bureaucratic-institutional, is 
contained in the design of the ejido itself. The ejido land tenure regime provides 
several entry points for the exercise of control from the land reform bureaucracy that 
- as argued for example by Ibarra (1989)- allow for keeping unruly elements in 
check. Such important issues as the allocation/withdrawal of land rights within the 
ejido and the accreditation of ejido authorities (comisariado ejidal and comité de vigi-
lantia) ultimately depend on approval by the land reform bureaucracy (Ibarra 1989: 
318-9), giving the latter considerable scope to exercise pressure on 'devianf groups 
or co-opt loyal' groups. Similarly, restrictions on the alienation of ejido land (espe-
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dally the prohibition on selling) provide state agendes with opportunities for control 
and supervision that may be used to promote their political agendas. 
The need to problematise state control 
How effective state control over land reform beneficiaries may be is dear, for 
example, from the studies by Ronfeldt for Atendngo in Puebla (1975) and Rus for 
San Juan Chamula in Chiapas (1994). Rus shows how the co-optation of indigenous 
leaders since the Cardenista period turned Chamula into a bastion of support for the 
PRM (later PRI), ensuring - amongst other things - a steady flow of seasonal labour 
to coastal coffee plantations. Rus*s study does not centre on the land reform process 
per se but on the political networks forged around Cardenista polides, engineered 
esperially by a man called Erasto Urbina. Urbina incorporated agricultural workers 
into a structure similar to that of the C N C for ejidatarios (the Sindicato de Traba-
jadores Indigenas, see also Wasserstrom 1983) and controlled most of the land redis-
tribution process in the Central Highlands, giving - as Collier (1987) argues - the 
PRM/PRI a strong hold on munidpal politics. Ronfeldf s study shows how national 
and state governments maintained a tight grip on the vast, sugarcane producing 
ejido Atencingo, forcing the ejidatarios to accept a large collective ejido when they 
would have preferred smaller separate ones for the different settlements involved, 
and committing them to the exdusive cultivation of sugarcane, despite their wish to 
broaden productive options and indude maize cultivation. These cases are good 
examples of how state agendes may exerdse control through incorporation and by 
using the legal possibilities for surveillance of the ejido. 
However, my findings for the Tojolabal Highlands suggest that we should not 
equate land redistribution and the creation of ejidos too readily with subordination 
and state control. I am not denying that under given circumstances state agendes 
may skilfully employ combinations of co-optation and repression to impose certain 
projeds or pre-empt resistance. Indeed, I believe that manipulations of the land 
reform bureaucracy as underlined by Warman and others were pervasive. But we 
should be careful not to take them as a successful strategy of domination of a mono-
lithic state with dear objectives. Apart from the f a d that such a perspective exag-
gerates the coherence and purposefulness of the state apparatus, it ignores the f a d 
that the Mexican state was very often only partially successful in keeping land reform 
beneficiaries in check. Furthermore, a number of questions remain regarding the 
workings of such control. 
In the first place, one may doubt the strength of the 'corporate grip'. As regards 
the Tojolabal Highlands, as of the late 1970s, land reform benefidaries organised in 
structures that developed largely outside state channels and that the government was 
unable to co-opt (Harvey 1990; also Chapter Three of this book). The overt, well-
articulated resistance to state control inspired by Zapatismo in recent years is based 
on these earlier experiences. If there has been any corporate control of the region, 
we may therefore condude that it has certainly failed to deliver ever since the 1970s. 
One interpretation of these events is that the rise of opposition movements reflects 
a breakdown of the corporate system. However, it is also possible that in regions like 
the Tojolabal Highlands, such corporate control never existed in the first place. The 
latter interpretation is supported by a growing body of literature which argues that 
the corporate state may be a myth rather than an adequate description of Mexican 
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political realities between 1930 and 1970 (Knight 1 9 9 0 , 1 9 9 4 ; Rubin 1990,1997) . 
Knight argues that "the PRI never exercised the kind of unblemished hegemony 
sometimes suggested" (1990: 95). Certain regions or realms fell outside corporate 
control. In Rubin's words: "Although there has been a centralized state, an official 
party, and powerful mass organizations affiliated with the PRI and the regime since 
the Cardenas period, these institutions and organisations were established only 
partially and unevenly." (1990: 249). The hegemony of the PRI (or the corporate 
system) must be described in terms of its imperfections, limitations, and lacunae 
atid of fragmentation, vulnerability and contestation (cf. Knight 1994: 51, 53). The 
Tojolabal Highlands seem to have been one of the 'holes in the cheese', to quote 
Rubin again. 
It must be admitted, however, that the precise nature of the workings of political 
organisation in the region between 1940 and 1970 is hard to assess. Most contem-
porary observers only began reporting on the region in the 1970s and other sources 
are not readily available. 3 We also know that the votes for the PRI were guaranteed 
and that would-be land reform beneficiaries relied to some extent on the services of 
the CNC. But their 'incorporation' seems to have been little more than that. My 
impression is that, contrary to what Rus found for the Chamula region, the Tojo-
labal region was rather loosely tied to structures such as the CNC. Compared to the 
Central Highlands, state institutional presence in the Tojolabal Highlands was 
extremely limited. This helped the CNC and the PRI remain rather distant actors 
with no apparent direct relevance to the life of the population. This only changed in 
the increasingly politicised environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when 
both sought to increase their presence by means of the INI regional centre and the 
Tojolabal Supreme Council in Las Margaritas. But the INI and the Supreme Council 
were highly controversial from the start. They antagonised the groups that had just 
begun to organise politically in the Tojolabal Highlands, distancing them from the 
PRI and CNC. It should also be noted that although organisations in this region 
assumed the form of ejido unions, they maintained a high degree of independence 
from the state (Harvey 1998, Legorreta 1998). 
As discussed in Chapter Three, all the elements of the machinery of manipula-
tion were identified for the Tojolabal Highlands: corruption, endless procedures, 
dubious involvement of the land reform bureaucracy in conflicts, as well as outright 
violent repression. However, rather than achieving greater state control, these 
ajctions seem to have done quite the opposite, contributing to a de-legitimisation of 
the state apparatus and fuelling independent organisations that were highly critical 
of the state. A further question is whether manipulative actions of land reform offi-
cials (or other brokers) were indeed aimed at achieving state control. As suggested, 
they may have responded less to a corporate master plan than to possibilities for 
private gain (see the section on 'the cultivation of ambiguity'). Without denying the 
possible political use given to land conflicts, the dynamics seem marked more by ad 
hoc responses to explosive situations, half-informed guesses and miscalculations on 
both sides, with unpredictable outcomes for any of the parties involved. 
State control through the corporate route has therefore been difficult to achieve 
in the Tojolabal Highlands. The same holds for the bureaucratic-institutional route, 
which involves interference by the state apparatus in the internal organisation of the 
ejido. In this region, in all the fields providing entry points for state control - the allo-
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cation/withdrawal of rights, the accreditation of ejido authorities, and the organisa-
tion of production - the land reform bureaucracy played a far more circumscribed 
role than the formal design of the ejido property regime would suggest. In all of 
these fields, governing such vital concerns as access to land, management of the 
commons and leadership, primacy of control rested with the communities. The land 
reform apparatus confirmed rather than determined local decisions. (Its role was 
more crucial in the field of conflicts and boundary disputes, which I will discuss in 
more detail below). 
My dissatisfaction with the understanding of land reform primarily as an instru-
ment of control is not only related to the limited explanatory power it holds for situ-
ations like those I encountered in the Tojolabal Highlands. It also springs from the 
lack of attention to the question of when and how such control might be established, 
what it entails and how it works in practice. In fact, there have been few attempts to 
bring out the complex and sometimes contradictory ways in which such control is 
established or how processes of contestation take place within the corporate realm. 
In this regard, Ronfeldf s and Rus's studies of Atencingo and Chamula are notable 
exceptions showing that even where the state did establish a tight hold on local 
dynamics, control is not 'simply there' but needs to be enforced, legitimised and 
conquered in manifold ways. Domination is not an abstract quality of a political 
system but requires a considerable, continuous effort. It requires a sustained polit-
ical investment that is only worthwhile if the economic or political stakes are high 
enough. In the cases mentioned, they were: Atencingo produced significant 
revenues, Chamula was an important source of indigenous labour and provided a 
much-needed means of enforcing federal control in Chiapas. Moreover, the cases of 
Chamula and Atencingo suggest that control depends on skilled politicians with 
both a sufficient insight into local dynamics and good connections at the higher 
levels. Furthermore, the physical presence of individuals connected to a not too 
distant state institution - like Urbina's scribes and later the \H\-promotores in 
Chamula - seems crucial. In other contexts, the land reform bureaucracy or state 
government may have neither the interest nor the capacity to control local dynamics. 
Regarding the institutional route to control, a number of questions remain. It has 
been correctly pointed out that the ejido regime of land tenure has the possibility of 
control by the land reform bureaucracy built into it, so to speak. But one more often 
encounters general statements of the possibility of control than studies embarking 
on the detailed analysis of the actual processes of interference by state agencies in 
concrete ejidos, charting how and to what extent the institutional route to control is 
covered in practice. Rather than assuming that such control takes place, the ques-
tions that need to be addressed are under what circumstances and in what ways the 
land reform bureaucracy seeks to assert its control and with what results. It should 
be pointed out that the ejido regime gives collectivities of land reform beneficiaries 
a significant role in the overall management and organisation of their ejidos. The 
role of the land reform bureaucracy in this field is reactive and corrective rather than 
pro-active. Thus, depending on the degree of control the land reform bureaucracy 
actually seeks to establish, in practice ejidatarios might achieve a considerable degree 
of autonomy over internal affairs, as they did in the Tojolabal Highlands. 
As an instrument of state control, land reform in the Tojolabal Highlands hardly 
seems to have been successful. However, this does not mean that it did not have 
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important social and political consequences. The Mexican state has made itself felt 
in the communities of land reform beneficiaries in numerous contradictory ways. 
To address these issues we need a perspective that recognises the important role of 
the state without, however, being overly state-centred, that is, attributing agency prin-
cipally to the state. Recent approaches to state formation processes afford such a 
perspective. 
Land reform and state formation 
the state formation perspective 
To understand the consequences of the land redistribution process on communities 
of land reform beneficiaries in the Tojolabal Highlands, we need to look beyond the 
direct exercise of control and examine the multiple ways in which the Mexican state 
reached into the region. I found the perspective on processes of state formation - as 
proposed, among others, by Joseph and Nugent and the other contributors to their 
groundbreaking volume Everyday Forms of State Formation (Joseph & Nugent 1994) 
- extremely mspiring in this respect. 4 From the state formation perspective, rule and 
domination are understood as ongoing processes of legitimation and contestation. 5 
Purnell for example, writing on state formation in Michoacan, speaks of "a histori-
cally contingent process in which different actors, elite and popular, struggled to 
define the normative and institutional parameters of the state." (1999: n ) . Mallon 
understands state formation as hegemonic processes, "nested, continuous processes 
through which power and meaning are contested, legitimated, and redefined at all 
levels of society" (Mallon 1995: 6). The difference with a concept such as 'nation 
building' is that whereas the latter refers to the project of certain elites, 'state forma-
tion' points to complex and historically contingent processes of political change. 
Although nation building may have as its goal the estabhshment of state control over 
peripheral regions, the state formation perspective elicits the multiple contentions 
and re-negotiations this involves. 
The shift in perspective has consequences on the way we understand land 
reform. Rather than as an instrument of control (the effectiveness of which can 
hardly be doubted), land reform can now be understood as part of attempts by the 
state to assert its power over local dynamics and redefine relations of property and 
authority, with uneven and contradictory results. I therefore propose to discuss land 
reform and the ejido in terms of contention. What Purnell concluded for Michoacan 
holds equally for the Tojolabal highlands: "Agrarian reform, then, was neither a 
cynical and manipulative top-down imposition nor a peasant Utopia. Rather, it was 
an arena of contestation in which different actors advanced competing and often 
contradictory understandings of the origins and nature of property rights and of who 
could ultimately define and distribute them." (1999:12). 
The success with which state control could be effectively established was highly 
variable, depending on local conditions. Nugent and Alonso found that the people 
of Namiquipa in northern Mexico rejected the ejido regime of land tenure because 
it "was experienced as an imposition from without, as a form of state domination." 
(1994: 235). This has to be understood against the background of previous struggles 
over land and the meanings both land and state intervention had acquired in the 
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process. For Michoacan in the 1920s, Purnell found different reactions to land 
reform. Some communities reacted much like the Namiquipans. In their eyes, the 
ejido represented an 'illegitimate and undesirable level of state intervention in 
communal affairs' (1999: 12). Others, however, embraced the possibilities land 
reform offered in terms of obtaining both land and freedom from landowners 
(1999:7 & Ch. 3). In the Tojolabal region, accommodation and acceptance predom-
inated. Although not all mozos were equally enthusiastic about the possibility of 
ejido endowments initially, opposition such as that reported for Namiquipa was 
absent and the ejido soon gained ground. 
The different responses to the ejido were closely related to different regional histo-
ries. In both Namiquipa and Michoacan, rejection of the ejido was part of the 
defence of communal autonomy against an encroaching state. Amongst the mozos 
of the Tojolabal highlands, such a defensive culture of community was not as highly 
developed. The ejido did not have the same connotations of illegitimate domination 
nor was it contrasted with restitution - the legal recognition of lands the commu-
nities already possessed. In Namiquipa and a number of communities in 
Michoacan, land reform was seen as more mreatening than in the Tojolabal High-
lands. State interference was both more insistent and potentially more disruptive. 
As Purnell writes, land reform and the creation of ejidos would imply "a significant 
increase in the state's role in rural communities, in regulating and disMbuting prop-
erty rights, and in establishing the organisational forms and legal procedures 
through which newly created agrarian reform communities would relate to the state" 
(1999: Ch. 3). This entailed specific threats to communities - or rather specific 
groups wilhin communities. 
Land reform implied a 'conditioned endowment' through which the state sought 
to restructure land tenure and the organisation of authority and decision-making. It 
involved the re-framing of property rights, labelling people in terms of their 
'agrarian condition", and prescribing new institutional forms through which access 
to land and political representation were to be organised. It did not rely solely or 
primarily on coercion and oppression but involved multi-faceted and everyday 
processes, extending "into the social and cultural arrangements of daily life" (Wolf 
1 9 9 9 : 4 4 ) . Through land reform, the state conditions and confines, registers and 
measures, represents and misrepresents, coerces as well as seduces, encourages and 
antagonises. It is important to stress that these processes have a symbolic as well as 
a material dimension. State formation processes operate "not only in terms of words 
and signs but also necessarily involve[s] a material social process; that is, concrete 
social relations and the establishment of routines, rituals, and institutions that 'work 
in us'." (Joseph & Nugent 1994: 20; also Roseberry 1994). They not only act upon 
people's identities and discursive repertoires, but also entail struggles over the organ-
isation of time and space (Sayer 1994), the allocation and distribution of resources, 
the provision of services and the organisation of local governance. 
This material, or as I prefer to call it, institutional side of state formation is of 
great relevance to our present discussion. That is, the analysis of land reform needs 
to address how state institutional models permeate local land tenure arrangements 
and how dealings with the land reform bureaucracy shape organising processes. For 
a long time in the Tojolabal Highlands, for all practical purposes the presence of the 
state was limited to its engagement in land reform. In such contexts, land tenure 
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becomes one of the principal domains in which state formation takes shape and 
provides an important window onto it. As part of state formation processes, land 
reform not only involves, creates and shapes struggles over land tenure, but land 
tenure itself is the battieground. As Purnell expressed it, much of the contention 
involved in state formation processes takes precisely the form of struggles "to define 
the normative and institutional contours" of the state (1999: 7). I see this focus on 
the institutional dimension of state formation processes as complementary to the 
cultural or symbolic dimension. Where Knight speaks of 'cultural engineering* 
(1994: 59), we might add 'institutional engineering'. It seems useful to relate state 
formation not only to discourses on nationhood and citizenship (one of the dimen-
sions Mallon has developed, 1995) but also to understandings of properly, the organ-
isation of authority, and the acceptance and legitimacy of the institutional models 
proposed by the state. To further develop this particular perspective on state forma-
tion processes, a brief excursion into institutional and legal anthropological analysis 
seems useful. 
Developing a perspective on institutions and governance 
From the vantagepoint of land tenure, communities in the Tojolabal Highlands 
appear as governance structures. I first argued this in Chapter Three of this book 
and in subsequent chapters showed what this 'governing' comprised and how it was 
asserted vis-a-vis state structures, most notably the land reform bureaucracy, but also 
state and municipal governments. I also stressed governance as practice, rather than 
restricting myself to legal definitions of governing capacity. That is, I focussed on 
the ways in which this governing capacity is organised and exercised in practice, 
both vis-a-vis its own constituency and in relation to the outside. In doing so, I am 
building on the framework for analysing the workings of the governance of shared 
resources developed by Ostrom (1990). Ostrom defines institutions as "sets of 
working rules" that govern the management and distribution of resources, provision 
of collective goods, decision-making procedures and authority (Ostrom 1990: 51). 
Her framework provides a useful starting point for analysing the design, enforce-
ment and re-negotiation of institutions. It provides a vocabulary and brings out 
some of the crucial dilemmas involved in local governance (such as ensuring 
compliance and limiting free riding). 
The relevance to our discussion lies in the fact that Ostrom's framework helps 
chart the playing field on which state institutional models or property definitions are 
brought to bear and may meet resistance. The state can make attempts to prescribe 
rules and shape institutional arrangements at different levels and make claims to 
control the distribution of entitlements. As we saw, land reform legislation in Mexico 
has such a prescriptive role and authorises the state to supervise the allocation of 
rights within land reform communities. Ostrom underlines the importance of so-
called "external policy regimes" which may be facifitative or repressive of self-organ-
isation and points to the problems that may arise when states fail to recognise insti-
tutional regimes developed at the local level (Ostrom 1 9 9 0 : 1 9 0 ) . However, her 
perspective is limited as far as understanding the processes of contention that state 
intervention may entail. Ostrom departs from the effectively operating 'rules', that 
is, the rules that are commonly known, monitored, and enforced in a given context 
(1990: 51). She does not explore the multiplicity of norms or address the ways in 
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which struggles over the 'rules at work' are played out in practice. This leaves some 
of the central questions regarding land reform and state formation unanswered, 
such as how the state attempts to impose its own institutional models and property 
defniitions and with what consequences, when and how resistance occurs and what 
the consequences of ambiguities or contradictions are between state-imposed and 
other sets of rules. Insights from legal anthropology are useful for answering such 
questions. 
Legal anthropologists have long recognised the coexistence of multiple norma-
tive orders and have challenged the idea that "governments are the primary locus 
and determinative source of regulation" (Galanter, cited in Spiertz & Wiber 1996) . 6 
The work of Sally Falk Moore has been central in this regard. She introduced the 
concept of "semi-autonomous social field", characterised by the fact "that it can 
generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that it is also vulnerable to 
rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is 
surrounded" (1978: 55). Although certain conceptual problems have been identified 
with the notion of semi-autonomous social fields, such as the difficulties involved 
in demarcating these fields analytically (see F. Benda 1997:12 , also Nufjten 1998: 
18-9), I nevertheless find it useful. It underpins my understanding of communities 
as structures of governance. The notion recognises the ability of communities to 
create "enforceable and binding rules" (Falk Moore 1978:17), but also acknowledges 
that local institutional arrangements and governing practices do not take place inde-
pendentiy or irrespective of state regulation. The concept thus opens up avenues for 
studying the complex interactions between rules and institutions at the community 
level and state attempts at regulation. This makes it directiy relevant to understand-
ings of land reform processes, whereby states enter such semi-autonomous social 
fields. In fact they do more, since land reform may also reconfigure or even create 
such fields (see also below on the 'productiorf of community). 
To my mind, the essence of the semi-autonomous social field is located in its rule-
making and rule-enforcing capacity, that is, in its assertion as a structure of gover-
nance vis-a-vis other governance structures, including the state. It is not so much a 
separate normative order, as a claim to control and the exercise of a governing and 
juridical capacity. In the sphere of norms themselves- that is as far as the content of 
certain rules is concerned, what they stipulate, and the criteria they contain - there 
is no strict separation or necessary opposition between rules generated at the 
communal level and state law. We saw for the Tojolabal Highlands that local insti-
tutions draw upon traditions and practices from finca times as well as on state legis-
lation. With land reform, elements of the ejido model permeated local norms and 
property definitions. Several authors have made a similar point, arguing that local 
arrangements are at least partly based on official regulations and laws (Sierra 1995; 
Jansen & Roquas 1998; Jones 1998). Appropriation of state rules may even go so far 
that they may "at a later stage be opposed, as local law, to new legal reforms of the 
state" (F. von Benda-Beckmann & K. von Benda-Beckmann 1997: xii). 
A certain degree of permeability of local rules and land tenure arrangements to 
state regulations does not preclude opposition to state control. When communities 
contest state control, they do this not only or primarily on the basis of the authen-
ticity or originality of their rules - though claims to authenticity do sometimes play 
a role - but by defending the legitimacy of their governing capacity. It is not the 
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content of the rules, but the rule-making and rule-enforcing capacity that is at stake. 
This can also be illustrated with reference to the factional struggle between Catholics 
and Adventists in Chibtik. Although in that struggle, a community agreement and 
state legislation were opposed, it should not be reduced to a conflict over norms. The 
crucial issue at stake was a dispute of control, about which norms were valid and who 
was entitled to decide on the latter. It was a measure of strength between two 
competing claims to control. Specific norms are employed to support certain claims 
or de-legitimise others. What use they are put to cannot be explained on the basis of 
their content alone, but needs to be understood in relation to disputes of control. 
In order to address such disputes, I propose to move beyond the study of norms 
in the strict sense and to centre the analysis on governing practices, which involve 
decision making procedures, the organisation of authority, the exercise of control, 
and a positioning vis-a-vis other claims to control. Analysis should not only include 
conflict resolution - at the centre of much of the work in legal anthropology - but 
also address the ways in which rights to resources are asserted, regulations enforced, 
de facto juridical competence defined and the capacity to interfere in concrete situa-
tions claimed. It should also focus on the mutual challenges and negotiated settle-
ments between different claims to governance. Studying these issues ethnographi-
cally is one way of addressing the complex and contradictory processes of state 
formation in the Mexican countryside. 
Ways out of the paradox 
Together, the state formation perspective and the focus on governing practices 
suggest ways out of the paradox introduced at the beginning of this chapter. The 
processes of turning land into ejidos on the one hand, and resistance to state control, 
on the other, as I described them for the Tojolabal highlands, constitute a paradox 
in that what was a creation of state efforts, the ejido, turned against the state itself. 
Paradoxes such as these lie at the very heart of state formation processes. Attempts 
by states to extend their control generate resistance but at the same time "set[s] out 
the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can 
occur." (Joseph & Nugent 1994:20). It is along these lines that we may understand 
that the ejido as an institutional construct of the state, could apparentiy be success-
fully introduced into certain regions, while at the same providing the 'central terms 
around which and in which' state intervention was contested. 
Land reform was a 'conditioned endowment'. However, this conditioned endow-
ment involved complex processes of appropriation on the part of the land reform 
beneficiaries. As Nugent and Alonso put it: 
"the meanings and symbols produced and disseminated by the state are not 
simply reproduced by subordinated groups. Popular culture is contradictory 
because it embodies and elaborates dominant symbols and meanings, but 
also contests, challenges, rejects, revalues, reaccents, and presents alterna-
tives to theni (1994: 211). 
Land reform can be understood much in the same way. If we read 'institutions and 
norms' where it says 'meanings and symbols' and 'local governing practices' where 
it says 'popular culture', the quotation captures that dual quality of land reform in 
Mexico, of informing and shaping local discursive and institutional repertoires while 
also providing the terms for resistance. 7 
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Land reform confronts populations with state legislation and institutional 
models. Even when state norms or rules are rejected, this very confrontation is likely 
to imply a certain penetration of local institutional repertoires. Jones argues in this 
regard that state law provides "a reference point (to be upheld or avoided), a source 
of inspiration and a language" (1998: 520). Similarly, I showed for the Tojolabal 
highlands, that although local discursive and institutional repertoires adopted 
elements from ejido legislation they did not simply reproduce it. Some of the cate-
gories and criteria afforded by land redistribution became part of people's frames of 
reference and organising practices, but they were re-signified (sometimes beyond 
recognition) in the process. Let us recall, for example, the extension of ejido rights 
according to internally established criteria, or the local re-functionalisation of the 
comisariado ejidal and the asamblea. The exercise in institutional engineering in the 
Tojolabal highlands thus involved the adoption of certain aspects of the ejido model. 
However, these were reworked and imbued with new meanings. Furthermore, as 
time went by, institutional arrangements developed according to local features and 
changing needs. Thus, the ejido was progressively endogenised and, regardless of 
the original intentions of the architects of modern Mexico, the Tojolabal made the 
ejido their own. 
I analysed the twin processes of conditioned endowment and appropriation by 
focussing on institutional arrangements and governing practices. This focus allowed 
m e to trace how the notions of land reform legislation had permeated local reper-
toires and to gain a clearer understanding of the role played by the state apparatus 
in local governance and land tenure. I propose therefore that such a focus can be 
relevant to the understanding of state formation processes. I understand land tenure 
in communities of land reform beneficiaries as constantly changing, constantiy re-
negotiated fields of contention 8 between state control and local claims to autonomy. 
Below, I will explore what this autonomy amounted to and how multiple contentions 
were played out in more detail. First, however, I will discuss how the community, as 
the semi-autonomous social field by which such contention is sustained, is partly a 
creation of land reform itself. 
The 'production' of community 
As has been pointed out by Aitken (1999), processes of state formation 'produce' 
locality. Meanings and forms of locality are constructed in relation to state engage-
ment while local identities are related to state categories, at the same time as state 
institutions are locally re-signified. In the Tojolabal Highlands, the land redistribu-
tion process has been one of the central spheres of state engagement with the local 
population in which notions and forms of community have taken shape. By acting 
upon entitlements, spatial arrangements, and forms of association and organisation, 
land reform has acted upon the constitution of community itself. Land reform 
provided some of the central terms around which community life is structured. This 
re-slTuctixring implied giving communities the institutional appearance of ejidos, but 
it has also turned them into de facto local governments. Land reform afforded land 
reform beneficiaries a material basis, a constituency and a specific jurisdiction and 
thus gave them a governing capacity. Through its design, execution and interaction 
with a particular regional context, the land reform process contributed to the forma-
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Hon of communities as we know them today in the Tojolabal highlands, able to 
sustain a substantial claim to autonomy. 
Processes of restructuring 
For the Tojolabal Highlands, land reform constituted a turning point in history. 
Admittedly, there were important continuities with the previous situation of finca 
hegemony, while land reform alone was not responsible for the transformations that 
took place. Nevertheless, it is no exaggeration to say that land reform shaped the 
developments in the region in decisive ways and was one of the fields in which state 
intervention most directly touched people's lives. Land reform not only redefined 
property relations, but acted on the social and spatial configurations, people's iden-
tification, their organising practices, and their loyalties and alliances. O f course, it 
did so in a situation where certain rights, legitimisation, institutions, and definitions 
of community already existed, interacting with them in complex and sometimes 
contradictory ways. 
Land redistribution recreated previously existing communities of mozos as 
communities of land reform beneficiaries. Fincas were usually transferred to their 
own resident labourers, but not without a considerable amount of restructuring. In 
almost all cases, land redistribution implied a certain re-grouping of former finca 
labourers around the endowments. In some cases only some of the mozos ventured 
to petition for the endowment, in others alliances were formed between groups of 
mozos from different fincas, and occasionally other individuals were included 
among potential beneficiaries. In some cases, the creation of ejidos involved the re-
location of the beneficiaries, in others they continued to five in their previous settle-
ments. Land redistribution redefined existing notions of property and redistributed 
entitlements to land. Most ejidos were created at least partly on the basis of the finca 
most of the land reform beneficiaries had previously belonged to, but the match was 
rarely perfect. Parts of fincas were given or sold to different groups and lands not 
previously owned by particular fincas were added to endowments. 
In the process of land redistribution, rights to land were re-assigned. New enti-
tlements were created and others denied. The process involved experiences of 
dispossession, firstiy among former landowners, but - more importantiy for our 
discussion - also among groups of mozos that were not always able to claim the 
lands they preferred or that they considered 'theirs' for being part of'their' fincas. 
In some cases, the establishment of ejido boundaries involved lasting conflicts, as 
certain groups refused to give up lands of which they claimed ownership that were 
assigned to others. Despite these experiences, by and large the boundaries drawn in 
the process of land redistribution have become socially endorsed boundaries. 
Boundary disputes have centred on where the ejido boundary should be rather than 
calling into doubt the legitimacy of the ejido as such. There was a certain amount of 
agreement as to the vahdity of the boundaries drawn by the land reform bureaucracy. 
This is a good example of how the land reform process succeeded in 'providing the 
terms' around which contention was structured (Joseph & Nugent 1994). The formal 
assignment of land rights by the land reform bureaucracy became part of people's 
legitimation. 
Through land redistribution, the Mexican state embedded land rights in a codi-
fied system, that of the ejido regime of land tenure, through which it also provided 
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a framework for internal organisation and socio-political representation. The game 
had to be played by the rules set by the state. Claims to land had to be justified on 
the basis of legally specified criteria and furthered through legally specified chan-
nels and procedures. The response of the land reform bureaucracy to such petitions 
was based on legal norms rather than local circumstances. Such a conditioned 
endowment has been understood by many authors as part of a process of domina-
tion (see introduction to this chapter). They claim that the state forced peasants to 
accept land on its terms and retained considerable supervision over ejido commu-
nities after the endowment. My interpretation is different. I understand land reform 
to have advanced through a mixture of coercion, acceptance and appropriation. 
In contrast to what has been reported for some other regions, I have not encoun-
tered a strong rejection of the ejido amongst the Tojolabal. On the contrary, in Tojo-
labal discourse, the possibility of acquiring land through backing by the Mexican 
state in opposition to hitherto aU-powerful landowners is generally regarded as liber-
ation from oppression and maltreatment. The fact that this possibility was strongly 
conditioned by the Mexican state is conveniently overlooked (although Tojolabal 
leaders promoting an Indianist project are a notable exception, see Hernandez Cruz 
1999). Now this may be a reflection of the very success of the hegemonic project in 
the case of the Tojolabal region. Much of the initial opposition or disagreement may 
simply have been forgotten. My own research leaves considerable doubt as to the 
degree of coercion and resistance involved in the early stages of land reform. The 
Tojolabal were not forced' to accept ejidos, but how much choice did they really have? 
Land redistribution along the lines stipulated by the government was virtually the 
only way they could obtain land (direct land acquisition also played a role, but only 
in the context of the threat of expropriation). Sayer has argued that it is precisely this 
power of the state to unilaterally set the rules of the game that makes state forma-
tion processes "profoundly coercive" (1994: 375). Furthermore, as land redistribu-
tion progressed, the groups remaining on the fincas were forced to enter the game 
for fear of losing out completely. It is not quite clear how this was experienced and 
possibly resented by different groups of people. Experiences of dispossession as land 
redistribution crosscut previous entitlements emerged clearly both in the archives 
and in people's accounts, but other dramas may have simply been silenced and 
forgotten, such as, perhaps, the dispossession of women in relation to the male bias 
of land redistribution. Another question relates to the possible displacement of tradi-
tional, elder leaders as younger men assumed leading roles in the dealings with the 
land reform bureaucracy. Although such a process has been suggested by 
Hernandez Cruz (1999), I have not been able to verify it. Research focussing 
precisely on these issues might possibly bring out the numerous forms of coercion 
involved in the land redistribution process more clearly than I have been able to do. 
Notwithstanding these obscurities, the widespread acceptance of the ejido in the 
Tojolabal highlands cannot be explained by imposition or coercion alone. The fact 
that the Tojolabal had been immersed in the fincas for several generations -rather 
than organised in independent communities - also influenced the process. Oppo-
sition to the ejido has been reported especially for communities that managed to 
retain their independence throughout the 19th century (see Nugent & Alonso 1994, 
Purnell 1999). Under those circumstances, increased state engagement and the re-
structuring of land tenure arrangements and authority relations was understood as 
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a threat. The stakes and risks were different in the Tojolabal highlands, however. In 
accepting ejido endowments, the Tojolabal mozos had less to lose than the members 
of independent communities. A similar distinction in the reception of the ejido 
between hadenda-based populations and independent communities was observed 
by Schryer in Huejufla (1990). There, the latter neutralised the forcibly imposed 
ejido regime to such an extent that Schryer spoke of'virtual ejidos'. 
The acceptance of the ejido in the Tojolabal Highlands can also be attributed to 
the institutional vacuum that arose after the dismantling of the finca regime. Under 
the new system, ways needed to be found of regulating entitiements and organising 
authority. The ejido model afforded a rninimal base on which to built these (see also 
Chapter Four for more on this discussion). In this process, several of the criteria for 
defming and allocating rights to land, as well as elements of the institutional model 
for internal organisation, were adopted. 
Constructing governing capacity 
In an attempt to move beyond an understanding of land reform as an instrument 
of control, I do not frame my analysis of the ejido in terms of de-structuring and dis-
empowerment, but rather in terms of re-stmdnxring, involving both empowerment 
and dis-empowerment. Contrary to what is often regarded as the 'bureaucratic-insti-
tutional route to control', the ejido regime of land tenure in the Tojolabal Highlands 
has comirmed communities of land reform benefidaries as structures of governance 
with a considerable ability to contest state control. The strength of the community 
in this region as a governing structure is linked to a combination of factors, amongst 
which the most important are its collectivist orientation, the relatively marginal insti-
tutional presence of the state and the lack of other effective and recognised forms of 
local governance. 
Mexican land reform was based on an essentially collectivist design. Land endow-
ments were made to groups of daimants who enjoyed legal representation vis-a-vis 
the state. Private rights were combined with common ownership of forests, pastures 
and water sources. Responsibility for overall management rested with the collectivity 
of benefidaries. The first thing to note about this design is that it implies, as Ibarra 
has pointed out, a recognition of groups of land reform beneficiaries as collective 
subjeds with legal status (1989: 313-4; also Artide 23 of the 1971 Land reform Law). 
Furthermore, this collectivity is given a considerable rule-making and rule-enfordng 
capacity as far as matters within the ejido are concerned. The ejido regime of land 
tenure leaves much of the internal organisation of authority, allocation of rights, and 
management of common land - all of which are vital concerns - to the collectivity 
of land reform benefidaries. 
However, it should also be noted that the design makes the ejido, as Ibarra has 
pointed out, "a contradidory unit whose constitutive elements are in constant 
tension." (1989: 22). Although it grants land reform communities substantial 
governing capacities, it also upholds a considerable theoretical d a i m to control by 
the state. Few authors would deny this dual quality of the ejido institutional model. 
But whereas most underline the possibilities this affords the state to interfere with 
ejido affairs, I stress the ability of land reform beneficiaries to limit, contest and re-
direct such interference. In practice, the exercise of control by the land reform 
bureaucracy may be far less than state-centred perspectives on the ejido suggest. I 
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found communities in the Tojolabal Highlands to have considerable scope for devel-
oping their own property arrangements and governance structures, by building on 
yet in other ways diverging from the stipulations of land reform legislation. Further-
more, they became de facto local governments with capacities extending well beyond 
those ascribed to the ejido in land reform legislation. 
A number of factors contributed to the strength and scope of the governance 
capacities of communities in the Tojolabal highlands (apart from the theoretical 
possibilities implied in the formal design). The first is the policy of non-enforce-
m e n t 9 that was generally observed by the land reform bureaucracy and other state 
agencies. Although the endowment process itself was heavily conditioned, direct 
interference by the land reform bureaucracy in internal affairs was limited once the 
ejidos were established. Norms for internal organisation were not consistently 
enforced, leaving ample room for the development of various arrangements at the 
local level. The policy of non-enforcement was related to both a lack of interest and 
a lack of enforcement capacity. As also argued above, in connection with the cases 
of Atendngo and Chamula, the Tojolabal highlands represented no high political or 
economic stakes. Furthermore, effective interference in local dynamics was 
hampered by the weak state institutional presence in the region. As mentioned 
earlier, this only began to change in the 1970s. 
The practice of non-interference confirmed, by default, the governing capadty of 
the communities. The extension of their governing capacity beyond the realm of 
'ejido matters' is likewise related to the practice of state intervention in the region. It 
must be pointed out here that there is some ambiguity concerning the competence 
of the ejido authorities. Formally, the ejido model only grants legal recognition to the 
collectivities of land reform beneficiaries and only insofar as matters of land tenure 
are concerned. However, the distinction between the ejido and the locality or between 
ejido matters and those of general concern for the population, is not dearly estab-
lished. In practice, the collectivity of land reform benefidaries and the community 
have been juxtaposed and, until quite recently, ejido and community matters were 
bardy distinguished. This was so in people's own perception but also in the way they 
were addressed by government agendes. The responsibilities of the ejido authorities 
were frequently extended to matters other than land tenure regulation, to indude 
for example, imrastructure and the provision of services. 1 0 This was explained quite 
simply by the f a d that there were no alternative structures of governance that state 
agendes could have used as an entry point. In practise, therefore, ejidos have been 
endorsed as de facto local governments with a far wider jurisdiction. 
Admittedly, the fad that Tojolabal communities of land reform benefidaries func-
tioned as de facto local governments with far more authority than formally allowed 
for, does not in itself explain why recent political projeds have explidtly centred on 
autonomy (as described in Chapters Six and Seven). For that, it was necessary for 
political identities to take shape in opposition to state intervention. However, without 
that governing capadty, communities would not have been able to sustain then defi-
ance of the state in the way they are presently doing. By supplying some of the 
central terms around which communities became structured, land reform also 
provided some of the central terms for resistance to state intervention. 
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Fields of contention 
Land tenure in communities of land reform beneficiaries involves partly overlap-
ping and at times contradictory claims to control. It is therefore best described in 
terms of contention. As Jones has put it: 
"properly rights are about power (principally the ability to exclude), about the 
symbolism of who is able to exert power at particular moments and places, 
and how communities approach the government and interact with it."(2000: 
222). 
This section focuses on how such corrfrontation is played out and on the ways insti-
tutional arrangements take shape and are re-negotiated in the process. As Jones' 
words suggest, much of the contention concerns the engagement of the Mexican 
state with land reform communities. As mentioned earlier, considerable tension is 
inherent in the ejido regime of land tenure. On the one hand, it prescribes norms 
for the allocation of land rights and the organisation of decision-making and 
authority in land reform communities while affording the land reform bureaucracy 
the possibility of surveillance over local arrangements. At the same time, however, 
it allows such communities a considerable degree of self-government. 
I found for the Tojolabal Highlands that state control and the primacy of state 
legislation are not a given. When official legislation and community rulings are 
confronted, official legislation does not automatically 'wiri. Who governs land tenure 
is not clear from the outset but is fought out in different ways at various critical junc-
tures. This suggests that the degree to which state agencies can actually establish 
control over local dynamics and conversely, the degree to which communities can 
assert their autonomy, is not determined from the outset but is a question for 
analysis. Much of the contention between state agencies and communities is 
precisely about how far the state is allowed 'to get iri. In practice, land reform bene-
ficiaries accept, re-direct, neutralise or resist state engagement. Everything between 
relatively smooth accommodation and overt opposition may be found. 
Keeping the state out... or drawing it in 
In practice, the land reform bureaucracy does not always maintain the close surveil-
lance over institutional arrangements that the law formally affords it. This creates 
considerable scope for the re-working of the ejido institutional model at the grass-
roots level, a process to which I have referred as appropriation. The divergence that 
may thus occur between the gicfo-in-theory and ejiios-in-practice does not give rise 
to problems in or of itself. Whether or not it does depends on a number of contex-
tual factors. Often, such divergence is not even detected. On the one hand, as 
mentioned earlier, in the Tojolabal Highlands many of the norms and specifications 
contained in the land reform law are unfamiliar to ejidatarios, with the exception of 
those on which land reform authorities have insisted during the endowment 
process. On the other hand, land reform officials rarely possess accurate knowledge 
of local arrangements. There is therefore a certain 'margin of invisibility' that hides 
divergence from view. This generally limits the problems to some of the most impor-
tant stipulations, such as the appointment of ejido authorities, the criteria for quali-
fying as an ejidatario, and the ban on selling ejido land. 
Official regulations may be deliberately circumvented or neutralised. The offi-
cially prohibited, but frequentiy occurring sales of ejido land are probably the best 
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example for Mexico as a whole (e.g. Jones 2000, Nuijten 1998). An example from 
the Tojolabal highlands is the inclusion of more right-holders to the ejido than those 
formally listed. Such divergence does not necessarily give rise to major contradic-
tions. In practice, there is often considerable room for accommodation. To avoid 
confrontation, communities may combine token compliance with highly visible 
aspects with the clever use of margins of invisibility. In the Tojolabal highlands, for 
example, the inhabitants comply with the appointment of ejido authorities, but do 
so through locally endorsed procedures that bear only a faint resemblance to official 
ones. The room for manoeuvre is related to that fact that the land reform bureau-
cracy does not express a generalised interest in having ejido communities comply 
with the law. Compliance is not a goal in itself or a self-explanatory mission. Rather, 
the extent to which divergence between local arrangements and legal norms is 
regarded as a problem cannot be separated from wider social and political contexts. 
Insistence on legal requirements needs to be understood in relation to wider polit-
ical agendas. From the perspective of the land reform bureaucracy, non-compliance 
opens up possibilities for pursuing political goals, and applying different punish-
ments or rewards to communities. This opens up possibilities for manipulation. 
Whether such manipulation is successful, however, depends on the extent to which 
state officials are able to adequately interpret the local situation. In practice, however, 
this may be rather difficult, time-consuming and risky. 
Exercising control over the allocation of land rights and dedsion-making proce-
dures in communities of land reform beneficiaries is a complicated affair. Commu-
nities have numerous ways of keeping the state at a distance if they wish to do so. 
The difficulties land reform or munidpal authorities encounter in dedphering - let 
alone manipulating - communities should not be underestimated. They are at a 
great disadvantage when dealing with local arrangements that they cannot know and 
therefore are unable to contest. How does one enforce a spedfic allocation of land 
rights, for example, when it is impossible to tell who is who in a situation where all 
the men seem to resemble each other, where many names are repeated, and where 
few people have birth certificates so there is no way of checking whether they are 
who they say they are? In practice, the difficulties of dedphering the local situation 
severely hamper the 'institutional route' for controlhng the ejido. I do not deny that 
state control may take place. However, I argue that state efforts to interfere with the 
local level take place in complex fields of contention that will be configured differ-
endy in relation to social and political conditions. Spatial remoteness, language 
differences and the limited institutional presence of governmental agendes in rural 
communities, together with the presence of particular brokers and the different 
interests at stake, influence the ability of communities to withstand state interference. 
Communities of land reform beneficiaries have a number of mechanisms for 
keeping the state out. The distance of state agendes can be strategically used to keep 
local arrangements out of sight. In the region of study, binding agreements known 
only to community members, the use of the indigenous language, together with 
knowledge of local events and geography were strategically used to maintain 
opaqueness as regards local dynamics. Such a 'conspiracy of silence' could be hard 
to crack. Although this cannot fully prevent state intervention, it does condition and 
constrain it. 
My emphasis on the possible effectiveness of communal dosure vis-a-vis state 
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agencies (or other outsiders) should not be interpreted as a denial of conflicts at the 
local level. Internal strife is part and parcel of communities, but - as Mallon (1995) 
has also argued - this does not preclude the possibility of forming powerful coali-
tions vis-a-vis the state. When a common front is formed, this can be very effective. 
Even if the state has an interest in gaining tighter control over local dynamics, the 
possibilities of doing so are extremely limited as long as the 'conspiracy of silence' 
is) maintained. Struggles between or fissures wilMn communities provide the neces-
sary 'entry point' for state engagement. It is therefore misleading to discuss state 
ihtervention purely in terms of a binary opposition between 'state' and 'community'. 
In the Tojolabal highlands, state intervention usually took place in relation to strug-
gles between or within communities. This was clear from the discussions of partic-
ular conflicts in previous chapters (such as the struggle between Chibtik and Santo 
Domingo and the factional struggle between Catholics and Adventists within 
Chibtik), where state agencies were drawn into the conflict by one or both of the 
parties involved, each of which sought to use this involvement to its advantage. 
The interaction between local conflict and state intervention is fairly complex. 
Though the initiative rests largely with local actors, changes at the political level and 
the ways these are perceived by different stakeholders play an important role. Polit-
ical openings and new possibilities for alliances alter the balance of power at the 
local level. Other actors, most notably political organisations such as ejido-unions or 
more recently, the EZLN, are also important players in this field. What I specifically 
wish to underline is that interference by state authorities was limited to serious 
conflicts and contingent on the interests of one of the groups involved. 1 1 This has 
consequences for the meaning that state engagement has acquired. 
Challenging the state 
Factional conflicts provide state agencies with an entree into local dynamics. 
However, the association of state interference with factional interests did not 
contribute to a construction of legitimacy of the state; on the contrary, as I suggested 
in relation to the Chibtik case, factional conflicts frequendy provided a pretext for 
political chentelism and repression. Since state or municipal governments used legal 
norms in their attempts to control and let the conflict work to the advantage of their 
own political agendas, they contributed to an understanding of the state as a polit-
ical actor and state legislation as a political instrument . 1 2 The result was the 
increasing politicisation of both state intervention and state law itself, rather than 
legitimacy. As the region became increasingly politically organised from the late 
1970s onwards, state intervention and state law became the axes around which 
polarisation took shape. The state became an ally, albeit always a dangerous one, to 
some and an adversary to others. We should be careful not to oversimplify these 
oppositions. The public political stances of peasant political organisations - for or 
against 'the governmenf - did not always coincide with the concrete choices of 
specific groups of peasants when trying to win a land dispute, for example. Never-
theless, political projects emerged in which the legitimacy of the state was increas-
ingly called into question. In that context, compliance or non-compliance with state 
law acquired symbolic importance. The very competence of the state to prescribe 
and enforce norms was at stake. Compliance with norms provided by the state thus 
became a political statement about 'what side you were on.' Thus, irrespective of the 
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fact that many local land tenure arrangements draw on the ejido model, Tojolabal 
communities drew up political projects that reject and oppose state laws. There is 
no contradiction in this, if we realise that it is not the authenticity of norms, but the 
legitimacy of rule-enforcing capacity, or governance, that is at stake. 
In the early decades after the beginning of land reform in the region, Tojolabal 
communities enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy 'by default. They were left 
largely to their own devices to develop land tenure arrangements and authority struc-
tures. As long as they respected some of the principal rules of the game, local 
arrangements and official norms were accommodated without major struggles. The 
politicisation of land reform and the growing antagonism between state structures 
and communities affiliated to organisations not controlled by the latter, created a 
different situation, however. 'Autonomy by default gave way to an organised effort 
to limit the unfavourable effects of state interference on local affairs and processes. 
Autonomy became a political project in which the legitimacy of the state itself was 
challenged. This involved a redefinition of community as a space of resistance to the 
manipulation and repression of the government and a more articulated constitution 
of communities as separate jurisdictional spheres. This was strongest amongst the 
communities affiliated to independent organisations such as the C I O A C (i.e. the 
Pueblos Tojolabales ejido u n i o n ) , 1 3 but it was also present amongst communities that 
were members of the Lucha Campesina ejido union. The defence of autonomy as a 
political project culminated under Zapatismo. At both the discourse and the prac-
tical level, the EZLN expticitiy challenges the capacity of the state to govern. Much 
of the struggle is about whose government prevails. The opponents of Zapatismo 
abide by 'the law of the government' whereas the Zapatistas have their own laws. 
It is clear then, that there was never such a thing as hegemonic state control in 
eastern Chiapas. Neither the primacy of state legislation nor its power to interfere 
with local arrangements has ever been firmly established. In those situations in 
which clashes between community rulings and state regulation occurred, the 
outcome was more often a negotiated settlement between the two extreme positions, 
than a unilateral imposition of state law. This testifies to the rule-making and rule-
enforcement capacity of communities. (As I have shown, this capacity was also 
upheld vis-a-vis the EZLN. Its legislating ambitions were subjected to similar re-
negotiations to those that state attempts to introduce the ejido had decades earlier.) 
Analysis of land redistribution shows that the state has often been successfully 
defied. Since the stagnation of land reform in the 1970s, groups of peasants have 
frequently managed to push land reform beyond its own limits. Another example 
are the serious obstacles the implementation of PROCEDE encountered in the 
region, even before the Zapatista uprising was a fact. But Zapatismo in particular 
has cast serious doubts on the extent to which the state controls land redistribution 
and land tenure in Chiapas. As we saw, the official 'end-of-the reform' discourse and 
agrarian legislation proved to be of little value against the quest for land of many 
landless young families in Chiapas. 
Community, boundedness, and identity 
In this book, I have explored the ways in which land reform has acted on the consti-
tution of community. I have discussed at some length how I diirik we might look at 
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land, reform (proposing to understand it as part of processes of state formation) and 
now wish to briefly reflect on my understanding of community. When I speak of 
land reform as constitutive of community, I mean that land reform re-structures 
people's identifications, their commitments and ahgnments. In the region of study, 
land reform affected notions of property, entitiements, forms of organising, and of 
articulation with the state bureaucracy. It associated particular groups of people with 
specific, clearly delimited, mutually exclusive and largely contiguous areas, providing 
them with legal recognition and representation vis-a-vis the state and affording them 
ai certain degree of governing capacity in local matters. Thus, land reform 'produced' 
community. 
Such a historical contingency of specific social formations has also been under-
lined by Eric Wolf and others working from the perspectives of cultural ecology or 
Marxism (see Hewitt 1984: Chapter 3; Cancian 1989). Wolf regarded what he called 
the 'closed corporate community' as a product of colonialism in Mesoamerica 
(1955). 1 4 We can look upon more recent historical processes in the same way that 
Wolf looked upon colonialism and relate social formations in the countryside to 
specific modes of state administration. Community is not only or essentially a colo-
nial construct, but also a 'moderri one. At this point, it is important to stress that I 
have deliberately not spoken of the re-constitution of community. I do not see the 
community in the Tojolabal highlands as a recovery of earlier, pre-fmca or perhaps 
even pre-Conquest, social forms. Rather, I understand communities as new forma-
tions arising under specific conditions, without claiming, however, that they are 
entirely new, that is, allowing for both continuities and discontinuities in relation to 
finca times. 
Land reform did not just produce community; it produced a corporate commu-
nity. Wolf defined the corporate community in terms of restricted membership, 
corporate control of land, prescription of rights, duties and behaviour to its 
members, and collective representation (see Wolf 1955,1966). The communities of 
the Tojolabal highlands display all these features. Land reform reinforced the 
community as an integrated entity with a strong territorial base and a recognised 
governing capacity. In the context of finca hegemony in the region, land redistribu-
tion facilitated the formation of tightly knit communities. It contributed to the 
confluence of the four dimensions of community outiined in Chapter One - those 
of shared identity, shared residence or locality, shared interests, and a shared struc-
ture of governance - while at the same time building upon previous loyalties based 
on kinship and religion. 
I can only partly account for the specific institutional arrangements developed in 
Tojolabal communities or for the power of the collectivity over individual members 
with reference to land reform. The asamhlea as the central governing body, the prin-
ciple of equal shares and the close monitoring of rights and duties - to mention 
some of the central institutions - were developed in the context of the land reform 
process and the discontinuities it implied. They can only be fully understood, how-
ever, with reference to other factors, notably the specific dynamics of institutional 
development in relatively small groups that depend largely on shared resources, and 
Mayan cultural repertoires. As to the first, I expect the solution to be related to the 
distiplining force of property (as suggested by Sabean (1990); see also Chapter Four) 
and specific collective action dilemmas facing the population. 1 5 Even institutional 
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analysis on these lines, however, would be incomplete without some reference to 
Mayan culture. Nevertheless, tracing such cultural influences would require a 
different, more historical and comparative approach than I have followed here. 
The concept of the corporate community has been much criticised. It has been 
pointed out that Wolf's original conceptualisation over-emphasised the homogeneity, 
stability and isolation of these communities. Here I wish to address one of these crit-
icisms concerning the boundedness of communit ies . 1 6 Wolf presented communi-
ties as unambiguously bounded entities (using, for example, the image of an island, 
ref). This is undoubtedly a misrepresentation. The boundaries around communi-
ties are much more fluid and permeable. However, we should not discard the issue 
of boundaries all together. Although boundaries may not be 'clear-cut', boundary 
construction is nonetheless a primary concern in communities. I found a contin-
uous engagement with processes of in- and exclusion and re-negotiation of member-
ship. In my view, boundedness understood as the construction and maintenance of 
boundaries is a defining characteristic of community. 
These boundaries are not just symbolic or discursive. They involve institutional 
discontinuities that are directiy relevant to people's access to vital resources and serv-
ices. Boundaries between communities and to a certain extent within communities 
are constructed through property arrangements, rules for group membership and 
sets of rights and obligations. As we saw, the design, enforcement and re-negotia-
tion of such rules and arrangements is at the heart of community dynamics. Insti-
tutions function as boundary markers. This was apparent in the conflict between the 
two factions in Chibtik, but is also a highly relevant issue in the present conjunc-
ture, where political identities are expressed by opting for one law* over another. It 
is jurisdiction that makes the community, just as the community makes jurisdic-
tion. In legal anthropology, this is no new insight. Falk Moore's concept of the semi-
autonomous field brings this out, but it is also underlined, for example, by Karst and 
Rosenn when they argue that a kind of mutual re-enforcement exists between law 
and community (1975: 674-7). However, this dimension seems to have been some-
what neglected in the present tendency to understand community in terms of 
'community of meaning' and belonging. For communities such as those analysed 
in this study, speaking of belonging makes no sense without reference to institutional 
arrangements governing the rights and duties of the adherent constituency. Adher-
ence to specific sets of rules, access to resources, and identification are closely linked. 
Identity and identification are thus directly related to issues of governance and 
jurisdiction. I argued that for the Tojolabal highlands, community membership was 
heavily structured around land endowments. As a consequence, locality and collec-
tivity of right-holders were hardly distinguishable from one another. Originally 
agrarian categories such as derechero or avecindado became important referents of 
identity. Furthermore, ejido boundaries translated into jurisdictional boundaries, in 
the sense that the land belonging to one community also became the territory to 
which community rule extended. Land redistribution thus contributed to the 
construction of indide/outside divides, with spatial, symbolic, and material dimen-
sions. Not only did boundaries get drawn between communities, but the Tojolabal 
Highlands also have become progressively constituted as a Tojolabal space. Two 
processes influenced this. On the one hand, the disappearance of individual private 
properties made the region a domain of 'community rule'. The remaining private 
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properties, not subjected to community rule, were small islands of exception. On 
the other hand, the region Tojolabalised'. Land reform entailed a process of ethnic 
homogenisation, since not only the ladino landowners but also many of the mestizo 
caretakers left the region, or became - as we saw in the case of Chibtik - part of a 
Tojolabal land reform community, intermarried with the Tojolabal, adopted their 
language and also became subjected to community rule. 
There is a clear sense of the region as an 'inside' domain, where the Tojolabal 
language predominates and people can be identified and held accountable with 
Reference to their community. This contrasts strongly with the 'outside', made up of 
cities with their government offices. There, different sets of rules are valid and 
different behaviour is effective. People are well aware of this and adapt their behav-
iour accordingly. Both the Tojolabal themselves and external agents such as govern-
ment officials, NGO members and pastoral workers, recognise and re-create the 
cultural, institutional and jurisdictional discontinuities between 'inside' and 
'outside'. This does not mean the Tojolabal are confined to their own domain. Nor 
are the ways the different domains are defined and positioned in relation to one 
another unchanging. On the contrary, the Tojolabal frequendy move in and out of 
the region. Furthermore, the Tojolabal appropriation of the urban sphere is in full 
Swing. This does not leave the divide between inside and outside unaffected, but 
neither does it dissolve it. 
I looked at community through the prism of land tenure. This revealed the 
community's most corporate countenance. My particular vantage point brought out 
the disciplining force of the community and highlighted some of the fiercest strug-
gles over in- and exclusion. Land tenure has also been one of the strongest axes 
around which community membership has been structured. I am aware, however, 
that community is constituted by a number of other processes and structured 
around other axes as well. In my analysis, these other processes have remain unex-
plored and I would like to comment briefly on what I may have overlooked. Alter-
native definitions of community may be related to religion, specific projects and 
political organising. In these other dimensions, the construction of community is 
dominated less by adult m e n and expresses more of the needs and concerns of 
women, unmarried youth, and younger, landless men. These alternative construc-
tions do not necessarily always run parallel to the construction of community 
around land in the way that I have brought out. They may indeed constitute 
competing projects over what the community is and should be. The community as 
a landholding collectivity is still very much alive. However, it is possible that under 
the influence of processes such as the growing number of men without land rights 
of their own, the increasingly important role of women and the influx of NGO actors 
and projects, alternative projects will grow stronger and eventually overshadow the 
Construction of community around land. 
Final considerations 
To conclude this book, I would like to focus on two concerns of a more general 
nature for which my study of the land redistribution process in the Tojolabal High-
lands might perhaps suggest new directions. I first point to the importance of land 
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redistribution processes for understanding ethnicity and then draw out some impli-
cations for land tenure policy. 
A note on ethnicity 
Although it is now clear that a large part of the land reform beneficiaries in Mexico 
are indigenous (based on a rough definition of language or belonging to one of the 
recognised ethnic groups), the way land reform has affected Mexico's indigenous 
population has hardly been explored. In fact, we know very little about what land 
redistribution and the creation of ejidos implied in particular regions, the ways it re-
organised and re-territorialised the population, and how it interacted with earlier 
notions of property, territory, and identity. As briefly mentioned earlier, the ejido was 
not originally designed to honour ethnic claims, and may in certain contexts have 
been used to neutralise or frustrate them. Some authors have argued that the ejido 
de-structured larger indigenous communities, reducing the wider social linkages 
between groups and weakening the organisational structure. In the Tojolabal High-
lands, however, and the same might hold for other indigenous populations that were 
once part of fmcas, the ejido became the axis around which new identities and loyal-
ties took shape. 
This suggests that land reform may have interfered or even set in motion 
complex processes of ethnic reorganisation, acting upon forms of social organisa-
tion and identity construction, as well as the ways indigenous populations have 
become inserted into the national s ta te . 1 7 Land reform should not just be under-
stood in terms of disintegration but also in terms of the emergence of new axes of 
integration. It is true that land reform drew people together in relatively small, terri-
torialised clusters, with loyalty coming to rest largely with that group (Collier speaks 
of 'parochialisation' in this regard, 1987). But it is one-sided to see this as a problem 
in itself. Political projects may well be built upon such community structures. It 
should also be stressed that notions of citizenship, rights and nationhood - central 
to current political projects - may well have begun in many regions on the basis of 
the creation of ejidos. Note that in eastern Chiapas resistance has been sustained 
from within ejidos without seriously challenging or questioning the figure of the ejido 
itself. On the contrary, the indigenous population defended the ejido as theirs and 
contested Salinas's reforms to land tenure legislation aimed at <hsmantling the ejido. 
A better testimony to the extent to which these populations have made the ejido 
theirs could hardly be found. 
The impact of land reform on indigenous regions may also be important to 
understanding present demands for autonomy. The proposals for indigenous 
autonomy as they are currentiy being developed in Mexico contain different (and at 
times diverging) conceptualisations of territory and community. One of strongest 
among these is centred on communities as contiguous, exclusive domains in which 
private rights are combined with collective responsibility. 1 8 Territorial control and 
land rights are among the central demands of indigenous peoples' movements all 
over Latin America (e.g. Assies 2000, Deere & Leon 2000). In Mexico, this partly 
translates as the ejido being defended as an indigenous institution. In autonomy 
projects, territory is a twin concept of community. Together they are understood to 
constitute a spatial, jurisdictional domain where a specified collectivity enjoys 
governing capacity regarding both resources and people. It is also a sphere with 
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considerable autonomy as regards internal affairs and one that has traditionally 
allowed for keeping the state at a certain - though perhaps not always safe enough 
- distance. In many cases, such understandings and practices of governance that we 
now define as 'typically indigenous' have developed within ejidos and bienes comu-
nales, probably at least partly as a result of their semi-autonomous nature. 
In my view, the question to be addressed in future research is not whether land 
reform converted Indians into campesinos or whether loyalties are primarily based 
on class or ethnicity. Rather, the question is how understandings of Indian-ness are 
constructed in present day Mexico and what roles the ejido and the land redistribu-
tion process may have played in this, in informing notions as central as community 
and territory. We could thus begin to address two key issues in the field of ethnic 
reorganisation: the role of the state in shaping ethnic identities and the material, 
territorial and institutional dimensions of ethnicity. 
Concerning policy 
In discussing land tenure as a field of contention I have stressed that state inter-
vention in land tenure sets in motion processes that extend beyond the realm of 
policy, taking directions beyond the initial intentions. As land reform becomes 
enshrined in social reality - shaping people's notions of property, reoistributing enti-
tiements, re-arranging governing capacities - it can no longer be controlled by it. 
Nevertheless, in policy as well as in academic circles in Mexico, land tenure regula-
tion often continues to be treated as the exclusive domain of the state. This has 
become quite clear in the debate on the reforms of agrarian legislation in Mexico, 
where both advocates and adversaries attributed great transformational power to the 
legal changes. The extent to which land tenure is contested seems to have been 
generally underestimated. The limits to the self-attributed monopoly of the state as 
these are being disputed by communities of land reform beneficiaries have been 
largely ignored. 
'Social engineering' by means of land tenure regulation is by no means easy. The 
intricate interaction between multiple sources and spheres of regulation makes the 
outcome of state intervention in land tenure highly uncertain. To quote Falk Moore 
again: "Since, in a society as a whole, regulation emanates simultaneously from 
many social fields, including both corporate groups and less formally defined action 
arenas, the aggregate effect is extremely complex." (1978: 29). Failure to meet the 
intended purposes, together with unplanned and unexpected consequences, is the 
result. This holds not only for past, but also for present policies, as the paradoxical 
outcomes of the PROCEDE programme indicate. As discussed by Jones (1998, 
2000) and Zepeda (1999) many ejidos were registered through the programme, but 
the vast majority have decided to continue to be ejidos rather than convert to private 
property (less than one percent in terms of ejidatarios, 1.5 percent in terms of the 
number of ejidos, see Zepeda 1999: 207 (Table 8)). One way of interpreting this is 
that ejidos have sought to retain their considerable degree of control over the defini-
tion and allocation of property rights and felt that they would be threatened under 
the new situation. 
This brings us to a second consequence of understanding land tenure as a field 
of contention, regarding tenure security. In evolutionary perspectives on land rights 
(see the discussion by Platteau 1996) tenure security is seen to depend primarily on 
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private land tides granted by the state. This argument has underpinned much of the 
trend towards tiding and registration programmes in Latin America as well as in 
Africa. However, in view of the considerable role of ejido communities in adminis-
tering land tenure within their corrfines, one could argue that tenure security has 
been largely dependent on local recognition, together with or in some cases irre-
spective of or in opposition to state backing. Platteau (1996) argues that there is tittle 
reason to believe that tiding and registration programmes do much to promote 
tenure security in Africa. A case study for Honduras in fact suggests that it might 
do quite the opposite. Jansen and Roquas show that the P I T (Frograma de Titulacion 
de Tierras) contributed to increasing insecurity in a number of cases and entailed 
serious risks of dispossession for the most vulnerable segments of the population 
(Jansen & Roquas 1998). 
The limits of the hardcore neo-liberal recipe for land policy in Latin America are 
now becoming visible (Kay 1999, Zoomers & Van der Haar 2000). The emphasis 
on titling and privatisation (the cornerstones of the neo-liberal paradigm) has some-
what eased and greater recognition of communal tenure systems is supported 
(Deminger & Binswanger 2001). Instead of a full withdrawal of state involvement 
in land tenure with a view to letting the market do its job, the emphasis has shitted 
to institution budding, calling for a different role for state agencies. 1 9 Together with 
de-centrahsation policies and greater recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, 
these new approaches are likely to give actors other than state agencies a greater 
recognised role in land tenure regulation. These may be communities, associations, 
but also NGOs, environmental agencies and agri-business. Although it might open 
up new spaces, this process will undoubtedly involve dilemmas and contradictions 
of its own. The task will be to document and problematise how property arrange-
ments, definitions of territory and governing capacities are being redefined and how 
contestations over these issues are being played out. 
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Notes 
i In developing this point, I rely heavily on 
Hewitf s insightful discussion of 
academic debates on the peasantry in 
Mexico (1984, especially Chapters 4 and 
5). Amongst the important exponents of 
this view are Arturo Warman, Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, Amando Bartra and Luisa 
Pare. 
4 On the role of land reform in the devel-
opment of capitalism see Gutelman 
(1974), Grindle (1986) and Otero (1999). 
3 Municipal archives together with a closer 
scrutiny of the land reform archives 
might yield such information. 
4 Other works elaborating on this perspec-
tive that I will refer to are Mallon 1995 
and Pumell 1 9 9 9 . 
^ The state formation perspective works 
with notions o f rule and domination that 
draw on Gramsci's conceptualisation of 
hegemony. See Mallon (1994), Roseberry 
(1994) and Wolf (1999). 
6 For a recent discussion of anthropolog-
ical treatment of the plurality of legal 
systems, see Falk Moore 2001. 
7 A similar duality is found in the 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities, 
which reflect elements of formal munic-
ipal government at the same time as they 
contest its legitimacy (see Chapter 
Eight). 
8 The notion I introduce here, of field of 
contention, is loosely based on Nuijteris 
'field of force' which incorporates 
notions of process and actions drawn 
from Long (1989) at the same time as it 
emphasises power and srtuggle (1998: 
17-20). 
9 I first encountered the term in Bouquet 
and Colin (1996). 
10 Stavenhagen, for example, noted: 'As a 
locality, the ejido is also the object of 
other agencies: the Ministry of Public 
Education, the Federal Commission for 
Electricity, the Ministry of Public Health 
and Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and livestock, e t c ' (1970: 253). 
iji A similar argument can be made in 
criminal justice. Although nominally in 
charge of upholding the law, and 
pumshing murderers, for example, state 
authorities have little opportunity of 
knowing a murder has been committed 
unless it is reported to them. Whether 
or not it is reported to them will depend 
on local conflicts, tensions and power 
relations. 
12 The important role of legislation 
regarding forests should be mentioned 
here. Although the ejido regime of land 
tenure imposes restrictions on the use 
of forests, it was precisely the forestry 
laws issued by the Chiapas state govern-
ment that served as an entry point for 
state control. Ejidatarios were required 
to obtain logging permits which could 
relatively easy be used for political 
purposes. Furthermore, the ban on 
logging (veda forested) issued under 
governor Gonzalez Garrido in 1988, 
outlawing not only logging but also 
slash-and-burn cultivation, caused 
numerous conflicts with peasants (see 
Villafuerte, Garcia & Meza 1997; also 
Harvey 1998). 
13 I described in Chapter Eight how the 
member communities of Pueblos Tojo-
labales formed a region wide Tojolabal 
Government. 
14 In an earlier publication he argued that 
this type of community was functional 
to indirect Spanish rule, in tax collection 
and recruitment of labour (1955), which 
served to re-enforce social organisation 
along corporate lines. Later, he stressed 
the corporate structure as a response to 
the adverse conditions under colo-
nialism, as a defence mechanism by 
which the rural populations could 
protect themselves from the greatest 
threats to their subsistence (1959, see 
Hewitt 1984: 74-75). 
15 See, for example, Ostrom 1990, Baland 
& Platteau 1 9 9 6 , North 1990, Olson 
1965 on this issue. 
16 The supposed egalitarianism has also 
been m u c h criticised (see for example 
Cancian 1989, Ouweneel 1996). In m y 
discussion of the principle of equal 
shares, I present a different interpreta-
tion of the preoccupation with equality 
that one may encounter in indigenous 
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communities, following PopMrfs focus 
on problems of resource distribution. 
17 The term ethnic reorganisation was 
introduced by Nagel and Snipp to 
analyse processes of economic, social 
and political change among indigenous 
peoples (1993); see also Assies 1 9 9 9 . 
18 Stephen (1997) contrasts communally 
oriented and more regionally oriented 
projects o f autonomy. 
19 This is discussed more fully in Van der 
Haar 2000a. 
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Glossary 
A E D P E C H : Democratic State Assembly of 
the People of Chiapas/AsamMea Estatal 
Democrdtica del Pueblo Chiapaneco. 
Agostadero: uncultivated pastureland. 
Ajnanum: (Toj.) healer with potentially 
dangerous powers. 
Ampliation: extension to an ejido endowment. 
ANCIEZ: Emiliano Zapata Independent 
National Peasant Alliance/Alianza 
National Campesina Independiente Emil-
iano Zapata. 
Anexo: private property attached to a larger 
estate or finca (usually because it has been 
acquired separately). 
ARIC: Rural Collective Interest 
Association/Asododon Rural de Interes 
Colectivo. 
Asamblea: regular village meeting (also 
tz'omjel or junta) usually m d u d i n g adult 
m e n only, asamblea ejidal refers to the 
meeting of right-holders in the ejido. 
Baldio: usually refers to land lacking private 
title. In region of study also used to refer 
to the time of debt peonage, when people 
had to work 'for nothing'. 
Baldianos: people that 'work for nothing' on 
fincas, also mozos or peons. 
Bienes comunales; communal ownership of 
land recognised under Mexican law; 
constitutes, together with ejidos, so-called 
'social property' and is subject to the regu-
lations of land reform law. Unlike 'private 
property' it does not equal full ownership 
since restrictions on selling and leasing 
apply. 
Cabecera: 'head town', meaning capital of 
township or munidpality, seat o f munic-
ipal government. 
Cadque: l o c d political boss or strongman. 
CAM: Joint Agrarian Commission/ Comisiôn 
Agraria Mixta, involved in the proce-
dures for ejido endowments at the state 
levd. 
Casa grande: for fincas: the landowner's resi-
dence. 
Campesino: peasant, smallholder. 
CEOIC: State Council of Indigenous and 
Peasant Organisations/Consejo Estatal de 
Organizationes Indigenas y Campesinas. 
Certificado Agrario: certificate testifying to 
holder's rights in an ejido endowment. 
CIOAC: Independent Confederation of 
Agriculturd Workers and 
Peasants/Central Independiente de Obreros 
Agricolas y Campesinos. 
CNC: National Peasant 
Confederation/ConferaridfT National 
Campesina. 
Comisariado ejidal: three-headed council 
governing the ejido, answerable to the 
assembly of e/iîo-members and their 
representative to the land reform bureau-
cracy (in the region of study, the term is 
used to indicate the head of the council, 
who is offidally called the présidente del 
comisariado ejidal). 
Comité ejecutivo agrario: three-man 
committee leading the petition for ejido-
land, acting as a representative of would-
be benefidaries, which is dissolved or 
transformed into the comisariado ejidal as 
the endowment becomes a fact. 
Comunidad: community, term used to refer 
to rural settlement or locality, mostly in 
indigenous regions. 
Copropiedad: form of joint private property. 
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Dotation: land endowment in the form of an 
ejido. 
Ejidatario: right-holder in an ejido, ejido-
member. 
Ejido: originally referred to the commons 
surrounding a village; since the 1930s has 
referred to land granted under the land 
reform programme and subject to a 
special tenure regime. 
Encargado: caretaker or foreman on private 
estate. 
FIAPAR: credit scheme for cattle sharecrop-
ping and productive farming 
projects/Programa de Aparcerta Bovina y 
Proyectos Productivos Agropecuarios 
Finca: large landed estate, hacienda. 
Pinquero: owner of large estate, landowner. 
Inafectabilidad ganadera: exemption from 
liability for land redistribution of privately 
owned land used for cattle ranching. 
INI: National Indigenous Institute/Instituto 
National Indigenista. 
Komon: (To].) community, collectivity. 
Ladino, ladina: 'white', Spanish-speaking, 
non-indigenous person, usually carrying 
the connotation of rich and powerful. 
Mayordomo: foreman at finca, encargado. 
Milpa: field or plot for maize cultivation, 
sometimes in conjunction with other 
crops (beans, pumpkins). 
Mozo: landless labourer at finca, peon. 
Nortenos: 'Northerners', name given to polit-
ical advisors from central and northern 
Mexico in the 1970s. 
OCEZ: Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organisa-
tion/ Organization Campesina Emiliano 
Zapata. 
Patron: boss, patron, landowner (equivalent 
offinquero). 
Peon (acasillado): landless labourer, resident 
at a finca 
Pequena propiedad: private property, in prin-
ciple no larger than the m a x i m u m exten-
sions established in the land reform legis-
lation, often the nucleus of a former 
finca. 
PRA: Agrarian Rehabilitation 
Programme/Programa de Rehabilitation 
Agraria; land acquisition programme 
carried out under Governor Absalon 
Castellanos. 
PRD: Democratic Revolutionary 
Party/Partido Revolutionario Democrdtico. 
Présidente municipal: mayor, municipal pres-
ident, responsible for governing a 
municipality or township. 
PRI: Institutional Revolutionary 
Party/Partido Revolutionario Institutional. 
P R O C A M P O : Direct Rural Support 
Programme/ Programa de Apoyo Diretio 
al Campo. 
PROCEDE: Programme for the Certification 
of Ejido Rights and the Titling o f Urban 
Housing Plots/ Programa de Certification 
de Derechos Ejidales y Titulaciôn de Solares 
Urbanos. 
Procuraduria Agraria: Prosecutor's Office for 
Agrarian Affairs. 
RAN: National Agrarian Registry/Regisfro 
Agrario National. 
Rancheria: rural settlement usually with 
lands that have not been acquired 
through the land reform programme. 
Rancho: ranch, private property. 
Selva Lacandona: Lacandona Rainforest in 
eastern Chiapas. 
Solar, housing plot, usually including 
houses as well as fruit trees, annual 
crops, and domestic animals; in Tojo-
labal maka. 
Tatjun: (Toj.) grandfather, old man. 
Union de ejidos: ejido union; the two formed 
in the region of study were called Lucha 
Campesina ('peasant struggle') and 
Pueblos Tojolabales (the Tojolabal peoples' 
or 'Tojolabal settlements') respectively. 
U U : Union of ejido unions/ Union de 
Uniones Ejidales y Campesinas de Produc-
tion de Chiapas. 
Vaquero: cowboy. 
Xinan: (Toj.) 'white', non-Indian, ladina. 
Zapatismo: the movement around and 
m d u d i n g the EZLN, Zapatista Nationd 
liberation Aimy/Ejértito Zapatista de 
Liberation National 
Zapatistas: adherents or supporters of 
Zapatismo, sometimes called neo-
Zapatistas to distinguish them from the 
followers o f Emiliano Zapata in the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1919). 
Zonte: measure o f load of maize, equivalent 
to 400 ears of maize. 
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Resumen 
Ganando terreno: el reparto agrario y la 
constituciôn de la comunidad en la 
region alta Tojolabal de Chiapas, Mexico 
Este estudio reconstruye el proceso de reparto agrario en una region indigena de 
Chiapas, denominada la region alta Tojolabal. Hasta 1930 esta region - que se situa 
entre los mas conocidos Altos de Chiapas y Cafiadas de la Selva Lacandona - estuvo 
dorninada por grandes propiedades en manos de famihas comitecas. Estas fhicas de 
un promedio de 3 000 hectareas cada una, estaban dedicadas a la ganaderia exten-
siva y el cultivo de granos basicos. Los antepasados de los pobladores actuales de la 
region, Tojolabales en su gran mayoria, vivian y trabajaban en estas fincas en caHdad 
de peones acasillados. 
Esta situation cambio drasticamente a principios de los anos treinta, cuando 
Lazaro Cardenas asumio la presidencia y busco implementar el reparto agrario 
tambien en Chiapas. En la region de estudio los efectos no se dejaron esperar. Tras 
cierta vacilacion inicial entre los peones, las solicitudes ejidales surgieron rapida-
mente una tras otra, afectando a todas las propiedades de la region. A menos de 
quince anos del inicio del reparto solo el cincuenta por ciento de la superficie 
finquera quedaba en manos de propietarios privados no-indigenas. En 1970 esta 
superficie se habia reduddo al diez por dento y en 1993 al tres por dento. La mayor 
parte de las tierras habian sido dotadas a los antiguos peones en forma de ejidos. 
Otras tierras (espedalmente las llamadas pequenas propiedades, inafectables por el 
reparto) fueron vendidas por los propietarios a grupos de interesados, otra vez anti-
guos peones en su mayoria. Estas tierras, mas recientemente, se convirtieron en 
bienes comunales. 
A raiz del reparto, la region se convirtio en una zona de comunidades agrarias, 
de pobladon casi exdusivamente Tojolabal. (Para 1990 existian en la zona alrededor 
de 26 localidades con una pobladon total de casi 15 000 individuos.) Este estudio 
empezo con preguntas acerca del como fue que las fincas dieron paso a estas comu-
nidades y que significo este proceso para la pobladon. Al buscar respuestas a estas 
preguntas, m e encontre con que estaba entrando a un terreno casi inexplorado. En 
la Hteratura sobre Chiapas el reparto agrario comunmente es tratado como un feno-
meno sumamente limitado. Se supone que el poder de los finqueros les permitio a 
6stos neutralizar y desvirtuar el reparto. Asi, se sostiene que el reparto tuvo lugar 
sobre todo en base a terrenos nacionales (evitando la afedacion de propietarios 
privados). De acuerdo con esta version, un reparto de a migajas sirvio para controlar 
protestas campesinas. Sobre lineas similares se propone la falta de reparto de tierras 
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como una de las causas del levantamiento Zapatista. Si bien esta perspectiva se 
explica a raiz de las limitaciones y abusos del reparte- agrario observados a partir de 
los afios setenta, pierde de vista que en algunas regiones el reparto tuvo un alcance 
nada despreciable. En las regiones en las que se encuentra la poblacion de habla 
Tojolabal, el reparto tuvo consecuencias sociales y politicos tan importantes que 
hacen de él uno de los procesos mâs relevantes de la historia contemporânea 
regional. 
Para explorar el proceso de reforma agraria en la region de estudio m e apoyé en 
trabajo de archivo asi como en trabajo de campo. Asi, pude constatar que un ochenta 
por dento del reparto se habia basado en afectadones a propietarios privados y solo 
un veinte por ciento en terrenos nadonales. Encontre ademâs que los finqueros se 
habian opuesto a las afectadones pero no habian logrado mâs que postergarlas. El 
éxito del reparto fue tal que prâcticamente toda la zona se 'ejidalizô'. No fue solo que 
los ejidos (y en menor medida las copropiedades y bienes comunales) desplazaron 
a la propiedad privada. Fue ademâs que las comunidades Tojolabales adquirieron 
una apariencia netamente ejidal. Llegaron a contar con todos los atributos reque-
ridos - comisariado ejidal, asambleas reguläres, actas selladas con el sello ejidal etc. 
Hoy en dia el ejido es un eje principal de identificaciôn entre los Tojolabales y los 
miembros del comisariado ejidal figuran como sus 'autoridades tradicionales'. 
El reparto agrario fue mâs que una redistribuciôn de la tierra. Contribuyô a la 
formaciôn de las comunidades Tojolabales tal y como las encontramos fioy en la 
zona, asi como al desarrollo de reladones conflictivas entre estas y el Estado mexi-
cano. El reparto recreö los conjuntos de peones de las fincas como comunidades de 
beneficiarios del reparto. Si bien tiubo derta continuaciôn entre 'tihea' y 'ejido' en 
cuanto a las tierras y grupos de pobladôn involucrados, el proceso impticö re-defi-
nidones, re-agrupamientos y, en algunos casos, re-localizatiôn. Como consecuenda, 
las reladones sodales se re-estructuraron alrededor de las dotadones ejidales. A la 
vez, sin embargo, el ejido como modelo institudonal estatal sufriô un proceso de re-
definition. El proceso de dotation condicionado 'desde arriba' a la vez implicô 
procesos de apropriariôn 'desde abajo'. 
Esto queda daro sobre todo al observar las formas en que se organiza la tenenda 
de la tierra al interior de las comunidades de la region. Noté por ejemplo que comu-
nidades manejaban sus propias listas de 'ejidatarios' o 'derecheros', que discrepaban 
de los registres ofidales. Las comunidades re-defiman y re-asignaban los derechos 
a tierra de los miembros individuales de manera relativamente autônoma, segûn 
normas que parcialmente seguian las prescritas en la ley de reforma agraria pero 
que en otros puntos divergian de estas. En los hechos, entonces, las comunidades 
han afirmado una capacidad considerable de gobierno, en la tenenda de la tierra y 
mâs alla de esta. Ejercen esta capaddad tanto frente a sus propios miembros como 
frente a la burocrada agraria. De multiples maneras han desafiado la competenda 
de esta ultima de prescribir e intervenir en la tenenda de la tierra en los ejidos, que 
le atribuye la ley. La tenencia de la tierra en la region emerge entonces como u n 
campo de contestation entre distintos y a veces opuestos redamos por el derecho de 
control de la tierra misma, en los que se enfrentan no solo distintas nociones de 
propiedad sino también distintas ambidones de définir y asignar derechos a tierra. 
Esta discusion queda ilustrada aqui por medio de la description de un conflido 
entre dos facciones en una comunidad. 
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En anos recientes, la resistenda a la intervention estatal ha sido mas explicita y 
parte de un proyedo politico mâs articulado. Desde 1994 los Zapatistas desconocen 
^biertamente la legitirnidad del Estado. Esto se relationa con el hecho de que - a raiz 
às la creciente politizaciôn de la intervenciôn estatal - a partir de los setentas las 
ïdentidades politicas en la region se han ido formando en oposiciôn al Estado. 
Ademâs, los Zapatistas mâs que nunca dejan al descubierto los limites de la capa-
ddad de control del Estado. Un daro ejemplo de ello son las invasiones de tierra que 
han obligado al Estado a reconocer una reforma agraria de facto, en contravention a 
todas las dedaradones ofitiales de finiquito agrario. Asimismo, mediante los muni-
tipios autônomos han logrado afirmar una considerable capatidad de gobierno fuera 
del alcance del Estado. 
Los procesos descritos arriba encierran una paradoja, sobre todo si los contem-
plamos desde la perspectiva - elaborada por autores mexicanos a partir de los 1970s-
de que la reforma agraria es esentiahnente un instrumento de control en manos del 
Estado. Esta perspectiva, si bien revelo la importancia de agendas sécrétas en el 
reparto, no nos permite entender cômo el reparto pudo a la vez haber tenido tanto 
éxito (en crear ejidos) y haber fracasado tan rotundamente (en controlarlos). Para 
<Jar cuenta de esta paradoja necesitamos superar la perspectiva del control estatal 
para buscar dar cabida también a las multiples contestaciones que el proceso de 
reparto agrario implica. Para elaborar tal perspectiva alternativa, trabajos recientes 
sobre los procesos de formation del Estado en Mexico ofrecen un punto de partida 
prometedor. Desde la perspectiva de formation del Estado podemos entender el 
reparto agrario como parte de intentas del Estado federal de extender su control 
hatia regiones nuevas, pero con resultados impares y contradidorios. Este ângulo 
de observation permite vislumbrar cômo el Estado penetrô en la region, re-defi-
niendo reladones de propiedad y de autoridad y generando multiples contestadones 
y re-negodadones. 
Procesos de formation del Estado tienen un calidad dual, que también se hace 
relevante en el caso de la reforma agraria: informa y pénétra repertorios culturales 
e institucionales a nivel local, pero con esto a la vez proporciona a las localidades 
términos centrales alrededor de los cuales se articula la resistencia. Podemos 
empezar a entender asi que la ejidalizaciôn de la region alta Tojolabal conllevô 
procesos importantes pero contradidorios que no se dejan resumir bajo la étiqueta 
de subordination. Tal perspectiva ademâs apunta al papel del reparto mismo en la 
constitution de las comunidades como espacios de resistencia y desafio al Estado. 
Estas argumentas se desarrollan a lo largo del libro, a través de très lineas narra-
tivas. En primer lugar, se narra la historia de una comunidad en particular, llamada 
San Miguel Chibtik. Los esfuerzos de los Chibtikeros por conseguir la tierra que 
habian trabajado desde hace generationes, las formas de administrar y repartir estas 
tierras entre los distintos miembros, y su participation en invasiones de tierra bajo 
la bandera Zapatista a partir de 1994, sirven como hilo condudor a lo largo del texto. 
Proporcionan también los puntos de entrada para discutir très procesos relacio-
nados: los contornos y los avatares del reparto agrario en la region (Capitulos Dos y 
Très), el desarrollo de arreglos y prâcticas de tenenda de la tierra en las comunidades 
de benefitiarios del reparto (Capitulos Cuatro y Cinco) y las ocupationes de tierras 
en anos recientes como parte del proyecto politico Zapatista (Capitulos Seis y Siete). 
El anâlisis de estos procesos constituye la segunda linea narrativa. En un tercer 
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piano, el texto se puede leer como una exploration de las multiples formas en que 
el Estado mexicano entré en la vida de la région. Abre asi una ventana sobre una de 
las principales rutas de formation del Estado en el oriente de Chiapas. Esta pers-
pectiva, asi como las consideraciones conceptuales sobre las que se sustenta, se 
elaboran sobre todo en el Capitulo Ocho. 
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Samenvatting 
Terreinwinst*: landhervorming en 
gemeenschap in de Tojolabalse 
Hooglanden van Chiapas, Mexico 
Deze studie reconstrueert het procès van landhervorming in een Indiaanse Streek 
in Chiapas, Zuid-Mexico. Vôôr 1930 werd dit gebied - ingeklemd tussen de beter 
bekende Centrale Hooglanden en het Lacandön oerwoud - gedomineerd door grote 
landerijen in handen van families uit Comitân, de zogenaamde fincas. Deze lande-
rijen waren gemiddeld zo'n 3000 hectare groot en bedreven naast extensieve 
veehouderij 00k wat landbouw. De voorvaderen van de huidige bewoners van de 
Streek, de Tojolabal-Indianen, werkten op de landerijen als peones, landarbeiders. Zij 
werden niet betaald, maar verworven in rail voor hun arbeid het recht op de lande-
rijen te wonen en maïs en bonen te verbouwen. 
Deze situatie veranderde drastisch begin jaren dertig van de twintigste eeuw. De 
toenmalige Mexicaanse president Lazaro Cardenas zette vaart achter de herverde-
Ung van land die vijftien jaar eerder wettelijk mogelijk was gemaakt. Hij onteigende 
landerijen die groter waren dan het toegestane maximum van enkele honderden 
hectares en gaf dit uit aan boeren die geen of te wefnig land hadden. Voor het onder-
zoeksgebied had dit grote gevolgen. Nadat de Tojolabalse landarbeiders hun eerste 
aarzelingen hadden overwonnen, volgden de verzoeken tot landtoewijzing elkaar in 
rap tempo op. In minder dan vijftien tien jaar was al de helft van het areaal van de 
landerijen aan de voormalige landarbeiders toegewezen en deze trend zette zieh 
door. In 1970 was nog maar tien procent van de landerijen in handen van particu-
lière niet-Indiaanse eigenaren en in 1993 was dit gedaald tot zo'n drie procent. Het 
gjrootste deel hiervan was uitgegeven in de vorm van zogenaamde ejidos, waarbij 
groepen van minstens twintig boeren gezamenlijk de zeggenschap kregen over het 
land, dat niet verhuurd of verkocht mag worden. Een ander deel van de landerijen 
is door de toenmalige eigenaars verkocht aan groepen boeren, in de meeste gevallen 
* Het bleek moeilijk o m een letterlijke vertaling van 'gaining ground' te vinden, dat 
verwijst naar de manier waarop de landhervorrningspolitiek terrein veroverde in het 
gebied van onderzoek, maar 00k naar de strijd die gemeenschappen hebben geleverd -
en nog steeds leveren- o m en over h u n land. Anders dan 'gaining ground' lijkt 'terrein-
winst' te verwijzen naar een fait accompli terwijl ik 00k een beeld wil oproepen van de 
voortdurende strijd die met landhervonning en regulering van grondbezit gepaard gaat. 
Als ik hier dus over terreinwinst spreek gaat het niet o m een makkelijke overwinning, 
maar o m een moeizame en altijd voorlopige verworvenheid. 
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voormalige landarbeiders. Later zijn de meeste van deze stukken grond erkend als 
communaal grondbezit (hienes comunales). 
Als gevolg van de landhervormingspolitiek maakten de grote landerijen dus 
plaats voor boerengemeenschappen met een overwegend Tojolabal-sprekende bevol-
king. (In 1990 bestond de Streek uit zesentiÄdntig dorpen met een totale bevolldng 
van bijna 15 000 mensen.) Uitgangspunt van deze Studie is de vraag hoe zieh dat 
procès voltrokken heeft en met wat voor gevolgen voor de lokale bevolldng. O m die 
vraag te beantwoorden begaf ik mij op grotendeels onontgonnen terrein. In de lite-
ratuur over Chiapas wordt landverdeling over het algemeen afgedaan als een zeer 
beperkt verschijnsel. Er wordt verondersteld dat de macht van landeigenaren zo 
groot is geweest, dat zij de pogingen tot landverdeling hebben kunnen blokkeren of 
minimaliseren. Er wordt vooral aandacht besteed aan de uitgifte van nationale 
gronden (waar geen daims van particulière eigenaars op rustten) en aan het mond-
jesmaat uitgeven van land om boerenprotest in te dämmen. Tegen die achtergrond 
wordt 00k het uitblijven van landhervorming in Chiapas aangevoerd als één van de 
oorzaken van de Zapatista opstand van 1994. Een dergelijk perspectief valt te 
verklaren uit de beperldngen en grove onregelmatigheden die landmtgiftes sinds de 
jaren zeventig hebben gekenmerkt, maar verliest ten onrechte uit het 00g dat in 
delen van Chiapas landhervorming ailes behalve beperkt is geweest. In de Streek 
bewoond door Tojolabal-Indianen heeft lancmervorming zodanig vérstrekkende poli-
tieke en sociale gevolgen gehad dat het één van de belangrijkste processen in de 
récente geschiedenis genoemd mag worden. 
O m een beter beeld te krijgen van het procès van landhervorming in het onder-
zoeksgebied, heb ik mij gebaseerd op uitgebreid archiefonderzoek en veldwerk. 
Daarmee kon ik in de eerste plaats vast stellen dat landhervorming inderdaad 
omvangrijk was geweest. Landuitgifte in het gebied was voor tachtig procent geba-
seerd op landerijen, de andere twintig procent was afkomstig van nationale gronden. 
Er was door de landeigenaren wel tegenstand geboden tegen onteigening, maar die 
was grotendeels zinloos geweest. Landhervorming was zo succesvol dat het prak-
tisch het hele gebied omvormde tot ejidos (en in mindere mate hienes comunales). 
Daarmee doel ik niet alleen op het feit dat deze nieuwe vormen van landbezit de 
particulière landerijen verdreven, maar 00k op het feit dat de dorpen in het gebied 
onmiskenbaar het aanzien van ejidos hebben gekregen. Vandaag de dag vertonen ze 
alle karakteristieke kenmerken - zoals onder andere de zogenaamde comisariado 
ejidal (die aan hert hoofd van de ejido-leden Staat), regelmatige vergaderingen en 
schriftelijke besluiten bekrachtigd met het spedale e/ido-stempel. De ejido is een 
belangrijk referentiepunt in de identiteit van de bewoners van de Streek geworden 
en veel van de bovengenoemde kenmerken gelden tegenwoordig als 'typisch Tojo-
labals'. 
Landhervorming was meer dan een herverdeling van land. Zij heeft in belang-
rijke mate bijgedragen aan de vorming van de Tojolabalse gemeenschappen zoals 
wij die vandaag de dag aantreffen in het gebied. Ook is zij bepalend geweest voor de 
gespannen betrekkingen fassen deze gemeenschappen en de Mexicaanse overheid. 
De huidige gemeenschappen zijn deels een produkt van het landhervormings-
proces, waarbij mensen hergegroepeerd zijn rondom stukken land. Hoewel er een 
zekere mate van continuïteit was tussen de landerijen en de ejidos, zowel wat het 
land als wat de bevolldng betraf, hield landhervorming een flinke herordening in. 
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Groepen van voorrnalig landarbeiders hebben zieh verdeeld, samengevoegd of 
hebben nieuwe nederzettingen gevormd. Tegelijkertijd echter heeft het instittrüo-
nele ejido-model zoals dat door de Staat werd aangereikt in de praktijk ingrijpende 
veranderingen ondergaan. Landtoewijzing volgens 'van bovenaf bepaalde spelre-
gels ging gepaard met processen van toe-eigening 'van onderaf. 
Dit wordt vooral duidelijk als we de manier waarop landbezit binnen de gemeen-
schappen in het gebied is georganiseerd, onder de loep nemen. Zo heb ik bijvoor-
beeld vastgesteld dat de dorpen hun eigen lijsten met ejiio-leden (ejidatarios) of 
rèchthebbenden (derecheros) opstelden die in wisselende mate verschilden van de 
officiële registers. Ook werden landrechten op relatief autonome wijze toegewezen 
of ge-herdefinieerd, volgens criteria die voor een deel overeenkwamen met de wette-
lijke kaders, maar daar voor een deel ook van afweken. In de praktijk hebben de 
gemeenschappen een behoorlijke besHssingsmacht weten te ontwikkelen, zowel wat 
l^ndbezit betreft als op andere terreinen. Deze macht wordt uitgeoefend ten aanzien 
v^n de eigen leden, maar ook tegenover het bureaucratische apparaat van het minis-
tfrie van landhervorming. Op allerlei manieren hebben de gemeenschappen de 
wettelijke beslissingsbevoegdheid van dit apparaat wat betreft landverdeling binnen 
hlun grenzen, betwist. De regulering van grondeigendom blijkt een heftig betwist 
terrein te zijn, waarop niet alleen verschillende en soms tegenstrijdige defmities van 
bezit tegenover elkaar worden uitgespeeld maar ook verschillende aanspraken op 
beslissingsbevoegdheid tegen over elkaar komen te staan. Ik illustreer dit aan de 
hand van een conflict tussen twee fâches in een dorp. 
Recentelijk is het verzet tegen inmenging van de Staat uitgesprokener geworden 
dan ooit tevoren en ingebed in een politiek project. Dit moet begrepen worden tegen 
de achtergrond van het fenomeen dat met de voortschrijdende politisering van 
staatsinterventies in de jaren 70, politieke identiteiten steeds meer zijn geformu-
leerd in oppositie tegen de Staat. Sinds 1994 heeft de Zapatista-beweging de grenzen 
aan de macht van de Staat pijnlijk duidelijk gemaakt. Het meest duidelijke voorbeeld 
daarvan vormen de talrijke landbezettingen die de overheid hebben gedwongen 
feitelijk een nieuwe ronde van landtoewijzing te erkennen, alle offidële verklaringen 
over het definitieve einde van de landhervorming ten spijt. Bovendien slagen de 
Zapatistas er met de zogenaamde autonome gemeentes in de Staat op een behoor-
lijke afstand te houden. 
De processen zoals ze hier beschreven zijn beheizen een zekere paradox, die des 
te sterker is als we ze bezien vanuit het perspectief, ontwikkeld door Mexicaanse 
auteurs sinds de jaren 70, dat landhervormingen in essentie een middel tot over-
heidscontrole zijn. Hoewel dit perspectief terecht het belang van geheime agenda's 
in de landtoewijzing heeft benadrukt, is het niet in Staat te verklaren hoe de land-
hervorming enerzijds zo succesvol heeft kunnen zijn (in de vorming van ejidos) en 
anderzijds zo duidelijk heeft gefaald (in het onder contrôle houden daarvan). O m 
deze paradox het hoofd te bieden moeten we een ander perspectief ontwikkelen dat 
meer ruimte geeft aan de vele strijdpunten die landhervorming omgeven. Récente 
werken over processen van staatsvorming in Mexico zijn wat dit betreft veelbelo-
vend. Vanuit het perspectief van staatsvorming kunnen we landhervormingen 
begrijpen als pogingen van de centrale overheid haar greep op nieuwe gebieden te 
verstärken, maar met wisselend succès. Vanuit deze invalshoek kunnen we 
verkennen hoe de Staat deze gebieden binnendringt, ingrijpt op bezits- en macht-
285 
verhoudingen, alsmede waar dit twistpunten en verzet oproept 
Processen van steatsvorming hebben een tweeledig karakter dat we ook bij land-
hervorming kunnen onderscheiden. Landhervorming grijpt in op lokale culturele 
en institionele repertoires en vormt deze ook mede. Daarmee reikt zij tegelijkertijd 
echter enkele van de centrale termen aan waar omheen verzet wordt vormgegeven. 
Vanuit dit gezichtspunt kunnen we beginnen de complexe sociale en politieke 
gevolgen van de vorming van ejidos in het onderzoeksgebied te begrijpen. Boven-
dien wijst het op de rol van staatsingrijpen zelf in de vorming van gemeenschappen 
die bij machte blijken zieh tegen de Staat te verzetten. 
Deze argumenten worden door het boek heen verder ontwikkeld, grofweg längs 
drie verhaallijnen. In de eerste plaats vertelt het boek het verhaal van een gemeen-
schap, San Miguel Chibtik. De pogingen van de Chibtikeros om het land waarop zij 
al generaties lang woonden en werkten in handen te krijgen, hoe zij dat land onder-
ling verdeelden en tenslotte hun betrokkenheid bij landbezettmgen in de nasleep 
van de Zapatista opstand, lopen als een rode draad door het boek. Deze gebeurte-
nissen vormen ook de aangrijpingspunten voor de analyse van drie nauw verbonden 
Processen in het onderzoeksgebied: de omvang van en de politieke verwikkelingen 
in de herverdeling van land (hoofdstukken Twee en Drie), de toewijzing en verän-
d e r n d e defmitie van landrechten binnen gemeenschappen (hoofdstukken Vier en 
Vijf) en recente landbezettmgen die onderdeel vormen van het politieke project van 
de Zapatistas (hoofdstukken Zes en Zeven). Dit vormt de tweede verhaallijn. 
Tenslotte kan dit boek gelezen worden als een verkerniing van de manieren waarop 
de Staat, via landhervorming, op het gebied heeft ingegrepen. Het biedt daarmee een 
blik op een van de belangrijkste routes waarlangs staatsvorming in dit deel van 
Chiapas heeft plaatsgevonden. Dit gezichtspunt, alsmede de overwegingen waarop 
het berust, worden uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk Acht. 
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